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Abstract of Thesis
The relevance of cultural history to the development of Karl Barth's
theology has been greatly undervalued. Taking a short term view, Barth's
development can be compared in detail with the modernist movements of
the early twentieth century, and in particular with the history of German
Expressionism; taking a longer view, Barth's theology can be seen as a
response to the failure of the Enlightenment project. These two perspectives,
moreover, yield complementary insights.
Barth's earliest ventures into theological print coincided with the emergence
of Expressionism; both were given direction by the First World War; both
achieved success in the immediate post-War period, while simultaneously
suffering significant disappointments; and in the early 1920s Expressionist
writers and artists turned away from their previous forms in an effort to
overcome their alienation from community, just as Barth turned away from
dialectical method in favour of a discourse situated in and directed to the
life of the Church. Barth's theology was effectively engaged in a dialogue
with the central ideas embodied in modernist movements like
Expressionism, and can be read as a development towards the dialectical
inversion of the core ideas of modernism.
Taking a longer view, though, both modernist culture and Barth's theology
can be illuminated by placing them against the history of the Enlightenment
and its aftermath. This is a history which has been analysed usefully by
Alasdair Maclntyre, particularly in After Virtue and subsequent publications.
In the light of Maclntyre's work, Barth's inversion of modernism appears
also to constitute an inversion of the ideas embodied in the social world
which emerged from the failure of the Enlightenment project.
This reading of Barth can be supplemented and expanded by attention to his
own analysis of the Enlightenment in his lectures on the background to and
history of modern Protestant theology. Barth argued there that modern
theology, down to and including his own time, had been shaped decisively
by the Enlightenment. Yet like Maclntyre after him he discerned a flaw
inherent in the project of Enlightenment, and believed that that project had
in fact failed. Barth's theology appears, in consequence, as the attempt to re¬
establish dogmatic theology among the ruins of Enlightenment pride.
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Introduction Placing Barth in Context
In his lectures on the history of modern Protestant theology, delivered in
Munster in the winter of 1929/30, Karl Barth gave some interesting advice to
anyone who wished to study the history of modern theology. They should,
he said, make "a synchronous chart for every single year of the period". It
should contain:
five columns: the first for entering the most important dates of world
history in general; the second for the most noteworthy events in the history
of culture, art and literature; the third for church history in general; the
fourth for the dates of birth and death of the most prominent theologians of
the period; and the fifth for the years in which their most important books
were published. Anyone who does this will see a mass of connexions/
This insistence on a connection between theology and its context in political,
cultural and ecclesiastical history is striking. It should not be thought, either,
that Barth paid only lip-service to such a connection: his own lectures on the
history of modern theology display a consistent and serious attention to
context. The earliest version of them, delivered in Munster in the summer
semester of 1926, included a section entitled "Chronik" which consisted of a
complete year by year list covering the period 1799 to 1926, and containing
information in all the categories mentioned above. This he apparently
dictated in full to the students, devoting two whole lectures and part of two
1 The lectures were delivered under the title "History of Protestant Theology since
Schleiermacher". A typescript of them is held in the Karl Barth-Archiv in Basel. This was
the second of three occasions on which Barth lectured on the history of modern theology.
The first had been in Munster in the summer semester of 1926. The third and final version
was prepared and delivered in Bonn in 1932/33. That third version, for the most part, is the
basis of the published text: Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert. Ihre Vorgeschichte
und ihre Geschichte. (Evangelischer Verlag AG., Zollikon/Ziirich, 1947). English translation
Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century. Its Background and History (SCM Press Ltd.,
London, 1972). Only the section on Gottfried Menken was published earlier, in a 1933
Festschrift for E.F.K. Muller. See Eberhard Busch Karl Barth: His lifefrom letters and
autobiographical texts (SCM, London, 1976), 222. The quotation here is from PT, pp. 25-6.
However, the history of the lectures is complex, and the published text appears in fact to be
a composite of the versions of 1929/30 and 1932/3. In particular Chapter 1 of the published
text, in which this quotation is found, comes from the 1929/30 lectures and appears not to
have been included in the Bonn lectures. I am indebted to Dr. Hinrich Stoevesandt of the
Karl Barth-Archiv on this point. He advises me that the Archiv holds a typescript of those
lectures written completely anew in 1932/33, (i.e. chapters 2-6 of the published text). In this
typescript the 1929/30 introduction has been replaced by a somewhat shorter introductory
section.
others to the task. 2 When Barth lectured on modern theology for the second
time, in 1929/30, he dropped this detailed table but included in his intro¬
duction the recommendation that students do this for themselves, as quoted
above. Moreover he then prefaced his lectures on theological history with
substantial discussions of Lessing, Kant, Herder, Novalis and Hegel. When
he lectured on the subject for a third time, in Bonn in 1932/33, he prefaced
all this material with a lengthy discussion of the Eighteenth century,
including its political, social and cultural history, and its general attitude to
religion and the church, as well as the history of its theology. The result, in
the published version, is a book in which the background to modern
theology is given almost twice as much space as the theology itself.
This suggests, among other things, that Barth was serious about the relation
between theology and a wider historical context. My intention in this thesis
is to follow him in taking this relation seriously - while studying Barth's
own theology. I wish to set Barth's theology against the context of a wider,
non-theological history. The context which I will be concerned with in the
first instance is the cultural life of the period in which his early theological
development took place: roughly the years 1910-25. In German speaking
culture, the dominant feature of these years was the birth, development and
decline of the diverse movements known collectively as Expressionism. 3 The
first part of this thesis will therefore examine the relevance of Expressionism
2 See the manuscript of these lectures, held by the Karl Barth-Archiv, Basel. Barth's
marginal dates suggest that he spent part of the lecture of 6th May, all of the lectures of 7th
and 10th May, and part of the lecture of 11th May on this section.
3 Some relation between Expressionism and Barth's theology has long been recognized. In
his invaluable study Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie, (Verlag Jacob
Hegner, Koln, 1951), Hans Urs von Balthasar described the second edition of Barth's
Romans as "theological expressionism". ET: The Theology of Karl Barth trans. Edward T.
Oakes, (Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1992). The reference is to p. 83. A more recent
example is Richard H. Roberts: "The parallels between Barth's early post-war writings and
Expressionism are considerable; whilst this affinity has been noted, this would merit fuller
comparative study." From "Barth and the Eschatology of Weimar: A Theology on itsWay?"
in A Theology on its Way? Essays on Karl Barth (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1991), 172, note 11.
There are several brief discussions of the relation in the literature. See for example Werner
M. Ruschke Entstehung und Ausfiihrung der Diastasentheologie in Karl Barths zweitem
'Romerbrief (Neukirchener Verlag, Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1987), 155-8; Stephen H. Webb Re-
Figuring Theology: The Rhetoric ofKarl Barth (State University of New York Press, Albany,
1991), 8-18. As Webb has pointed out (p. 185), the literature on Expressionism is almost
devoid of references to Barth, but one useful exception is Wolfgang Rothe Der
Expressionismus: theologische, soziologische und anthropologische Aspekte einer Literatur (Vittorio
Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1977), 43-7.
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as context for the development of Barth's theology.
A wider perspective on cultural history is also necessary, though, not least
because Expressionism itself was part of a larger history. German culture
during the early part of this century was by no means isolated from
developments throughout Europe; nor was it unconnected with earlier
German cultural history. To understand Expressionism in any depth it is
necessary to see it both as part of a wider wave of modernist movements in
Europe, and also to appreciate the ways in which it was the product of
characteristically German cultural traditions, going back through
Romanticism to the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment. To consider
Barth's relation to his immediate cultural context, then, leads inevitably into
a study of his relation to these wider histories. It leads to a study of the
relation between Barth's theology and modernist movements in general;
and, taking a longer view, to a study of his relation to the Enlightenment -
its projects, its achievements, its failures and its legacy.
Such a project would, of course, be perfectly legitimate in principle even if
Barth himself had displayed no interest in the relation between theology and
other areas of social and cultural life. Its propriety in no way depends on his
aum view of the relation between theology and culture. Yet his attitude,
quoted above, is important. It suggests at very least that to study Barth's
theology in relation to culture is not to prejudge its worth. To argue that
there existed a significant relation between Barth's theology and its cultural
context is not necessarily to devalue it. This point needs to be emphasized,
since it is often assumed that the opposite obtains. Many commentators on
Barth, conscious of his stress on the distinctness of theology's task and
criterion, are given to emphasizing the purely theological roots of his
thinking. T.F. Torrance, for example, discussing the formative influences on
Barth's break with liberal theology, identifies the primary factor as his
discovery of "the new world within the Bible, as week by week he ploughed
over the ground in careful laborious exegesis".4 Torrance expands on this by
depicting Barth as sifting out the Word of God from any social or cultural
influences:
4 T.F. Torrance Karl Barth: an Introduction to his Early Theology 1910-31 (SCM Press Ltd.,
London, 1962), 34.
3
He was determined to hear the Word of God out of itself, as it came straight
from above, unfettered by a masterful culture, uncontrolled by the needs
and satisfactions of bourgeois society, and before it had been sifted and
diluted by being passed through some general frame of thought already
worked out by modern man.5
The picture here is of Barth attempting to re-establish theology on the basis
of the Word of God, in distinction from those theologies which, under social
and cultural influence, lost sight of their true object. There is undoubtedly
some justification for such a picture. Barth did regard the entanglement of
modern theology with culture as one of its most significant errors. In his
lectures on modern theology (which constitute by far his most detailed and
sustained treatment of this theology) he develops the critique in
considerable detail. He suggests that the failures of modern theology stem
from the fact that it allowed itself to be shaped by social and cultural
developments, and that it thereby fell into a moralism in which theological
statements had only ethical content, even when they had dogmatic form.6
Such theology, he suggests, failed to perform its fundamental task of leading
and guiding the Church. Instead, the Church took its lead from the
prevailing culture, with theology dragging along in its wake, trying to be
contemporary but always in fact lagging behind the times.
The result, Barth said, was that in modern theology there was no clear
distinction between the advance of Christianity and the advance of modern
civilized culture. Of Schleiermacher he said:
By birth and upbringing in its innermost sanctuary his theology is cultural
theology: in religion itself which is the true object of his theology, it is the
exaltation of life in the most comprehensive sense, the exaltation, unfolding,
transfiguration, ennobling of the individual and social human life which is
at stake. Civilization as the triumph of the spirit over nature is the most
peculiar work of Christianity, just as the quality of being a Christian is for
its own part the crown of a thoroughly civilized consciousness. The
kingdom of God, according to Schleiermacher, is utterly and unequivocally
identical with the advance of civilization.7
Schleiermacher and the nineteenth century in general were not engaged in
5 Torrance op. cit. 35.
6 This argument is described in detail in chapters 5 and 6 below.
7 Barth, FT, 434-5.
mystical theology but cultural theology.8 The theology of the period was
characterized, Barth says, by its "unqualified and direct affirmation of
modern cultural consciousness" .9 This is the heart of Barth's view of modern
theology. It was a theology which allowed contemporary cultural conscious¬
ness to have an independent validity over and against any criterion which
Christian theology itself might have. It was therefore unable to find room for
the possibility that there might, in Barth's words, be a "secret of Christianity
at some point beyond all culture". 10
Barth's criticism of those theologies which get entangled with culture was
severe. However, it has to be noted that he could not have made any such
criticism had he not studied the theology of the modern period in the
context of the development of "modern cultural consciousness". His
diagnosis of the failures of modern Protestant theology, in these lectures,
comes after a detailed discussion of the cultural and intellectual life of the
Enlightenment and its aftermath, and of its influence upon the life of the
Church and on theology. And what Barth objected to was not that modern
theology was interested in modern cultural consciousness, or related to it, but
that it tended to identify Christianity with the development of that
consciousness. He did not expect the theologians of the 18th and 19th
centuries to remain untouched by their times, but he did expect them to
retain some notion of their own distinctive task and criterion.
There is of course a very strong echo here, in Barth's historical writing, of his
own theological views. This is as important as it it unsurprising. For his
willingness to recognize the connection between theology and a wider
context was no idiosyncrasy of his historical writing. His theological views
enable and demand a recognition of the limited and relative character of all
theology. While Barth was concerned to maintain that Christian theology
was a form of enquiry with a quite distinctive task and criterion, he was
equally concerned to remind theology that it was and is always a historical,
human activity. It ought never to imagine that it can grasp or possess its
8 It was as a consequence of this analysis that Barth was so critical of Emil Bruriner's
interpretation of Schleiermacher in DieMystic und das Wort, of 1924. See 'Brunners
Schleiermacherbuch' in Zwischen den Zeiten 2 (1924), 49-64.
9 Barth, FT, 437.
10 Ibid. 435.
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criterion - the Word of God - and thereby elevate itself above the rest of
human history - social, political, cultural, and intellectual. This is evident in,
amongst other things, Barth's view of the relation between theology and
philosophy. His view was not, as is sometimes suggested, that theology
should or could cut itself off entirely from philosophy. It was, rather, that
theology should never be captive to or subject to a philosophy. It must make
use of it as it can; but such use ought always to be in the light of its
fundamental awareness of its own distinctive nature. Theology cannot avoid
dealing with philosophy. What matters is how it deals with it.11 Similarly, his
argument in Protestant Theology was not that theologians in the eighteenth
century should or could have avoided the influence of the Enlightenment
altogether. The point he wanted to put to them was that they should have
been able at the same time to keep sight of their own particular aims and
norms. 12
So for all his stress on the distinctiveness of Christian theology, Barth was in
fact able to be remarkably frank about the historical conditioning of
theological reflection. An important statement of this was in his preface to
the fifth edition of his commentary on Romans. Responding to critics who
had noted the book's debts to other authors, Barth asks the following:
Am I after all merely one of those bad theologians who are no more than
servants of public opinion? ... Have they [Barth's readers] been presented
with what is really no more than a rehash, resurrected out of Nietzsche and
Kierkegaard and Cohen? If this be what has actually occurred I must accept
judgement and recognize that I am just the author of—a bestseller. But why
should this not be the truth? And even if it were not true, no credit would
be due to me or to my book.
11 Barth summed his view up neatly: "There is choice irony on God's part. He tells us: Since
you have philosophy in you, well, have it and do your best... ! But on condition that your
philosophy does not prevent you from being disciples." See Busch, Karl Barth, 300. From
The Faith of the Church: a commentary on the Apostles' Creed according to Calvin's Catechism ed.
Jean-Louis Leuba, trans. G. Vahanian, (Collins, London, 1960), 27-8. Von Balthasar put this
as follows, in defending Barth from the charge of philosophism: "He [Barth] knows, and he
has repeated it often, that every theologian has no choice but to work with human concepts
and thought forms. ... He has made use of them, not as a philosophy per se, but as a
helpmate for theological work, transposing them and submitting them to a necessary
critique, sterilizing the instruments before using them in his theological operations....
Everything depends on the discretion with which theologians know how to handle their
instruments." The Theology ofKarl Barth, 218-9.
12 See Barth, PT, 139.
Acknowledging this possibility, then, Barth makes the following point:
It may be that every criticism implied in the former reflection is justified,
and yet that nevertheless, in spite of much arrogance and wrong-
headedness, aye, even in the midst of it, something has been brought out
into the open through what has been observed and said in this book—as it
were by forensic justification. 13
The justification of a theology is never that it is immune to public opinion or
to the influence of the times and their prominent spokesmen: but nor, then,
does such influence invalidate a work. To study such influences may aid
understanding, but it cannot justify dismissal of the work any more than it
can justify the work itself.14
I can now, perhaps, make the nature of this thesis a little clearer. First of all,
it does not intend to engage in reductionism, attempting to explain away
Barth's theology as a product of contingent historical circumstances which
may or may not obtain any longer. Nor does it begin from determinist
premises, such that Barth could do nothing other than re-transmit the voices
that rose to the surface at that particular moment in cultural history. On the
contrary I am aiming at a better theological understanding of Barth. There is
no parting of the ways, where students of theological and non-theological
history must adopt distinct and incompatible presuppositions or methods.
The student of Barth's theology who wishes to consider its wider context
faces no impassable border - not least because Barth himself recognized no
such impassable border.
!3 Romans II, 22-3.
14 It is worth noting that similar affirmations can be found in the Church Dogmatics. See for
example CD 1/2,802-803: "Church teaching always exists in specific forms, i.e., in
sequences of thoughts and ideas which specifically choose, emphasize and underline, or
again deny and suppress. If all is well the one aim of these sequences is to explain and
apply Holy Scripture, and therefore to proclaim the divine revelation. But in concreto they
always owe their origin and persistence to the specific currents of Church life (conditioned
by the general historical situation), which emanate from the concrete personality of
individual preachers and the character of their congregations." Or again at p. 884: "But not
even for a moment can we forget that, when and in so far as we do think and speak the
truth in Church proclamation and dogmatics, it is God himself and alone who, using man
as his servant, and without incurring any obligation to him, has actually thought His
thoughts and spoken His word. It is only in this modesty that we do think and speak the
truth. And this modesty includes the realization that in God's light we are shown to be
darkness, in God's judgement we are exposed as liars, and that we shall think and speak the
truth always against our own selves."
Chapters 1 and 2 will provide the initial material on the basis of which the
relation between Barth's theology and its cultural context can be assessed.
Chapter 1 will discuss Barth's theological development beginning around
1909, passing through his break with liberalism in 1915, and going as far as
his Elgersburg lecture in October 1922. Chapter 2 will discuss Expressionism
including its relation to its contexts in both German society and modernism
more widely. On the basis of the material in these two chapters, Chapter 3
will consider the connection between Barth's theology and Expressionism,
and therefore its relation to cultural modernism in general. Chapter 4 will
extend this discussion to consider Barth's relation the Enlightenment and its
legacy, with particular reference to the account of the Enlightenment
developed by Alasdair Maclntyre in After Virtue and more recent works.
Chapters 5 and 6 will consider in detail Barth's own understanding of the
Enlightenment and its aftermath, in his lectures on modern Protestant
theology.
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Chapter 1 Theology in crisis: Earth's development 1909 - 1922.
i. Barth's development and the quest for the "insight of the beginning".
In so far as there is a standard view of the development of Karl Barth's
theology, it is the one commonly associated with Hans Urs von Balthasar's
1951 study Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie. This view
emphasizes two significant turning points in Barth's theology: his initial
turn away from liberal theology in the aftermath of the outbreak of War in
1914, and his "great shift ... from dialectics to analogy",1 associated
primarily with Barth's book on Anselm published in 1931. Von Balthasar
says: "Just as Augustine underwent two conversions, the one from gross
error to the true God and to Christianity and the other (much later) from the
religious Neoplatonism of his early writings to an authentic theology, so too
in Barth we may find two decisive turning points."2 Of the second of these,
the shift from dialectics to analogy, von Balthasar says: "The first work to
document this change in his [Barth's] thinking was his book on Anselm's
proofs of the existence of God, which he himself has called the real
manifesto of his departure from his first period."3
More recently, some scholars have argued that this picture, and particularly
the suggestion of a turn from dialectic to analogy around 1930, is
inadequate. There are three main elements involved in this reassessment.
First, there have been doubts about the identification of the Anselm book,
and therefore of the year 1930, as the location of a decisive turn; there has
been a suspicion that significant changes took place in Barth's thinking
during the twenties. The publication of Barth's dogmatics lectures from
Gottingen has reinforced this questioning, suggesting that he had begun to
1 Von Balthasar, The Theology ofKarl Barth, 137.
2 Ibid. 93.
3 Ibid. 137. The reference is to Fides Quaerens Intellectum (Chr. Kaiser Verlag, Zurich, 1931).
ET: Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum: Anselm's Proofof the Existence ofGod in the Context of
his Theological Scheme (SCM Press, London, 1960).
9
depart from the 'dialectical' theology of the second Romans as early as 1924.4
Secondly, a number of doubts have been raised about the appropriateness of
the designation of Barth's development after the second Romans as a turn
"from dialectics to analogy." Bruce McCormack, in his recent study Karl
Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, classifies the problems with this
view under four headings.5 First, the formula of a turn from dialectic to
analogy is misleading because more than one thing in Barth's thought can
be designated by the term 'dialectic'. Second, and more importantly, the
analogia fidei is itself an inherently dialectical concept, grounded in the
dialectic of veiling and unveiling in revelation. Third, dialectic and analogy
are not comparable categories. When von Balthasar spoke of a turn away
from dialectic he had in mind the dialectical form or method of Barth's
theology in the early 1920s. But the analogia fidei was not a theological
method of this sort.6 Fourth, McCormack argues that to describe Barth's
development in terms of a turn from dialectic to analogy privileges form
over content; it therefore ignores the shift which McCormack wishes to
emphasize, from the predominance of eschatology to the predominance of
Christology.
The third aspect of the challenge to the standard view is the most important,
though, for it presents a more radical alternative. It doubts whether it is
correct at all to speak of a second decisive shift in Barth's theology,
4 Doubts had existed about the 'standard view' even before the Gottingen dogmatics came
to the awareness of scholars. See for example Eberhard Jiingel's important article of 1982
'Von der Dialektik zur Analogie: Die Schule Kierkegaards und der Einspruch Petersons', in
Barth-Studien (Benziger Verlag, Zurich and Koln, and Gutersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn,
Giitersloh, 1982), 127-79. Two volumes of the Gottingen lectures have been published in the
Gesamtausgabe as 'Unterricht in der christlichen Religion', i. Prolegomena, 1924 ed. H. Reiffen,
(TVZ, Zurich, 1985), and 'Unterricht in der christlichen Religion', ii. Die Lehre von Gott/Die
Lehre vom Menschen, 1924/1925 ed. H. Stoevesandt, (TVZ, Zurich, 1990). English translation
of vol. i. and part of vol. ii, The Gottingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion vol.1
trans. G.W. Bromiley, (Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids), 1991.
5 Bruce L. McCormack Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and
Development 1909-1936 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). See pp. 16-20.
6 To this extent itmight have been less misleading to speak of a turn from dialectic to
dogmatic method.
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comparable with his break with liberalism in 1915.7 Barth's development, it
is suggested, involved nothing which could be thought of as a second
conversion: it should be seen, rather, as a gradual process in which Barth, in
various ways, struggled to give expression to an essentially unchanging core
conviction. McCormack regards this as a new view of Barth's development,
and attributes a good deal of the credit for it to Ingrid Spieckermann's 1985
study Gotteserkenntnis: Ein Beitrag zur Grundfrage der neuen Theologie Karl
Barths 8 Spieckermann sees Barth's development after 1915 as "a more or less
continuous unfolding of a single material insight or intention".9 The picture
then is of continuing developments, but no radical shifts, no change of
direction comparable with the initial break. It emphasizes both the
continuity between the different phases of Barth's thought, and the gradual
nature of its development throughout his life. The important thing about
this type of account of Barth's development is its implication that there is in
all of Barth's post-1915 theology an essentially constant core, an initial
insight that lay at the heart of his theological revolution, and indeed of his
later dogmatic theology. If this is in fact the case, then the identification and
description of this core is clearly one of the most important tasks for
students of any aspect of Barth's work.
Before going on to consider this issue, though, it should be noted that the
view of Barth's development as a "more or less continuous unfolding of a
single material insight or intention" is not as new as McCormack suggests.
Such a model in fact appears in von Balthasar's study, written some 35 years
earlier. To this extent McCormack's criticisms of the standard view of
Barth's development are aimed largely at the wrong target. He fails to
acknowledge that von Balthasar, despite his talk of a second "decisive
turning point" and his association of this with the Anselm book, actually
7 It should be pointed out that McCormack's arguments, which are on the whole accurate,
do not establish that there was no second decisive shift in Barth's thought: they simply
establish that it is inadequate to speak of such a shift as being from dialectic to analogy.
They suggest two alternative descriptions of a turning point, in fact: a shift in method, from
dialectic to dogmatic form; and a shift in content, from eschatology to Christology. What is
not established so far is whether these shifts are gradual or sudden, or indeed whether they
are major or minor changes in direction.
8 Ingrid Spieckermann Gotteserkenntnis: Ein Beitrag zur Grundfrage der neuen Theologie Karl
Barths (Chr. Kaiser Verlag, Miinchen, 1985).
9 McCormack, CRDT, 9. See Spieckermann, ibid. 72-82.
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offered a much more subtle and nuanced account than such phrases suggest
when abstracted from their context. In fact the origin of the 'standard view'
probably owed more to Barth's own retrospective descriptions of his
development than to von Balthasar. The latter certainly, like most scholars of
the time, was poorly informed about some aspects of the history of Barth's
writings.1° He lacked any knowledge of Barth's first dogmatics lectures in
Gottingen, for example; on such points recent writers have been able to
supplement and correct his account. But his talk of two "decisive turning
points" should not be taken out of context; it was strongly qualified by its
occurrence in the course of an account which affirmed the gradual nature of
Barth's development, and which emphasized the considerable continuity
underlying different stages of development. For example the quotation
above comparing Barth's shifts to Augustine's conversions is followed
closely in the text by the comment that Barth's second conversion "took
place after a nearly ten-year struggle, sometime around 1930".n Later he
notes that "Barth did not suddenly replace dialectics with analogy. We
cannot isolate any one particular text as the sign of this shift, for it happened
gradually. ... Our watchword must be 'development' ".12 Only in the late
1940s does this change really bear fruit fully in the Church Dogmatics, he
suggests. So while von Balthasar does talk of Barth's second conversion, on
closer examination he qualifies this considerably. Strictly speaking, he sees it
as a process which began around 1920 and continued for perhaps thirty
years.
As for the continuity underlying the different stages of Barth's development,
von Balthasar had this to say early on:
It is now quite clear that the material content of his [Barth's] Church
Dogmatics is radically different from his earlier writings. But can the same
10 There was of course no Barth Archive in 1951, nor a Gesamtausgabe. Having access to
the living Karl Barth was perhaps a poor substitute, so far as accurate historical information
about his earlier work was concerned!
H Von Balthasar op. cit. 93.1 have, however, followed McCormack's translation (see CRDT,
p. 1) on this one occasion as Oakes' rendering is misleading. The important point, though, is
von Balthasar's recognition that Barth's development throughout the whole decade of the
twenties involved a struggle to liberate himself from previous thought-forms, a process
which issued in and was completed by the clarification he felt he had achieved in his study
of Anselm. The Anselm book is therefore linked to a long-term process of development.
12 Ibid. 107.
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be said of the formal principles of this theology? This is a question to which
we will have to return, but we can say for the moment that the answer must
be No. Despite the far-reaching evolution of his work, Barth has remained
true to his own deepest intuitions. The insight of the beginning has been
maintained through all the vicissitudes of his career. True, this insight has
found numerous and various conceptual and verbal expressions over the
years, with earlier foundations partially scoured and cleaned; but as this
image implies, it was all for the purpose of clarifying, purifying and
preserving his original intuition. If we assume this is true, our first task will
be to look for the enduring constants supporting the whole of Barthian
theology. We must search for the ultimate intuition, the deepest passion
that animates him, that fiery vision that has set loose such an immense
work and had such an impact.13
This picture of Barth's development as a process of finding new ways of
expressing an original and constant intuition is indeed operative throughout
the book. For example the conclusion of von Balthasar's discussion of
Barth's dialectical period is that the second Romans did not and could not
say what Barth had wanted it to say. The shift that followed was necessary
to enable the expression of the same intuition which dialectical theology had
tried to give voice to.!4 Later again von Balthasar says that the bell which
had resounded in the second Romans "carried such force that it would
continue to echo in everything that Barth would later write. The ultimate
purpose of so prophetic a thinker and preacher could never really
change."15 Interpreters who argue against talk of a second "decisive turning
point" in Barth's theology, in favour of continuity and gradual
development, may in fact find that they have been anticipated or even
outdone by von Balthasar.16
Von Balthasar's high estimation of the continuity between different stages of
Barth's thought therefore confirms the importance of the question already
identified: what was the fundamental intuition, the "insight of the
beginning" that lay at the heart of all Barth's theology? What was the
13 Von Balthasar, op. cit. 24-5.
!4 Ibid. 85.
15 Ibid. 168. Also important in this connection is the short chapter "On Interpreting Barth"
(59-63) which lays out von Balthasar's determination to relate Barth's earlier and later work
reciprocally.
16 I have not yet mentioned, either, what is perhaps his most radical acknowledgment of
the continuity between the different stages of Barth's theology. I mean by this his opinion
that the central lines of Barth's theology can be found in significant measure in his
publications prior to his conscious break with liberal theology, in 1915. This is discussed in
more detail in the next section.
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enduring constant that Barth sought all his life to express? Von Balthasar's
initial answer to this question is to describe it as a passion which: "if we
were to give ... [it] a name, we could not do other than call it Barth's
consuming zeal for God".17 On its own, this is perhaps rather opaque.
However it is offered merely as the marker for further explanation, which
von Balthasar goes on promptly to provide. His first explanation is that this
zeal is what Barth sought to express in his adoption of Kierkegaard's
"infinite qualitative distinction". Implied in it then is a sense of the
distinction between God and creation. Its early expression took the form of
"a relativizing of everything that was not divine".18 This sense of creaturely
relativity was never dropped, though. Von Balthasar summarizes the view
of Barth's mature theology: "Even creaturely truth and goodness and beauty
are relative: they come from God and return to him. In themselves they have
no consistency, no power, no meaning, no existence.'T9
God's absoluteness and creaturely relativity: these are the form of Barth's
zeal.20 The development from Romans to Church Dogmatics was necessary
because God's absoluteness tended in the earlier work to threaten to
annihilate the creature. The later work expressed God's absoluteness as
absolute love, in which God's Yes and No, judgement and grace, are both
located. For this reason, the key to Barth's mature theology, and therefore to
all his theology, is his doctrine of predestination. The relativity of the
creature and the absoluteness of God are able to be affirmed only when
God's absoluteness is understood as love, in which his election and rejection
of the creature are both grounded. Therefore "seen in the perspective of
revelation, the doctrine of election is the summa evangelii ... It is the key for
understanding all of God's revelation in creation, reconciliation and
redemption".21 In this regard too von Balthasar affirms the continuity of
Barth's thought. He says of volume II/2 of the Church Dogmatics, which
deals with this doctrine, "Without doubt, it is the most magnificent, unified
17 Von Balthasar, op. cit. 168.
18 Ibid. 169.
10 Ibid. 169.
20 It is worth noting that McCormack's answer to the question of the original intuition
animating Barth's theology is essentially the same, even if he uses a different formula. See
CRDT, 134: he offers the Barthian phrase "God is God" as the key, explaining its
significance as indicating "the sharp distinction ... between God and humankind".
21 Von Balthasar, op. cit. 174.
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and well-grounded section of the whole work. Written with the greatest
love, it is the heartbeat of his whole theology".22 But he also at the same time
affirms the early origin of Barth's distinctive view of election, stating that it
was fully formed even in the first edition of Romans.
ii. Barth's earliest theology: 1909 -1914.
One of the most important aspects of von Balthasar's answer has not yet
been addressed, however. I am referring to his discussion of the principal
theological writings Barth published prior to his break with liberalism. That
von Balthasar should have turned to these writings is not in itself surprising:
the question of the "insight of the beginning" inevitably implies an
investigation of Barth's theological beginnings. The presentation of Barth's
theological development as a gradual unfolding of an essentially constant
theme calls for study of the initial break in which this theme emerged, and
of the theology that preceded that break.23 What is surprising, perhaps, is
that von Balthasar finds Barth's zeal well rooted in the early material. He
says:
The publications of this time (up until about 1916) show, of course, that he
[Barth] was in the mainstream of the then-prevailing liberal theology. But,
remarkably enough, many of the outlines of his later writings are clearly
discernible.24
In order to appreciate the grounds of von Balthasar's claim, it is necessary to
consider the views which the young Barth espoused, and their context in the
theological and philosophical landscape of the period. The most important
context for Barth's first theology was the Marburg neo-Kantianism of Paul
Natorp and Hermann Cohen, and the theological appropriation of this by
22 Von Balthasar, op. cit. 174.
23 It is not surprising that the new emphasis on this model in recent scholarship has been
accompanied by renewed interest in Barth's earliest writings. See for example McCormack,
CRDT, 68-77 and 104-7; Spieckermann Gotteserkenntnis, 21f.; Cornelis van der Kooi
Anfangliche Theologie Der Denkweg des jungen Karl Barth (Chr. Kaiser Verlag, Miinchen, 1987),
21-61; Steven G. Smith The Argument to the Other: Reason beyond Reason in the Thought ofKarl
Barth and Emmanuel Levinas (Scholars Press, California, 1983), 13-20; Simon Fisher Revelatory
Positivism? Barth's Earliest Theology and the Marburg School (O.U.P., Oxford, 1988), 170 ff; and,
a little earlier, George Hunsinger in Hunsinger (ed.) Karl Barth and Radical Politics
(Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1976), 192-198.
24 Von Balthasar, op. cit. 210.
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Barth's teacher Wilhelm Herrmann.25 Cohen, like Kant before him,
envisaged philosophy as a discipline which could provide a secure
grounding for scientific knowledge by carrying out a critique of thought. He
followed Kant in adopting a transcendental method, but departed radically
from Kant in his understanding and employment of this. The distinction is
clearest, perhaps, in neo-Kantianism's refusal to accept Kant's split between
the noumenal and the phenomenal. Cohen, following in the footsteps of post-
Kantian idealism, regarded Kant's notion of the Ding an sich, the thing-in-
itself, as unacceptable; if we have no knowledge of the thing as such, lying
behind our perception of it, then the positing of such things-in-themselves is
unjustifiable. They become an "ontological quirk and an epistemological
monstrosity". 26 Cohen's transcendental method therefore insisted on a
complete identification of being with knowledge: to be is is to be thought,
and also to be known. "Being, he [Cohen] suggested, achieves existence by
becoming thought, and the two are held together by a dynamic, never
ending, process of knowing. "27 Being has its origin in the judging activity of
the mind: "Cohen's theory of judgement could well be termed a generative
theory of judgement. ... When thought judges it produces knowledge and
being."28 As Fisher notes this gives it an originary power analogous to
traditional notions of divine creation ex nihilo:
In several writings Kant contrasted human cognition with the sort of
intellectual cognition which, according to the rationalist schools,
characterizes the mind of the maker. The former was called by Kant intuitus
derivativus, since human knowledge depends upon there being something
in existence for it to discover and, by implication, upon empirical intuition.
Divine intuition, being intuitus originarius, is not so dependent. It is
originarius because it creates the objects of its knowledge ex nihilo or from its
own thought. With Cohen's philosophy human thought becomes originarius
in that it is creative and productive. 29
25 A useful account of neo-Kantianism, of Hermann's theology, and their relevance for
Barth's early theology is Simon Fisher's Revelatory Positivism? What follows is indebted to
his treatment.
26 Fisher, Revelatory Positivism?, 34. Cohen did not, however, reject the concept of the
noumenon altogether, but reinterpreted it as a law through which we understand
experience. A useful account of this is given in John Lyden's article "The Influence of
Hermann Cohen on Karl Barth's Dialectical Theology', in Modern Judaism 12 (1992), 168 f.




One problem for neo-Kantianism, though, was the question of how to treat
religion. The Marburg critique of thought divided knowledge into logic,
ethics and aesthetics. If religion was to be accounted for and grounded, in
this system, it presumably would have to be under one of these three
headings. Cohen's early writings attempted to deal with religion under the
category of ethics.30 Natorp, however, resisted the urge to subsume religion
under one of the three categories, embracing instead a theory of religious
feeling as the "inaccessible source of everything that makes personal
experience authentically human". 31 Neither solution allowed religion any
independent ground outwith the prescribed categories of knowledge.
As Fisher notes, Wilhelm Herrmann, who taught theology at Marburg from
1879 to 1917, was in large measure a Ritschlian. His theology was shaped by
the Ritschlian dualism between Natur and Geist, by its rejection of
metaphysical speculation about the ontological status of objects of
experience, and by its Melanchthonian epistemology, in which God is
known in the benefits of Christ in the believer. His response to Marburg
neo-Kantianism was to insist on the autonomy of religion, the impossibility
of accounting for it by a system of scientific knowledge. It deals, he argued,
with a reality "of a totally different order from anything encountered by
philosophy or Wissenschaft"32 Fisher describes this as a dualism of faith,
going against the monism of Marburg philosophy. Herrmann's work,
though strongly influenced by neo-Kantianism, constituted a robust
dialogue with his philosopher colleagues. It insisted that religion involves
an actual experience of divine reality, which cannot be treated as an
objectless feeling nor subsumed under the categories of logic, ethics and
aesthetics. What is decisive in the realm of religion is the individual's
experience of God in faith, in the event of revelation; and as such, religion is
immune from the critical powers of scientific philosophy.
Herrmann's acceptance of neo-Kantianism could not be uncritical; in fact it
reversed the direction of its epistemology: "Instead of thought generating
reality from the tasks it sets itself, faith, being an experience in which
30 See Fisher, op. cit. 73. See also Lyden, op. cit. 171.
31 Fisher, ibid. 73.
32 Ibid. 135.
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something real is given and known, generates conceptual forms for
expressing the new reality it has encountered."33 Herrmann therefore
regarded conceptualizations of religious faith as expressions of individual
experience. The truth and meaning of such conceptualizations are therefore
tied to the experience, and are not matters of knowledge of a type which
could be subjected to scientific scrutiny. They are not laws of religious truth
but "personal testimonies of religious experience".34 This, of course, leaves
theology in something of an ambiguous position. How is theology possible
as a discipline with any general validity if its statements are tied to
individual experience? Herrmann, perhaps inevitably, developed a dualism
here to match his dualism of faith: theology is to be seen as a heterogeneous
discipline, with its own kind of validity.
This, then, is the theological and intellectual context which had the strongest
effect on the young Barth. The last semester of his student years was spent
in Marburg in 1908, and he stayed on for a further year as assistant to the
editor of Die Christliche Welt, Martin Rade. His first important venture into
theological print was in an article written in 1909, during his stay in
Marburg. Entitled "Moderne Theologie und Reichgottesarbeit", and
published in Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, it was promptly
supplemented by a further article in which Barth defended his views against
critical responses by E.C. Achelis and P. Drews, professors at Marburg and
Halle respectively.35 The background to the article was some recent
discussion of why so few graduates of faculties associated with modern
theology went into foreign mission work, compared with graduates of
theologically conservative faculties. Barth argued that modern theology,
lacking authoritative normative statements of faith, makes the transition into
pastoral work much harder for its students. This is something which Barth
thought required to be acknowledged and faced realistically. He was not
advocating a conservative position, though, nor saying that modern
theology makes students unable to undertake practical work. As Bruce
McCormack puts it, the essay "fairly bristles with Barth's sense of
33 Fisher, op. cit. 154-5.
34 Ibid. 155.
35 "Moderne Theologie und Reichgottesarbeit", in Zeitschriftfur Theologie und Kirche vol. 19,
(1909), 317-21 and 'Antwort an D. Achelis und D. Drews', ibid. 479-86.
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superiority to both those on the theological right ... and those modern
students on the left who jump ship at the first available opportunity".36
Barth was not, then, expressing doubts about liberal theology as such; on the
contrary he shows a sufficiently firm commitment to it to be able to see the
difficulties it implies for practical pastoral work, and yet to advocate it
enthusiastically.
Looking back on his university studies, Barth says that he takes two things
from them out into the world: "religious individualism and historical
relativism." Religious experience is necessarily individual. As such, Barth
denies that there is any objectifiable or demonstrable revelation which one
person could convey to another. But in and through its strictly personal
character, religious experience is an absolute standard. This means in
consequence that there is no absolute standard in historical or cultural
existence. The two principles of religious individualism and historical
relativism are linked. And the relativism is thorough. Barth says: "We apply
historical relativism to our own theology as well, and, when we compare it
to others, we see it as but one manifestation of the gospel alongside
others."37 In his subsequent defence of his views Barth quoted
Schleiermacher to support his view of religious experience: "Everywhere
our thoughts are the changeable epiphenomena behind which lies the inner
unchangeable reality that can never itself be conveyed as such."38 Von
Balthasar comments: "The whole of this first essay is dominated by the idea
of the radicalism of the nontangibility, the nonobjectivity of religious
reality. "39
The theological debts in this first essay are quite clearly to Herrmann, and to
the the latter's critical engagement with neo-Kantianism. Von Balthasar's
claim that Barth was in the mainstream of the prevailing liberal theology at
this time seems to be justified. What, though, about his suggestion that
important elements of Barth's later thought can be discerned? He is surely
correct here also. The primary theme of the essay is the combination of
36 McCormack, CRDT, 70.
37 Barth, MTR, 321. Quoted by von Balthasar, op. cit. 210.
38 Ibid. 482. Quoted by von Balthasar, op. cit. 210.
39 Von Balthasar, op. cit. 211.
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historical relativism and of a religious individualism, both of which arise
from the incommunicable quality of religious reality. Von Balthasar, it will
be recalled, described the combination of creaturely relativity and divine
absoluteness as the form of Barth's 'zeal'. It is not therefore an insignificant,
incidental aspect of Barth's later theology that is foreshadowed here, but
rather its very core. The 'insight of the beginning' is itself rooted in the
Herrmannian theology of the young Barth. This gives rise to a difficulty,
though. How can Barth's theological revolution, apparently so opposed to
the liberal theology of his teachers, have as its central insight something
rooted in that liberal theology? The answer to this is complex, and certainly
should include attention to the fact that the religious individualism of this
early essay was not preserved in the emphasis on divine absoluteness which
was characteristic of Barth's later theology. Also essential for a satisfactory
answer, though, is some recognition of the extent to which Barth's
Herrmannian theology was a restless theology, marked by tensions which
can be seen, with the benefit of hindsight, to have propelled him onwards
towards a quite different position.
To this extent it cannot be ignored that these essays, despite their
enthusiasm for a Herrmannian theological position, are preoccupied with
the problems which arise from that position. Chief among these is Barth's
recognition that practical pastoral and missionary work requires some
account of doctrine which can function as a norm for faith; without such a
norm practical work becomes a quite different and "incomparably more
difficult" task. These essays demonstrate Barth's remarkable sensitivity to
the practical problems that follow from a Herrmannian theology, with a
dualism between nature and religion and a consequent tension between
divine revelation and the relativity of all attempts to set out religious truth
in speech. This is not, I would repeat, to call into question Barth's
commitment to a Herrmannian theology. On the contrary the difficulties
that Barth highlights follow from his desire to be a consistent and honest
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follower of Herrmann's theology.40 But nonetheless it is remarkable that
Barth advocates a Herrmannian theology not as the solution to the problem
of how to live and speak as a Christian in the modern world, but as the
source of a problem about these things, a problem which he has no solution
for but whichmust be acknowledged and faced.
I am suggesting, then, that problems inherent in Herrmann's theology were
very much connected with Barth's subsequent theological development.
Two aspects of Herrmann's theology are particularly relevant. The first is
the extremity of the dualism it established between religious and scientific
knowledge. The second is the extraordinary weight that this dualism placed
on the possession of the requisite individual religious experience.
Herrmann's epistemological dualism amounted to an attempt to establish a
barrier behind which the corrosive powers of modern scientific and
philosophical criticism could not reach. The consequence of this dualism
was that the whole of the natural realm was handed over to scientific study
without reserve. No religious knowledge could be gained from the natural
sciences or from critical historical study. It could only come from a
revelation which "cannot be objectively explained, but ... can certainly be
experienced in man's own self, namely, in the non-objectifiable subjectivity
of the dark, defenceless depths in which we live the moment of
involvement".41 The narrowness and impassability of these boundaries
causes the problem: even the attempt to articulate religious experience in
words crosses the boundary, passing over into the realm of relativity. Barth
put it this way in his Antwort: "the normative, objective, eternal lies only in
40 McCormack is right to emphasise that Barth was fully committed to the liberal theology
of Herrmann, noting the comment in Barth's correspondence to Martin Rade that "the
picture of the perplexed candidate who [stands] at the edge of despair ... does not fit me".
(See CRDT, 70.) Fisher (see Revelatory Positivism? 173 and also 207, note 11) is also right to
reject the view that "the earliest writings of Barth represent a brief half-hearted flirtation
with a liberalism which meant very little to their author", a view which, he notes, has been
influential in Britain and America. Barth's immersion in Herrmann's theology, and in the
thought-world which gave rise to it, was deep; and his commitment to such a theology was
manifestly strong. What I am suggesting was that there were in this theology, as in all
theologies, certain tensions and problems; and that Barth was both particularly sensitive to
these and unusuallywilling to acknowledge and face them. In this regard, it is worth noting
that Barth stated, inthe concluding sentence of his Antwort, that "a theology which has life
within it not only tolerates but demands that its problems be recognized and openly
expressed." See Antwort, 386.
41 This is part of Jiirgen Moltmann's description of Herrmann in Theology ofHope trans. J.W.
Leitch, (SCM Press, London, 1967), 52. Quoted by Fisher op. cit. 145.
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the 'affection' of this inner experience. Everything which is set forth in
thoughts and words belongs itself once again to the relativizing stream of
history and is, as that which passes away, only a parable."42 A theology
which has as much difficulty as this in making space for religious speech is
likely to be unstable. The other consequence of this dualism, though, was
that the individual's experience of God became the keystone on which the
whole of religion depended. Barth himself captured something of the
precariousness of this theology when he noted Gottfried Keller's mockery of
theologians who "sit themselves on the topmost branch of a tree, from
which they will one day fall down with a great crash".43 Without the
"personal living reality" of individual religion, Barth noted, one is indeed in
great danger of falling down "with a great crash".
Barth's commitment to a Herrmannian theology is equally evident in his
second significant publication in this period. This was a lecture given in
Neuenburg in 1910, and published in an expanded version in two parts in
1912 under the title "Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte".44 Its
preoccupation, once again, is the connected dual principles of historical
relativism and absolute but incommunicable religious reality. Barth
describes his aim as follows:
While fully presupposing and recognizing historical relativism, we wish to
establish a uniquely religious and theological methodology based on such
relativism by virtue of which there can emerge an absolute relation to
absolute history, by virtue of which faith and revelation can occur. 45
Barth rejects any attempt to use historical data as an objective norm by
means of which the historical personality of Jesus can be reached and form a
basis for faith. He therefore rejects both the biblicism of the Reformers and
the Roman Catholic understanding of the episcopal Magisterium. The
modern age realizes the relativity of all historical data, and there can be no
return behind this recognition. But nor is it desirable to return to a
heteronomous understanding of religious knowledge. Kant has succeeded
42 Antwort, 484. Quoted by McCormack, CRDT, 72.
43 Barth, MTR, 319.
44 "Die Christliche Glaube urid die Geschichte", in Schweitzerische Theologische Zeitschrift,
(1912), 1-18 and 49-72.
45 Ibid. 4. Quoted by von Balthasar op. cit. 211.
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"in rescuing the autonomy of consciousness from the crust of the coercive
culture of the Middle Ages. ... There is only one way of knowing and that is
the knowledge of critical rationalism."46 The principle of historical
relativism is not, then, a threat to proper religious authority but a liberation
into the realm of autonomous knowledge. Faith is not touched by this
relativism, for it is not to be identified with any particular thoughts
occurring in religious history. It is, rather, "experience of God
[Gotteserlebnis], an immediate awareness of the presence and efficacy of the
power of life".47 It is to be contrasted with the knowledge classified by
Cohen under the categories of logic, ethics and aesthetics. The resulting
problem of the apparent lack of relation between faith and history is tackled
by Barth, as by Herrmann, by means of a reinvention of history in which a
kind of empathy enables one to see as the biblical authors saw, and to catch
sight of the inner life of Jesus through his effect on those who witness to
him. Understood in this way, history and faith are identical. The living
experience of God means ultimately the identity of the life of the believer
with the life of Christ. Yet this cannot be the result of scientific investigation
- it can exist only by means of God's revelation: "The feeling that God brings
about, his justification, his deed of election, all these arise in the [subjective]
intuition and seeing of God's efficacious work".48
The only substantial theological text Barth produced during his early years
in Safenwil was a lecture entitled "Der Glaube an den personlichen Gott".49
Once again Barth's debt to neo-Kantianism and to Herrmann are evident;
once again elements of his later theology are anticipated; and once again his
awareness of the tensions inherent in a Herrmannian theology is plain. As in
the two earlier works, the focus is on a specific and intractable problem
which arises in a Herrmannian theology: this time it is the problem of how
to relate the notions of divine personality and absoluteness, both of which
seem to belong to the concept of God, and seem to be demanded by
religious experience. Personality and absoluteness cannot, though, be
reconciled conceptually, since personality inherently involves limitation and
46 Barth, CGG, 17. Quoted by von Balthasar op. cit. 212.
47 Ibid. 5. Quoted by McCormack, CRDT, 74-5.
48 Ibid. 53.
49 Originally a lecture delivered at a pastoral conference in May 1913, published in
Zeitschriftfur Theologie und Kirche (1914), 21-32,65-95.
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change. The idea of 'Absolute Personality' has, as D.F. Strauss pointed out,
to be regarded as nonsense.so Yet neither concept can be abandoned; the
only solution is to allow them both to stand, despite the conceptual
contradiction. Von Balthasar summarizes Barth's position in this way:
all that remains to us is to hover between the sic et non of two unacceptable
alternatives: between the forbidden frontier of pantheism, which would
strip God of all personal attributes, and the forbidden boundary of deism,
which would like to subsume God's personality within the finitude of the
world. Between these two impossible alternatives we must content
ourselves with the ambiguous center, with that sic et non that we are never
allowed to cover over with a false apologetic synthesis.5l
Barth's willingness to contemplate a 'non-solution' of this nature is striking.
As before, his desire is to avoid a false synthesis of distinct principles. There
is no attempt to discover a fundamental identity underlying the manifest
difference. Instead the antinomy, and the unrest which it produces, have to
be accepted as they stand. Not surprisingly this view is connected once
again with the notion that what can be experienced in a living encounter
with God cannot be articulated conceptually. The problematic relation
between religious experience and dogmatic theological formulation comes
to the fore again. Barth's attitude is not that conceptualizations of faith
should be abandoned in view of their inadequacy; on the contrary he is
acutely aware of the need to articulate faith. As Steven G. Smith puts it,
Barth's view is that "Dogmatics is a secondary pursuit but a necessary
one."52 He quotes Barth's view in this lecture of the scientific character of
theology:
The scientific character of dogmatics cannot consist in the freedom from
contradiction of the most harmonious system possible, but in the most exact
interpretation possible of religious reality by its propositions, and in the
greatest possible purity and completeness of thought. In this respect
Calvin's Institutio is more scientific than most of what has been written in
50 Barth, GPG, 80.
51 Von Balthasar, op. cit. 216.
52 Smith, op. cit. 17.
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dogmatics since.53
iii. The nature of Barth's break with liberalism.
Two questions arise from this brief study of Barth's early theology. First,
given the presence in this early period not only of elements of Barth's later
theology, but of an early form of what is arguably the central insight of that
mature theology, what precisely did his break with liberalism consist in?
Secondly, why did that break take place? The first of these questions can be
answered quite simply. Herrmann's theology had been an attempt to draw a
boundary around religion, beyond which scientific and philosophical
criticism could not reach;54 Barth's revolution was to consist in the collapse
of confidence in the possession of the experience of God, which had been the
jewel so carefully guarded by Herrmannian boundaries. In other words
there was nothing left behind the defences. The sense of possession of God
was replaced by a sense that we do not have God. Barth's reference to those
theologians who sit on the topmost branch of a tree proved in due course to
be prophetic. Without confidence in the possession of the requisite religious
experience, his previous theology was left in the most precarious position.
Even more than before, religion and theology were now understood to be
part of the world of relativity; for Barth no longer had any confidence in a
53 Barth, GPG, 23f. Quoted by Smith, op. cit. p. 17. It is notable that Barth affirms dogmatics
as something which aims not at the logical clarity of a philosophical system, but at a
rational character derived from the nature of its particular object. His recognition of the
merits of Calvin in this regard, and in contrast to more recent dogmatics, is also significant.
It would not be too strong to say that this lecture anticipates the understanding of scientific
dogmatics which informed Barth's mature theology. See CD 1/1,1-11 and 315-330 in
particular. It is also interesting to note von Balthasar's observation that in this lecture
(written in 1913, it must be remembered) there is discernible the first formulation of a
doctrine of the analogy of faith. He quotes: "We cannot find an analogy to the real content
of religious belief in God in the human personality. ... No concept of God that arises from
projecting human awareness onto the transcendent can ever reach the reality of God, let
alone describe it exhaustively. Religion's thinking about God cannot be something
projected from within ourselves; it can only be the reflection of a fact that has been created
and projected into us. This fact is life in God, which is granted to us through our connectedness
to history. This inner connection to history is religious experience. In it we possess God, and
because of it we can speak of God." (GPG, 89. Quoted by von Balthasar, op. cit. 216.) It
seems to me that this thought is probably associated with Barth's absorption of the ideas
contained in his brother Heinrich's dissertation Descartes Begriindung der Erkenntnis (Max
Drechsel, Bern, 1913). See also chapter 3 below.
54 See Fisher, op. cit. 146-7: "It is no understatement to affirm that Herrmann's theology
aspired to protect the integrity and efficacy of divine activity in revelation from the
sophisticated idealizations of the Marburg Philosophers."
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privileged realm of religious experience, in which the gulf between faith and
history could be bridged.55 Still present was an emphasis on revelation as
the ground of our knowledge of God, and on the subjectivity of God in
revelation; but without confidence in the unity of revelation and faith in
immediate experience. A dualism remained, though its purpose was
radicalized. It did not serve to guard the distinctness and integrity of the
immediate experience of God, but rather to emphasize the otherness of God
and the world of God. If the problems in a Herrmannian theology were the
extremity of its dualism and the consequent emphasis on religious
experience, Barth's revolution was to consist in a breach at the second of
these points; overcoming the first of these was something that lay further in
the future, in the rise to prominence of the notion of God's act of election,
and of the ground it provides for our discourse.
The second question remains, though. Why did this break take place? It
would be wrong to suggest that an answer can be given solely in terms of
internal problems of a Herrmannian theology. External factors undoubtedly
played an important part. There were political factors associated with the
outbreak ofWar, not least the dual disillusionments which resulted from the
manifesto by ninety-three intellectuals in support of the War (which
included Wilhelm Herrmann's signature), and the initial support of the
German Social Democratic Party for the War. There were factors such as
Barth's involvement with Religious Socialism, and his visit to Christoph
Blumhardt in April 1915. There were intellectual and theological factors
such as his renewed study of Kant and his decision to engage in intensive
study of the Bible, and in particular Paul's epistle to the Romans. However I
want to argue that the tensions inherent in a Herrmannian theology were
also a significant factor. This is not to say that Barth's espousal of this
theology in his early writings was half-hearted; nor is it to commit myself to
the view that nineteenth century theology as a whole, and Herrmann's in
particular, was undermined to an unusual degree by internal
inconsistencies. I do not, to take one example, agree with Stephen Webb's
55 Steven G. Smith says "There are hints in these wartime writings of a polemic against
Schleiermacher, Marburg and religious socialism, but what we find for the most part is a
sudden vacuum in the place where these were taken for granted not long before." Smith,
op. cit. 23.
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judgement that Barth's early essays were intimations of his "gradual
dissatisfaction with theological modernism". 56 Webb's claim ignores the
extent of the common ground between Barth and Herrmann, and
misunderstands Barth's purpose in his early articles, which was not to
dissent from Herrmann's approach to theology but to try to achieve better
understanding of its implications and problems.
It is, however, instructive that such misunderstandings occur. They are
perhaps caused not just by the fact that Barth's early essays focus on
problems for a Herrmannian theology: all theological schemes have their
inconsistencies and problems, after all, and these provide a focus for the
efforts of that theology's advocates, as well as its critics. What surely
contributes to misunderstandings is the fact that the problems Barth
identifies are so intractable, and the 'solutions' he offers are not really
solutions at all. This is particularly true of 'Moderne Theologie und
Reichsgottesarbeit', in which the difficulties created by modern theology for
theological conceptualization, and hence for practical pastoral work, have to
be acknowledged and faced; and it is equally true of 'Der Glaube an den
personlichen Gott', in which conflicting elements in religious experience
lead to a contradiction at the level of thought, which cannot be dissolved in
a higher synthesis. Even in "Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte" the
Schleiermacherian solution proposed by Barth to the relation of faith and
history (presupposing the ultimate unity of Anschauung, the subjective
apprehension of God's work, and feeling Gefiihl, the objective taking effect
of God's work in us) is something which can only take place as God's act. As
von Balthasar puts it, "we leap from the relativity of history into the
absolute by a kind of Platonic 'vision' of this life as it 'shines through' the
documents and by the simple fact that this life proves to be efficacious".57
This is a solution which arguably redefines the problem rather than solves it.
It becomes a problem not of the relation of faith to history but of inner
history to outer history, and therefore once again a problem of relating
absoluteness to relativity.
56 Webb, op. cit. 55. Nor do I accept his claim on the previous page that "even at an early
stage, he [Barth] showed signs of tension with and dissent from liberalism".
57 Von Balthasar, op. cit. 214.
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One would be justified in concluding that Barth was particularly sensitive
to, and willing to acknowledge, the most intractable problems of modern
theology. Solutions, where they are available, are only present in immediate
lived-experience; discursive theology has to live with the paradoxes. One
problem which cannot therefore be resolved is the position of discursive
speech: religious experience drives us to think and speak, but discursive
thought and speech are inevitably inadequate. The basic difficulty is the one
with which Barth began in 1909: the dubious position of the follower of
modern theology who wishes to go into practical religious work. Steven G.
Smith makes this point:
It would be a mistake, therefore, to imagine that the Barth who wrote The
Epistle to the Romans was awakened into critical awareness from a sound
'liberal' dogmatic slumber. His earliest theology is a restless one. The
incomparability of Christian existence makes it resistant to the very
theological expression it demands.58
There is a restlessness in Barth's earliest writings, not because he wavers in
his commitment to the theology of his teachers but because he exposes its
most intractable problems. This restlessness is chiefly to do with the
ambiguous and problematic situation of theology. The dual principles of
relativistic historical science and individual religious experience combine to
undermine the position and task of the theologian. Theology seeks to be
scientific. It aims at "the most exact interpretation possible of religious
reality by its propositions, and in the greatest possible purity and
completeness of thought".59 Theology strives after objectivity, in the sense of
speaking about its proper object, in a manner which can only be determined
by the character of that object. But theology in the modern period knows
that it has no way of reaching this object. Faith can occur in the individual in
immediate lived-experience, in which the gulf between relativity and
absoluteness is overcome. But theology cannot share in this overcoming. It
knows that it is excluded. It strives after objectivity but may never attain it.
Its only honest option is to speak in a way that acknowledges its own
inadequacy. This awareness of the paradoxical situation ofmodern theology
made Barth restless, even prior to his turn away from liberal theology.
58 Smith, op. cit. 19.
59 Barth, GPG, 23f.
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This restlessness was to be one of the chief reasons for Barth's break with
liberalism. It was, however an indirect reason. It placed a weight on
religious experience which could not be carried indefinitely. But the collapse
of confidence in religious experience was not to resolve the problem of the
relation of absoluteness to relativity. On the contrary it made the problem
more severe, rather than less. It is after 1915 that the impossibility of human
speech about God comes to full prominence in Barth's writing; it is after 1915
(and most strikingly in the second Romans) that he strives for a theological
method that acknowledges and displays its own inability to speak of God.
The matter can perhaps be put like this: a Herrmannian confidence in
religious experience was deceptive. Its "supreme confidence"60 in the
experience of God with which this theology went on its way served to
conceal that fact that its way was one of retreat. Marburg neo-Kantianism,
and behind it the great expansion of scientific endeavour in and since the
Enlightenment, had placed theology on the defensive. There was nothing
left for theologians like Herrmann and Barth to place their confidence in,
other than a realm of experience which was individual, in principle private,
and strictly incommunicable.
iv. Safenwil and restless socialism.
There was, however, another side to Barth's theological and pastoral work
in his early years in Safenwil, which requires some comment. I am referring
to his well documented commitment to and involvement in socialism.6!
Barth later wrote of his arrival in Safenwil:
Class warfare, which was going on in my parish, before my very eyes,
introduced me almost for the first time to the real problems of real life. The
result of this was that my main study was now directed towards factory
legislation, insurance, trade union affairs and so on, and my energies were
60 See McCormack, CRDT, 77.
61 See particularly F.-W. Marquardt Theologie nnd Sozialismus: Das Beispiel Karl Earths (Chr.
Kaiser Verlag, Munich, 1972). This admittedly controversial work single-handedly brought
the issue of Barth's socialism to the forefront of theological discussion on its publication.
Also of particular value is Hunsinger (ed.) Karl Barth and Radical Politics. This work includes
an account of the controversy provoked by Marquardt's thesis, an article by Marquardt
himself summarizing his views, and a variety of responses to his work. It also includes a
translation by Hunsinger of Barth's 1911 lecture 'Jesus Christus und die soziale Bewegung'.
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taken up in disputes sparked off bymy support for the workers, not only in
the neighbourhood but in the canton.62
Barth began to give lectures to the local workers' association, and one of
these in particular, delivered on 17th December 1911 and entitled 'Jesus
Christus und die soziale Bewegung', has proved to be of great value for
understanding the nature of his socialism and its relation to his theology.63
Barth's discussion of socialism, both in the lecture and in his subsequent
reply to a critical open letter from a local manufacturer, makes clear that he
has acquired considerable familiarity with socialist theory.64 The emphasis
in the lecture is on the fact that Barth's approval of socialism is on the basis
of its aims, rather than the means which it adopts to try to achieve those
aims: "When I talk about the movement for social justice, I am not talking
about what some or all Social Democrats are doing; I am talking about what
they want."65 Barth declares himself to have no desire either to Christianize
socialism or to present Jesus as if he were a contemporary socialist; but he
regards the aim of socialism and the aim of Jesus as essentially one: "But
regarding the goal, social democracy is one with Jesus".66 Both oppose that
"which ought not to be". With the means employed it is a different matter.
Barth praises the method of Jesus: "He worked from the internal to the
external. He created new men in order to create a new world. In this
direction the present-day social democracy still has infinitely much to learn
from Jesus."67 Barth, though, does not want to spend time criticizing the
methods of socialists. He recognizes the inadequacy and relativity of all
human strategies: "It is precisely Christians who ought to know that we all
fall short when we look at what we're doing."68
One notable feature of Barth's socialism in this lecture is how consistent it is
62 Quoted by Busch, Karl Barth, 69.
63 First published in 'Der Freie Aargauer' in December 1911. Reprinted in the Karl Barth
Gesamtausgabe volume Vortrcige und kleinere Arbeiten 1909-1914 ed. H.-A. Drews and H.
Stoevesandt, (Theologischer Verlag Zurich, 1993), 380-408. ET in Hunsinger op. cit. 19-37.
64 He refers, for example to the economistWerner Sombart's discussion of socialism as well
as to the CommunistManifesto of Marx and Engels. In the reply to Herr Hussy he refers to
the official programme of the Swiss Social Democratic Party.





with his Herrmannian theology.69 The principal theological element in the
lecture is the identification of the aims of socialism with the aims of Jesus.
This depends on the fact that what we obtain from the gospels is a vision of
what Jesus wanted; this, of course, is just the sort of connection between
faith and history which would derive from a Herrmannian notion of the
inner life of Jesus, and which Barth had defended the previous year in his
lecture 'Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte'. There seems to me to be
another more significant affinity present, though. The lecture reflects, I
would suggest, the same problem of the relation of absoluteness and
relativity that had preoccupied Barth theologically. It is the distinction
between aims and methods that matters here. The aims of Jesus (and the
socialists) are an absolute value. But the methods by which these aims may
be pursued are inevitably flawed and imperfect, undermined by the fact that
in what we do, we all fall short.
This problem of the relation between absoluteness and relativity remained
at the heart of Barth's socialism. It is particularly evident in a review of the
1913 issue of the journal Die Hilfe, a text which George Hunsinger has drawn
attention to. 70 Written in the summer of 1914, just before the outbreak of
War, the review takes issue with the pragmatism of Die Hilfe and its highly
respected editor, Friedrich Naumann. Barth acknowledges that practical
politics always involve compromise and concession; but he will not allow
that a more radical socialist politics is therefore to be dismissed as hopeless
idealism. What Barth values in socialism is precisely its radicalism, its deep-
rooted critique of the present social order. Radicalism gives social
democracy its "revolutionary unrest", its "uncanny greatness".71 He says:
But a politics which raises the necessary concessions and compromises to
the dignity of generally valid ultimate ideas is very different from a politics
which, to be sure, also makes concessions and compromises for the sake of
immediate goals ... but in doing so, constantly makes it known: these are
provisionalities for which we do not for a minute have any enthusiasm and
69 Cohen's neo-Kantianism had some connections with socialism. Barth was well aware of
this, as is demonstrated by the fact that he at one point attempted to introduce the Safenwil
workers' association to Cohen's thought! See Busch, Karl Barth, 69.
70 See his 'Conclusion: Towards a Radical Barth' in Hunsinger, op. cit. 181-233, and in
particular 198-9. See also McCormack, CRDT, 107-111. The review in question was
published in Die Christliche Welt 28, (15th August 1914), 774-8.
71 Barth 'Die Hilfe 1913', 777-8.
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to which we do not allow ourselves to be tied, because we believe in
something greater. It is one thing to become accustomed to the world of
relativities, finally becoming completely satisfied and ... at home in them, as
those who have no hope. It is another thing altogether, in the midst of this
world of relativities, to be incessantly disquieted and full of longing,
fundamentally revolutionary vis-a-vis that which exists, longing after the
better which will come, after the absolute goal of a human community of life
beyond all temporal necessities.72
The preference of Die Hilfe for moderate reforming socialism over any more
radical or revolutionary view incurred Barth's severe displeasure, therefore.
For Barth, it was socialism's ability to present the most radical demand to
the world that made it valuable. A radical socialism removes the tendency to
be too much at home in the world as it is. The difference between social
reformism and radical social democracy is a religious difference, rather than
a relative difference of political judgement.73 Barth's earlier distinction
between socialism's aims and methods has been radicalized. On the one
hand, he recognizes the imperfection and provisionality of life in general, in
virtue of which politics inevitably involves compromise and concession, and
in virtue of which he himself was willing to engage in reformist social
action. But on the other hand he insists on the radical, religious element in
socialism which stands in judgement over against the whole of social reality,
reformed and unreformed, and in virtue of which we are restless and
disquieted, full of longing for a better life, for "a human community of life
beyond all temporal necessities".
The basic problem in Barth's socialism is the same as the basic problem of
72 Barth, 'Die Hilfe 1913', 776. Quoted by McCormack, CRDT, 109.
73 Barth also affirms in the review his belief that Naumann was misreading the German
Social Democratic Party in suspecting that it was moving to a reformist position. He wrote
that if he should be wrong in this, and if the SPD was indeed to embrace reformism, this
would merely be a disappointment, and not a proof that reformism was the only possible
option. Between Barth's writing this review and its publication on 15th August, not only
did War break out, but in the Reichstag on the 4th of August the SPD voted with the other
parties to grant the Kaiser the financial credits he had sought for the pursual of the War.
This was a part of the double disappointment Barth suffered after the outbreak ofWar,
something Marquardt drew attention to (the other part being the declaration of the 93
intellectuals). See Marquardt Theologie imd Sozialismus op. cit. 120f. Marquardt quotes a
retrospective comment of Barth's that the 4th of August 1914 was a "dark day, on which
German Social Democracy betrayed socialism". It is interesting to note that Barth was not
the only person caught out by the nationalist swing of the SPD. Lenin apparently refused
initially to believe the news that the SPD had voted for the approval of the war credits. See
Ronald Taylor Literature & Society in Germany 1918-1945 (Harvester Press, Brighton, Sussex,
1980), 3.
his early theology: how to speak and act, given the absoluteness of God and
the divine demand placed upon us. How can we speak theologically and act
pastorally given the gulf between absolute divine truth and the relativity of
all conceptualizations? And how can we speak and act ethically and
politically given the absolute divine demand presented to us and the
relative, compromised nature of all that we can in practice do? Religion lives
from the experience of the absolute. This experience demands expression,
but discursive thought is subject to the relativities of history, and can never
be adequate. Theology must therefore speak in the knowledge of its own
inadequacy. The contradiction between the experience of the absolute God
and the relativity of discursive speech cannot be overcome by a better
theology. Socialism lives from and expresses the most radical of demands, in
which "the Absolute, God, is taken with seriousness politically". 74 This
demand seeks expression, but political action can only ever be relative and
provisional. It must be undertaken in the knowledge that it is inadequate.
The contradiction between the radicalism of socialism's imperative and the
relativity of political action cannot be overcome by working out a better
political theory. The structural parallels between Barth's restless theology
and his restless socialism are striking. The chief characteristic of each is the
tension between an absolute demand and the relativity of the world in
which we must live, speak and act.75
v. The emergence of a new theology.
It is not my purpose here to give a comprehensive account of the
74 Barth, 'Die Hilfe 1913', 777.
75 It is worth noting at this point that there are significant similarities between Barth's
socialism and Cohen's. See p. 35 below, note 80. Before moving on I would also draw
attention to the fact that there were significant divergences between Barth's socialism and
his Herrmannian theology during this period. Bruce McCormack has highlighted this: see
CRDT, 92-104. He points out that even in 'Jesus Christus und die soziale Bewegung' Barth
was critical of the tendency in German theology (Lutheran in particular) to understand
religion only as a matter of the relation between the soul and God. Barth's conception of the
Kingdom of God in that lecture has departed from his teachers in its overtly political aspect.
McCormack notes, too, how Barth's sermons during 1913 contains elements which do not
combine well with the theology of his teachers: notably an embryonic critique of religion
and an emphasis on divine judgement. He also notes Barth's apprehensions of catastrophe
in these sermons. I would add to McCormack's observations that there is a contrast here
with Barth's views in 1911. In his reply to Herr Hussy he had declared a firm belief in "the
moral progress of humanity", even describing this belief in progress as the critical issue
between him and Herr Hussy. See Hunsinger, op. cit. 43.
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developments in Barth's thought during the early years of the War, or of the
two commentaries on Romans which constituted his major works in the War
and post-War years.76 There are, though, aspects of that process of
development which are worth commenting on because of their connection
with the themes already considered. The first I want to mention is Barth's
relation to the rift in Swiss Religious Socialism during the War. The two
leading figures in the movement were Hermann Kutter and Leonhard
Ragaz. To summarize the situation, and at some risk of over-simplification,
Kutter took the more radical stance. He valued the radical element in
socialism most, and he saw in Social Democracy an expression of the New
Testament's demand for a new world. The Church he believed to have
betrayed this with its emphasis on inwardness. However he did not himself
take any part in politics. He saw the task of the Church as to proclaim the
New Testament message, leaving socialism alone to get on with its
opposition in the most radical way possible. Ragaz on the other hand was an
ethical socialist who saw the way forward primarily in terms of political
action. He believed not in the Marxist account of the inevitable triumph of
socialism, but in the necessity of practical action determined by ethical
willing. His activism therefore included the desire to transform socialism.
From Ragaz's point of view, Kutter was hopelessly quietistic. Kutter,
though, regarded Ragaz as engaged in a pointless attempt to Christianize
socialism. This tension between the two orientations had been present
before the War, but became much more visible under the pressure of
responding to the events of 1914.
From what I have already said about Barth's socialism, it is clear that on the
question of the attempt to Christianize socialism, he agreed with Kutter.
However he also agreed with Ragaz on the necessity of practical political
engagement. In fact, in the period prior to and during the early months of
the War, Barth found himself closer to Ragaz. He was wary of Kutter's
quietism, which seemed to him to cut the religious off from ethical
consequences. By the early months of 1915, though, Barth appears to have
found the choice between the two much harder to make. In a letter to
Thurneysen of 5th February, he recognizes that Kutter's position is more
76 A good attempt at a comprehensive discussion of this period of Barth's development is
provided by McCormack, CRDT, 11-290.
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radical; but equally he is still suspicious of his quietism, and will not
abandon Ragaz's attempt to "bring the religious orientation into connection
with practical ethical goals".77 The following month he speculated on the
possibility of a dialectical relation of the two positions, such that a
harmonizing of the two might occur. "I believe" he affirmed "in the
possibility of such a position even if I cannot yet immediately describe it".78
But by August of that year Barth, partly influenced by Thurneysen, had
begun to sense problems with Ragaz's ideas. He was beginning to see
ethical striving, part of the world of relativity under judgement, as
something akin to the works of the law. He doubted whether it was possible
to have confidence in the connection between our political and ethical works
and the Kingdom of God which was their professed goal. "Is it self-evident
that 'we' 'represent' the Kingdom of God?" he asked in a letter of 6th
August.79 Barth had clearly shifted towards Kutter's position, and away
from Ragaz.
The value of all this for the present discussion is that Barth's changing
relation to the two strands in Swiss Religious Socialism, which was closely
connected with the development of his own new theological perspective,80
77 Karl Barth - Eduard Thurneysen Briefwechsel: Band i. 1913-1921 ed. E. Thurneysen, (TVZ,
Zurich, 1973), 29. See McCormack, CRDT, 122.
78 Ibid. 33. Quoted by McCormack, CRDT, 123.
79 Ibid. 69-70. Quoted by McCormack, CRDT, 124.
80 See McCormack, ibid. 124 on this point. With regard to Barth's doubt quoted above he
writes: "With this question, the fundamental axiom of Herrmannian theology (the certainty
given in religious experience) was now for the first time rendered dubious." I would add,
though, that I cannot accept McCormack's claim on the following page that while residues
of Barth's earlier thought persisted for some time he "had broken with Marburg for ever".
This, I would suggest, is a considerable exaggeration. For one thing, the shift between the
two editions of Barth's Romans was provoked by his inability to discern the connection
between this world and the Kingdom of God in the events around the end of theWar. (See
below.) This suggests strongly that the 'process eschatology' of the first Romans had not
broken entirely with Herrmannian and Ragazian assumptions. See McCormack, CRDT, 188.
Itmight be better to see Barth's development in this period as a mutation of Herrmannian
theology (albeit a radical one) rather than a breakwith it. See also John Lyden, who points
out that Barth's turn away from Herrmann can be seen as a turn towards Cohen. Cohen's
reinterpretation of the Kantian split between the noumenal and the phenomenal issued in a
distinction between the ideal (and real) and the actual. For Cohen, God is real as the ideal
unity of the world and morality. This unity is our goal "as we strive to actualize moral
ideals in the world." However we "can never actualize this unity fully, so the world and
morality remain distinct in our experience." See Lyden, op. cit. 171. The distinction between
the ideal and the actual was therefore the ground of Cohen's ethical socialism. Significantly,
though, Cohen's distiction is closely related to the distinction between absoluteness and
relativity which, I have been arguing, lay at the heart of Barth's theology and his socialism.
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has close parallels with the problem of absoluteness and relativity already
discussed. As before, the difficulty is of how to relate an absolute truth and
an absolute demand to practical speech and action in the realm of relativity.
As before, Barth's strategy is initially to hold the two alongside one another
though he can give no satisfactory account of how they relate. What ties the
two together is simply the assumption that we can apprehend the absolute
and so be confident that our practical action serves it, albeit imperfectly.
What happens in 1915 is that he loses confidence in this apprehension of
truth and therefore can no longer be sure that particular practical work does
serve the Kingdom of God. Once again, though, this is not a solution to the
problem of the relation between absoluteness and relativity. In fact the
relation has become even more problematic. Barth's new perspective is a
radicalization of the gulf between absolute divine truth and relative
conceptualizations, between means and ends, between the new world of
God and the old world of human striving.
Barth's changing attitude to Ragaz and Kutter is reflected in his attitude to
socialism in this period. His disillusionment with Social Democracy, given
its failure to offer a resolute international opposition to the War, did not
mean that his political activities ceased. In fact he decided to join the Swiss
Social-Democratic Party in January 1915. Writing to Thurneysen to tell him
of this, he affirmed that "faith in the Greatest does not exclude but rather
includes within itwork and suffering in the realm of the imperfect".81 Yet by
the beginning of the following year it is clear that Barth's shift in
understanding has begun to undermine his commitment to practical
political action. In a letter to Thurneysen of 1st January 1916, Barth wrote
that he was giving weekly lectures to workers on practical social issues; but
while, he says, he still believes in the necessity of such things, he gives the
lectures "without enthusiasm, ... because I cannot as yet get on to the one
thing necessary".82 The shift in Barth's socialism can perhaps even be
described as an increasingly eschatological understanding of its demands. In
a lecture delivered in December 1915, he stated that he valued socialism
because it points beyond materialistic and nationalistic thinking, beyond all
81 In a letter of 5th February 1915. See B-Th. Br. J. 30.
82 B-Th. Br. I. 122. ET in Revolutionary Theology in the Making: Barth - Thurneysen
Correspondence, 1914 - 1925 ed. and trans. James D. Smart, (Epworth, London, 1964), 36.
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attitudes which believe more strongly in the present than the future.
"Despite all its [socialism's] imperfections - one can talk about them quite
calmly and openly - it is to me one of the most encouraging signs that God's
kingdom does not stand still and that God is at work."83
Only in the summer of 1916, however, does a serious development take
place as Barth begins to talk of, and engage in, renewed theological activity.
In early June 1916 Barth spent a short break with Thurneysen during which
they decided to undertake new theological studies.84 On the 26th of June
Barth wrote to Thurneysen that he had started making extracts from Kant;
but by the 19th of July he had already begun to work on Paul's letter to the
Romans.85 The chief product of this new activity was, of course, the first
commentary on Romans, published at the end of 1918. The nature of the
development that was taking place became visible somewhat earlier than
this, however. Significant here is Barth's lecture "Die neue Welt in der Bibel"
delivered in Leutwil on 6th February 1917, in which new patterns of thought
are clearly crystallising.86 It is worth considering this lecture for a moment
as it illustrates well how Barth's views have changed.
The key idea of the lecture is, as the title suggests, that what is significant in
the bible is not the history or the morality or even the religion within it, but
83 See Busch Karl Barth, op. cit. 88. A stimulus to an increasingly eschatological
understanding of the problem of the relation of absoluteness and relativity was
undoubtedly Barth's meeting with Christoph Blumhardt in April in 1915. See Busch, Karl
Barth, 84-5 for a brief account of this. It should be noted though that even before the
meeting with Blumhardt Barth's thinking was placing increasing stress on eschatology. See
Barth's comment in the letter to Thurneysen of 5th February 1915 , mentioned above, that
he "set such emphasis Sunday by Sunday on the last things". (B-Th. Br. I. 30.)
84 See RTM, 37. See also Thurneysen's footnote to Barth's letter to him of 26th June 1916 in
B-Th. Br. I., 145, note 1.
85 B-Th. Br. I., 146. Barth did not at this point have any clear idea ofwriting a book for
publication. His comments suggest that his decision to work on Romans was his own (and
somewhat unforeseen), rather than any plan discussed in advance with Thurneysen. Note
also a mistranslation by Smart of Barth's reference to Kant. He has Barth saying: "I am
already busy making extracts from Kant (until now prolegomena and laying of
foundations, next it is to be the Critique ofPure Reason, oh!)".Barth was actually saying that
he had so far dealt with Kant's "Prolegomena" and "Grundlegung". Smart apparently
misses the fact that these are abbreviated titles of two of Kant's works. See RTM, 37-8.
86 In Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie (Chr. Kaiser Verlag, Munich, 1925), 18-32. ET: 'The
Strange NewWorld Within The Bible' in The Word ofGod and the Word ofMan trans. D.
Horton, (Hodder, London, 1928), 28-50. Thurneysen has pointed out that the dating of this
to Autumn 1916 in Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie (reproduced also in WGWM) is
erroneous. See B-Th. Br. I., 170, note 1.
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a new world. If we go to the bible looking for history or morality or religion
we will find them, certainly; but if we seek answers to questions about these
things we "find ourselves only in the midst of a vast human controversy and
far, far away from reality, or what might become reality in our lives".87 The
bible does not answer our religious questions - it has another centre, another
concern altogether: "All religions may be found in the Bible, if one will have
it so; but when he looks closely, there are none at all. There is only — the
'other', new, greater world!"88 This 'other' world, the world of God, is not
however something that can be appropriated or taken possession of. It is not
the answer to any of our questions:
One cannot learn or imitate this life of the divine seed in the new world.
One can only let it live, grow, and ripen within him. One can only believe —
can only hold the ground whither he has been led. Or not believe. There is
no third way.89
It is not difficult to see how Barth's thought here has developed from his
earlier Herrmannian theology. The basic problem is again the dualism
between the relativity of historical reality and the absoluteness of divine
reality. And the essential shape of Barth's liberal theology remains. As
before, there is no demonstrable revelation. However there is now no
individualistic religious experience either, to serve as the point of access to
divine reality. It has dropped out of the picture. In its place there is the
notion of the 'other' world of God. Knowledge of God, as before, is not
achievable except as granted by God; only now it is not religious experience
that is "the reflection of a fact that has been created and projected into us".90
Instead it is the Bible that speaks of this new world. In the place of religious
individualism appears eschatology. There are elements in this both of the
idea of the imperfection and provisionality of the world, which had been so
important in Barth's socialism, and of the idea of the relativity of the
historical and phenomenal world, which had been so important in Barth's
87 Barth, WGWM, 43.
88 Ibid. 42.
89 Ibid. 41.
90 Barth, GPG, 89.
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liberalism. 91 "The fact is", Barth says, "that we must seek our answer in this
direction— 'Yea, let God be true, but every man a liar.' "92
There is in this lecture also a re-emphasis of an idea in Earth's early theology
which was to become increasingly important for his thought: the idea that
the antithesis between the relative and the absolute can only be overcome by
God's act, God's "deed of election".93 This early idea is reflected in a
passage which points forward to a theology of the Word of God:
It is not the right human thoughts about God which form the content of the
Bible, but the right divine thoughts about men. The Bible tells us not how
we should talk with God but what he says to us; not how we find the way to
him, but how he has sought and found the way to us; not the right relation
in which we must place ourselves to him, but the covenant which he has
made with all who are Abraham's spiritual children and which he has
sealed once and for all in Jesus Christ. It is this which is within the Bible.
The word of God is within the Bible.94
vi. The two commentaries on Romans
The new theology which began to emerge in this lecture was affirmed and
expanded in the commentary on Romans which was published almost two
years later. Notable particularly in the commentary is the development of
the 'organological conceptuality' which had already appeared at Leutwil,
and for which Barth was heavily indebted to J.T. Beck. The notion of the
Kingdom of God growing within this world in fact becomes the key to the
commentary's eschatology. This conceptuality doesn't mean, though, that
the world of God grows out of this world. There is a sharp diastasis between
this world and the world of God, a continuation in a new form of the gulf
between the relativity of this world and divine absoluteness. Moreover,
91 An important comment of Barth's which is of some relevance to this relation between his
historical relativism and his eschatological relativisation of the world is contained in his
letter to Thurneysen of 1st January 1916. He says "Already under the influence of
Herrmann, I always thought of historical criticism as merely a means of attaining freedom
in relation to the tradition, not, however, as a constituting factor in a new liberal tradition as
apparentlyWernle and his like want to have it. Already five years ago I collided with
Wernle on this point. And the antithesis will, in fact, become still sharper." See B-Th. Br. I.,
121. ET in RTM, 36.
92 Barth, WGWM, 42.
93 Barth, CGG, 53.
94 Barth, WGWM, 43.
Barth, having rejected the resolution of this diastasis in religious experience,
is at pains to emphasize that it is not within our power to bridge the gulf,
and we should not imagine that any of our activities in this world can do so.
One of the most important sections of the commentary, therefore, is the
discussion of Romans chapter 13. Barth no longer seeks a practical politics
connected with the realization of the Kingdom of God. On the contrary he
sees great value in the unresolved tension between the new world of God
and this world, and counsels against actions which would draw attention
away from it. Barth describes this in an important passage, discussing
Romans 13, v. 4:
It is a matter of the great work of constructing a new world, which can
manifest itself in storms and catastrophes, but which must be achieved
inwardly and essentially through a quiet, common becoming-accustomed of
all humankind to the divine atmosphere, through a common becoming-
comfortable in the divine orders, and which may not be absorbed and
disturbed by individual, anarchistic explosions into the external. ... Each
one is therefore supported by the divine, which wants to hold them back
from personal revolt against the ruling powers in themselves ... lest they
diminish the tension of the general situation through hasty openings of all
kind of valves; lest they destroy the fruitfulness of the moment through rash
'letting out' and going on about God's mystery; lest they compromise the
blessing of the future by the grinding down of seed; but so that the healing
unrest, which has been placed in their heart by God, might deepen itself and
grow stronger, and reinforce the flood-tide of the divine which is rising all
around, and which will one day by itself tear apart the dams.95
Barth's eschatology is such that he opposes any tendency to try to construct
the new world by revolt against existing powers. But this is not because the
existing powers are good. They are of this world. But equally any kingdom
95 Der Romerbrief (Erste Fassung) 1919 (Theologischer Verlag Zurich, 1985), 508. The passage
is a useful illustration of some of the language and conceptuality of the commentary. The
talk of "the divine" is characteristic, as is the talk of the "seed" of future blessings. Both are
products of Barth's organic conception of the kingdom of God, which, while it is other than
our world, and is brought about not by our action but by God's, nevertheless grows in the
midst of this world. Steven G. Smith goes so far as to describe J.T. Beck's idea of the Holy
Spirit's work as a new 'organism' as "the hermeneutical centrepiece of the first edition of
Barth's Romans". (Smith op. cit. 21.) The passage also gives a good sense of the "dynamic
eschatology" which von Balthasar regarded as the theme of both this book and the
subsequent second edition. He describes this as "the irreversible movement from a fatally
doomed temporal order to a new living order filled with the life of God". See von Balthasar
op. cit. 64. Busch, Karl Barth, p. 100, describes the same thing rather differently, in
suggesting that the book had two principal points to make: one, the relativity of all human
distinctions and possibilities, even religious possibilities; and two, the distinction of the new
kingdom of God from all such human possibilities. Busch's description makes clear the
continuity of the book with the course of Barth's development as already described above.
we construct by our own power will be of this world, and will not be the
kingdom of God. This is not to advocate quietism, though. We live in the
world and cannot avoid our responsibility for it. The state is necessary, and
we have responsibilities as citizens which we ought not to deny. But no
programme or policy of whatever kind can claim the slightest justification
from the new world that is God's alone to bring. Barth's eschatology is
emphatically not about hope for this world as such. It is hope for the new
world of God which is distinguished radically from our world. Even if the
new world is to grow in the midst of this world 'organically', this world as
such is already finished with. The divine flood-tide will tear it to pieces
(zerreiften). It is clear here that the absolute demand of God's Kingdom and
the relative ethical and political programmes of this world are further apart
than ever before in Barth's thought. Before long, however, they were to
become further apart still.
In the second edition of his Romans, Barth replaced his organological
conceptuality with the idea of the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between
God and the world. The key concept of the book is an idea which had
played almost no explicit part in the earlier version: the Krisis of divine
judgement, under which the whole of this world stands.96 Much closer to
the surface of the work, then, is the problem of how it is that God can make
himself known in revelation without thereby becoming a given object, able
to be apprehended by human cognition and described by human concepts.97
Even if God should choose to reveal himself, that revelation will still be as
incommunicable as the individual experience of God which had been at the
centre of Barth's earliest theology. Our concepts and language are
inadequate for it.
This is the 'logic' of both editions of Barth's Romans, though it is much more
consistently visible in the second. If our religion and morality are part of the
old world, not the new; if our religious and theological speech is subject to
the relativity and inadequacy that afflict everything in the old world, how
96 It is worth noting that Krisis is not only one form of the German word for crisis, but the
transliteration of a Greek term meaning a decision or judgement.
97 Bruce McCormack identifies this as the fundamental problem of the second Romans,
describing it as the problem of the divine Subjectivity in revelation. See McCormack, CRDT,
207-8.
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can the theologian speak? Isn't the attempt to speak theologically necessarily
to try to grasp the new world by means of possibilities inherent in the old?
How can theology speak about that which is not part of this world? How
can the theologian speak about the new world of God? How, even, can the
theologian speak of the dissolution of the old world, in the rising flood of
the divine? All such speech is surely historical, relative, done away with,
finished in principle. It is surely a product of "the criminal arrogance of
religion".98 As Barth says in the first Romans: "In the face of the logic of the
divine order, (Rom. 1:32) one can take refuge in no religious-moral
'standpoint'. The standpoint itself condemns that which stands on it."99
The paradox becomes particularly clear if we consider the notion of the
universal Krisis, so important in the second Romans. All of human history,
Barth says there, stands under a Krisis of divine judgement.!00 How, though,
could we know and express this? By revelation, Barth says. The Krisis is
contained in the divine address. But revelation cannot be the passing on of
communicable truths about the world or about God.101 If it were, then the
Krisis would not be universal. These truths at least would not be subject to it.
And if revelation is not the passing on of communicable truths, then any
claim that knowledge of or speech about a universal Krisis is founded on
revelation will not save such speech from being subject to that Krisis.w2 To
talk of the whole of human history, culture and speech being under a
universal Krisis of judgement therefore seems to be self-refuting. The
98 Romans II, 37.
99 Romans I, 43.
10° por example "There is no fragment or epoch of history which can be pronounced divine.
The whole history of the Church and of all religion takes place in this world. What is called
the 'history of our salvation' is not an event in the midst of other events, but is nothing less
than the KRISIS of all events." Romans II, 57. Also "The true God, Himself removed from all
concretion, is the Origin of the KRISIS of every concrete thing, the Judge, the negation of
this world in which is included also the god of human logic." Romans II, 82.
1°1 As Barth said in the first Romans: "The revelation which has taken place in Christ is not
the communication of an intellectual clarity, a formula about the world, the possession of
which enables one to be at rest". Romans I, 356. Also, in the second Romans "Faith is not
revealed to us byflesh and blood,... no one can communicate it to himself or to anyone else.
What I heard yesterday I must hear again to-day; and if I am to hear it afresh tomorrow, it
must be revealed by the Father of Jesus, who is in heaven, and by Him only." Romans 11, 98.
102 "we must not conclude from this that we have achieved a secure standing place. We
have done no more than make room for the 'Moment' which has no before and no after,
and for the decision which lies only in God's hands. We cannot claim that we have attained
this possibility." Romans II, 137.
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theologian's attempt to speak - about God, yet in the world - seems to be
self-refuting.
All of this, of course, was already a problem for as consistent a follower of
Herrmann as Barth had been in 1909. The redeeming feature of that early
theology, though, had been its confidence in the possession of God in
religious experience. Theological speech could at least be accounted for as
conceptualization of that experience, inadequate perhaps, but nonetheless a
parabolic witness to that experience. Now it is not at all clear what account
can be given of the relation between absolute divine truth and our concepts.
In the second Romans in particular the dialectical method adopted suggests
that the only thing our speaking can in fact witness to is its own inadequacy.
Without a ground in religious experience the position of the modern
theologian is both perplexing and uncomfortable.
vii. Theologian and preacher: a cry for rescue.
It is hardly surprising then that Barth, when asked in 1922 to give a lecture
imparting an introductory understanding of his theology, rebelled against
the very notion that he 'had' something that could be called 'his theology'.
He said:
I must frankly confess to you that what I might conceivably call 'my
theology' becomes, when I look at it closely, a single point, and that not, as
one might demand as the least qualification of a true theology, a standpoint,
but rather a mathematical point upon which one cannot stand— a viewpoint
merely.
He suggested a few lines later that he did not offer a new theology, in a
manner to rival other theologies but simply:
a kind of marginal note, a gloss which in its way agrees and yet does not
agree with all these types — and which, I am convinced, loses its meaning
the moment it becomes more than a note and takes up space as a new
theology next to the others.103
103 Barth, WGWM, 98. The comments are from a lecture delivered to a Ministers' meeting in
Schulpforte in July 1922 entitled "Not und Verheifiung der christlichen Verkiindigung". See
Das Wort Gottes and die Theologie, 99-124. ET: "The Need and Promise of Christian
Preaching" in WGWM, 97-135.
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The theologian's task is problematic to the core; there is no stable point on
which the theologian can stand and speak. Interestingly, Barth adds that his
attempt to speak in such a way, as a marginal note, a theologia viatorum,
arose from what he felt to be "the need and promise of Christian
preaching".104 He continues the lecture by discussing some of the difficulties
he experienced as preacher in Safenwil. He says: "two magnitudes, life and
the Bible, have risen before me (and still rise!) like Scylla and Charybdis: if
these are the whence and whither of Christian preaching, who shall, who
can, be a minister and preach?" His audience that day was a meeting of
ministers. He tells them that he is sure they already know and understand
this problem, and that those who do "are already introduced to my
theology". i°5 Barth's theology, on this his own account, is essentially an
acknowledgment and restatement of the problematic position of one who
would speak of God, whether theologian or preacher: "the familiar situation
of the minister on Saturday at his desk and on Sunday in his pulpit
crystallized in my case into a marginal note to all theology".106
The continuation of these remarks is no less interesting. Having emphasized
the determination of his thought by the unbridgeable gap between the
"whence and whither of Christian preaching", he makes it clear that his
theology does not consist in the discovery of a way out of this problematic,
critical situation.
Exactly not that. But this critical situation itself became to me an explanation
of the character of all theology. What else can theology be but the truest
possible expression of this quest and questioning on the part of the minister,
the description of this embarrassment into which a man falls when he
ventures upon this task and out of which he cannot find his way— a cry for
rescue arising from great need and great hope?107
!°4 Barth, WGWM, 100.
106 Ibid. 101.
106 Ibid. 101. It is interesting to recall that Barth's 1909 article "Moderne Theologie und
Reichgottesarbeit" began with the thought that the transition from theological study to the
parish was particularly difficult for the pupil of modem theology - and counselled that this
difficulty must be faced, rather than avoided in a flight into practical work.
107 ibid. 101. There are, not surprisingly, many passages in the second Romans which deal
with these and similar themes. For example "The man of God is aware of the true and tragic
and paradoxical state of affairs. He knows what he is about when he adopts a point of view
which is no point of view, and when he in nowise regards himself as excused by his
vocation." Romans II, 58.
44
The problem with the theology Barth found around him, he says, was that it
did not recognize the seriousness of this situation. Why, he asks,
did the theologians I knew seek to represent the minister's perplexity ... as a
condition superable and sufferable, instead of understanding it at all costs,
instead of facing it — and thereby perhaps discovering in it, in its very
insuperableness and insufferableness, the real theme of theology? 108
The insufferableness of the minister's perplexity as the real theme of
theology! This is a striking way of speaking, to say the least. Barth continues
with it later in the lecture:
as a matter of fact, the church is really an impossibility. There can be no such
thing as a minister. Who dares, who can, preach, knowing what preaching
is? The situation of crisis in the church has not yet been impressed upon us
with sufficient intensity. One wonders if it everwill be. 1°9
Barth goes on to relate the impossibility of ministry specifically to the
Reformation focus on the Word of God. In contrast, there is in Roman
Catholicism a "way of God to man and of man to God" which is "evident,
obvious, well-ordered, and possible".n° It is significant, though, that when
Barth glances towards Roman Catholicism he does not simply register
disagreement or disapproval. He looks at it with a kind of envious
admiration, as someone might look at an object of forbidden desire or
unattainable beauty. He says:
At those times when the task of being verbi divini ministri... has worried and
oppressed us, have we not all felt a yearning for the fine worship of
Catholicism, and for the enviable role of the priest at the altar? ... I once
heard it announced literally at a first mass, "Le pretre un autre Jesus Christ!" If
only we might be such too!m
There is a strong sense that Barth has felt, and still feels, the the sheer
insufferableness of the theologian's and preacher's situation. He longs for its
problematic character to be resolved, for something of the positive role that





the Catholic priest has in the mass, when "the double grace of the sacrificial
death and the incarnation of the Son of God is not only preached in words
but consummated under his hands, and he becomes a creator Creatoris before
the people".112
Certainly it is not this solution that Barth aims at; in his view it is a
premature dissolution of the problem, rather than a genuine solution. He
does not want the qualitative distinction between time and eternity to be
forgotten so quickly; he does not want the illusion perpetuated, as he sees it,
that God's address to humanity can become our secure possession. But from
1909 onwards Barth's theological work has been a quest for a way of coming
to terms with the gap between human speech about God and the object of
that speech; it is a quest for a way of speaking which fully recognizes that
gap yet is not silenced by it. To put it another way, it is a quest for a point
from which the preacher and the theologian can speak of God, and speak
truly, while still speaking in human words, and therefore as part of the
human community. It is a protest against the too hasty integration of our
speaking about God into the life of the community - in which event it cannot
possibly be speaking of its intended object; and at the same time it is a cry of
longing for the impossible possibility of a true speaking about God in
human language, within the human community.
viii„ The beginnings of a solution.
A few months later, in a lecture delivered in October 1922, Barth once again
spoke of the perplexity that results from the minister's situation:
112 Barth, WGWM, 113. It would not be surprising if Barth's statements about the
paradoxical and problematic character of preaching and of theological speech were found
to reflect, to some extent, his own experience as minister and as professor of theology. The
strongest indication that this is in fact the case is the exchange of letters between Barth and
Thurneysen in June 1925 when the possibility emerged of Barth succeeding Hermann
Kutter in his ministry in Neumiinster in Zurich. In a letter of 13th June, Barth talked of how
troubled he was by the memory of how greatly he had failed as a pastor in Safenwil, unlike,
he adds, Thurneysen in Leutwil. See B-Th. Br. 11., 341 (ET: RTM, 230). This, in a private letter
to his close friend, should not be dismissed too quickly as false modesty. In a letter of 23rd
June, Barth says he is very conscious that he can be "neither a proper professor nor a proper
pastor". See B-Th. Br. II., 343 (ET: RTM, 231). It is perhaps not too fanciful to connect Barth's
comments to his continuing struggle with this central problem: the incapacity of the
preacher or the theologian to do the very thing they exist in order to do - speak of God.
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We whose profession it is to teach the inner meanings of religion find
ourselves in perplexity. We may be hopeful but we cannot be happy. We
darkly suspected when we were yet students that it would be so; we have
grown older and it is worse than we suspected. Whether we are ministers in
parishes or in professorial chairs, it is always the same perplexity: none of
us can avoid it. 113
The perplexity arises from the situation of the minister, which Barth gives a
definitive and famous description of: "As ministers we ought to speak of
God. We are human, however, and so cannot speak of God. We ought
therefore to recognize both our obligation and our inability and by that very
recognition give God the glory."H4 This situation is what defines the
ministry as a profession - and it is what alienates it as a profession. If
ministers try to avoid this paradox by offering a more worldly wisdom, the
results are unedifying: "We cut a ridiculous figure as village sages — or city
sages. As such we are socially superfluous."115 This lecture signifies the
beginning of the end of the phase of the second Romans. The insufferable
nature of this logic and this situation is now almost tangible. The sign that
Barth is seeking a way beyond the dialectical method of his commentary
comes in his consideration of the three possible ways of doing theology in its
perplexity: dogmatic, negativistic, and dialectical. He begins his discussion
of the last of these by proclaiming that "intrinsically it is by far the best". Its
balancing of affirmation by negation mean that attention is focussed beyond
the claims and counter-claims themselves towards the living centre which
cannot itself be apprehended. But in the course of the discussion Barth
recognizes that dialectical method itself cannot ensure that the truth is
witnessed to. He says that when when the practitioner of dialectic succeeds,
it is not because of the dialectic itself but because "through his ambiguous
and unambiguous assertions, the living Truth in the centre, the reality of
God, asserted itself. However, says Barth:
this possibility, the possibility that God himself speaks when he is spoken of,
is not part of the dialectic way as such; it arises rather at the point where this
way comes to an end. It is evident that one is under no compulsion to listen
to the assertions of the dialectician. In this respect the dialectician is no
113 In a lecture entitled "Das Wort Gottes als Aufgabe der Theologie" delivered on 3rd
October at a conference of the Friends of the Christlichen Welt, on the Elgersburg. Translated




better than the dogmatician and the self-critic. 116
Dialectical method has no power to enable the theologian to do what is
otherwise impossible - speak of God. But if this is so, the perplexity of the
minister really is inescapable. If dialectical method offers no escape from the
logic of the universal Krisis of judgement, Barth must admit that this mode
of theology, which was gaining him so much admiration and attention, has
no more merit than other modes. But dialectic has peculiar disadvantages: it
is "an appalling performance for those who are not free from dizziness".H7
When Barth says that the absence of the living truth from the dialectician's
speech is, "only the more painfully evident"118 he was not, perhaps, using
excessive hyperbole. The balancing of affirmation by negation has the
disadvantage of constantly appearing to undermine the speaker's own
purpose. If such dialectic cannot itself point to the truth beyond it, the only
thing left may be the speaker's constant undermining of their own role. This
insufferable situation and perplexity of the minister and theologian now
sends Barth in search of a mode of discourse which will not betray his
convictions about the diastasis between the relativity of history and the
absoluteness of God, but which, unlike dialectical method, can envisage its
own existence, and the lives of those who engage in it, as consisting in
something other than continual frustration. At this stage Barth has not
found such a mode of speech. But he does give two hints as to the direction
in which he must go. The first lies in the criticism he makes of dialectic
method. What really matters is not the dialectic, but "the possibility that
God himself speaks when he is spoken of". He expands on this in his
penultimate paragraph:
It may be that the Word, the word of God, which we ourselves shall never
speak, has put on our weakness and unprofitableness so that our word in its
very weakness and unprofitableness has become capable of being the mortal
frame, the earthen vessel, of the word of God. It may be so, I say: and if it
were, we should have reason not so much to speak of our need as to declare
and publish the hope and hidden glory of our calling.119





This is, once again, an appearance of the thought that was later to become
the analogia fidei. What Barth seeks is a mode of discourse which will allow
this analogical possibility to flourish. The second hint is his mention of
Christology at the conclusion of the lecture. All of Barth's thoughts, he says,
have been circling round "the one point which in the New Testament is
called Jesus Christ." He immediately adds: "Whoever can say 'Jesus Christ'
need not say 'It may be'; he can say 'It is.' "120 The implication of this is that
Christology is the key to a speaking of God on the basis of God's gracious
decision. Anyone who can speak of Jesus Christ will be speaking on the
basis that God has spoken. The only problem is how we speak of Jesus
Christ! With this hope and this doubt, Barth concludes the lecture with these
famous words: "Can theology, should theology, pass beyond prolegomena to
Christology? It may be that everything is said in the prolegomena."121 As
early as October 1922, then, Barth affirmed that a dogmatic speaking is at no
disadvantage compared to a dialectical speaking; moreover he had begun to
take seriously the possibility that God's gracious decision in Jesus Christ can
be the basis of this, and therefore the possibility of a dogmatics grounded in
Christology. The thought has clearly occurred to him that on the basis of
God's Word 'putting on our weakness' it is possible to do more than express
the insufficiency of the speech of the preacher or theologian; it is possible
120 Barth, WGWM, 216.
121 Ibid. 217. It seems to me quite clear that Barth did not believe here that everything was
said in the prolegomena. He was genuinely seeking a way forward and Christology seemed
to be the key. See though Bruce McCormack's plea in mitigation of those like Hans Frei who
took the opposite view but without access to those works of Barth which remained
unpublished during his lifetime. See McCormack, CRDT, 313, n. 70. McCormack's
discussion of this lecture offers several reasons in support of the view that the closing
question is not rhetorical. I would add to them the evidence of the letter Barth wrote to
Thurneysen on 7th October 1922, shortly after the delivery of this lecture. Describing the
debate after the lecture, Barth says: "Good, in fact remarkably good, was E. Foerster, who
flatly revoked his criticism of last year and only underlined from his side the Christological
problem which came up at the close of my lecture (which is not to be taken amiss in the
light of how little we are able to say about it at present)." See B-Th. Br. II., 104-5 (ET: RTM,
109).
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also to declare "the hope and hidden glory of our calling."122
There is a quite striking development in the course of this lecture, then, in
Barth's dual realizations of the incapacity of dialectical speech to point
beyond itself in the desired way, and of the potential for dogmatic speech on
the basis of "the possibility that God himself speaks when he is spoken of".123
Such ideas take Barth well beyond the dialectical method embodied in the
structure of the lecture, in terms of which the minister's recognition of his
conflicting obligation and inability will give God the glory. For it is clear
now that such a recognition of obligation and inability cannot by itself give
God the glory. The critical step away from dialectical to dogmatic form has
occurred in the course of this lecture. The idea of "God's deed of election"
122 I would note at this point that although Bruce McCormack describes this lecture at some
length (see McCormack, CRDT, 307-314) he nowhere acknowledges that there is any new
development in it, let alone that itmight constitute a critique of the theology of the second
Romans, or that itmight constitute Barth's first tentative step towards a permanent
resolution of the problem that has dominated his theology since 1909. There seems to me to
be a strong case for saying that there is indeed a significant critique here of the dialectical
speaking which had been the dominant form in the second Romans. The relevant passage is
worth quoting at length: "The real weakness of the dogmatician and the self-critic, their
inability really to speak of God, the necessity which is upon them always to speak of
something else, appears to be raised even to a higher power in the dialectician. For the very
reason that he refers everything to the living truth itself, the inevitable absence of that living
truth from his own references must be only the more painfully evident. And even if his own
references were accompanied by that which gives all things their truth and meaning, even if
God himself should say through him the one true word, his own word, by that veryfact the
dialectician himself would be proved wrong and could only confess that he could not speak
of God. ... There is no reason why the dialectic theology should be specially capable of
leading one up to a gate which can be opened only fromwithin. If one should fancy that it
possesses a special pre-eminence, at least in preparing the way for the action of God, let him
remember that it and its paradoxes can do no more to this end than can a simple direct word
of faith and humility." (WGWM, 211-12). This is surely a striking recognition by Barth that it
is a mistake to think that dialectical method can point one beyond its theses and antitheses
to the truth that is God's. It has no power whatsoever to do this. The dialectic that remains
present in this lecture itself, in its recognition of the simultaneous necessity and
impossibility of speaking of God, has a restless quality. Barth is no longer happy to leave it
at that. He seeks a way forward, from the prolegomena to Christology. There is a
despairing note in his comments: "The task of the minister is the word of God. This spells
the certain defeat of the ministry. It is the frustration of everyministry and every minister. ...
our purpose is that God should speak; and we need not be surprised, therefore, if at the end
of our way, however well we should have done our work - nay, for the very reason that we
have done it well - theWord should still remain unspoken." (ibid. 214 - 5.) Barth's
restlessness with regard to dialectical method was actually intimated in advance of the
lecture, in a letter to Thurneysen of 20th September: "Something in me urges me to strike
out beyond the mere dialectic to theWord which 'resounds from heaven' (Luther) but what
it is with this Word and how one comes to say something about it, I haven't the faintest
idea." See B-Th. Br. II. 99.
123 Barth, WGWM, 211.
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which has been present in Barth's thought from the beginning has finally
begun to yield fruit. Barth had been seeking a mode of speech for preacher
and theologian which would overcome the problem of the relation of
absoluteness and relativity. He had been seeking a discourse which could be
both true speech about God, yet at the same time be fully human, integrated
into the speech of the community. Only such a discourse could turn
insufferable perplexity into healing unrest. And at last, in October 1922,
Barth has begun to perceive its character.
Chapter 2 Culture in crisis: German Expressionism and its context.
i. New movements in culture: German Expressionism 1910 -14.
The term 'Expressionism' seems to have originated at the very beginning of
this century, as a name for new developments in French painting, marking a
distinction between this newer art and Impressionism. Wolf-Dieter Dube,
for example, notes its use by the Frenchman Julien-Auguste Herve in 1901 as
a designation of his own work; and that it was used around the same time
by the critic Louis Vauxcelles as a description of the painting of Henri
Matisse.1 A decade or so later it began to be applied to new movements
among German painters whose work displayed a similar turn against
Impressionism and other established styles: the first such use noted by Dube
dates from 1912.2 Very soon it had become a term which applied primarily
to German art, marking it out from post-Impressionist movements in France
and elsewhere, notably Fauvism and Cubism. Dube notes the use of the
term by Paul Fechter in 1914 in precisely this sense.3 At the same time it
began to be used of contemporary developments in other areas of German
culture - notably poetry and drama, but gradually encompassing almost
every area of cultural activity from architecture to film.
This brief history of the term illustrates two important points about German
Expressionism. First, the term came to be applied to a group of related
movements in German culture which, while they were distinctively
German, were at the same time related to artistic movements elsewhere in
Europe. Expressionism was, broadly speaking, the German manifestation of
the phenomenon we now think of as international modernism. 4 Secondly,
1 See Wolf-Dieter Dube The Expressionists trans. M.Whittall, (Thames & Hudson Ltd.,
London, 1972), 18.
2 Dube says (p. 19) that the exhibition in Bonn in 1913 with the title 'Rheinische
Expressionisten' was "the first time that an exhibition of German artists had appeared with
the heading 'Expressionists' ". However he himself notes (p. 105) that the Sturm exhibition
in Berlin in March 1912 (which was in fact the first of the Sturm exhibitions) carried the title
'Deutsche Expressionisten'.
3 Ibid. 19. Dube comments "What Fechter succeeded in doing was to prescribe limits which
are still valid on the whole, but within them the terminology remained undefined."
4 "On the one hand, it is part of the great international movement of modernism in art and
literature; on the other hand, it is a turbulent and vital chapter in the catastrophic history of
modern Germany." Walter H. Sokel The Writer in Extremis - Expressionism in Twentieth-
Century German Literature (Stanford University Press, California, 1959), 3.
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the above history indicates that 'Expressionism' was not the name given by
artists themselves to any programme they pursued; it was applied
retrospectively, first by critics and then by artists and writers themselves.
Since there was no definitive Expressionist programme, there is no single
criterion which defines the essence of Expressionism or which could enable
us to circumscribe its boundaries neatly. Its characteristic forms and
concerns are best understood by considering the history of the diverse
movements that made up Expressionism, from its birth around 1910 to its
demise in the early 1920s.
It is worth noting at this point that, contrary to what might be expected, the
distinctive character of Expressionism is not its emphasis on expression as
the proper method and aim of art. It is certainly true that Expressionism was
very much concerned with the expression of inner realities; the artist's
works were indeed understood as vehicles for the expression of emotion or
of inner realities which could not otherwise be conveyed. But this concern
was not unique to German Expressionism. In this most general sense
'Expressionism' would be an apt description of most of the European
modernist movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. From the
painting of Van Gogh and Matisse to the music of Schoenberg, an emphasis
on expression was one of the most common aims of modern art in general.5
A useful starting point for understanding the relevant history is indicated by
Walter Sokel, in his perceptive study of Expressionist writing The Writer in
Extremis. He describes Expressionism as:
a peculiarly German phenomenon, which contains elements, notably the
violent conflict between the generations, not to be found to the same extent
in the experimental literature of other countries. The history of German
5 See Christopher Butler's EarlyModernism (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), 35-6. He quotes
Van Gogh's description of his aim in his The Night Cafe (1888) as the attempt "to express the
terrible passions of humanity by means of red and green". He also quotes Matisse's Notes of
a Painter (1908): "The entire arrangement of my picture is expressive: the place occupied by
the figures, the empty spaces around them, the proportions, everything has its share.
Composition is the art of arranging in a decorative manner the diverse elements at the
painter's command to express his feelings." Also see p. 53, where Schoenberg's music is
said to be "about the purest form of Expressionism". This understanding of art as
expressive is at the same time a move away from the understanding of art as
representation. Impressionism had not broken with representation - only with a particular
view of what was being represented and how it should be done.
literature since the 1770's has been marked by revolts of youthful poets and
writers which aim not only at a new style in writing but at a new way of life
as well. Expressionism is the last and most intense of these revolts.6
Sokel's emphasis on the character of Expressionism as a revolt not just
against established art but against the established order is important. This
anti-bourgeois orientation, articulated as a sense of the dissolution and
collapse of the old social order, was one of the most universal features of
Expressionist activity. It was paradigmatically stated in a short poem
published in Berlin in January 1911, written by Jakob van Hoddis, and
entitled Weltende:
Dem Burger fliegt vom spitzen Kopf der Hut,
In alien Liiften hallt es wie Geschrei.
Dachdecker stiirzen ab und gehn entzwei,
Und an den Kiisten—liest man—steigt die Flut.
Der Sturm ist da, die wilden Meere hupfen
An Land, um dicke Damme zu zerdriicken.
Die meisten Menschen haben einen Schnupfen.
Die Eisenbahnen fallen von den Briicken.
(The bourgeois's hat flies off his pointed head,
the air re-echoes with a cry.
Roofers plunge and hit the ground,
And at the coast—one reads—seas are rising.
The storm is here, the savage seas hop
On land and crash thick dams.
Most people have a cold.
Trains fall off bridges.)7
Van Hoddis's poem had an extraordinary impact, such that it has been
described as the "Marseillaise of the Expressionist Revolution", and has
been identified as the real beginning of German Expressionism.8 It was
chosen to be the first item in what was probably the definitive anthology of
Expressionist poetry, Menschheitsdcimmerung, published at the height of
6 Sokel, WE, 2.
7 First published in the journal Der Demokrat Berlin, 11 January 1911. The translation is from
Paul Raabe (ed.) The Era ofGerman Expressionism trans. J.M. Ritchie, (Calder and Boyars
Ltd., London, 1974), 44-5.
8 Ibid. 313.
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Expressionism's popular success in 1920.9 Its imagery articulates a sense of
the crisis of bourgeois culture and society, and suggests its impending
collapse. It suggests the dissolution of order into chaos, in which the most
trivial events stand alongside the most momentous, there being no
viewpoint from which they can be distinguished. The success of this poem
lay in its concise statement of convictions and apprehensions that were
widespread. Testimony to this can be found not only in the poetry of the
period but in the later reflections of those who lived through it. Claire Jung,
for example, said this:
The creative work in which the expression of this age has been captured
already shows the dissolution of form. In all of them the disintegration of
the old social ties, the collapse of an all-embracing and till then generally
accepted faith is already visible, but also the quest for a new one.
Expressionism, she affirms, did not just aim at a transformation of artistic
form. It sought "to evoke a revolution in the general attitude to life".10
Along with this sense of the inadequacy and imminent collapse of the old
order, many Expressionist writers and artists attempted to offer a vision of
something new and better. There was among them a widespread conviction
that they were on the brink of, and were creating, something decisively new.
Again testimony can be found in their later reflections: take for example
Kurt Pinthus, editor of Menschheitsdcimmerung, who spoke of hundreds of
young people being "seized by the awareness and the certainty of what was
coming, namely a new generation".11 Or take the writer Johannes Becher:
We felt like new beings, like creatures on the first day of creation, a new
world was to be ushered in with us, and we swore we would cause such an
uproar that the bourgeois world would be struck deaf and dumb and
consider it a blessing to be sent straight to Hades by us.12
Pinthus' anthology, mentioned above, illustrates something of the range of
9 Menschheitsdammerung: Eine Symphonie jiingster Dichtung ed. Kurt Pinthus, (E. Rowohlt,
Berlin,1920). Note for example the comments of Ronald Taylor: "There is still no more
authentic or powerful source of this poetry than the anthology published in Berlin in 1920
under the title Menschheitsdammening". See Taylor op. cit. 80.
10 Raabe, EGE, 38-9.
11 Ibid. 67-8.
12 Ibid. 44.
attitudes that could thrive between these poles of apocalyptic collapse and
Utopian enthusiasm. Even the titles suffice to show the range: it extends
from Ehrenstein's 'Leid' and 'Schmerz' through to the same author's
'Hoffnung', from van Hoddis' 'Weltende' to Werfel's 'Veni creator spiritus'.
Indeed even the title of the anthology hints at this ambivalence, since
Dammerung can mean either twilight or dawn. Whether the Expressionist
poets stated their opposition to the bourgeois world in the form of a
proclamation of its downfall, or the announcement of a new order and a
'new man', their style was distinctive: "direct, peremptory, insistent,
challenging".13
As Sokel indicated, moreover, Expressionism was a revolt of young artists
and writers against an older generation. This self-consciousness was evident
in the titles of poems and anthologies, such as ErnstWilhelm Lotz' Aufbruch
der JugendM It was also evident among painters, for example in the
programme set out in 1906 by the Dresden based group of artists known as
"Die Brucke":
Believing in development and in a new generation both of those who create
and of those who enjoy, we call all young people together, and as young
people who carry the future in us we want to wrest freedom for our
gestures and for our lives from the older, comfortably established forces. We
claim as our own everyone who reproduces directly and without
falsification whatever it is that drives him to created5
The Expressionists were indeed mostly younger artists born in the mid
1880's or even later.16 Their energy and outlook were essentially youthful: it
13 Taylor, op. cit. 85.
14 See R. Samuel and R.H. Thomas Expressionism in German Life, Literature and the Theatre
1910-1924 (W. Heffer, Cambridge, 1939), 2.
15 Quoted by Dube, op. cit. 21. This group, formed in 1905, was one of the loci in which
German Expressionist painting emerged, along with the Munich Neue
Kiinstlervereinigung, formed in 1909, and the Berlin Neue Sezession, founded in 1910.
16 See Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 3. Examples include Georg Heym - born 1887;
Walter Hasenclever - 1890; Kurt Hiller -1885; Kasimir Edschmid -1890; Gustav Sack -1885;
Oskar Kokoschka -1886; Paul Kornfeld -1889; Reinhard Sorge -1892; Ernst Toller -1893;
Fritz von Unruh - 1885; Franz Werfel -1890; and, not least, Franz Kafka -1883. Among
painters, the four founder members of the Brucke group, Kirchner, Bleyl, Heckel and
Schmidt-Rottluff, were all born between 1880 and 1884. Barth's birth in 1886 therefore
places him in the midst of the Expressionist generation, just as his first significant published
article in 1909 parallels the timing of the emergence of Expressionism. Nothing should be
read into such circumstantial details on their own, of course.
is perhaps not completely surprising that its confidence and energy ran out
in the early 1920's, as its leading practitioners reached middle age. Yet
within its life-span of little more than a decade it made a dramatic impact on
German culture. The weekly journal Der Sturm, founded in 1910 by
Herwarth Walden, a principal advocate of the new art in Berlin, rapidly
achieved a circulation of 30,000 copies. At the second of Walden's
exhibitions in Berlin in 1912 (showing the art of the Italian Futurists), there
were sometimes 1,000 visitors a day.17
One area of significant activity hardly mentioned so far was the theatre. In
drama Expressionism found one of its most important media. It has been
suggested that while "the lyric was the form in which the new generation
most naturally expressed itself, it was in the drama that it found the most
effective means of disseminating its ideas".18 Developments in drama
paralleled the emergence of the new literature and art. The shift in painting
from representation to an emphasis on form, colour and expression, was
matched by a shift in drama away from realistic characterization and
narrative to the use of abstraction and extreme symbolism. The characters
were frequently referred to by their roles - the Son, the Father, the Girl, and
so on - rather than by personal names. Realistic characterization is replaced
by the use of characters to represent ideas. Sokel highlights this contrast by
noting the differing approaches to speech:
In the realistic drama each character has his more-or-less fixed idiom even
as he possesses a more-or-less constant personality, molded by milieu,
heredity, and sum total of experiences. ... As in real life we can recognize
and type a character by his speech. His speech distinguishes him from other
characters; it marks the boundaries of his individuality, setting him off from
other individualities. ... The Expressionist reverses this principle, since
speech for him is not a means of characterization, but a function of
expression. A character changes his speech as he changes his mood.19
Oskar Kokoschka's Morder, Hoffnung der Frauen of 1908 has been described
as the first attempt at Expressionism drama, but it is Reinhard Sorge's Der
Bettler of 1911 that is more commonly taken as the first fully fledged
17 See Dube, op. cit. 159-60.
18 Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 19. See also Ludwig Marcuse in Raabe, EGE, 293.
"Expressionism really came to life on the stage; the stage made it into a cult".
19 Sokel, WE, 40.
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Expressionist play.20 Sorge's play certainly illustrates well many of the
characteristic features of Expressionist drama. Its characters are not
realistically portrayed: they are designated by their roles rather than
personal names; the beggar's father, a retired engineer, plans a project to use
the canals on Mars for the improvement of the world. He kills a bird to use
its blood since he has run out of red ink for his plans and the shops are
closed. He beats a toy drum "with an exaggeratedly big stick".21
He illustrates, therefore, the dream-like qualities of characters in
Expressionist drama. They are not "lifeless abstractions",22 but neither are
they realistic. Sokel comments: "some strange detail, some distortion or
implausible exaggeration, a grotesque twist, an intentional incongruity,
appearances at empirically impossible times and places, again and again
destroy our illusion that we might face three-dimensional persons of flesh
and blood in these dramas".23 In this respect Expressionist abstraction goes
significantly beyond the symbolism often found in neo-Romantic drama.
Thomas points this out by means of the example of Hoffmanthal's Elektra.
She:
retains her individuality; she is still a woman and interesting as a woman.
She is a personality in whom one quality, the quality of revenge, has been
stressed to the almost complete absorption of all others. In Der Bettler on the
other hand, the Father makes no corresponding impression of individuality.
He has been conceived in association with an idea of which he becomes the
outward and visible sign. 24
This abandonment of realism, which brings ideas to the forefront of the
drama, is also reflected in the structure of plays: "there is hardly any action
in the usual sense of the term, and the play moves towards a climax not in
the working out of an action but of an idea".25
Der Bettler is also interesting for its content: here too it is illustrative of the
20 See H.F. Garten Modern German Drama (Methuen, London, 1959), 108 to 115. See also
Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 19f. and Sokel, WE, 36-7 and 147.
21 Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 29.
22 Sokel, WE, 36.
23 Ibid. 37.
24 Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 25.
25 Ibid. 27.
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typical concerns of Expressionist drama. Perhaps the most important idea it
displays is the conflict between a son and his father. This theme appeared in
many plays, often with violent consequences.26 In Der Bettler, the contrast
between the Beggar and the Father highlights the Messianic idealism of the
Beggar in his search for meaning and salvation. As Sokel says: "In
contrast to the Son's idealism, the Father represents the materialistic
counterpoint in the composition. He misinterprets the Messianic theme
materialistically as technical progress and enrichment."27 The Father/Son
motif in Expressionist drama symbolizes the conflict between the younger
generation and the established order, the clash between the old art and the
new art, and therefore between the old ideals and the Expressionist 'new
man'. It is one more embodiment of the 'oppositeness' which permeated
Expressionist activity.
In the years before the outbreak of the War, then, Expressionism was a
potent force in drama as in lyric poetry. What of the visual arts, though, and
painting in particular, with which I began? There was in fact significant
continuity between the new movements in literature and art. An obvious
parallel is in the sense that both writers and artists had of the necessity of
getting below surface reality to the heart of the subject. This connection is
described by Richard Samuel:
The difference between Impressionist and Expressionist style can be
illustrated by a comparison of the painting ofManet and Marc. If the former,
for example, paints a bull he depicts not only every detail of the animal, but
he also elaborates with meticulous care the setting in which it is placed, the
grass, the bushes and the sky. With Marc on the other hand, the bull
occupies three quarters of the canvas and the landscape serves only the
purpose of throwing into relief the central object. ... Whereas Manet's
purpose is to portray the animal as an object of nature, Marc's aim is to
reveal its 'soul.' The same principle is applied to literature.28
Samuel expands on this by summarizing the ideas of Kasimir Edschmid, one
of the first to theorize about the nature of Expressionism. He says: "Whereas
the Impressionists aimed merely at reproducing in the most subtle form the
26 Peter Gay, in his Weimar Culture, even felt it appropriate to give his chapter on
Expressionism the title "The Revolt of the Son: Expressionist Years". See Gay Weimar
Culture: The Outsider as Insider (Seeker and Warburg, London, 1969).
27 Sokel, WE, 37.
28 Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 146.
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impression that an object or situation made upon them, the Expressionists
endeavour to express its inner meaning." A quotation from Edschmid
illustrates this: "A house is no longer merely a subject for an artist,
consisting of stone, ugly or beautiful; it has to be looked at until it is
liberated from the muffled restraint of a false reality, until everything that is
latent within it is expressed." To concentrate on the external appearance
would be to be deceived, misled by a superficial bourgeois attitude.
Samuel's summary of the Expressionist approach is this: "Once the
bourgeois mask is torn away the link with eternity given to every human
being will be revealed."29 Edschmid was typical of many in seeing in the
inner life a link with eternity. Samuel summarizes:
Edschmid claims that reality must be created by ourselves, because only in
our own soul is the image of the world kept pure and unfalsified.
Accordingly the traditional modes of art no longer suffice, for 'the field
covered by the Expressionist artist is vision.' Creative work therefore can
only be achieved by 'intuition.'30
One of the most significant painters of this period was Wassily Kandinsky -
yet he was in many ways untypical of the Expressionists. He was 20 years
older than most of them, and was Russian rather than German. More
importantly, his drive towards the development of a genuinely abstract art
was not wholly typical of Expressionist painting. But this drive, and the
influential theories of art which accompanied it, make him particularly
important. He was prominent in the new German art of the period in virtue
of his involvements in firstly the Munich Neue Kiinstlervereinigung and
subsequently Der Blaue Reiter. Kandinsky's understanding of art is in many
ways quite consistent with the Expressionism already described. His
emphasis was firmly on the expressive aim and character of art. This stress
on expression led him to think in terms of the musicalization of painting. In
his liber das Geistige in der Kunst published in 1911, he says this:
With few exceptions music has been for some centuries the art which has
devoted itself not to the reproduction of natural phenomena, but rather to
the expression of the artist's soul, in musical sound. A painter, who finds no
satisfaction in mere representation, however artistic, in his longing to
express his inner life, cannot but envy the ease with which music, the most
29 Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 11.
30 Ibid. 12.
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non-material of the arts today, achieves this end. He naturally seeks to
apply the methods of music to his own art. And from this results that
modern desire for rhythm in painting, for mathematical, abstract
construction, for repeated notes of colour, for setting colour in motion.31
Kandinsky was not the only artist to think in these terms. Matisse, for
example, wrote "From the relationship I have found in all the tones there
must result a living harmony of colours, a harmony analogous to that of a
musical composition. "32 As Christopher Butler comments, this "appeal to
the idea of musical harmony runs right through the modern period".33 The
emphasis on expression and the freedom from mimetic convention had also
begun to bear fruit in music itself. Kandinsky and Franz Marc heard a
concert of Schoenberg's music in January 1911 and immediately recognized
its kinship with their own work. Marc, writing to August Macke, said "I was
constantly reminded of Kandinsky's large Composition, which also permits
no trace of tonality".34 Kandinsky and Schoenberg entered into
correspondence; the almanac Der blaue Reiter, edited by Kandinsky and
Marc, and published in 1912, contained an essay by Schoenberg as well as
music by Schoenberg, Webern and Berg. 35 Schoenberg also exhibited some
oil paintings as part of the first Der blaue Reiter exhibition in December
1911.36
For Kandinsky, art which aims at musical harmony has a fundamentally
spiritual role: "Every man who steeps himself in the spiritual possibilities of
his art is a valuable helper in the building of the spiritual pyramid which
will some day reach to heaven. "37 in a sense, his drive towards abstraction is
a drive away from the unspiritual world of appearances to an inner spiritual
reality. Butler puts it like this: "Kandinsky believed that if physical matter
was in any case on the point of dissolving in the coming Apocalypse, there
was little point in continuing to represent aspects of the natural world in
31 ET by M.T.H. Sadler, published as The Art ofSpiritual Harmony, (Constable, London,
1914). Republished as Concerning the Spiritual in Art (Dover, New York, 1977). See p. 19.
32 Quoted by Butler, EM, 36.
33 Ibid. 36.
34 Quoted ibid. 47.
35 Der Blaue Reiter edited by Kandinsky and Marc, (R. Piper & Co. Verlag, Miinchen, 1912).
ET: The Blaue Reiter Almanac (Thames And Hudson, London, 1974).
36 Dube, op. cit. 101.
37 Concerning the Spiritual in Art, 20.
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painting."38 Another aspect of this is the interest that Kandinsky and others
had in primitive art, folk art and in the painting of children. They saw in
these an expressive character, a relative freedom from mimetic convention.
These interests perhaps also reflect a negative judgement on the nature of
modern European civilization, in particular its perceived rationalism and
materialism.39 In Uber die Geistige in der Kunst, Kandinsky was scathing
about all forms of materialism, including socialist economics, democratic
and republican politics, and modern science.40
ii. The social and political context of Expressionism.
The diverse strands within Expressionism came together most obviously in
opposition to the established order and therefore to the modes of artistic
activity that reflected and affirmed that order. And in so far as
Expressionism sensed the inadequacy and imminent collapse of this order
its apprehensions were not unique to writers and artists, but were
widespread. As J.M. Ritchie has put it:
Germany before the outbreak of the First World War was filled with a
longing for change. People wanted something to happen—almost anything,
to bring release from the oppressive traditions and conventions of the
society they lived in. Life in Wilhelminian Germany meant for many a state
of emptiness and boredom in which the dictum Ruhe ist die erste Biirgerpflicht
still applied. Little wonder then that talk of Aufbruch, i.e. the need for a new
start, a break with the old, was wide-spread and was not merely one of the
many slogans coined by avant-garde contributors to Expressionist journals
with inflammatory titles like Storm and Action. Indeed in a sense it is
38 Butler, EM, 38.
39 There is undoubtedly a connection with the interest of Expressionist writers in Chinese
and oriental literature and art. Sokel notes: "Some of the best lyric poetry of Expressionism
is, like the poetry of Surrealism, imagist in character. The sharply outlined dreamlike image
or image-scene forms its basis. It resembles in this respect the poetry of the Far East with its
brief evocative scenes and largely visual appeal to the emotions. This similarity is not
accidental. Rimbaud's Illuminations, which deeply influenced both Surrealism and
Expressionism, were in turn influenced by Mile Gautier's French translations of Oriental
poetry, and strong interest in Chinese and Japanese poetry and art preceded the rise of
Imagist poetry in English, Surrealist poetry in French, and Expressionist poetry in German."
Sokel, WE, 43.
40 There was perhaps a reflection here of the longstanding German tendency to contrast
civilization unfavourably with culture, stated famously by Thomas Mann in his
Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen of 1918: "Deutschtum, das ist Kultur, Seele, Freiheit, Kunst
und nicht Zivilisation, Gesellschaft, Stimmrecht, Literatur." Mann Gesammelte Werke (12
vols.) Frankfurt am Main, 1960, xii, 31.
misleading to repeat the idea that the Expressionists were singled out from
their contemporaries by their pre-visions of war, doom and destruction,
chaos and annihilation, the twilight of man-kind,—they were merely giving
their particular form of expression to much more widely held longings for
release from unbearable restrictions.41
What, though, was the source of these apprehensions? What were the
unbearable restrictions that were so widely felt? An answer here requires
attention to the state of German society more widely. Europe in general, and
Germany in particular, had undergone a rapid process of economic
modernization in the period prior to 1914; and this process was one of the
chief sources of the pressures reflected in modernist movements. As David
Harvey writes: "Modernism is a troubled and fluctuating aesthetic response
to conditions of modernity produced by a particular process of
modernization."42 For a description of these conditions, Harvey turns to the
analysis of capitalism formulated by Marx and Engels in The communist
manifesto. They argued there that the new international economic order had
been bought at a price:
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all
social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the
bourgeois epoch from all earlier times. All fixed, fast-frozen relationships,
with their train of venerable ideas and opinions, are swept away, all new-
formed ones become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid melts
into air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to face with
sober sense the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their
fellow men.43
The process of capitalist modernization, Harvey summarizes, tends towards
a disruption of social relations and experience, marked by "individualism,
alienation, fragmentation, ephemerality, innovation, creative destruction,
speculative development, unpredictable shifts in methods of production and
consumption (wants and needs), a shifting experience of space and time, as
well as a crisis-ridden dynamic of social change".44
44 In his introduction to Vision and Aftermath: Four Expressionist War Plays trans. J.M. Ritchie
and J.D. Stowell, (Calder & Boyars, London, 1969), 7.
42 David Harvey The Condition ofPostmodernity. An Enquiry into the Origins ofCultural
Change (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989), 99.
43 Quoted by Harvey, op. cit. 100.
44 Ibid. 111.
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Certainly Germany's population and economy had grown steadily and
rapidly throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early
years of the twentieth century. The middle of the nineteenth century was the
point at which Germany turned from its pre-industrial past and began to
become a modern industrial society. In the words of Walther Rathenau in
1912: "Through the middle of the last century runs a sharp division. Beyond
it lies the old age, old fashioned culture, past history; on this side are our
fathers and us, the modern age, the present."45 There had been steady
movement of population away from rural areas and employment in
agriculture and forestry to urban areas and employment in industry.46 By
1914, both Berlin and Vienna had reached a population of two million.47
New technology - railways and trams, the motor car, the bicycle, the
telephone, the typewriter, domestic and industrial electricity - transformed
urban life during these years.48 The social institutions of Wilhelmine
Germany, however, were placed under pressure by the steady construction
of a modern industrial economy. There was a widely felt need for a new
ordering of society; but the inflexibility of pre-war patterns meant that the
task of social modernization was not able to begin in earnest until after the
war. 49
By the end of the War, then, there was a widespread desire not just for a
new political leadership, but for a fundamental change, for some decisively
new social order. Hopes for a new social order were greatly intensified by
the events of the War years: by disillusionment about the War itself, which
grew considerably after the initial euphoria of 1914; by virtue of the
45 Walther Rathenau 'Zur Kritik der Zeit' in Gesammelte Schriften vol. i, (Berlin, 1925), 11.
Quoted in Ritchie Robertson Kafka: Judaism, Politics and Literature (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1985), 38. (My translation.)
46 See W.H. Bruford Germany in the Eighteenth Century: The Social Background of the Literary
Revival (C.U.P., Cambridge, 1935), 159-60.
47 Robertson, Kafka, 38.
48 See Norman Stone Europe Transformed 1878-1919 (Glasgow, 1983), 79-81, quoted in
Robertson, Kafka, 38-9.
49 See D. Peukert The Weimar Republic trans. R. Deveson, (Penguin, London, 1991), 277: "The
years before the outbreak of the First WorldWar had already been marked by the
challenges of modernization, by a questioning of previously undisputed assumptions about
society and culture ... After the war these phenomena took centre stage, stripped of the
familiar reassuring veils of national mythology which had still disguised them during the
Wilhelmine era. ... The Janus-faced nature of the process of modernization became a fact of
everyday life; it dominated cultural discourse."
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significant hardships suffered by civilians as well as the military; and by the
outcome of the War - defeat for Germany. In June 1917 there were hunger
strikes on naval vessels; in July the Reichstag passed a resolution calling for
an honourable peace; there were many strikes and other acts of dissent and
protest, through 1917 and 1918. As Peukert notes: "The euphoria that had
swept through the masses in 1914 had long since given way to
disillusionment".50 The combined effect of the pre-War pressures for
modernization and the experience of the War meant that when the conflict
ended and the Republic was proclaimed, extravagant hopes were invested
in the new era.
Inevitably, many of these hopes were disappointed. The expectations placed
in the Weimar Republic were far too great; but most importantly the
political and economic circumstances in which it was born greatly
constrained its successive governments. Disillusionment was not slow in
coming. Ronald Taylor quotes a diary entry of Count Kessler: "Thursday,
May 1, 1919. A national holiday. Everything closed, even restaurants and
bars. An atmosphere of national mourning for the revolution that came to
naught."51 The reasons for this rapid disappointment are complex. As
mentioned above, the hopes invested in the Republic were unrealistic from
the start. And undoubtedly the conflicts and disagreements between
different social and political groups did not help. But an important
additional factor was that there was a social and political vacuum left by the
end of the monarchy and the rejection of the concept of monarchist
government. To a large extent the administration of affairs went on much as
it had done before, but without the monarchial structure which had
legitimated it, providing a focus for a sense of national values and identity.
Taylor quotes Rudolf Wissell, a Socialist minister in the first Republican
government, speaking in June 1919:
We have been governing in the old ways, and there has been little sign of a
new spirit infusing the old procedures ... The essential character of German
culture and social life has hardly changed, and even the few observable
changes have hardly been for the better. The people believe that the
achievements of the revolution are purely negative in character, that the
only difference is in the set of officials who exercise military and
50 Peukert, op. cit. 25.
51 Taylor, op. cit. 12.
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bureaucratic control, and that the principles of the present government do
not differ in essence from those of the former regime.52
Republicanism and parliamentary democracy were not exactly well rooted
traditions in German public life, and there were from the start reactionary
elements which portrayed them as foreign imports, unfit for the German
people.55 The Republic's legitimacy was further undermined by the
problems and crises of its early years: the widespread anger at the terms of
the Treaty of Versailles, and particularly its 'war-guilt clause';54 outrage at
the French invasion of the Ruhr in 1923; continuing political tensions and
crises, including the 'Spartacist uprising' of January 1919, the Munich
Rdterepublik of April-May 1919, the Kapp putsch of March 1920, outbreaks of
fighting between left and right wing militias, the murders of prominent
figures in political and public life; all against the background of an economy
unable to provide for and sustain the reconstruction of German society, and
which collapsed in an inflationary spiral in 1923.
Yet for all this the Weimar Republic was in many ways a period of
remarkable success. Peukert says:
It was during the Weimar years that the main features of the contemporary
world took shape and that modern ideas and movements in social policy,
technology, the sciences, the humanities, art, music, architecture and
literature achieved their breakthrough. In less than a decade and a half
virtually every social and intellectual initiative we think of as modern was
formulated or put into practice.55
Despite its flaws, and despite the economic difficulties which undermined it
and greatly contributed to its end, it nonetheless achieved to an
extraordinary degree the modernization of German society. It was, as
Peukert notes, not only a time of economic, political and social crisis: it was
52 Taylor, op. cit. 12.
53 Taylor, p. 12, mentions Oswald Spengler's view that "the war had taught Germany
nothing: she had failed to find her true, that is, Prussian, self, with the qualities on which
alone could the true German state be built, and attempts to import such alien traditions as
those of English liberalism and French democracy, let alone the ponderous superficial
principles ofMarxist class-warfare, would quickly be shown up for the irrelevancies that
they were."
54 An excellent account of the settlement at Versailles can be found in A. Lentin Guilt at
Versailles. Lloyd George and the pre-history ofAppeasement (Methuen, London, 1985).
55 Peukert, op. cit. 275-6.
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also "the archetypal emblem of what we understand by modernity" 56
iii. After 1914: Expressionism, war and peace.
Expressionism was by no means isolated from all that was going on around
it. The link between its restlessness in the Wilhelmine world and a more
widespread sense of unrest has already been noted. The development of
Expressionism through the war years and into the Republic continued to
reflect the social and political situation. Perhaps the most visible example of
this was the Messianic Expressionism (as Sokel calls it) which was
characteristic of the period around the end of the War. In it the "visualization
of subconscious or existential states became the vision of social renewal".57
Expressionist longings were transferred "to the ethical and utopian-political
sphere". 58 At its best it combined ethical idealism and psychological insight
in a vision of "inner regeneration through outer revolt"50 Expressionism
united, then, with the general tendency to invest the fledgling Republic with
extraordinary expectations for social and spiritual renewal. It is a great
mistake, though, to think of this movement, with its ecstatic proclamation of
the 'new man', as the whole of Expressionism. Just as there was a wide
spectrum in the earliest Expressionist writers between visions of destruction
and hope, so there is a wide spectrum of views in the wartime and post-war
periods, in relation to social and political reality.60
R. Hinton Thomas offered a typology differentiating three further
56 Peukert, op. cit. 164.
57 Sokel, WE, 162.
58 Ibid. 111.
59 rbid. 163.
60 Sokel's view is therefore distinct from the line taken in Paulsen's influential study
Expressionismus und Activismus. Paulsen distinguished an activist tendency from
Expressionism proper: activism, he suggested, was marked by its concern with practical
social and political reform, in distinction from Expressionism proper which strongly
resisted the compromises such an approach necessarily involved. Activism, however, is
better seen as a divergent stand within Expressionism. Certainly several individuals who
would have to be classed as activists - Ernst Toller, Johannes Becher, Walter Hasenclever
and Georg Kaiser - were significant figures in the development of Expressionism. The
activist tendency was, moreover, presentwithin Expressionism right from the beginning.
The journal Die Aktion identified itself from the start with radicalism in literature and
politics, and called for the formation of a "great German Left". See Samuel and Thomas,
Expressionism, 92. See also Raabe, EGE, 37, where Claire Jung, recalling the years 1910-11,
refers to Die Aktion as a "literary and political journal".
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tendencies besides activism: first a group who share much of the rationalism
of the activists, but not their hopes, taking, on the whole, a sceptical view of
social reality - writers like Gustav Sack and Gottfried Benn; secondly a more
optimistic strand which tends towards nationalism, in that it sees the bond
between individual and nation as offering the hope of the new community;
third the purest group in Thomas' view, which he calls the religious
Expressionists. These writers did not identify Expressionist hopes with any
particular vision of social renewal, focussing more intensely on the
individual, on spiritual transformation, or on the relation of God and
humanity - figures like FranzWerfel, Kasimir Edschmid, and Paul Kornfeld.
Attitudes to social and political issues were brought into sharper focus by
the political events of the period, most notably the War. Many Expressionist
artists and writers (whether activist or not) took a strongly anti-War stance
in 1914. Some served in the military despite this; others did not - several of
them leaving Germany for neutral Switzerland. Others joined in the general
mood of cathartic enthusiasm for the war. When disillusion set in however,
particularly in 1916, faced with the barbarity and apparent senselessness of
the conflict, this group's outlook changed.61 'Transformation' (Wandlung)
became a key description not only of the experience of this group but of its
message. Ernst Toller is perhaps the most striking representative of this. He
was a volunteer at the beginning of the war and served for two years at the
front line. After his health had broken down, he experienced a profound
personal transformation, and wrote the partly autobiographical play Die
Wandlung.62 Its message is "humanity". In his final speech the main
character, Friedrich, lambasts the repressiveness of the old order - its
authoritarianism, the dehumanizing routine of industrialized labour, the
misery and degradation of urban poverty. To people living under such
conditions Friedrich offers his gospel of humanity: "you could still be men
61 There was, then, a gradual convergence between different strands of Expressionism in
their view of the War. Samuel comments: "All the writers believed that the War was mainly
the outcome of a decayed state of society, ruled by the combined forces of mammonism and
State-autocracy, which must be destroyed before new aims could be realised.... They were
filled with enthusiastic hope that the new day had dawned and that their ideals could be
attained." (Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 101-2)
62 it was begun in 1917 and completed in prison in 1919. It had its first performance in
Berlin that year and made a great impact. See Expressionist Texts Ed. M. Gordon, (PAJ
publications, New York, 1986), 156.
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and women, still be human, if only you had faith in yourselves and in
humanity, if only you would grant the spirit its fulfilment". The response
comes: "To think that we ever forgot! We are men, men and women!" The
play concludes with a call for the people to go out and proclaim revolution,
a cry which the crowd takes up and repeats enthusiastically.63
The war years brought an upturn in interest in Expressionism, particularly
for drama, which had made a limited public impact before the war. Many of
the early Expressionist plays had to wait several years for a performance.64
During the course of the War there was a widespread shift in public
attitudes: "The wave of patriotic enthusiasm subsided, the military situation
grew worse and the economic situation inside Germany threatened
starvation." This led to an atmosphere altogether more receptive to
Expressionism:
In the deep spiritual and material distress caused by the War, only one hope
remained, namely that after the War there would come a brighter and better
time. ... It is intelligible, therefore, that the apocalyptic messages of the
young writers were more heeded in the later years of the War than the more
traditional poetry.65
However the experience of war gave the Expressionist an even greater cause
to hope for better future. As Sokel noted they expected their own Wandlung
to be mirrored everywhere:
The World War seemed to be everybody's fault. But it was also everybody's
punishment. It was the inferno. Men, the Expressionists believed, could not
endure the losses and heartbreaks which war inflicted without changing
profoundly. Exaggerating the limited echoes they did find, the
Expressionists believed that the whole nation shared the experience they
themselves underwent. They underestimated the persistence of traditional
patterns of behaviour. They had the eschatological faith in the final event, ...
the Wandlung, which would ring out at the end of history and usher in the
beginning of perfection. Any road out of hell, they thought, would have to
63 Gordon, Expressionist Texts, 206-7.
64 For example Der Bettler, though published in 1912, was not performed until after Sorge's
death in the war in 1916. See Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 34-5: "Der Bettler was first
produced by the 'Gesellschaft des Jungen Deutschland' on 23rd December, 1917, but it had
been influential since its publication five years previously." (See also Raabe, EGE, 235.)
Another example is Georg Kaiser's From Morn toMidnight, also written in 1912 but not
produced until 1917. Prior to 1917, Kaiser had seen only two of his twenty five plays
performed. See Gordon, ibid. 48.
65 Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 102.
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lead to paradise.66
The proclamation of the Republic on the 9th of November 1918 seemed to
many Expressionists to offer hope for the realization of their dreams. This
was particularly true of the activists; but the early years of the Weimar
Republic were the heyday of all branches of Expressionism. Plays that had
struggled to gain a first performance were produced all over Germany;
poets that had sold only a few copies on first publication became widely
known through bestselling anthologies. The outsiders of the Empire, as
Peter Gay noted, became the insiders of the Republic. The pattern was
repeated time and again: "ideas developed in the Empire, given political
direction by theWar, and finding open expression in the revolution".67
As noted earlier, though, disillusionment with the revolution and the
Republic set in quickly. Inevitably, therefore, the "ecstasy of the activist-
Expressionist vision lasts only for a moment in history".68 The important
thing to note, though, is that the loss of faith in the immediate realization of
a Utopian society and the associated 'demise of the new man'69 did not mean
the abandonment of Expressionism as such. It did not even mean the
abandonment of its hopes. On the contrary there was a reaction within
Expressionism suggesting both disillusionment with messianic optimism
and a reinterpretation of its eschatological hopes.
Not surprisingly this tendency is evident among some of the more idealist
Expressionists. Paul Kornfeld, for example, talked in his 1918 essay 'Der
beseelte und psychologische Mensch' of the need to supersede the state
rather than transform it: 'The mission of Art is to draw man's attention away
from the meaningless world of politics to 'that world in which the qualities
66 Sokel, WE, 179-80.
67 Gay Weimar Culture 9.
68 Sokel, WE, 192.
69 See B.D. Webb The Demise of the New Man: an analysis often playsfrom late German
Expressionism (Kummerle, Goppinger, 1973).
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of his higher spiritual nature are alive.' "70 However even among the
activists a new outlook is evident: a 'second Wandlung' takes place. Ernst
Toller's Masse-Mensch (Man and the Masses) written in 1919 is a good
example. Toller had played a leading role in the failed Munich Raterepublik
of the spring of that year. One of the painful lessons of that experience had
been his discovery of the great gap between his intellectual-humanitarian
socialism and the outlook of the masses. Toller discovered that his fellow
revolutionaries
were motivated not by the dream of man's divinity but by hatred of the
bourgeois. They wanted to shoot all bourgeois hostages, whom Toller tried
to save at the risk of his life. For this humanitarianism, his Communist allies
denounced him as 'petty bourgeois' and had him arrested.71
Masse-Mensch differs from the earlier Die Wandlung in that the intellectual is
separated from the masses by an unbridgeable gulf. Where the hero of the
earlier work, Friedrich, had succeeded in stirring the people to follow him,
the Woman in Masse-Mensch fails in her appeals and is left alone. But
pessimism is not the necessary result of the second Wandlung: the Woman
renounces violence completely, even though to do so will cost her her life.
She still believes that a better world will come, but it has been pushed into a
distant future. This reduced and modified optimism was fragile, however.
Sokel pointed out that in his correspondence during this period Toller
lamented his loss of activist faith and bemoaned the isolation which the
second Wandlung implies - isolation from the proletariat as well as the
bourgeoisie.72 Toller's drama Hinkemann of 1921-22, conveys a strong sense
of the inescapable tragedy of existence. This is not to say that optimism has
been extinguished entirely, though. Killing and mockery go on and on but
they are not necessary. Things could be different. The play ends on an
7(1 Quoted in Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 116. This tendency, of course, posed some
quite serious dangers for the Republic. Note the comments ofMartin Swales: "it is
important to note that a great deal of what passed for political debate in the short-lived
existence of theWeimar Republic was curiously devoid of a modest and practical
consideration of political aims and means. The legacy of Expressionism was anything but
helpful in this respect: over and over again political aspirations were framed in terms of
some vatic transfiguration of banal reality: redemption (Erlosung) rather than legislation
assumes a central place in the political vocabulary." M. Swales "In Defence ofWeimar:
Thomas Mann and the Politics of Republicanism" in Weimar Germany: Writers and Politics
ed. A.F. Bance, (Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1982), 7.
71 Sokel, WE, 196-7.
72 Ibid. 200-1.
ambiguous note: "Any day can bring the Kingdom of Heaven, any night the
End of the World."73 Hope exists, albeit in symbiosis with judgement.
The extent of the recoil from activism is demonstrated by Fritz von Unruh's
Platz of 1920, in which the antagonist of the Expressionist hero also speaks in
an Expressionist manner.74 The play indicates the self-accusation of
Expressionism, the fear that the new world envisaged by activism actually
tended towards the demagogic and tyrannical. A similar movement is
evident in Max Brod's novel of 1919, Das grosse Wagnis (The Great Risk). It
satirises the activist ideal by presenting a community of 'new men' which is
supposed to embody reason and freedom but which in fact becomes a
totalitarian nightmare. Brod was in this period moving towards embracing
Zionism. His second Wandlung meant a narrowing of hope from a universal
ideal of humanity to a religious-national programme. Sokel calls this "both a
restriction and an interiorization of hope."75 It is a typical development of
late Expressionism: as some embraced Zionism, others (such as Hanns Johst)
embraced Nazism, while others (Johannes Becher for example) turned to
Communism. The pattern had been established much earlier by Sorge, who
had converted to Roman Catholicism by 1914.75
iv. Expressionism in the context of modernism.
I want now to turn from the particular history of Expressionism to the wider
context provided by modernism. There are two questions that need to be
addressed: what were the fundamental concerns of cultural modernism in
the early years of this century?; and how does Expressionism relate to this
international modernism and its concerns? The first of these questions will
be addressed primarily in this section; the second will be dealt with
primarily in the next. A good place to begin is with David Harvey's
observation, noted above, that the modernity produced by technological
73 Vision and Aftermath op. cit. 208. Sokel notes, though, that there were other outcomes:
Georg Kaiser in particular never regained the activist optimism of 1919, his late work being
decidedly pessimistic.
74 Sokel, WE, 203-5. See also Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 162.
75 Ibid. 209.
76 Many other examples could be given. Herwarth Walden turned to communism and
emigrated to Russia, while Lothar Schreyer, his friend and colleague on Der Sturm, gave his
allegiance to the Christian Church. See Raabe, EGE, 199.
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change and economic modernization tends towards a disruption of social
relations and experience. In particular, Harvey emphasizes the extent to
which ephemerality and contingency characterize modern experience.
It is interesting, then, that the most common denominator of modernism
was its break with the notion of art as representation, or at least with the
established conventions of representation. George Steiner has drawn
attention to how nineteenth century poets such as Rimbaud, Mallarme and
Holderlin began to think in terms of poetry as a subversion of the
conventions of everyday language, rather than just an extension of them.
These poets helped initiate a "new programme for language and for
literature" whose "subversions of linearity, of the logic of time and of cause
so far as they are mirrored in grammar ... are far more than a poetic
strategy. They embody a revolt of literature against language."77
Christopher Butler notes a related movement in late nineteenth century art
subverting the established conventions of representation. He uses the
example of Cezanne's Apples and Oranges of c. 1899, in which the perspective
is not 'true', and the relation of the objects in the picture seems to suggest
that the artist had moved about and painted his subject from slightly
different angles. Contemporary critics of such work, he notes, questioned
whether Cezanne's vision was defective, or whether his technique was
simply inadequate. Yet it quickly became appreciated that such painting
was concerned with the overall form of the image, rather than with
traditional descriptive convention. Butler quotes the critic Emile Bernard,
writing in 1904 of how Cezanne had advanced beyond Impressionism, in his
raising of form towards a decorative conception and of colour towards the
most musical pitch. So that as the artist works on, the further he gets from
objectivity, from the opacity of the model he started from, and the deeper he
goes into sheer painting for its own sake: the more he abstracts his picture,
the more broadly he simplifies it, after a narrow, conforming, hesitant
commencement.78
Butler notes how such paintings draw attention to the fact that they are
designs on flat surfaces, and as such make their own methods visible. When
77 Steiner After Babel: aspects of language and translation (OUP, London, 1975), 183. Quoted by
Butler, EM, 8-9.
78 Butler, EM, 13.
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this is appreciated, Cezanne's paintings can be appreciated as a series,
"intriguing the spectator by displaying the development of their own
method".79 This introduces a powerful relativism into the practice and
appreciation of painting, since "no one version can claim to be adequate to
the complexity of the objects it purports to represent". There is more than
one way of seeing, more than one set of conventions by which the painter
may depict his or her subject. Modernist literature offers parallel examples
of this relativism: Butler draws attention to the deliberate use of stylistic
variation in modernist writing, citing the divergent styles employed in the
different episodes of James Joyce's Ulysses as a climax of this tendency.80
The avant-garde nature of the movements that constitute modernism is
related to this relativism: an emphasis on experimental technique and
individual style is the means by which the old conventions can be
superseded or destroyed.
Does this emphasis on the conventions of artistic production, though, mean
that modernism's concerns were essentially aesthetic? Was it at bottom
a self-critical examination by artists of their own procedures? Such formalist
approaches have certainly been advocated by influential critics, such as
Clement Greenberg.81 Butler rightly rejects such accounts emphatically,
arguing instead that the new techniques of modernism reflect new ideas.
The relativism inherent in modernism's rejection of established conventions
of representation reflects a relativism in modern experience, a sense that the
world of appearance is not the world of truth, a doubt about the human
capacity to grasp truth in the midst of appearance, and ultimately about the
ability of human language to connect to anything outside itself. The crisis of
artistic representation intimates a crisis in our confidence in our ability to
represent the world to ourselves in language, a crisis of the word. It is here
that modernism connects to the situation described by Harvey. The
experience of modernity, marked by ephemerality and contingency,
79 Butler, EM, 14.
80 Ibid. 29.
81 Ibid. 14. See Clement Greenberg 'Modernist Painting' inArt and Literature no. 4, (Spring
1965) 193-201, reproduced in Modern Art and Modernism (Harper & Row, London, 1982), 5-
10. The tenor of Greenberg's view is indicated by the following quote: "Realistic, illusionist
art had dissembled the medium, using art to conceal art. Modernism used art to call
attention to art. ... Whereas one tends to see what is in an Old Master before seeing it as a
picture, one sees a Modernist painting as a picture first." (p. 6.)
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undermines the stable modes of representation employed in realistic fiction
and art.
Harvey expands on this by emphasizing the importance of our changing
experience of space and time as a result of technological innovation and
economic modernization. He suggests that the development of capitalist
modes of production and the consequent industrialization and urbanization
of society, including the development of new technologies of
communication, resulted in a crisis in people's experience of space and time.
He characterizes this process by the phrase 'space-time compression', which
he explains as follows:
I mean to signal by that term processes that so revolutionize the objective
qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite
radical ways, how we represent the world to ourselves. I use the word
'compression' because a strong case can be made that the history of
capitalism has been characterized by speed-up in the pace of life, while so
overcoming spatial barriers that the world sometimes seems to collapse
inwards upon us. ... As space appears to shrink to a 'global village' of
telecommunications and a 'spaceship earth' of economic and ecological
interdependencies - to use just two familiar and everyday images, and as
time horizons shorten to the point where the present is all there is (the
world of the schizophrenic), so we have to learn how to cope with an
overwhelming sense of compression of our spatial and temporal worlds.82
The rapid industrial and economic development of Europe from 1850-1914
resulted, Harvey suggests, in just this experience of 'space-time
compression'. The importance of this for cultural modernism is that it led to
a crisis of representation. The changing experience of space and time
"undermined the cogency and meaning of realist fiction and painting".83
Realistic art necessarily depicts a particular time and a particular place; but
the rapidly shrinking horizons of space and time undermine the necessary
sense of fixed space and linear time.
The varied directions taken by modernism can be understood, then, both as
expressions of a crisis of representation, and as responses to the distinctive
ephemerality and transience of modern life. The emphasis on expression
reflects a shift in attention from the outer world of appearance and change;
82 Harvey, op. cit. 240.
83 Ibid. 265.
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value and truth are sought in intuitively grasped emotion, rather than in the
material realm. Abstraction tends to serve expressive ends, displacing the
goal of representation entirely, in many cases. Cubism, on the other hand,
while it was an extension of earlier attacks on realism, began as a radically
new way of representing, a form of simplification rather than abstraction.84
Unlike Kandinsky, neither Braque nor Picasso provided any theoretical
account of their ideas or aims.85 However one of the their early followers,
Jean Metzinger, provided what has proved a valuable insight, pointing out
that Cubism had "uprooted the prejudice that commanded the painter to
remain motionless in front of the object".86 The fragmentation of space in
Cubist painting can be seen, in other words, as resulting from the use of
various views of the object painted. The point usually taken from this is that
such paintings contain the experience of passing time. They break with
methods of painting which attempt to capture the object at one particular
moment. This thought is taken up by Harvey, who suggests that Cubism
"tried to represent time through a fragmentation of space".87 The Cubist
attack on realism can also be seen, in that case, as a reflection of the modern
experience of fleetingness and the accelerating experience of time.88
A useful additional point about Cubism is the observation that it is
84 Butler argues, though, that its rapid development took it very quickly in the direction of
abstract art: "His [Braque's] work then evolved with startling speed towards painting in
which representational elements are not much more than alluded to, so that the image
serves intuitively conceived expressive purposes of a very complex kind. Its implied
aesthetic, if not its method, is in the end very similar to that of Schoenberg and Kandinsky,
though not perceived to be so at the time. This is because as Cubism 'progresses',
subservience to an object... is so adroitly blocked, that the rationale for the painting has
ultimately to lie within the artist's creative play." (p. 56) Butler therefore is able to point out
that "early Cubism is at base just as 'Expressionist' as the work of Kandinsky, because the
placing of most of the elements within the picture plane is intuitive and unconstrained by
mimetic convention" (p. 69).
85 Butler says: "The Cubists are too often credited with having had a new view of reality,
whereas it seems that neither Picasso nor Braque were really capable of this kind of
thought." (p. 67.) See however note 94 below.
86 Quoted by Butler, EM, 69.
87 Harvey, op. cit. 267. Harvey also notes the parallel with James Joyce's method of writing
at this time, designed to capture a sense of simultaneity. Simultaneity is an extremely
important theme for modernist art and literature in general: see Butler, particularly pp. 156-
167. Note also van Hoddis' 'Weltende' above, in which a sense of simultaneity is important.
88 A more explicit attempt to represent speed and movement is found in some of the work
of the Italian Futurists, for example in paintings by Boccioni and in poetry by Marinetti. See
Butler, 137-153.
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characterized by a sense of 'spatial continuity'.89 Butler describes this with
reference to Braque's Le Port of 1909. He notes how areas which suggest
realistic perspective are contradicted by others which seem to press forward
to the picture plane, the net result being that the work appears almost like a
'bas relief' sculpture. There is no clear distinction between objects and
background. In short, the picture "makes everything, sea, sky, boats, and the
space in between, seem equally solid, and locked together in the picture
plane."90 The spatial continuity developed here is very evident in the
pictures Braque and Picasso produced in 1909, Butler points out. In these
pictures "The painter no longer respects the identities of the separate objects
before which he stands, but 'materializes' the space between them. "91 Butler
is wary of making too much of this aspect of Cubism, lest he be guilty of
mistaking analogies for causes.
There seems to me, though, to be an obvious point to be made about this
blurring of the distinction between 'subject' and 'background'. In such
paintings, what are in question are the contexts of meaning in virtue of
which the object is more important than the background. What is being
painted is space; what is in doubt is the context which might make one piece
of space (that occupied by a boat or a girl) more significant than another
piece of space (that which surrounds them). There is a parallel here with the
type of modernist poetry which juxtaposes apparently significant and trivial
events. Van Hoddis' Weltende was of course a paradigmatic Expressionist
example of this, where trains falling from bridges are placed alongside
people having colds. 92 There are also parallels with the some of the collage¬
like poetry written by Apollinaire around 1913, such as 'Lundi rue
Christine',93 and indeed with the collage pictures which Picasso had begun
to produce in 1912. Picasso himself later said of such works:
89 The phrase is Butler's, p. 59.
90 Ibid. 59.
91 Ibid. 60.
92 An affinity between the apocalyptic strand of Expressionism and the fragmentation of
space in early Cubismis suggested by the German painter Ludwig Meidner's comment that
he did not follow Kandinsky or Matisse with their "decorative and ornamental designs" but
rather Robert Delaunay "who inaugurated our movementwith his grand vision of the Tour
Eiffel". Quoted ibid. 178.
93 See ibid. 165-7.
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If a piece of newspaper can become a bottle, that gives us something to
think about in connection with both newspaper and bottles, too. This
displaced object has entered a universe for which it was not made and
where it retains, in a measure, its strangeness. And this strangeness was
what we wanted to make people think about because we were quite aware
that our world was becoming very strange and not exactly reassuring. 94
It is no exaggeration then to say that one of the basic impulses of modernist
art and literature is to place a question mark against the contexts and
conventions which have customarily organized and given meaning to
experience. In drawing attention to the 'strangeness' of the world, modernist
movements questioned the narratives which had served to shape it and
allowed its identification as order rather than chaos. For some, this was
experienced as an inevitable development of art along scientific lines; for
others it was a liberation of art and even of the human spirit; for others it
was perhaps primarily a loss of meaning and value. As Butler says,
modernist writers:
salvage the bits from past history that they want, or redeem fragments from
the chaos of a present which has become incomprehensible in terms of
traditional organizing narrative. There is an extraordinary internalization of
a confusing external experience (of multiplicity, uncertainty, and conflict)
into a collage whose form imposes upon us the simultaneity of things,
precisely by depriving them of the usual forms of analytical interconnection.
The question then haunts the rest of Modernist (and Postmodernist) art,
whether this is not in fact a kind of defeat, ... a renunciation of the attempt
to give an order to things, a despair of history ... .95
If the above account is correct, and modernism is rightly understood as
more than a formalist self-examination on the part of artists and writers,
then we ought to expect the preoccupations of modernism to crop up
elsewhere in the period, outwith the realm of artistic and literary
production. If modernism's new techniques were indeed related to ideas, we
should be able to locate other instances of these ideas. Was there, then, a
more widespread apprehension of a crisis of the representative power of
language? Was there a relativism about apprehensions of truth and value,
and a sense of the loss of contexts and conventions which had organized
and given meaning to experience? I would suggest that an affirmative
94 Quoted by Butler, EM, 167, from F. Gilot and C. Lake Life with Picasso (New York, 1964),
77.
95 Butler, EM, 175.
answer can be given. Several of the most significant contributions to modern
thought betray similar concerns. Ferdinand de Saussure, generally regarded
as the founder of modern linguistics, developed his most distinctive and
influential ideas around 1911. He emphasized that language is a structured
system of signs, which operates on the basis of arbitrary convention, by
means of the relation of signs to each other in a system, at a particular time.
Words have meaning in virtue of their relations to other words, rather than
by a relation reference to the world. In this way Saussure's emphasis on the
role of convention in language parallels the modernist doubt about the
ability of language to connect to or depict a reality outside itself.
A little earlier, philosophers had begun to take a new interest in language,
and, in particular, questions of the relation between language and the world.
Gottlob Frege's 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung'96 of 1892 distinguished between
the semantic content of language and its reference to an object. He pointed
out that there is more to meaning that the relation between language and an
object, but he nonetheless affirmed the referential function of language.
Frege's solution (in which names refer to objects, predicates to concepts, and
sentences to truth values) was rather counter-intuitive, however, and
seemed to some to be a mystification of, rather than a clarification of, the
relation between language and the world. Bertrand Russell's classic paper of
1905 On Denoting97 is equally concerned with the relation between language
and the world, if not more so. It attempted to develop and defend a strictly
referential view of meaning. To do so, Russell outlined a method of
analysing the 'definite descriptions' which appear in sentences of natural
language, until they consisted purely of 'logically proper names' and simple
predicates or relations. Meaning is guaranteed by the reference of these
'logically proper names' to objects of immediate experience.
The apogee of referential theories of meaning was undoubtedly
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, written during the War while
its author served with the Austrian Army, but not published until 1921. In
96 Originally published in Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, vol. 100 (1892),
25-50. English translation in Translationsfrom the Philosophical Writings ofGottlob Frege ed. P.
Geach and M. Black, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1952), 56-78.
97 Mind (1905) 479-493.
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the Tractatus it is not logically proper names that refer but propositions, and
they do so in the manner of pictures. They must share logical form with the
thing pictured; but equally they must have representational form - which is
to say that they are not identical with the thing pictured. The choice of
particular signs to serve as symbols in this way is acknowledged to be a
matter of arbitrary convention. Like Russell's views, though, Wittgenstein's
theory is a form of logical atomism: propositions in natural language must
be analysed until their elements are simple, and correspond to logically
simple objects. 98 The attempt to provide a theory of representation leads to
the positing of logically simple objects which cannot be specified but must
be supposed to exist in order for language to be meaningful. The 'linguistic
turn' that such philosophies amount to reflects an increasing concern for the
connection between language and the world. Wittgenstein later saw his
early philosophy as unsuccessful; his concern for language remained, but he
ceased to see a theory of representation as the necessary basis for
understanding the meaningful use of language. 99
It is interesting that in the very era in which art and literature turn away
from realism and question the conventions of representation, linguistics and
linguistic philosophy should emerge as essentially new disciplines
concerned with the nature of language and its connection with the world.
Further food for thought is provided by Harvey. He points to several
distinct areas of significant historical change and development which can be
seen to reflect the issues already raised. One such development was the new
physics of Einstein, whose theories of special relativity and general relativity
date from 1905 and 1916 respectively. In presenting space and time as
something other than the stable, fixed categories of common sense, Einstein
drew on and supported the notion of non-Euclidian geometries developed
in the 19th century. As such, the new physics reinforced the relativism
which was replacing the Enlightenment idea of a single, shared, rational
98 Unlike Russell, though, Wittgenstein's atomism was not an attempt to give language an
epistemological grounding.
99 Articulating similar concerns, and part of the background to Wittgenstein's Tractatus,
was the sceptical nominalism of Fritz Mauthner's Beitrage zur Kritik der Sprache, published at
the beginning of the century. A useful description of Mauthner's views can be found in
Wittgenstein's Vienna by Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, (Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
London, 1973), 120-133.
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perspective on reality. "It is hard" says Harvey, "not to conclude that the
whole world of representation and of knowledge underwent a fundamental
transformation during this short space of time."too
v. Modernism, alienation and Expressionist longings.
Though discussions of modernity tend to focus on the transformation of
"the whole world of representation and of knowledge", few commentators
have paused to acknowledge that modernism's concerns and ideas owe an
enormous debt to the writings of Immanuel Kant. Walter Sokel is one who
does record the peculiar significance of Kant for modernism in general and
Expressionism in particular. He says: "The philosophical foundation of
modernism, and indeed a good part of its program, are to be found in
Kant."The reasons for this bold claim are actually very simple. "Both
historically and epistemologically", Sokel points out, "the theory of mimesis
is connected with the belief in a cosmos."102 Kant, he suggests, challenged
the pre-modern notion that there is a relation between the human subject
and nature. Sokel's description of Kant on this point is worth quoting at
length:
Nature, for Kant, is not a given framework in whichman has his place, but a
construction which our mind imposes upon phenomena. Without the mind
there would be no nature since there would be no quantitative formulations
called laws of nature and, therefore, no ordered universe. It is we who
connect phenomena through causality and relation. It is we who have to
perceive phenomena in succession and call this subjective necessity time; it
100 Harvey, op. cit. 28-9. Another development mentioned by Harvey, though less
important for my purpose here, is the emergence of modern ideas and practices in
industrial management and production. F.W. Taylor's The Principles ofScientific
Management was published in 1911, and in 1913 Henry Ford set up the world's first
assembly-line production system in Dearborn, Michigan. By the fragmentation and
reorganization of space, Harvey argues, Ford accelerated the process of production and
therefore the turnover time of capital in production. Ford fragmented the process of
manufacture into distinct tasks, all carried out simultaneously by the workforce on a
constantly moving series of products. Such a procedure, in Harvey's view, parallels the
emphasis on simultaneity in modernist culture, and particularly in the fragmentation of
space in cubist painting. It could perhaps also be said that such a process is an especially
effective means of obscuring from those involved in it the disparity between the value of
their work and the payment they receive for it. As in cubist painting, then, the
fragmentation of space serves to disrupt the conventional contexts in which value can be
recognized and acknowledged.
101 Sokel, WE, 8-9.
102 Ibid. 8.
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is we who have to perceive phenomena in location and call this subjective
necessity space. But space and time are neither given facts nor empirical
concepts. They constitute themselves in our perception. But they are not
objective absolutes, existing outside ourselves. The source of phenomena is
forever unknowable. ... The Critique of Pure Reason unmasks the world as
the product of our mind and declares the supernatural unknowable. With
these two blows Kant shatters the foundation for art as mimesis and art as
revelation. ... Absolute art, i.e., art as utterly free creation or pure design,
became theoretically conceivable after Kant's Critique ofPure Reason. 103
The implications of this for the artist were worked out in the Critique of
Judgement. Kant's aesthetic theory was built on the insight that the artist has
an "arbitrary freedom to create according to his intentions".104 Sokel
describes this freedom as "absolute sovereignty". The artist chooses the
form of his or her art. It is not bound to any non-artistic reality, but nor is art
therefore abandoned to a formless chaos.105 The cosmos which is under¬
mined by the Critique of Pure Reason can be replaced by the quasi-divine
creation of the artist:
The artist is more than a discoverer of symbols and even a prophet of
truth—he is the creator and legislator of a universe; and this universe of art
is the only one in which man is completely free of the yoke of empirical
necessity and the categorical imperative of the moral law. Thus art assumed
a far greater importance than it had possessed in earlier aesthetics. Both art
as mimesis and art as revelation had been subservient to other realities,
physical or spiritual, means to an end; for Kant art became an end in itself.
And since it was the only realm in which man could be free it also became
man's salvation. In art man became God, not by discovering or revealing
Him, but by creating as a god creates.106
From this notion of the sovereign creativity of artistic genius, Kant worked
out an aesthetic theory which stressed the sharp distinction between
aesthetic ideas and logic, and also the organic nature of art. The organic
conception of art, Sokel notes, was the common property of Idealism,
developed also in the thought of Herder and Goethe and applied rigorously
by Schiller. Its essence is the notion that meaning in art is not a matter of
content - e.g. the theme or subject of the work of art - but a matter of the
organic or functional relation of its various parts. Organic art, then, is art in
105 Sokel, WE, 9.
104 Quoted ibid. 9.
105 Although as Sokel notes elsewhere formless chaos has sometimes been very evident in
German artistic life, not least in Expressionism.
!06 Ibid. 10.
which the idea of the work is to be found in its form. Sokel quotes Schiller's
extraordinary affirmation that "the art-secret of the master" is "that by the
form he abolishes the content".107 The resemblance between this idea and
the abstraction of Kandinsky and other modernists is obvious. It indicates
the extent to which modernism had roots in German Idealism; yet it also
indicates a paradox, that the idea of absolute form should originate in
Idealism, which was a conscious reaction against the rationalizing
Enlightenment emphasis on form. As Sokel notes, both formalist abstraction
and the rebellion against form are products of the rejection of mimesis. Both
of them "lack the full-bodied three-dimensional impression of life at which
realistic art aims".108 He suggests that the roots of this are to be found in the
social situation of the German intellectual and artist: compared to the polite
societies developed in other European nations during the eighteenth
century, Germany was backward. Intellectuals, and writers in particular,
were not integrated into the established social order. Their attitude to it
therefore tended to be sceptical and critical. One result of this is the
recurrence in German literature of the idea of youthful rebellion against
established social constraint. The point Sokel makes, though, is that both
formlessness and absolute form, (i.e. vitalism and abstraction) are attempts
to deal with the artist's alienation.109
A question arises here, though, as to whether Sokel's emphasis on the social
situation of German artists implies a radical limitation of the connection,
which I have already sought to defend, between artistic techniques and
ideas. If modernist techniques were a product of the particular social
situation of artists, isn't modernism of negligible relevance to everyone
except artists? Wouldn't this place severe limits on the range of ideas and
experiences that are relevant to modernism? I would suggest that this need
not be so. For one thing, the situation of Enlightenment writers and
107 See Sokel, WE, 13.
108 Ibid. 13.
109 A fuller account of the circumstance s Sokel refers to can be found in W. H. Bruford's
Germany in the Eighteenth Century: The Social Background of the Literary Revival, op. cit., and in
particular Part IV Chapter II, 'The Influence of Political, Economic and Social Factors on
Literature'. Bruford makes clearer than Sokel the connection between the experience of
writers and more general social and cultural changes. See also Henri Brunschwig
Enlightenment and Romanticism in Eighteenth Century Prussia trans. F. Jellinek, (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1974), especially pp. 150-163.
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intellectuals reflected broader changes in society.no The rise of modern
science, the progress of capitalism, the development of political absolutism,
the plurality of religious confessions in the German territiories following the
Thirty Years War: all these contributed to a sense of the disenchantment of
the world, which placed the connection between the world and the human
subject in question. The social alienation of German writers and intellectuals
amounted to an intensification of this more general situation. To this extent,
moreover, the circumstances and experience of these writers prefigured the
subsequent course of modern societies. The estrangement from society felt
by Enlightenment and Romantic intellectuals was therefore the forerunner
of the dissatisfaction with bourgeois convention that permeated the
Expressionist generation,m
Sokel makes an important point, then, when he draws attention to the
resemblance between the world as described in the Critique of Pure Reason
and the results of economic modernization: "Technology has made our
world conform ever more closely to Kant's philosophy in the Critique ofPure
Reason: each day the world resembles a little more a construct created by our
mind in a chaos of meaningless phenomena. "H2 The message of Kant -
mediated by technological and economic modernization - was taken
seriously by modernism. The sovereign creativity of the artist mirrors the
apparently sovereign creativity of technology. This results in a radical shift
from thinking in terms of stable substantial reality to thinking in terms of
function:
Even as content gives way to form, the concept of 'being' yields to the
concept of 'functioning'. ... Substance is transferred into process and
function; the noun bows to the verb; content becomes method; active
HO See note 109 above.
HI Sokel makes these points himself, when he notes that Georg Kaiser's Der gerettete
Alkibiad.es (Alcibiades Saved) of 1920 "symbolises in a subtle and ingenious way the cultural
situation of Europe and the intellectual's role in it" (p. 109).
112 Ibid. 117.
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expression replaces passive experience.l13
What results from this, though, is a conflict between the different impulses
inherent in modernism. On the one hand there are these apprehensions of a
crisis of representation, the sense that knowledge and language are not
rooted in a stable, substantial reality, but are contingent constructions
arising in social life. While the new emphases on expression and function,
rooted in the constructive human spirit, can be and were understood as a
dramatic advance over earlier culture, they can equally be interpreted as a
loss. Gottfried Benn, perhaps the most enduringly and persistently
modernist writer among the Expressionists, described the notion of the
constructive human spirit as something superior to life, and therefore
capable of a transcendence of nihilism.114 Behind this modernism lurks
nihilism; behind its sense of superiority lies alienation. The
'desubstantivation of the world' that Werfel had demanded in 1917 reflects a
desire to rise above the level of 'natural life' in disembodied creativity. But
as the failure of the activist-Expressionist Wandlung to transform the world
made plain, it provides no new grounding for the social order in the midst
of the flux and ephemerality of modernity. Modernism, as noted earlier, is
haunted by the sense that its apprehensions constitute a defeat, a
"renunciation of the attempt to give order to things, a despair of history".115
This modernism, then, results in a second, conflicting impulse: the impulse
to regain a connection with objective reality, with a given order and
meaning; the impulse, in short to overcome estrangement from society, a
115 See WE, 116. Sokel is describing the work of Gottfried Benn, who was more consistent in
the application of these ideas than any other Expressionist. It is interesting that Sokel goes
on to provide two more examples of the relation between these ideas and other
developments in intellectual life. He notes first a parallel with the new physics: "The
transformation of the ancient concept of substance into the modern concept of function is
probably the single most important philosophical revolution wrought by modem physics in
which matter is defined as energy." Secondly he notes a parallel with modern psychology,
in which behaviour takes the place of the psyche as the object of study. I would draw
attention to the fact that David Harvey places great emphasis on this very same shift, but he
describes it in slightly different terms, as a conflict between the privileging of space over
time and the privileging of time over space. He notes (p. 205) that aesthetic theory tends
towards the former, because representation is a 'spatialization of time'. Social theory
however tends the opposite way: rapid social change undermines a sense of fixed space and
accelerates the sense of the passing of time. Harvey therefore tends to emphasize those
elements in modernist art which seem to attempt to represent the flow of time.
114 See ibid. 115.
115 Butler, EM, 175.
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longing for integration into a social order. It is a longing for a cosmos, a
restless desire for a context in which sense and meaning are intrinsically
present.
The late history of Expressionism can, as Sokel has shown, be interpreted in
terms of the dialectic of these opposing impulses. Few writers were able to
sustain a modernist approach much beyond the start of the new decade in
1920. Gottfried Benn stands almost alone as one who maintained an
experimental approach; even this, though, did not prevent him from an
enthusiastic declaration of support for Nazism in the the early 1930s.116
Those Expressionists who attempted to maintain the form and message of
their early work mostly appeared anachronistic, and failed to achieve any
lasting artistic success. In the fifteen years prior to his suicide in 1939, Ernst
Toller achieved little of any critical note or popular success. Unruh, Sokel
says, "experienced premature decline from work to work".117 He continued
to try to combine activist moralism with Expressionist form, but the works
he produced went unrecognized. They were no longer, Sokel suggests,
116 Hugh Ridley's paper Irrationalism, Art and Violence: Ernst Jiinger and Gottfried Benn (in
Bance op. cit. 26-37) provides useful comment on the ways in which Benn's approval of
Nazism was a new development, but nonetheless a development, of his views during the
Weimar period. Sokel (p. 229f.) has valuable comment on the complex relation between
Expressionism and totalitarian movements. Expressionism was one of the main targets of
the Nazis' denouncement of degenerate art; yet, as Sokel says, the "confluence of late
Expressionism and Nazism was neither a chance happening nor a reversal of the
Expressionist current but a natural denouement of basic Expressionist tendencies". Other
writers, though, moved towards Communism and populist commercialism, and were
equally able to see their development as true to Expressionism.
117 Sokel, WE, 231.
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viable works of art.n8
The majority of Expressionists, on the other hand, found modernism
unsustainable, and sought to overcome alienation by giving precedence to
the impulse towards Sachlichkeit. They diverted their hopes towards existing
religious or national communities - Johst's Nazism and Becher's
Communism have already been mentioned. Another important example of
this trend is Franz Werfel's critique of Expressionism and accommodation
with commercialism. The works in which this turn became clear were his
Spiegelmensch trilogy of 1920 and his Verdi of 1923. In Spiegelmensch Werfel
exposes and condemns the self-deification present in Expressionism, in its
ethical idealism as well as its vitalism. The background to the action is
provided by a narrative of the three stages or 'visions' of human life, told to
the hero of the story, Thamal, by the abbot of the monastery in which he has
sought refuge. Sokel summarizes: "In the first vision men think they see the
world while they see only themselves. In the second vision they know that
they see only themselves and realize the prison in which egotism keeps
them shut off from reality."H9 This second vision, then, involves a struggle
with the "mirror man", the personification of reflected self love. If this
struggle is won then one's mirror will change into a window, allowing light
118 It should be noted that painting and other areas of cultural production did not follow
quite the same path as writing and drama. The demise of Expressionism as a powerful force
did not mean that modernism died out, even in Germany. On the contrary the decade of the
twenties was the period of 'heroic modernism', to borrow David Harvey's term.
Kandinsky's painting is a good example: his drive to abstraction was maintained
throughout theWeimar years and in his late work, after he left Germany in 1933. However
his work did display significant development in its style and technique. As Harvey notes,
(p. 280f.) his early, Expressionist works convey a strong sense of movement and excitement.
They display "such an explosive sense of space that they appear to spill off the canvas with
an uncontrollable dynamism" (p. 281). After the War Kandinsky began to paint in a way
that suggests stillness and calm, a more studied and rational organization of the canvas.
Harvey calls these "controlled pictures of spaces neatly organized within a secure frame, in
some cases clearly taking the form of diagrammed city plans viewed from a perspective
high above the earth" (p. 280). Even in abstract art there was in a sense a move toward
Sachlichkeit! The modernism of the Bauhaus (at which Kandinsky taught throughout the
twenties) represented a new attempt of the constructive human spirit to impose order,
reconciled with technology and mechanization, and thereby to resist the nationalistic
mythologies which grew up in the aftermath of the War. The Bauhaus was eventually
closed down by the Nazis. Unfortunately the constructive spirit of heroic modernism
proved well suited to the aims of totalitarianism. Just as Gottfried Benn sensed an analogy
between the Nazi state and the constructivism of modernism, the architecture of
modernism was easily taken over by totalitarian regimes. See Harvey, op. cit. 282.
119 Sokel, WE, 213.
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in and making one ready to iove. The third stage, which is not achievable for
mortals, is the stage of the saviour, the Christ, who sees the world and
redeems it, at the same time redeeming God - for the world is God's mirror,
the scene of his struggle with his image, humanity.
The story follows the career of Thamal who mistakenly thinks he has
attained sight of a genuine reality. He passes through vitalism and activism,
his self-deception illustrating the delusion at the heart of Expressionism, its
"blasphemous deification of man". With hindsight, Werfel presents this as
"the archsin of Expressionism and the cause of its ruin". Like other works
involved in the recoil against activist Expressionism, Spiegelmensch envisages
an ideal of a life integrated into a normal human community. It is
distinguished, though, by the fact that this ideal is not treated as a remote
and revolutionary (even eschatological) goal. On the contrary Werfel sees
such a normality as grounded in the past, in the continuity of succeeding
generations.
Werfel's Verdi is an even more direct critique of modernism, contrasting it
with art which is directed towards the end of satisfying actual human needs.
The novel works this out by drawing a contrast between Verdi and Wagner.
Wagner's art is taken in the novel to be the result of idealist/modernist
rootlessness. Its desire for unrestricted expression is indicative of neurosis
and megalomania. Its indifference to its reception by an audience is not
humility but arrogance, "vanity thwarted and turned inward".120 its
creativity is at the same time destruction. Verdi, by contrast does not share
the modernists' desire to challenge and shatter musical conventions. Verdi
represents a tradition in which the alienation of art from life has not taken
place. Art is therefore not a matter of absolute form, of organic development
which follows some supposed inner law, but of the needs and desires of its
audience. 121 The recoil, says Sokel, has gone as far as it can go:
Werfel's novel shows the artist's integration in the community, the dream
120 Sokel, WE, 224.
121 As Sokel notes, a distinction must be drawn between the characters inWerfel's novel
and the careers of the composers themselves. In particular, he notes that Verdi's music
moved with time towards greater sophistication and complexity. Werfel's Verdi, by
contrast, moved towards greater and greater simplicity.
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that had motivated activist Expressionism from its beginning, not as a
Utopian goal attainable only through a revolutionary upheaval and the
regeneration of mankind, but as a commonplace reality.122
But this commonplace reality cannot be produced by "spectacular personal
regeneration" or, for that matter, "collective revolution". Werfel's later
work, notably his Song of Bemadette, complied with the ideas expounded in
Verdi: written in a simple and conventional style, it achieved great popular
success.
vi. Franz Kafka: Judaism, alienation and integration.
Franz Kafka is one writer whose work points to a more sustained dialectic
between the dual impulses inherent in Expressionism. He was not, perhaps,
an entirely typical Expressionist; yet his writings provide us with
paradigmatic instances of the concerns already discussed. To conclude this
chapter with a brief discussion of Kafka, therefore, will help to give further
emphasis to these essential concerns; it will moreover, draw attention to the
alternative possibility which Kafka points to, in which neither of the
opposing impulses of Expressionism triumphs at the expense of the other.
First of all, Kafka's work was deeply concerned with the problem of the
writer's estrangement from society, and with the alienating effects of
modern society generally. An important context for his concern with these
issues is his family background. A German-speaking Jew, Kafka was
brought up in Prague, a city in which the vast majority both ethnically and
linguistically were Czech. In regard to both Jewish ethnicity and his German
language, Kafka was a member of estranged minorities. Yet there was
another aspect to the alienation of Kafka and his contemporaries: they felt
themselves to be cut off also from their Jewish identity. Assimilation was the
goal of Jews like Kafka's parents; their adherence to Jewish traditions was
largely nominal; it appeared to Kafka to be a meaningless attachment to
antiquated customs.123 The rootless, estranged situation of the West-
^~Sokei/VVE/225.
123 See Robertson, Kafka, 6: "Kafka came to feel that his parents' residual Judaism had been
drained of its religious content and was merely part of the complex of Jewish middle-class
values to which they adhered unquestioningly."
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European Jew came, understandably, to be a major concern of Kafka's
writing. But to this extent his experience and concern were closely related to
modernism. By virtue of the condition of diaspora, as David Harvey notes,
Jews were "the ethnic and religious group most representative of
internationalism".124 As a minority, often discriminated against and
perceived as outsiders, Jews had plenty of experience of the alienation from
the social order which, paradoxically, was coming to be the common
experience of the ethnic and religious majority too. As a member of this
minority, Kafka's situation was typical of "the marginal position of the
intellectual in modernWestern society".125
Yet there was inevitably another side to the Jewish experience. The process
of assimilation raised a question about the continuing nature of Jewish
identity. To be a West-European Jew was not only to have extreme exposure
to the experiences that defined the modern self; it was, equally, to be aware
of a different identity, an identity rooted in a particular ethnic group with its
distinct religious tradition. It was this conflict between the modern self and
an identity rooted in tradition that was decisive for Kafka's writing. The
immediate stimulus to his awareness of his own Jewish identity came from
his encounters with East European Jews in 1911-12, in the form of a Yiddish
theatre company from Galicia. The important thing about this experience
was that it showed Kafka for the first time a genuinely living tradition of
Jewish culture and life. The experience of Jewishness in Prague conveyed
primarily one's marginal position; the experience of Galician Yiddish theatre
conveyed a living and unselfconscious Jewish culture. Kafka's contact with
the Yiddish theatre, Robertson notes "gave him a burning desire to find out
all he could about Jewish history and culture". 126 As Robertson also points
out, this contact provoked Kafka's thoughts about minor literature, recorded
in his diary on 25th December 1911. In these notes, Kafka envisaged "a
society in which literature was intimately connected with popular and
124 Harvey, op. cit. 277.
125 Robertson, Kafka, 7. It is also worth noting that Kafka's employment in the state
insurance Institute concerned with compensation for industrial accidents gave him a good
appreciation of the nature of industrial work and its dehumanizing effects, as well as its
physical dangers. This awareness appeared in his writing, particularly in Der Verschollene.
Der Prozeji and Die Verwandlung also record the dehumanizing effects of work in
bureaucratic and commercial organizations. See ibid. 50f.
126 Ibid. 17.
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political life and had a central place in peoples' interest."127 Such a literature
"would permeate the life of the society, especially its political life, without
sacrificing its artistic integrity. The problem of the artist's position in society
would thus be overcome."128
Kafka's encounter with the world of the Galician Jews prompts him, then, to
envisage a society, and a literature, in which the alienation of modernity had
been overcome, or, perhaps, had never taken place. Yet he himself was not a
Galician Yiddish speaker. He was a German speaker with a Western
education. There was no easy symbiosis between his artistic efforts and the
society in which he lived. This was reflected painfully in his own home, in
which literature had a marginal status, and where "his parents regarded his
writing and his reading with uncomprehending disapproval".1^ An
excellent summary of the situation of Kafka and his friends is contained in a
letter he wrote to Max Brod in 1921: "Most young Jews who began to write
German wanted to leave Jewishness behind them, and their fathers
approved of this ... But with their posterior legs they were still glued to
their father's Jewishness and with their waving anterior legs they found no
new ground. The ensuing despair became their inspiration."!30 Kafka's
vision of the artist's integration into the community was an ideal which he
had no means of realizing. To summarize, what is plain in all this is that
Kafka's circumstances and experience presented him particularly forcefully
with the dual impulses which shaped Expressionism - expression of
estrangement, and desire for integration in community.
This tension between alienation and integration was to be decisive for
Kafka's writing. Robertson argues that Das Urteil, his "first major work of
fiction",131 is an answer to the problem of "the Judenjfage, the problem of the
position of Jews in Western society".132 In the encounter and conflict
between Georg Bendemann and his father, there is a mirror of the conflict
127 Robertson, Kafka, 24.
128 Ibid. 25.
129 Ibid. 25.
130 See Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors ed. M. Brod, English translation by. R. and C.
Winston, (Schocken Books, New York, 1977), 289.
131 Robertson, Kafka, 28.
132 Ibid. 30.
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between the secular world to which Western Jews had become assimilated,
and the Jewish past. What gives the story its peculiar force, though, is the
fact that the encounter has the character of a confrontation between absolute
justice and absolute guilt. Georg's guilt is absolute but is buried so deeply in
his being that it is hidden, undetectable by introspection, and unable to
made explicit in the story. He lives in a world estranged from absolute
justice; and when that justice is suddenly encountered, when its cover is
momentarily thrown off, condemnation and death are the unavoidable
consequences. The position of assimilated Jews like Georg (and by
implication all those assimilated into the modern industrial world) is
untenable. They are alienated from the truth of their existence; yet if they
could confront that truth they would find themselves absolutely
condemned.
It is this sense of complete alienation from absolute justice that marks much
of Kafka's writing. The key is in the statement of the officer in In der
Strafkolonie: "guilt is always beyond question."133 Robertson refers to this as
the estrangement of consciousness from being. 134 As a result of this
estrangement, "no amount of self-exploration can reach the bedrock, the
fundamental being, that underlies consciousness". The self "always retreats
before attempts to define it. No matter where the observer places himself,
the self stays just beyond the horizon of consciousness."135 It is worth noting
how Kantian this quality is. The estrangement of consciousness from being
clearly reflects the Kantian split between the phenomenal and the noumenal.
Another thing worth noting is that Robertson's talk of our consciousness
being estranged from "the bedrock, the true being, that underlies our
consciousness" is potentially misleading. Such talk of a bedrock suggests
something solid and secure, something capable of underlying consciousness.
Yet the truth which we are estranged from, in Kafka's story, is not a secure
self, but an absolute justice that condemns us. The truth of our existence, in
Kafka's early fiction, is our absolute guilt, our negation. If anything is stable
and secure it is only our absolute condemnation.
133 See 'In the Penal Colony' in The Transformation and Other Stories, 132.
131 See Robertson, Kafka, 33 and 80, and also 185-217 generally.
135 Ibid. 80.
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There is a sense, too, in this writing that the absolute justice which
condemns us is genuinely transcendent: it can no more be adequately
represented in the world than the absolute guilt it implies can be discovered
by introspection. In so far as the transcendent realm is able to be represented
in human life, it seems to be in strangely imperfect forms. Robertson puts
this well, pointing out that on several occasions, "a transcendent reality is
manifested in shabby and repellent guise".!36 The first of these occasion, he
suggests, is the 'Teater von Oklahama' episode in Der Verschollene, which he
interprets as ironic; yet even in Das Urteil, written some two years earlier,
shabbiness and repulsiveness are not wholly absent from Georg's father,
who has the responsibility of pronouncing the judgement on his son.137
An important change in Kafka's thought occurred in the winter of 1917-18.
Robertson relates it to Kafka's realization, recorded in his correspondence
and diary, that his tendency to self-incrimination was actually a form of
vanity. In the light of this admission, Kafka's earlier stories which focus on
guilt as the truth of our existence appear as exercises in self-condemnation
and therefore disguised pride. His writing from this point onward focuses
much less on the sense that to encounter transcendence is to encounter our
own absolute guilt. The first fruit of this is in the aphorisms which he wrote
in Ziirau during that winter. The ideas that came to the fore in his earlier
work are still present. There is still, for example, a conviction that the truth
136 Robertson, Kafka, 61.
137 Another way of putting this would be to note, as R. Hinton Thomas does, that Kafka
presents an extreme form of the dualism between finite and infinite that marked the whole
of Expressionism. See Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 23-4, where he says: "The duality
which we find inherent in the theoretical formulation of Expressionist doctrines by
Kornfeld and which recurs so persistently in Expressionist writers, the contrast namely of
the Finite and the Infinite or, inWorringer's words, the antithesis of 'Transcendence' and
'Immanence,' gives to Expressionist art a special task; it must resolve this implicit duality. If
Man is to become, as Komfeld demands he shall become, in true contactwith the Divine, he
must establish a link with the Infinite; he must become 'der Beseelte.' He must, however,
fulfil his infinite obligations within the framework of the Finite.... If, therefore, the
Expressionist artist is to satisfy both imperatives he must discover a method of uniting the
opposing claims." Thomas acknowledges that in Kafka, more than any other writer, this
antithesis is present. In fact Kafka is from this point of view the exemplary Expressionist:
"By no other writer of the Movement is the irreconcilable dualism of the Finite and the
Infinite, of Time and Eternity, given such significant expression." ibid. 140. See also 'Franz
Kafka and the Religious Aspect of Expressionism' by R.H. Thomas in German Life and Letters
vol II, (1937-8), 42-49. Itmight actually be better to say not that Kafka was the exemplary
Expressionist but that he went well beyond Expressionism in the seriousness with which he
took this dialectic.
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of our existence transcends us. 138 There is still a sense of absolute
judgement,139 and a concentration on the nature of good and evil. Yet there
is also a sense that human life is grounded in truth, as well as judged by it.
The notion of 'the Indestructible' (das Unzerstorbare) as the basis of human
life is important for this development. He wrote "The Indestructible is one:
it is each individual human being and at the same time it is common to all,
hence the unparalleled strength of the bonds that unite mankind."140
The most substantial fruit of this new approach was Das Schlofi, written in
1922. As Robertson notes, it reaffirms "the idea of a frontier that
consciousness cannot cross. If the Castle corresponds to the indestructible
basis of human life, then K.'s efforts to penetrate the Castle and apprehend
'das Unzerstorbare' intellectually are as futile as the attempt to jump over
one's own shadow would be".i4i Yet there is something very different in the
book from Kafka's earlier stories. In Der Prozefi the Court, which had
symbolized transcendence, had been the absolute condemnation of human
life. Now transcendence is symbolized by the Castle which, though just as
unattainable as the higher reaches of the Court, is nonetheless the basis of
the village's life. To be alienated from truth is not to be debarred from a
fruitful life. It is therefore possible to live in accordance with the truth of life
even if one cannot apprehend it. K., in Das Schlofi, may not be able to enter
the Castle but he is nonetheless able to live in the village. This is something
he realized early in the novel, though he did not heed it. The occasion was
his observation that the letter from Klamm recognizing his appointment as
land-surveyor offered him a choice: he could either become one of the
village workers, hoping to achieve something in the Castle by working in
the village; or he could depend on his connection to the Castle and hope to
achieve something through that connection directly. His response is instant:
K. did not hesitate in his choice, and would not have hesitated even had he
lacked the experience which had befallen him since his arrival. Only as a
worker in the village, removed as far as possible from the sphere of the
138 See for example "Truth is indivisible, hence it cannot recognize itself; whoever wants to
recognize it must be a lie." The Great Wall ofChina, 92.
139 See for example "It is only our conception of time that makes us call the Last Judgement
by that name; in fact it is a permanent court-martial." ibid. 85.
140 Ibid. 90.
141 Robertson, Kafka, 275-6.
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Castle, could he hope to achieve anything in the Castle itself; ... then all
kinds of paths would be thrown open to him, which would remain not only
for ever closed to him but quite invisible were he to depend merely on the
favour of the gentlemen in the Castle. I42
The rest of the book, however, records K.'s attempts to proceed on the basis
of the Castle's favour. When he is presented with opportunities to become
more integrated into the village's life he spurns them because of his desire to
make contactwith the Castle.
Kafka's irony is to the fore again in his last stories, notably in "Josefine, die
Sangerin oder das Volk der Mause", written in March 1924 and published
immediately.143 As Robertson notes, it constitutes Kafka's last statement
about the artist's place in the community, substituting self-effacement for his
earlier self-torment. Josefine, the mouse-songstress, does nothing but
squeak, in a manner indistinguishable from ordinary squeaking except for
its feebleness. Her vanity is incorrigible; yet she is listened to, not because
she is a real artist but because she is one of the mouse-people. Therefore "It
is not Josefine's performance but the act of listening to it that matters. The
mice who gather to hear it feel that they form a 'Volksversammlung'."144
The song at such a gathering of the people is neither an aesthetic
achievement nor a revelation of truth. It is, instead, like a speaking arising
from the situation of the people as a whole and addressing each one:
This piping which rises up, when all others are enjoined to silence, comes
almost as a message from the people to each individual; the thin piping of
Josefine in the midst of grave decisions is almost like the pitiful existence of
our people amid the tumult of the hostile world.145
The mouse people, as Robertson makes clear, are like the West-European
142 The Castle, 29-30. Note also Max Brod's editor's note to the first edition, describing the
ending which Kafka had apparently planned for the book: "The ostensible Land Surveyor
was to find partial satisfaction at least. He was not to relax in his struggle, but was to die
worn out by it. Round his death-bed the villagers were to assemble, and from the Castle
itself the word was to come that though K.'s legal claim to live in the village was not valid,
yet, taking certain auxiliary circumstances into account, he was to be permitted to live and
work there." ibid. 7.
143 It had to be published immediately to help pay for Kafka's medical care. It was in fact
the last story he wrote; he died on 3rd June 1924. The story was published in a literary
supplement to the Prager Presse's Easter issue on 20th April 1924.
144 Robertson, Kafka, 280-1.
145 The Transformation and Other Stories, 227.
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Jews. Josefine's role is not to call them out of the "tumult of the hostile
world"; nor to bemoan their "pitiful existence" - for there is in her piping
"something of a lost happiness that can never be found again, but it also has
something of our busy life here and now, of that little admixture of
unfathomable gaiety which persistjand cannot be extinguished".146 Rather
she speaks to them out of their experience, and addresses that experience.
If Kafka's writing is distinguished from other Expressionists by its sense of
the transcendence of truth, his late work is marked by its vision of an art
that speaks from and to the life of the diaspora Jew, and indeed the modern
world in general. To call this Kafka's solution would perhaps be too strong;
but there is in the picture of the feeble squeaking of the mouse-songstress
and in the inextinguishable gaiety of her people a dialectical resolution of
their alienation.14? The way Kafka suggested was neither an abandonment
of his generation (something he felt Werfel had committed) nor was it an
embrace of Zionism (like his friend Brod). It envisaged a people estranged
from, yet grounded in the transcendent. They are unable to breach the
heavens but they can still live, despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that
they cannot. Kafka could mock the artist's situation with gentle irony: their
value for the people was not what they thought it to be; but the attempt at
art was still needed, and still had a value and a purpose.
146 The Transformation and Other Stories, 230.
147 See Robertson, Kafka, 283, where he talks of a dialectical resolution both inside and
outside the story.
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Chapter 3 Barth and Expressionism
i. Karl Barth and modern art.
Unlike his close contemporary Paul Tillich, it is clear that Karl Barth had no
special love for, or interest in, twentieth century art and literature in general
and Expressionism in particular.! This does not mean, though, that he had
no interest in culture whatsoever. It is simply that his tastes and interests
seem to have been directed towards the middle ground rather than the
avant-garde. There are plenty of illustrations of this in Barth's theological
writings, for he was not slow to make connections between theology and
those aspects of culture which did appeal to him. Most obvious, perhaps, is
the fact that his writings are peppered with references to his beloved
Mozart; notable also are references to Griinewald's depiction of the
crucifixion from the Isenheim altarpiece.2
So far as literature is concerned, Barth's treatment of Lessing and Novalis in
his lectures on the background to modern Protestant theology testifies to his
interest in and knowledge of classical and romantic German literature. He
had planned to conclude those lectures with a study of Goethe which would
have emphasized this even more, but which was, unfortunately, never
written.3 Coming closer to the modern period, there are references in Barth's
work which suggest reasonable familiarity with the work of writers and
dramatists at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth
centuries, such as Ibsen and Gerhart Hauptmannd He was introduced to the
! Many of Tillich's writings on art, including Expressionism, have been published in Paul
Tillich On Art and Architecture ed. J. & J. Dillenberger, (Crossroad, New York, 1989).
2 See for example Barth, WGWM, op. cit. 65-7 and 75-6. It is interesting to note that
Grlinewald was much admired by Expressionist artists. Note also Tillich's comment: "I
believe that it [Griinewald's Crucifixion] is the greatest German picture ever painted, and it
shows you that expressionism is by no means a modem invention." See Tillich, On Art and
Architecture, 99.
3 This is mentioned in the foreword written in 1946 for the publication of the lectures. See
PT, op. cit. 11. This is supported by an as yet unpublished letter from Barth to Thurneysen,
dated 23rd December 1932. Describing the course of lectures he has partly completed, he
wrote: "Goethe,mit dem ich eigentlich gipfeln und schliessen wollte, werde ich vielleicht
im Sommersemester an den Anfang nehmen mussen."
4 Barth includes Hauptmann's 1910 novel Emanuel Quint on his year-by-year list of events
mentioned on p. 1 above. There are references to Ibsen in the Tambach lecture, see WGWM,
315, and in the second edition of Romans, op. cit. 232.
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novels of Dostoevsky by Eduard Thurneysen while in Safenwil, and his
interest in them seems to have been considerable. He is reported to have
said that he could not have written either version of the commentary on
Romans without his acquaintance of these novels.5
Having said all this, though, it ought to be stressed that Earth was by no
means ignorant of modern art. In this regard I want to draw attention to the
fact that he was fortunate enough to have had some personal contact with
an artist closely involved in the development of Expressionist painting, and
to that extent had an excellent opportunity to learn about its principles; nor
does he seem to have spurned this opportunity. This contact came via
Barth's brother-in-law Richard Kisling, who lived in Zurich. Kisling was, as
Busch records, a "keen patron of the fine arts"; but more than this he owned
a gallery and dealt in pictures. As one might expect of someone in his
position, he was a personal friend of several artists.6 Barth spent time in his
house on several occasions, and got to know several of Kisling's circle of
friends, in particular the painter Cuno Amiet and the sculptor Hermann
Hubacher. Barth mentions having spent time at the Kislings' house in his
correspondence to Thurneysen as early as 25th September 1914.7 In a letter
of 20th January 1915 he mentions being at Kisling's gallery in connection
5 See How I changed myMind ed. J.D. Godsey, (John Knox Press, Richmond VA., 1966), 21.
German translations of Dostoevsky became available only in the early part of this century.
Dostoevsky also was a significant influence on Expressionism.
6 See Busch, Karl Barth, op. cit. 101. Kisling was married to Hedwig Hoffmann, the sister of
Barth's wife Nelly. Reference to his gallery is made in Barth's letter to Thurneysen of 20th
January 1915, see B-Th Br. I. 26, also ibid. 14.
7 See B-Th Br. I. 11-14.
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with a family wedding.8 On 14th June that year he mentions that he is about
to go to Zurich to baptise a child of the Kislings.
Richard Kisling died prematurely on 7th March 1917, but Barth's contacts
with his circle of friends did not cease; in fact only after this date are
Hubacher and Amiet mentioned in Barth's correspondence. The first of
these references is in a letter of 26th May 1917, in which Barth mentions that
Amiet has been shown one of Barth's sermons "Uber die Grenze" ("Across
the Border"). Barth spent a month in Zurich with his sister-in-law after
Easter 1918, while working on the first Romans. Amiet and Hubacher were
staying there also, and Barth seems to have enjoyed the contact with them.
In a letter to Thurneysen of 24th April he says: "Very pleasing to me is the
contact with the painter Amiet and the sculptor Hubacher, who are also
staying with my sister-in-law, and with whom I have quickly been able to
reach an understanding. "9 A month later, Barth mentions a trip he has taken
with his confirmation candidates which ended with them meeting Amiet.10
The next reference is somewhat later, in a letter of 3rd December 1919, in
which Barth mentions Hubacher in passing.il The only other substantial
reference is in a letter of 20th June 1921, in which Barth describes having
been in Zurich to baptise three nieces. Present among the company were
8 He describes having to speak while standing in front of a picture of the Battle of
Marignano painted by Ferdinand Hodler. Hodler, though older than the Expressionists,
was an important figure in Swiss and German art around the turn of the century. He
developed techniques which were influential on the younger generation; he was regarded
by some Expressionists as having an influence on them ranking with van Gogh, Matisse,
Gauguin and Klimt. See Peter Selz German Expressionist Painting (University of California
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957), 113. As will be noted shortly his influence on the
Briicke group was transmitted partly via Cuno Amiet. Dube op. cit. 77 also records Hodler's
favourable impression on the young Emil Nolde during the 1890's. Nolde was later a
member of the Brticke. Hodler's influence extended even to writers: Samuel and Thomas
note (p. 113) that he was important for the worker-poet Gerritt Engelke. Barth recounts the
day in question as follows: "Scene: the picture-gallery ofmy brother-in-law Kisling. I stand
among trees under a violent, bloody part of Hodler's picture of Marignano, a Swiss Guard
taking a swing at my head the whole time!" (B-Th Br. I. 26.) This occasion on its own does
not amount to a wide exposure to modern art; it does however give a good indication of
Kisling's interest in and contact with some of the most important contemporary art.




Hubacher and also the writer Hermann Hesse.12
It is Earth's contact with Amiet that is interesting in all this, since the latter
had important connections with the development of German Expressionist
painting. He joined the Brucke group in 1906 by invitation, one of the first
two to be added to its original membership; he exhibited with them from
this point on, right until the group's dissolution in May 1913.13 Peter Selz
suggests that Amiet, who was a little older than the other Brucke artists, was
not greatly influenced by them. However: "His [Amiet's] influence on the
development of the Briicke ... must have been considerable: Amiet brought
them the direct message of Gauguin, of Hodler, and of his own work in
Fauve-like colour."14 He also quotes a retrospective comment by Karl
Schmidt-Rottluff (one of the founders of the Briicke), acknowledging that
Amiet had been "ahead of us with his large planes of colour".is Selz sums
up Amiet's importance for the development of the Briicke by saying that he
"was able to help the Brucke evolve from a provincial group of German
12 Barth records his impressions of the latter: "The conversation with Hesse took place
beforehand. I was again amazed by the pietistic narrowness with which these artists are
apparently mostly concerned with the problem of their private existence. T work the matter
out, in order to find my way out of the sizeable difficulties of life...'; that is the tenor of all
their arguments.... in short, the man was nothing to write home about, and a little didactic.
Hubacher is, without 'world-view', much more reasonable." ibid. 497. Barth's view of
Hesse, and indeed of artists in general, is clearly not very positive. Note that Busch
comments (Karl Barth p. 125) that this baptism ceremony took place in Richard Kisling's
home. This is at very least misleading, since Richard Kisling himself had died more than
four years earlier.
13 Note an error by Selz who says, at p. 96, that Amiet's participation was limited to the
contribution of one work to their exhibition in 1907. This is incorrect. Selz in fact contradicts
himself, for he notes on p.116 that Amiet exhibited with the Brucke in Dresden in 1910. For
fuller information on Amiet's contributions to the Brucke exhibitions see Georg Reinhardt
Diefriihe 'Briicke': Beitrage zur Geschichte und zum Werk der Dresdner Kiinstlergruppe 'Brucke'
der Jahre 1905 bis 1908 (Brucke-Museum, Berlin, 1977/78), 192-4. Reinhardt makes clear that
Amiet's work appeared in most of the Brucke exhibitions, from 1906 until January 1913 (in
Basel). Note also that Reinhardt provides a useful bibliography on Amiet at p. 200. Note
also a potentially misleading comment in Busch, Karl Barth, p. 125. His reference to the
Brucke is ambiguous, but could be taken to suggest that both Hubacher and Amiet were
members. Hubacher never was, though. He appears not to have had any links with
Expressionism, in fact. His style has been described as "realistic academicism". See Michel
Seuphor The Sculpture of this Century: Dictionary ofModern Sculpture (A. Zwemmer, London,
1959), 169.
14 Selz, op. cit. 96.
13 Ibid. 97. Schmidt-Rottluff corresponded for some time with Amiet, as did Erich Heckel.
Some of this correspondence is held in the Archive of the Brucke-Museum in Berlin.
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artists to a movement of European importance."18 It is extremely interesting
that Barth, at a time when he was working on the first Romans, spent a
month in the same house as an artist who had had such close involvement
with the development of Expressionist painting, conversing with him and
apparently coming quickly to an understanding. It would be unwise to
make too much of this, in the absence of further information about the
conversations and the understanding reached. However the fact of this
contact is important, and is useful background for the rest of this chapter.
These references in Barth's correspondence also illustrate the fact that
Switzerland was no cultural desert during the War. On the contrary it
experienced an extraordinary enrichment of its cultural life due to an influx
of artists and writers who, usually through opposition to the War, chose to
make their home outwith their native Germany. The destination of many of
these was Zurich. Paul Raabe's The Era of German Expressionism contains
several vivid accounts of Zurich during the War.17 The following passage,
from the recollections of Hans Arp, gives a good idea of their content:
Despite the war those days were full of unusual charm and in retrospect
they seem almost idyllic to me. At the time Zurich was occupied by an army
of international revolutionaries, reformers, poets, painters, politicians and
apostles of peace. They tended to meet in the Cafe Odeon. There every table
was the extra- terrestrial possession of some group or other. The Dadaists
took up two corners by the window. Opposite them sat the writers
Wedekind, Leonhard Frank, Werfel, Ehrenstein and their friends. In the
neighbourhood of those tables the dancer couple Sacharoff held court in
precious attitudes and with them the two painters Baroness Werefkin and
Jawlensky. A jumble of other people jostle about in my memory ... Joyce,
the Irish writer, Busoni and my countryman from Alsace Rene Schickele,
preferred to direct the fates of the world over a bottle of champagne in the
Kronenhalle. ... Not far from the Cabaret Voltaire in which Dada first saw
the light of day Comrade Lenin lived a few houses farther down the
Spiegelgasse.18
As well as giving a general indication of the situation in Zurich during these
years, the above passage indicates one distinctive and significant movement
which emerged at this time in Switzerland: Zurich was the birthplace of
16 Selz, op. cit. 97. It is worth noting that Amiet's involvement with German Expressionism
was not exhausted by his membership of the Briicke. He was also a member of the Berlin
Secession, and, like the other Briicke artists, the Neue Sezession which split from it in 1910.
17 See Raabe, EGE, 152-179.
18 Ibid. 178.
Dadaism. Established by Hugo Ball in 1916, the Cabaret Voltaire was the
original venue of this famous cultural protest, an "ironic and contemptuous
response to a culture which had shown itself worthy of flame-throwers and
machine-guns".19 For all its neutrality, Switzerland during the War was no
sleepy backwater in cultural terms.
ii. Expressionism in the Tambach Lecture.
In the light of all the above it is interesting that Earth's early theological
work contains one explicit reference to Expressionism, in his famous lecture
to a Religious Socialist conference in Tambach in Thuringia on 25th
September 1919.20 This reference makes clear that Barth knew enough about
Expressionism to be able to make some interpretation of it in a theological
context. The lecture itself made a great impact on its immediate audience
and was the work which began to establish Barth's reputation in Germany.
It s argument moved from a recognition of the gulf glossed over in the title
Barth had been given ("The Christian's place — in society! How these two
magnitudes fall apart! How abstract they are to each other!"), to a
recognition that only as the action of God can there exist a real relation of
the distinct magnitudes ("The synthesis we seek is in God alone, and in God
alone can we find it."21) Yet the lecture also shows Barth's appreciation of
the situation in post-war Germany, picking up the pessimism prevalent in
the post-war period (Nachkriegszeit). Before talking of the world of God he
talks of the scepticism about the social and political world which has
resulted from the course of recent history. Family life, the economic order,
art, science, politics, international relations, all go about their business
according to their own laws; but it can now be seen more clearly than before
that they are all on the wrong course:
The catastrophe from which we are emerging but are not yet free has
brought this fact for many, though not for all, into devastating clearness. If
we had our wish would we not turn away from life and society in utter
19 Raabe, EGE, 170. The comments are by Richard Huelsenbeck, an early contributor to and
participant in the performances. A useful brief description of the Cabaret Voltaire is given
in Huelsenbeck's Die dadaistische Bezvegung, quoted at length in Raabe, EGE, pp. 340-1.
20 "Der Christ in der Gesellschaft", published in Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie, 33-69. ET:
"The Christian's Place in Society" in WGWM, 272-327.
21 Barth, WGWM, 275 and 322 respectively.
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scepticism and discouragement? 22
The negative view of the social and political realm evident in the first
Romans has clearly not gone away. Nor has Barth's negative judgement on
the Religious Socialist attempt to reform this fallen realm. Indeed this lecture
has been described as Barth's farewell to Religious Socialism.23 Barth
criticized what he saw as an emerging trend in the Protestant Churches - the
attempt to "furnish worldly society with an ecclesiastical cupola or wing",24
by means of the creation of a new church suited to the day, modelled on
democratic or socialist lines. He likened this to a clericalization of society, on
the lines of the medieval Christendom. The temptation offered in such a
programme should be resisted as a betrayal of society, he suggested. Given
the nature of the lecture's original audience, it is not surprising to learn that
the response was not one of universal approval. 25
The restlessness, the discontent with the ways of the world which Barth
described at the outset of the lecture has to be deepened before it can bear
theological fruit. If the ways of the world are not ultimate authorities for us
this is not just because we share a general perception of the inadequacy of
past and present social norms. It is, Barth says, "not only because we have
been shamed into becoming wise by the outward events of our times".26
There is another reason, arising from the movement of God into the world,
in history and in human consciousness, a "movement of Life into life". In
the light of this movement of God, the unreality of all that is not rooted in
that movement becomes plain. What is striking here is that the general
restlessness earlier described must be reinforced with the assitance of some
Kantian terminology before it can be useful theologically:
Dead are all 'things in themselves' (Dinge an sich), all the heres and theres,
22 Barth, WGWM, 272. ~~
23 By Busch, see Karl Barth, p. 111.
24 Barth, WGWM, 280.
25 McCormack, CRDT, 195-6, has a brief description of the background to the conference,
summarizing a fuller account given by F.W. Marquardt in Der Christ in der Gesellschaft, 1919-
1979, (Chr. Kaiser Verlag, Munich, 1980), 7-24. As McCormack comments, Barth's view of
religious socialism by this time was so negative that it would have been hard to find a more
unsuitable speaker for a Religious Socialist conference. See also Busch, Karl Barth, 111,
where it is mentioned that at least one person, Carl Mennicke, "left in a fury".
26 Barth, WGWM, 289.
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all the onces and nows, all the thises and thats which are not united to each
other. Dead are all mere facts. Dead is all metaphysics. Dead were God
himself if he moved his world only from the outside, if he were a 'thing in
himself' and not the One in all, the Creator of all things visible and invisible,
the beginning and ending.27
Interestingly, it is at precisely at this point that Earth makes explicit
reference to Expressionism. He includes it in a list of "strangely confused
and ambiguous movements of our times" which, he argues, are properly
understood as protests against the complacent certainties of the previous
generation, and therefore protests against the underlying assumption of
human autonomy. The list includes the youth movements of the period,
which Barth takes to be a protest against authority for its own sake; the
dissolution of traditional attitudes to the family, which he takes as an attack
on the family for its own sake; Expressionism, an attack on art for its own
sake; the Spartacist and communist movements on the political left, an
attack on economic activity for its own sake; and finally the questioning of
religion and the church, a protest against religion for its own sake. Barth
does not suggest lending these movements unqualified approval: they are
liable "here to be halted by the interdict of the old and there to be formed into
new and godless materialisms".28 But they nonetheless should be
understood as part of a single movement, a "shaking of the foundations of
the world" which is at one with our God-given restlessness, and which can
be understood, if we have "the insight of God"29 to be the divine negation of
this world, God's judgement of the world which takes place when he sets
his own righteousness over against it.
Barth's reference to Expressionism is important, then, despite its brevity. His
comments, though, are ambiguous as to whether he himself had any feeling
for Expressionist art. The presence or absence of such a feeling is beside the
point, though:
However strong our aversion may be to the work of the modern
expressionistic artists, it is more than clear that for these men the chief
concern is the essence, the content, the referring of the beautiful to life's
unity ... For this tendency as well we must spare more than a shake of





It is striking that Barth is able to speak of Expressionism as part of a single
movement which is God's movement, a critical opposition of Life to life. He
sees it as something analogous to revolutionary Socialism, a protest against
a reality not grounded in the movement of God.31 It is, moreover, interesting
that Barth's reference to Expressionism in this lecture should characterize it
as an attack on art for the sake of art. Clearly what impressed Barth about
Expressionism was not its sense of ushering in a new world and a new
humanity, but its negative side, its sense of the dissolution of the bourgeois
world and its artistic conventions and aims.32
iii. Barth's first theology and early Expressionism.
The question of affinities between Expressionism and Barth's writing more
generally has yet to be addressed, though. This is the task of the remainder
of this chapter, beginning with Barth's earliest theology and the
Expressionism of the pre-War period. Is there, then, anything in Barth's pre-
1915 theology which reflects the birth of Expressionism? The obvious
30 Barth, WGWM, 292. ~
31 The parallel with politics is revealing for Barth's view of modern art, perhaps. Bruce
McCormack draws attention to the fact that in this lecture Barth called for support for the
democratic socialists in their participation within the Republican government, rather than
for the Spartacists. See WGWM, 319. Barth says: "Today there is a call for large-hearted, far-
sighted, characterful conduct toward democracy— no, not toward it as irresponsible
onlookers and critics, but within it, as hope-sharing and guilt-sharing comrades". As
McCormack says, (CRDT, 201) Barth could be classified as a Vernnftrepublikaner, a 'rational
republican', albeit from the socialist side rather than the nationalist-imperialist side. Yet it
was the anti-republican Spartacists that he pointed to as (inadvertent) witnesses to the
divine negation of this world. In a similar manner, Barth's indication of Expressionism as a
witness of this sort did not presuppose that he gave any personal or even theological
approval to Expressionism as a programme for art or literature.
32 The most radical attack on established art, of course, came from the Dadaism born in the
Cabaret Voltaire, in which the very idea of the work of art came under fire. It is by no means
impossible that the Zurich milieu in which Barth encountered modern art directed his
attention particularly to its negative side, its rejection of the forms, conventions and values
of the art of previous periods. Barth certainly knew something of Dadaism by 1921, for he
made reference to it in the second Romans, see p. 194. Too much should not be made of this,
though, for Barth could have derived his view of Expressionism perfectly well from more
mainstream literature. See for example the comments of Kurt Pinthus in the preface to
Menschheitsdammerung, op. cit. p. xiv: "Nowhere have aesthetic values and the principle of
art-for-art's sake been so flouted as in this poetry, which has come to be called 'modern' or
'expressionist' because it erupts, explodes, has an intensity which it must have in order to
break through the hostile crust of aestheticism ...". Quoted by Taylor op. cit. 34.
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answer is no. Barth's Herrmannian theology, like the neo-Kantian
philosophy on which it drew, was essentially confident. Despite the
challenges of modern science and philosophy it claimed a genuine relation
with God, a relation which secured and grounded the existence of the
subject. The aim of this theology was to secure a stable place for religion
within the world. There is no apocalyptic note in it, no sense of the
emptiness of the bourgeois appeals to truth, goodness and beauty; there is
no sense of a radical break with this world and its values. There is nothing,
then, which recalls the distinctive voice and mood of early Expressionism. In
so far as Expressionism was "a deep-seated Angst before the spectre of
modernity",33 Barth's Herrmannian theology seems to breathe a different
air.
Yet to rest content with this negative answer would be to miss something
important about Barth's earliest theology, and about neo-Kantianism. For
the point which Sokel made about the affinity between the experience of
modernity and Kant's critique of knowledge is all the stronger if one
amends Kant in the way in which the neo-Kantians did. It was Marburg
neo-Kantianism, more than Kant, which emphasized the constructive nature
of thought, and which therefore challenged the notion that "a given external
creation, a cosmos, exists outside man"34 It was neo-Kantianism, rather than
Kant, which accorded with Sokel's description of the "trends of our century"
which seek "to transcend the 'givenness' of nature by asserting the
autonomous and creative potentiality of the mind".35 Marburg neo-
Kantianism displays a remarkable affinity with what Sokel called "the
technological age", in which ephemerality and transience come to
prominence at the expense of a sense of the permanence and givenness of
the world.
In the light of this, it is not too strong to say that the central ideas of neo-
Kantian philosophy were in substantial accord with the ideas which lay at
33 This is Bruce McCormack's description of the basic spirit of Expressionism. See
McCormack, CRDT, 33.
34 Sokel, WE, 117. Neo-Kantianism has this in common with most post-Kantian idealism,
from Fichte onwards. For some discussion of whether the influences on Barth were Kantian
or neo-Kantian, see Appendix A below, pp. 251-8.
35 Ibid. 117.
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the heart of modernist movements. And this, of course, implies a connection
between neo-Kantianism and Expressionism. The two clearest illustrations
of this connection are probably the proclamation by Werfel of the
Expressionists' task as the "desubstantivation of the world", and, even more
clearly, the insistence of Gottfried Benn on the necessity of the "konstruktive
Geist" or "constructive mind".36 Benn's idea is a particularly clear reflection
of the modernist turn away from the notion that we know and can represent
a reality which exists independently of our consciousness of it. Sokel's
comments on it are worth quoting here:
Benn's concept of art has nothing in commonwith the traditional view of art
as representation of reality or as a confession of experience. Like Kaiser,
Benn is not interested in the personality of the artist; nor is he concerned
with the raw material of art nor with the psychological effect of the finished
work. Indeed his poetry is addressed 'to no one.' He is solely interested in
the method of artistic creation, in the sifting, organizing, condensing activity
of the mind in the process of creating. The constructive mind, as Benn
understands it, is not a 'what' but a 'how'; it is a method of organizing data
into significant patterns. ... The ideal art which he envisions has no content;
it is nothing but form. It is to embody the complete triumph of mental
organization over the resistance ofmatter. The raw material, the 'data' given
by nature— and nature includes human nature— should be sucked up and
made to disappear in the formal structure of the work. 37
In so describing Benn's idea Sokel has, possibly unwittingly, highlighted its
strong resemblance to Marburg neo-Kantianism, with its rejection of any
metaphysics of substance, its unwillingness to grant sensation a role in the
construction of knowledge, and its belief in law-governed thought as the
source of both knowledge and being. Both Expressionism and neo-
Kantianism abandoned a metaphysics of substance in favour of a belief in
the constructive character of thought, consistent with the experience of
modernity marked by ephemerality and fragmentation.
36 See Sokel, WE, 116. These ideas, of course, also illustrate the fact that Expressionism was
not fundamentally opposed to modernity, but was highly consistentwith it. To this extent,
an important qualification has to made of the view expressed above: while Expressionism
was indeed a response to modernity, it is a mistake to think that its mood was always
dominated by Angst.
37 Ibid. 115-6. A much briefer and more general statement of Benn's principle is given by
Richard Samuel in respect of Expressionism generally - see Samuel and Thomas,
Expressionism, 12. He says that Expressionism believed that "reality must be created by
ourselves, because only in our own soul is the image of the world kept pure and
unfalsified".
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What, though, does all of this imply for the early theology of Karl Barth?
The important thing is this: in so far as the theologies of Herrmann and the
young Barth were engaged with neo-Kantianism, they were already
engaged with the ideas which lay at the heart of modernist movements. If a
theologian with such engagements were to begin to feel himself estranged
from the bourgeois world of late Wilhelmine Germany, it would be a short
step indeed to the unrest of early Expressionism. The restless socialism of
Barth's pre-War sermons and lectures, of course, suggests precisely this kind
of estrangement.
I shall return to Barth's socialism shortly. In the meantime, I want to draw
attention to the fact that the theologies of Herrmann and the young Barth
had already turned in a direction which made this step even simpler, in
their rejection of the monism of Cohen and Natorp. Religion, as has already
been noted, posed something of a problem for neo-Kantianism. And
Herrmann's dualistic solution to it was hardly orthodox, from the
philosophers' point of view. Fisher's observations about this are useful:
Such dualism of faith was certainly not welcome to Marburg
Religionsphilosophie, not only on account of its confessional or apologetic
character, but additionally because it threatened to upset the system by
advocating two major asymmetries. First, it was asserted by Herrmann that
another reality existed ausserhalb that monism of experience which was the
central presupposition of Marburg philosophy. Secondly, moreover,
Herrmann's own theological epistemology contradicted the general
epistemology of the Marburg philosophers. Their claim was that for human
cognition alles aufgegeben ist, whilst Herrmann suggested that the reality
encountered in the Christian religion is gegeben through a special
experience, namely, revelation.38
Barth followed Herrmann in this rejection of "Marburg ontology and its
logical monism". 39 What this amounted to, in Barth's case in particular, was
not simply the introduction of a new element in the philosophers' system,
but an attempt to rebuild the system on a different ground. It is at this point
that the influence of Barth's brother Heinrich is particularly important.
Heinrich had studied at Marburg, like Karl, and in 1913 submitted a
dissertation to the University of Bern entitled Descartes Begriindung der
Erkenntnis. The argument of this work amounted to a theistic
38 Fisher, op. cit. 135-6.
39 Ibid. 193.
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reinterpretation of Cohen, and in particular of his category of the Ursprung.
Heinrich identified Descartes as the historical root of neo-Kantianism's
notion of the originary power of human thought; but he also disputed the
adequacy of Descartes' attempt to ground the human subject in the cogito.
Instead he argued for a grounding of the subject and of being in a wholly
transcendent reality. This amounted to an inversion of Cohen's thought,
relocating originary power in the divine mind. Karl was aware of his
brother's ideas at an early stage, and may well have been influenced by
them; though there was in any case a fair amount in common between
Heinrich's views and the Herrmannian response to neo-Kantianism. Fisher
describes the results of this type of thinking as follows:
Thought no longer actualized its possibilities by virtue of its innate
dynamism; the revealed actuality of God rather actualized the subject, who
then received power to construct a cultural order in which truth, beauty,
and goodness would continuously become incarnate.40
The result of this was that revelatory experience became the ground of the
individual, of science, and of culture. The consequence, of course, was to
undermine the possibility of reality and actuality outside this revelatory
experience. This method has, in Fisher's words, the "unfortunate result of
leaving the world and its culture to their own devices, consigning them to
the shadowland of semblance, resembling that inhabited by Plato's cave-
dwellers."41 Troeltsch, Fisher notes additionally, was alert to this problem
and criticized Herrmann vigorously for a reduction of everything outside
the Christian consciousness to utter Sehnsucht or longing.42
By giving the Christian consciousness such prominence, the theologies of
Herrmann and Barth left the world at large in a thoroughly ambiguous
position. In Barth's revelatory monism (as Fisher calls it) the reality of
anything not determined by the Christian consciousness becomes deeply
problematic. In this way Barth's earliest theology was unwittingly prepared
for the transformation that would come over it when he could no longer




take revelatory experience as given.43
iv. Barth's restless socialism and early Expressionism
The critical question about Barth's early socialism is whether it can be seen
as an expression of estrangement from the bourgeois world of pre-War
Europe. I would argue that it can. Barth's plunge into socialism in the
middle of 1911 appears to be related to the widespread sense of unrest in
Europe in the years immediately before the outbreak of war. From the
beginning, as already noted, Barth's admiration of and commitment to
socialism had more to do with its aims than its actual practices. A distinction
between goals and means was present in Barth's socialism from the
beginning. It enabled Barth, from the beginning, to give full weight to
socialism's radical critique of the bourgeois world and its values,
unimpeded by worries about militant revolutionary methods. The typical
tone of his socialism was therefore one of unrest, of a radical critique of this
world and its ways.
It is not surprising, then, that Barth's sermons from the period before the
War often exemplify this tone of restlessness, assimilating the socialist
critique of capitalist society to the divine word of judgement. Bruce
McCormack's discussion of these sermons is valuable, highlighting the
emergence of the theme of judgement, of an embryonic critique of religion,
and of the idea of the wholly-other God in the sermons of 1913.44 Each of
these themes is notable as an anticipation of Barth's later theology; and of
course they largely stand apart from his 'official' Herrmannian theology
before the War. I would suggest, however, that these themes have a further
significance in this context: they indicate the extent to which Barth's ideas
were consistent with the mood of unrest and longing exemplified by
43 It is undoubtedly for this reason that Marburg thought in general and Herrmann's
theology in particular were continuing influences not only on Barth but on others involved
in the the new theological movements of the twenties and thirties - notably Rudolf
Bultmann.
44 McCormack, CRDT, 92-104.
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Expressionism at this time.45
There are many points at which this is clear. For example, by 1913 Barth was
expressing scepticism about the idea of continuous cultural and moral
progress:
Or our modern culture of which many are so proud! ... would we not like to
cry out here once again: Dead works! when we place alongside these
accomplishments the fact that self-seeking and superficiality and
uncertainty in the most important things are nowadays, in spite of
everything, greater than ever?46
45 The circle connected with the journal Die Aktion made the link between socialism and
Expressionism explicit. Note for example that van Hoddis' 'Weltende' was first published
in a journal with the title (in translation) The Democrat. Journal for liberal politics and literature.
This had been edited by Franz Pfemfert, subsequently the founder and editor of Die Aktion.
Pfemfert himself wrote political commentaries in Die Aktion, and it also included
contributions from Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. (See Raabe, EGE, 35-7.) The
political atmosphere of Die Aktion has been described as "anarchism, pacifism, anti-
authoritarianism, and anti-militarism", (ibid. 18.) Pfemfert was once retrospectively
described as "the only man in Germany openly opposed to the obligatory war hysteria",
(ibid. 342.) See also the extract in Raabe entitled "The political significance of Die Aktion",
pp. 181 -5. However a word of caution is necessary here. Certainly Expressionism and
socialism cannot be identified in a simple way. For one thing, Expressionism was
sufficiently varied for its proponents to offer their allegiance to a variety of political causes,
including nationalism. For another, socialism itself was then, as now, a somewhat malleable
term. Bruce McCormack (CRDT, 117-8, n. 100) notes the wide range of views represented in
Swiss religious socialism. More significantly, socialism was a term appropriated by both
ends of the political spectrum in the Weimar Republic. Peter Gay notes the importance of
Spengler's 1920 political pamphlet Preussentum und Sozialismus in this respect. In it Spengler
accepted the inevitability of socialism in some form. But he distinguished English Socialism
(in which he included Marx ) from German Socialism. Gay notes Spengler's shrewdness in
identifying a distinct 'German' strand the socialism of his day. He quotes: "The Bebel party
had something soldierly, which distinguished it from the socialism of all other countries:
clanking step of the workers' battalions, calm decisiveness, discipline, courage to die for
something higher—Jenseitiges." (Gay Weimar Culture, 85.) Spengler's idea of an
authoritarian, anti-democratic, German form of socialism is like a prophetic vision of the
National Socialism which was to come to power some thirteen years later, with such
disastrous consequences. His notion of such a socialism dedicated to something 'beyond' or
'other' (jenseitig) is also sobering. It indicates the possible political ambivalence of anti-
bourgeois sentiments, socialist involvement and the appeal to things jenseitig. (The lack of
unanimity on political matters among the dialectical theologians is perhaps not so puzzling
in this light.) It is hardly surprising, given the above, that Expressionism's anti-bourgeois
convictions and unrest were able to produce writers with political sympathies as varied as
Johannes Becher, later Minister of Culture in the German Democratic Republic (from 1954)
and Hanns Johst, who under Hitler became President of the Reichsschriftumskammer,
President of the Deutsche Akademie der Dichtung, Reichskultursenator, and first holder of
the NSDAP prize for Art and Science. (On Johst, see J.M. Ritchie 'Johst's Schlageter and the
End of the Weimar Republic' in Bance op. cit. 153 -167.)
46 Barth, Predigten 1913,125; sermon 21 March 1913. See McCormack, CRDT, 95. Again this
critical note contrasts quite sharply with the belief in progress which he had affirmed so
strongly in his reply to Herr Hussy little more than a year earlier. See chapter 1 above.
Again, he could by this time offer his congregation a picture of their lives as
being immersed in a battle between two opposing worlds: "on this
boundary, a battle is raging. Two gigantic kingdoms are engaged in a war
with one another. ... We have to become participants on one side or the
other."47 He could talk of divine law breaking through the customary order
of things, of Jesus carrying out a revolution: "when the divine appears in
human form, there must always be a revolution against human order".48 He
could talk of God effecting a "transformation" of "all corrupt and defective
human order".49 He could talk in vivid images that reflected a
contemporary mood of impending doom: "Catastrophes and violent storms
must serve the coming of His Kingdom."50 Such examples make it clear that
Earth's preaching at this time made use of ideas analogous to those that
gave early Expressionism its distinctive voice; in fact Earth's vivid images -
of the war between two worlds, of the inadequacy of the customary order of
things, of transformation, of the storms that accompany the new world - all
these are highly reminiscent of the language and mood of much early
Expressionism. 51
v. Barth's revolution: 'origin' and 'constructive mind'
I have already, in chapter 1, described Barth's theological revolution as
provoked by his loss of confidence in the givenness of God in religious
experience. The theology which emerged involved prominently the notion
of the dissolution of the world under divine judgement, something which
47 Barth, Predigten 1913,143; sermon 23 March 1913. See McCormack, CRDT, 96.
48 Ibid. 38; sermon 19 January 1913. See McCormack, CRDT, 98.
49 Ibid. 79; sermon 2 March 1913. See McCormack, CRDT, 101.
50 Ibid. 93; sermon 9 March 1913. See McCormack, CRDT 102.
51 Take for example the comments about Der Sturm by Lothar Schreyer, its managing editor
from 1916-26: "The storm purifies, uproots, destroys. But it also roars through the world
like the Holy Ghost. It is the never-ending transformation, the renewal from the ground up,
the cypher under which the spiritual truth of the Absolute meets the frailty and hope of
temporal existence. Hope—even if often despairing—brings us the joys, our frailty the
sorrows." (Raabe, EGE, 194.) Or see some comments made by Wassily Kandinsky in 1913:
"Painting is like a thundering collision of different worlds that are destined in and through
conflict to create that new world called the work. Technically, every work of art comes into
being in the same way as the cosmos - by means of catastrophes, which ultimately create
out of the cacophony of the various instruments that symphony we call the music of the
spheres." From Kandinsky's Reminiscences, quoted in Kandinsky by Ulrike Becks-Malorny,
(Benedikt Taschen Verlag, Koln, 1994), 88.
112
drew both on Barth's Herrmannian, neo-Kantian influenced theology, and
on socialist critique. It also developed a dialectical conception of the relation
between God and the world which can be seen to have roots in both
Herrmann's stress on the transcendence of God and in Barth's socialism
with its restless distinction between aims and means. Not only was Barth's
Herrmannian theology transformed by his loss of confidence; also
transformed was his socialism, which could no longer claim a simple
connection between the aims of socialism and the Kingdom of God. The
basis for continuing faith of any sort was provided by a feature of Barth's
earlier inverted neo-Kantian emphasis on God as 'origin': the basis for faith
was God's action, breaking into this world, albeit unable now to be treated
as a 'given'.
In the light of all that has been said so far in this chapter, I would now argue
that Barth's revolution was in fact the theological equivalent of the
Expressionist revolution in culture. As such it was a theological response to
the condition and experience of modernity; and I would even go so far as to
call Barth's new theology an inventive and uncompromising appropriation
of modernism. The emergence of Barth's distinctive theology was
consequent upon his loss of confidence in the moral, cultural and
intellectual world of the nineteenth century; just as Expressionism was born
of a loss of confidence in that world and its values. The theology which
emerged reflected its two sources: a philosophy which was deeply engaged
with modernity, and a socialism which reflected the contemporary
restlessness and sense of the dissolution of the bourgeois world. The latter
gave Barth's thought its urgency, its self-critical edge, its sense of crisis. The
former supplied it with its basic framework of divine absoluteness and
human relativity. The anchor for Barth's theology before 1915 had been the
possession of God in the experience of faith; from 1915 onward this anchor
was removed, and in its place was a lacuna. How could anything of this
theology stand without its centre, though? The answer seems to have been
that it no longer sought to stand on its own feet. The critical thought here
came from Barth's restless socialism - the idea of the judgement of God, the
radical opposition between the kingdom of God and this world. God
dissolves as well as creates; God is the destruktive Geist as well as the
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konstruktive Geist. It should be no surprise if theology lacks a centre -
theology with a centre other than God is not theology; but God is not given
to us to provide us with a centrepiece for our theological construction.
Theology too is suffering dissolution under the judgement of God. As a
result of all this, Barth was effectively able to make a virtue out of that
quality in Herrmann's theology which Troeltsch had criticized: that it made
everything outside the Christian consciousness into sheer longing. Now
with the collapse of the Christian consciousness, Barth's theology could
accept this longing as inescapable. When theology understands this it comes
to understand itself as longing. As he would later point out, theology
becomes only an instance of the sigh Veni Creator Spiritus!52
The affinity between this theology and Expressionism is primarily a matter
of the ideas which animated both. Expressionism's diversity was clustered
round a centre provided by the loss of a metaphysics of substance, displaced
by a sense of contingency and ephemerality; by the sense of the loss of the
mimetic power of the artist's language and of given conventions of
representation; and by the consequent shift from a mimetic to an expressive
aesthetic. It oscillated between the positive pole of the sovereign freedom of
the creative mind, and the negative pole of the artist's estrangement from
community, symptomatic of a more general sense of rootlessness, of
estrangement from previously-accepted social conventions. Barth's theology
likewise reflected the loss of the metaphysics of substance, and suggested a
corresponding sense of the ephemerality of created reality standing under
judgement. It likewise focused on the lack of mimetic power in language
and the inadequacy of conventions of representation - above all as regards
our language about God and our conventions for representing the divine. In
its turn towards a dialectical method it reflects a sense that our language
about God has no power to represent God, but ought rather to express our
situation i.e. our inability to speak of God. Dialectics is the form of this
theology because the contradiction of thesis and antithesis expresses our
inability. Dialectics is therefore a method analogous to an expressive
aesthetic: it does not state the truth of the matter; it can only point to it by
adopting a style which does not aim at mimesis.
52 Barth, WGWM, 134.
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This theology does not require to erect barriers round some foundational
knowledge exempt from the dissolution effected by the divine, not even
around the minimal demand of an experiential unity of faith and revelation
which can acquire no magnitude in cognitive discourse. The source of this
dissolution is not just critical-historical method, or scientific advance. It is
not just one particular culture that has been found wanting by another. The
experience of modernity gives the lie to all previous illusions of security.
The source of this dissolution is God, and so the dissolution is universal.
Reality is grounded in the divine constructive mind, and only that; any
pretensions that we can apprehend a stable and substantial reality are
dissolved by it. Our social and cultural contexts of meaning lose their
validity, being seen for the contingent constructs that they are. Theology in
the modern world had tended to proceed by a series of retreats, each
marking out ever smaller boundaries for a region of theological truth-claims,
boundaries at which the expanding claims of scientific and historical
disciplines could be repulsed. With Barth, theology becomes modern in a
new sense. There is no space left behind the barriers. There is nothing left to
defend. The Church and its teachings are flawed and relative, through and
through.
To emphasize the negative so strongly, though, raises the question of what
room there is left for anything positive, and therefore of the ground of this
negative also. It sounds at the moment as if the term 'modern theology' is an
oxymoron. The key to the positive must be found in the fact that the
judgement against the world, including the Church and its speech, is God's
judgement. And as judgement it is therefore also grace. The dialectical
relation of judgement and grace is explicit in Barth's writing as early as
March 1913, in one of the sermons which McCormack quotes:
But judgement too cannot be the last word of God. Judgement too must be a
means and the way of His grace. When God judges and punishes, He is at
the same time the Creator who calls new life into existence. Catastrophes
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and violent storms must serve the coming of His Kingdom.53
It is also important to note, in this regard, that the dialectic of judgement
and grace in Barth's sermons had an analogue in his brother Heinrich's
thought. The key to this was the fact that the Ursprung subjects knowledge
and being to a critical negation as well as providing their ground. For this
philosophy: "Logic and science are true to the Ursprung in that they subject
the givenness of contents to a radical negation in order to erect them anew
in accordance with their own laws."54 It is widely recorded that Karl Barth
was impressed and influenced by his brother Heinrich's work in the period
between the two versions of Romans.55 It is also clear, though, that he had
early knowledge of his brother's dissertation of 1913, in which the essentials
of Heinrich's modification of neo-Kantianism are contained. Proof of this
early knowledge is in the fact that Karl referred to it in a footnote to his 1913
article 'Der Glaube an den personlichen Gott'.55 That reference comes at a
53 See McCormack, CRDT, 102. Apart from anything else, it is notable that there is a clear
affinity here between the relation of judgement and grace and the Expressionists' idea that a
new world and a new humanity would be born through the collapse of the old order,
through the sufferings of their own time. See for example Margarete Susman's comments,
quoted in Taylor op. cit. 34: "Our world must be made new, but this can only come about in
agonised convulsions—there is no other way. The days of serenity, of gracefulness, of
reticence, of modesty are over. God does not come to us ill-starred mortals on the wings of a
gentle breeze. Expressionism has a mission in which beauty plays no part. When
Expressionism has become the sole will and principle of an age, and when the naked soul
kneels down and cries out to God, beauty is like a robe that has been consumed by flames,
while despair manifests itself in forms filled only with the sound of screams and prayers."
Another example quoted by Taylor is from a speech by the eponymous heroine of
Hasenclever's Antigone, of 1917: "Palaces totter. Power is at an end.
Those who were once great will plunge into the abyss,
The gates crash shut behind them.
Those who owned everything have lost everything; The slave sweating at his job
Is richer than they.
Follow me! I shall lead you.
The wind stirs among the ruins;
The new world dawns. ...
Food and rewards for everyone;
Blood has flowed;
War will perish;
Nations will stretch out their hands in friendship."
See Taylor, 46. He gives a reference to act 5, scene 3. The passage is actually from act 5,
scene 2.
54 Heinrich Barth 'Gotteserkenntnis' inMoltmann (ed.) Die Anfdnge der dialektischen
Theologie, vol. 1,238. See McCormack, CRDT, 222.
55 See Barth's letter to Thurneysen of 13th April 1919 for example, in B-Th. Br. I. 456. See
also Busch Karl Barth 109, and McCormack, CRDT, 223. See alsoWerner Ruschke op. cit.
particularly 83-87 and 118-124.
56 Barth, GPG, 72.
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point in the article at which Karl both connects the concept of God to the
category of the Ursprung, and suggests a dialectic of affirmation and
negation:
To question the foundation of 'reality' as such is to affirm it at the same
time. ... The 'unfounded' becomes the ground for the foundation of what is
thought and willed, the pure deduction to pure origin (Ursprung). It is the
truth and validity which rests in itself—the truth and validity of the a
priori—that manifests itself here as the positive component of the concept of
God. 57
It is perhaps significant also that Heinrich had stressed the non-givenness of
this divine origin. For Heinrich this philosophy was essentially a mutual
correction of German idealism and Plato, and to that extent a continuation of
philosophy in the great tradition of western metaphysics. Unlike his
theological brother, though, Heinrich's stress on the non-givenness of God
did not involve the traumatic loss of something previously taken to be
secure.58 What fends off nihilism in Karl Barth's new theology, on this
account, is his assimilation of the idea of God as the transcendent, non-given
Ursprung, and therefore his drift towards a 'revelatory monism', in place of
Herrmann's dualism of faith.
One major issue arises from all this, though: doesn't such a revelatory
monism amount to an attempt to return behind Kant and modernity
57 Barth, GPG, 72. Quoted by Fisher, 266. Fisher is correct to see Karl Barth in 1913 already
appropriating his brother's religious interpretation of neo-Kantianism. However he is
surely mistaken to suggest, on p. 303, that Heinrich Barth's dissertation was the object of
Karl's later polemics against 'theological Cartesianism'. This dissertation, while seeing
Descartes as anticipating neo-Kantianism, argued for a correction of both. To this extent he
was surely the source of his brother's critique of theological Cartesianism, rather than its
object.
58 McCormack notes (CRDT, 221, n. 37.) how Heinrich, apparently untouched by the
collapse of neo-Kantianism in the aftermath of the War, continued to seek a way forward on
the lines he had already developed, i.e. following the Marburg school, which he took to be a
continuation of "classical philosophy". Heinrich's unwillingness to abandon neo-
Kantianism - particularly in its religious interpretation - need not be seen as an
anachronistic attempt to cling to the past, nor as disconfirmation of the suggested affinity
between his brother's thought and Expressionism. Karl, like his brother, did not see any
need to reject what he'd gained from neo-Kantianism wholesale after the war, in favour of
phenomenology or anything else. On the contrary, as has been noted, Heinrich exercised a
renewed influence on him. It is also worth noting that Heinrich's views did change over
time. Fisher notes, p. 11: "Heinrich's adoption of existentialism was slow and reluctant, but
this stance clearly distinguishes his Erkenntnis der Existenz, which was posthumously
published in 1965."
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altogether? Isn't this inversion an attempt to provide secure foundation for
theological speech, and therefore a new basis for mimesis generally? This is
a possibility which has to be taken seriously. It is essentially the same point
that is at stake in accusations that Barth adopted a positivism of revelation.
Certainly, even Heinrich's account of the knowledge of God in his 1919
lecture involved recourse to the idea of revelation. He noted, as McCormack
points out, that "the consciousness which men and women have of the
Ursprung is not to be had through 'living and moving in God' but rather 'in
Christ'. ... The resurrection testifies to the truth we have forgotten: that the
truth of human existence is that our Origin lies in God and that the decision
which men and women were seeking in the revolutionary events of the time
had already been made in God."59 In the case of Karl, it is even clearer that it
is not neo-Kantian logic which leads to knowledge of God as Origin but
God's act of revelation. The critical thing, though, is that revelation is not a
given quantity; and more importantly it is something which we are not of
ourselves capable of receiving. The diastasis between God and world, even
between God's revelation and the human subject, is that which wards off
any accusation of positivism, and which counts against the charge that Barth
restores metaphysics to try to provide a new ground for mimesis.
The question of whether Barth's theology avoids a repristination of pre-
Kantian metaphysics becomes, then, the question of whether revelation is
possible on these terms. Are the negations and affirmations described above
commensurable? How can the wholly other God who negates the world in
judgement and affirms it in grace can be apprehended? How can the
diastasis be bridged without imploding? If it is unbridged, if revelation does
not take place, then the whole account falls as a self-deceptive and
ungrounded speculation. Yet if it is bridged how can we still talk in terms of
a diastasis? If the gulf between God and the world has been bridged how can
59 McCormack, CRDT, 222-3.
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there still be a gulf?60 The story of the development of Barth's theology from
this point on is the story of his strategies for dealing with this problem -
usefully and neatly classified by McCormack as stages marked by process
eschatology, by consistent eschatology, and by anhypostatic/enhypostatic
christology. The question of whether Barth's theology ultimately reflects or
ignores the modernist crisis of representation can only be answered by
considering the results of these strategies.
vi. Expressionism and Barth's new theology
I have argued above that the affinities between Barth's theology and
Expressionism run deep, and are by no means merely matters of literary
style or vocabulary; yet there were also, not surprisingly, similarities in style
60 This particular question highlights the difference between Barth's views before and after
1915. Barth insisted, even before 1915, on the transcendence of God, on the impossibility of
natural knowledge of God, and on the impossibility of expressing revealed truth in human
language. But his understanding of revelation as self-authenticating, establishing a
relational nexus between the divine and the human, effectively breached the diastasis. Such
a theology was indeed very close to neo-Platonism, and, as Fisher points out, is open to the
charge of revelational positivism. See Fisher, 334-5. There is a misconception in Bruce
McCormack's comment on Fisher's view: see McCormack, CRDT, 219. He says that Karl
Barth stood under the influence of Heinrich, rather than Cohen, at this point; therefore his
thinking was not positivistic. McCormack is correct that Heinrich Barth's thought was
distinguished from Cohen at this point, and that Karl was to some extent influenced by
him. See ibid. p. 220, where McCormack rightly points out that it was Heinrich's emphasis
on non-givenness which "made his thinking alien to all forms of positivism". But on this
point Karl was clearly not under his brother's influence before 1915. On the contrary, at that
time Karl insisted on the givenness of God in revelation. It is precisely on this account that
Fisher supports the description of Karl's thought at this time as positivistic. Fisher makes
absolutely clear, though, that he is making no judgement as to the appropriateness of this
accusation against Barth's post-1915 theology (see Fisher, 335). Moreover McCormack's
comments on this matter are not consistent: on p. 219 he asserts both that Karl's
understanding of the Ursprung was "at this point under the influence of Heinrich", and also
that it "was controlled by a theological understanding which was not shared by his
brother". McCormack makes a further criticism of Fisher on the subject of the location of
originary thought in God, which also fails to hit the mark. He says, at p. 219, "Fisher was
wrong, however, to think that this move only took place in the chaos of the post-war
period; it had already been initiated by Heinrich Barth in the pre-war period." Fisher did
not state, as McCormack suggests, that the re-attribution of originary thought to the divine
mind only took place after the War. His account of Barth's pre-war theology makes the
presence of this move quite clear. It also makes clear that it was Heinrich who was
primarily responsible for this move. See Fisher chapter 5 generally, and in particular p. 266:
"Cohen's last book of religious philosophy seems to have made the totality of ideas into the
thoughts of God, ... with the deity therefore becoming a divine principle of origin. Barth
anticipated Cohen in this move, but he should not be credited with originality on that
account, for such a religious interpretation of Marburg philosophy had already been
advanced in the doctoral thesis of his philosopher brother, Heinrich Barth."
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and language. These became more obvious in the writings that emerged
from Barth's theological 'revolution'. After 1915, Expressionistic language
begins to appear outside the pulpit, in lectures first of all and then in the
lengthy commentary on Paul's letter to the Romans written during the
second half of the War. An early example is in the lecture "Die neue Welt in
der Bibel", delivered in Leutwil on 6th February 1917. In trying to describe
the strangeness of the biblical world, in that lecture, Barth suggests that as
we read the biblical narrative we "are aware of something like the tremors
of an earthquake or like the ceaseless thundering of ocean waves against
thin dikes".61 There is a clear resonance in such language of the rising tides
of 'Weltende'.62 However the most significant Expressionistic quality in this
lecture is simply the idea of the new world as something quite distinct from
but also related to this world. The 'Messianic Expressionism' of the later
War years also focused on the idea of a new humanity and a new world, in
accord with its tendency to convert the visualization of inner states to a
vision of social renewal. At the same time as Barth began to stress the idea of
a new world, in fact, Expressionism began to think in very similar terms,
and to speak in very similar language.
The Expressionistic images evident in the Leutwil lecture are evident also in
the first edition of Romans. One example has already been quoted: the image
of flood-tides bursting through dams from Barth's discussion of Romans
13:4. He talked, it will be recalled, of healing unrest (heilsam Unruhe)
reinforcing "the flood-tide of the divine which is rising all around, and
which will one day by itself tear apart the dams".63 There is an ambiguity
about this imagery, as in much Expressionism; chaos and catastrophe imply
judgement, but also grace: the unrest can heal, and the destructive tide is
also the influx of the divine, suggesting the dawning of a new age.
The comparison between the first Romans and Expressionism is once again
much more than a matter of style and vocabulary, though. In fact the
commentary's 'process' eschatology, which is so fundamental to it, has
^B^thTYJGWM/29.
62 This is not to say that Barth was familiar with van Hoddis' poem, necessarily. Such
imagery was the common property of Expressionism. There was for example a journal with
the title Die Flut. See Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 2.
63 Der Romerbrief (Erste Fassung) 1919,508.
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much in common with Expressionism, and with modernist ideas generally.
The commentary draws a distinction between 'so-called history' and 'real
history'. The former, the history of the world as we perceive and know it, is
a history which proceeds from the Fall of humankind out of a relation of
immediacy to God. It is a history, therefore, of judgement, a "history of
alienation, ambiguity, and death", as McCormack puts it. 64 However there is
another history, 'real history', which is quite distinct from this. It is the
history of God, and in its light " 'so-called history' is seen to be less than
real, that is, mere appearance".65 Barth's eschatology envisages a relation of
these two histories as a process, a turning which is taking place throughout
time. These two histories are movements, and they are related in a process
in which one is coming to an end the other is beginning. This eschatology is
anti-individualistic, envisaging salvation as the redemption of the whole.
Moreover it is not that the old world has within it the power to give birth to
the new: rather the possibility of the new is hidden, a divine possibility not
visible in the old.
Barth's eschatology here bears a remarkable resemblance to the
Expressionist ideas about the dissolution of the old world and the rising of a
new one.66 What I want to draw attention to particularly, though, is the fact
that an emphasis on process and function was typical of the whole of
modernism. Barth's concepts display the same transfer of substance into
process that we noted in the previous chapter. As Sokel put it:
the concept of 'being' yields to the concept of 'functioning'. This is the
Expressionist ideal of the 'desubstantivation of the world' (Entsubstantivierung der
Welt) ... Substance is transferred into process and function; the noun bows to the
verb; content becomes method; active expression replaces passive experience. With
these ideas, German Expressionism is completely at one with European
modernism.67
64 McCormack, CRDT, 142.
65 Ibid. 143.
66 One example is in the comments of Franz Kafka on a postcard to Max Brod in January
1918, concerning the conclusion to Brod's Das grosse Wagnis: "it occurred to me that the
affirmative conclusion of your novel actually points to something simpler and more
obvious than I at first thought, that is the building of a church, an asylum, something of that
sort, which will almost undoubtedly come about and is already rising around us as
everything crumbles and in the same tempo." See Kafka Letters op. cit. 185.
67 Sokel, WE, 116.
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Like Barth's anti-individualistic eschatology, the turn from substance to
process in modernism is a rejection of individualism. Sokel again:
A substance exists in and for itself; it can be considered an individual. A
function on the other hand, has no existence in isolation; it acquires
meaning in relation to a totality. The idea of individual personality has
meaning in a world of substances; it is meaningless in a universe of pure
function and process.68
The ideas of the first Romans,then, do indeed have a strong relation to
Expressionism and modernism. Bruce McCormack is right, then, to note that
von Balthasar's description of the second Romans as theological
Expressionism fails to do justice to the first edition.69
vii. Expressionism and the second Romans: style and influences.
In spite of what has just been said, however, it is in the second edition of
Romans, that the analogies between Barth's work and Expressionism
multiply. These are particularly clear in the changes in Barth's style of
writing and in his imagery. An important instance of this is the rise to
prominence of Expressionistic concepts such as the 'new world' and the
'new man'. Barth, of course makes his own use of such terms; but they
nonetheless bear the marks of the contemporary context. A good illustration
of the prominence of such terminology is Barth's treatment of the fifth
chapter of the letter. In the first edition, this section had been given the title
of 'The Day'. Verses 1 to 11 were headed 'The New Situation', and verses 12
to 21 headed 'The Victory of Life'. In the second edition, the whole chapter is
given the title 'The Coming Day'; the first eleven verses are headed 'The
68 Sokel, WE, 117.
69 McCormack, CRDT, 139. McCormack points out that there is a parallel between the first
Romans and the Expressionist notion that reality lies beneath surface appearance. He also
suggests that the first Romans was written in "an Expressionistic style". These observations
are useful; however they do not perhaps, fully reflect the strength of the analogies between
the first Romans and contemporary culture. Moreover these are aspects in which, as will
shortly become clear, the second Romans is considerably more Expressionistic than the first.
To this extent I disagree with McCormack when he says that "it is not the expressionistic
qualities of the rhetoric of the second edition which sets that work off from its predecessor",
(p. 243.) This, unfortunately, is his only comment on the link between the second Romans
and Expressionism.
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New Man', and the latter part headed 'The New World'.70 The second
edition was, of course, written in late 1920 and in 1921, a time when
Expressionist poetry and drama had become much better known than they
had been during the war. Whether Barth was deliberately choosing a
vocabulary which recalled Expressionism is uncertain; but the adoption of
such language undoubtedly makes a major contribution to the rhetorical
effect of the book.
The turn to a more Expressionistic prose is not just a matter of vocabulary,
however. Barth's writing in the second edition generates a different
atmosphere from the earlier version, or rather a distinct intensification of its
atmosphere. It is not only the content of the second Romans that is unlike
historical-critical commentaries: its style and mood are utterly different.
Reading it is an extraordinary experience by any standards. George Steiner
has recently described the book as "an explosive step in the history of the
German language", and suggested that in it Barth's style actually goes
beyond Expressionism.71 Certainly the book is characterized by a sense of
intensity and excitement which, at very least, is strongly reminiscent of
Expressionism. There is, from the very first page, an extraordinary sense of
striking through to the heart of the matter, ignoring all incidental detail,
sparing no time to set the scene or decorate the situation. There is an effect
similar to that noted by Richard Samuel, when he described the contrast
between Manet and Marc:72 the subject matter is thrust into the foreground;
Barth's aim is not to present the epistle to the Romans as an object of nature
(or religion or ethics or history) but to portray its 'soul', its essential
message. The external qualities of Paul's letter - those which keep it at arms
length, as a historical object yielding information about religious history -
are of no consequence. Barth presses through, insistently, with unwavering
concentration, in order to discern and display the true subject matter.
The second edition's popular success and lasting influence were in part due
70 The discussion of the chapter concludes with a ringing affirmation: "But because we have
perceived this, we are able to recognize ... the power and meaning of the Coming Day: the
Day of the New World and of the New Man." Romans II, 187.
71 George Steiner To Speak of God', review of Bruce L. McCormack Karl Barth's Critically
Realistic Dialectical Theology in The Times Literary Supplement, 19th May 1995, 7.
72 See Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 146.
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to the fact that in it, Barth arrived at a rhetoric which could give appropriate
and powerful expression to its central ideas. It did so by means of its
concentration on a narrow range of key concepts; by its anxiety-producing
dialectical method of statement and counter-statement; even by the
repetitiveness that seems to result from the sheer narrowness of its gaze; and
all these focussing on the question of "the being which the world has in the
thought of God", as Cornelis van der Kooi puts it.73 The rhetoric conveys a
sense of crisis, and to that extent is superbly suited to the content. The sheer
concentration of the book gives it an atmosphere reminiscent of the
visionary quality of much Expressionist drama; and as is often the case in
Expressionist writing, there is a sense that in these visions we have
fleetingly, tangentially touched (or been touched by) the truth of how things
are for us.
Moving on from questions of language and rhetoric, another feature of the
second Romans is its appropriation of influences which were also important
for Expressionism. The most obvious of these shared influences is
Kierkegaard. This was noted by von Balthasar, who went so far as to call the
second Romans "theological expressionism, especially in methodology". The
justification for this appellation was the fact that the 'infinite qualitative
distinction' between God and humanity, so important for the methodology
of the second Romans, was something which had been "rediscovered in the
febrile and tumultuous years following World War I, the era of
Expressionism".74 The importance of the dialectical opposition of time and
eternity in the second Romans does not need to be stressed; it is central to the
work, as Barth admitted in the preface.73 It is significant, though, that much
Expressionism can be understood in terms of a similar dialectic between
time and eternity. As noted in chapter 2 above, R. Hinton Thomas went so
far as to describe the duality of finite and infinite as the special problem
facing Expressionist art 73 The debt to Kierkegaard, whose writings had only
73 See Cornelis van der Kooi Anfangliche Theologie: Der Denkweg des jungen Karl Barth (Chr.
Kaiser Verlag, Miinchen, 1987), 169.
74 von Balthasar The Theology ofKarl Barth op. cit. 83.
75 Romans II, 10.1 do not wish, or need, to take a view here on the question of the precise
importance of Kierkegaard's influence. See McCormack, CRDT, 237-40 for a brief discussion
of this issue.
76 Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 23-4.
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recently become known in Germany, is obvious. Thomas mentions Kafka's
debt to Kierkegaard in particular, while noting that the former gave more
significant expression than any other contemporary writer to "the
irreconcilable dualism of the Finite and Infinite, of Time and Eternity".77 The
duality Thomas describes, though, was widespread in Expressionism,
appearing in a variety of guises: particularly in its apocalyptic notes and in
its opposition between the old world and the new, between bourgeois
culture and the new man, between the chaos and futility of the passing
world and the spiritual realm which can be grasped in an intuitive vision.
Kierkegaard was not the only writer who influenced Barth and was also
important for Expressionism. The novels of Dostoevsky had begun to be
available in German translation in the early years of the century, and had a
profound influence on the new generation of writers, sufficient for R. Hinton
Thomas to remark that the whole period was captured by the spell he cast. 78
Barth seems to have been introduced to his novels by Thurneysen, whose
admiration of Dostoevsky is documented in his book of 1921.79 These novels
seem to have had a lasting impact on Barth. Barth refers to them in his
correspondence with Thurneysen as early as 18th August 1915, when he
says that he spent the whole of the previous day reading Crime and
Punishment. In the second Romans he refers to Dostoevsky and his books on
numerous occasions.80 Dostoevsky's value, for Barth and Thurneysen, was
his ability to put the stable reality of the familiar everyday world, and the
humanity which inhabits it, into question. Thurneysen opened his book by
highlighting the disturbing effect of Dostoevsky's narrative. He wrote:
Whoever comes to Dostoevsky from the regions of secure humanity, of the
77 Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 140. See Robertson, Kafka, 192-5, though, on the
extent to which Kafka came to dislike and reject important elements in Kierkegaard. The
extent of Kierkegaard's influence on Barth has also been disputed recently, of course.
78 Ibid. 122. One particularly important instance of Dostoevsky's influence was Kafka.
There is a good deal of literature on this; a useful article, including references to other
relevant work, is W.J. Dodd's 'Varieties of Influence: On Kafka's Indebtedness to
Dostoevskii' in Journal ofEuropean Studies, xiv (1984), 257-269.
79 Dostojewski (Chr. Kaiser Verlag, Miinchen, 1921). ET: Dostoevsky trans. Keith R. Crim,
(John Knox Press, Richmond, 1964).
80 There are in fact some twenty-six occasions when Dostoevsky or his novels are
mentioned. Unfortunately the indexes to both the German and the English translation are
inaccurate and incomplete. I would estimate, however, that of post-biblical sources only
Luther is mentioned more often than Dostoevsky.
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pre-war period for instance, must feel like one who has been looking at such
domesticated animals as the dog and the cat, the chicken or the horse, and
then suddenly sees the Wild before him, and without warning finds himself
face to face with the yet untamed animal world ... He is surrounded by
awesome wildness, by strangeness ...81
Dostoevsky was felt by him to sum up the restlessness and scepticism of the
age. He:
unites in himself the whole many-sided striving of the European soul at the
end of the nineteenth century and holds the mirror up to it. Whoever looks
into it reads something of the nameless disquiet, the deep scepticism, the
torment and defiance, and the unallayed longing of this unfortunate epoch,
which was being driven into the abyss of war and revolution.82
Dostoevsky's value is that he puts a question not on the basis of some secure
position that he has found, but a question that undermines all that is: "The
man Dostoevsky, taken as a whole, is one great, fiery protest against all that
exists as such."88 Yet Thurneysen finds that because of this "absolute
critique", Dostoevsky's writing identifies and criticizes with particular
accuracy the mood and thought of western bourgeois culture:
Dostoevsky's thinking has two poles: life as it is, the world as it goes its
way, is one, and the beyond, 'resurrection,' eternity, is the other. Here is
man, there God. Dostoevsky's total knowledge consists in the strict critical
relationship of these two moments to one another, as he portrayed it. But
what he does not know—or knows only all too well in its demonic
danger!—is that in-between world where man becomes God and the other-
world becomes this-worldly, where the dream is dreamed of being like
God, of the development of man from 'gorilla to superman'. It is just this
idolatrous dream which Dostoevsky saw was being dreamed in the West
above all, in the form which is so well known to us, of cultural evolution
towards leagues of nations, yes, to the union of all mankind and finally to
the automatic arrival of the Kingdom of God and universal peace.84
Thurneysen's account of Dostoevsky indicates accurately the value that the
latter had for Barth. The understanding of Dostoevsky implied by Barth's
references in Romans is recognisably related to Thurneysen's picture. Barth
talks for example of Dostoevsky's "hunger for eternity"85 and of his




85 Romans II, 252.
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presentation of "the impenetrable ambiguity of human life".86 The ends of
Dostoevsky's novels, he says, parallel the end of Paul's letter to the
Romans.87 What he means by this is that Dostoevsky's 'absolute critique' is
grounded in a perception of the 'universal Krisis'. This close parallel
between the Barth and Thurneysen's reading of Dostoevsky is, though,
hardly surprising. What is less expected, perhaps, is that Thurneysen's book
also reflects accurately Dostoevsky's value for the whole generation of
writers. That value is said by Thomas to have lain primarily in his
"eschatological vision of world-destruction", an "impressive vision of the
collapse of mankind"88 - this is the very quality which Thurneysen
described as Dostoevsky's 'absolute critique'. Thomas notes that the highest
expression of this among all Dostoevsky's novels is The Brothers Karamazov.
It is worth noting that in the second Romans, almost all of the references to
Dostoevsky which mention a particular novel relate to The Brothers
Karamazov .89
viii. Expressionism and the second Romans: divergence
So far, in discussing style and influences, I have touched only slightly on the
relation between Expressionism and the theological ideas in the second
Romans. Are the connections considered above, matters of common
influences and of style and vocabulary, reflected in the book's theological
content? Is the 'theological Expressionism' of the second edition more than
skin deep? At first sight it might appear as if a retreat from modernism had
taken place. I have argued, after all, that the most important connection
between the first Romans and Expressionism was their common substitution
of process for substance. But in the second Romans process eschatology has
been displaced by consistent eschatology. What is to be made of this? Is the
change to be regarded as a step away from the influence of the Zeitgeist
towards a purer theological expression of Barth's ideas? Or does the shift in
perspective between the two editions perhaps reflect a parallel change in
86 Romans II, 505.
87 Ibid. 505.
88 Samuel and Thomas, Expressionism, 121.
89 To be precise, there are eleven references to The Brothers Karamazov, one to The Idiot, and
one to Crime and Punishment. Most of the references to The Brothers Karamazov are to the
Grand Inquisitor episode.
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culture and society? I want to deal with this in two stages: first of all I will
consider the ways in which Barth's theological perspective, particularly in
the second Romans, distinguishes his work from Expressionism and from
modernist culture generally. After that I will consider the positive analogies
between the theology of the second Romans and the post-War history of
Expressionism.
To begin with, it has been noted earlier that Expressionism's assumptions
and commitments were not compatible with traditional religious belief. It
would in fact be impossible to talk usefully about similarities between Barth
and Expressionism were it not for the element of anti-theology in his
writing, his denial of the possibility of human speech about God. However
his writing was not simply anti-theology: it was also theology, a speaking
about God despite itself, claiming a basis in God's address to the creature.
Any discussion of affinities between Barth and Expressionism appears to be
in difficulties as soon as this side of the matter comes into view. The critical
thing here is the question of the nature of the basis of the positive side, the
element which grounds Barth's transcendence of theological nihilism: in
other words Barth's inversion of neo-Kantianism, his location of originatory
thought not in the human konstruktive Geist but in God. For Barth it was not
human creativity or decision that matter, but God's decision and act. This
tendency had been present in his thinking since well before the war. Even in
1910, speaking of the intuition in which faith is united with God's act of
justification, he described this as "God's deed of election".90 By 1913 this
thought had become clearer: "Religion's thinking about God cannot be
something projected from within ourselves; it can only be the reflection of a
fact that has been created and projected into us."91 When the mediation of
religious experience is no longer assumed, Barth's thinking is clearly
differentiated from Expressionist subjectivism: despite Kant's demolition of
the possibility of metaphysics, it is God's creative action, God's act of
election that grounds our reality and our knowledge.
There is, at very least, a considerable divergence between Barthian theology
and Expressionism here. Expressionism's visions, whether of inner states or
90 Barth, CGG, 53.
91 Barth, GPG, 89.
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social renewal, were typically visions of human creativity. Despite its sense
of the otherness of the future, the source of the new world and the new
humanity was to be the transfigured old humanity, not a power that broke
into world from without. The gulf it sensed between the old world and the
new was not therefore of the same order as the diastasis between the two
worlds in Barth's thought. Expressionism thought in terms of a gulf between
human actuality and human possibility, even if the realization of human
possibilities would require a profound Wandlung of the individual to take
place. But Barth thought in terms of a gulf between human actuality and
divine possibility, which is human impossibility. In this sense, perhaps,
George Steiner is correct to say that Expressionism falls short of Barth. 92 The
diastasis between the human and the divine, especially in the second Romans,
was of a different order than the Expressionist gulf between the finite and
the infinite. Barth's visions could not be visions of eternity. As he said: "The
vision of the New Day remains an indirect vision; in Jesus revelation is a
paradox, however objective and universal it may be."93
Does Barth's theology, then, for all its analogies with Expressionism,
amount to a thorough rejection of modernist assumptions and convictions?
Was his 'Expressionism', like Werfel's, a search rather than a destination? Is
his modernism, located particularly in his insistence on the complete
inability of human language to represent God, ultimately incompatible with
his theological realism and his stress on God's decision and address? Do the
latter notions not ultimately subvert modernism's emphasis on
ephemerality and contingency? Does the idea of God's revelatory address
not provide a positive grounding for judgements of truth and value, and for
renewed confidence in the mimetic power of language? These questions,
arising from the genuine divergence between Barth's theological ideas and
the ideas animating modernist culture, reaffirm the doubt about whether the
Expressionism of the second Romans goes any deeper than the surface of the
book. They are questions, though; and they are not rhetorical. Any answer
that did not consider the relation between the post-War development of
Barth's theology and the development of Expressionism in the same period
would be premature. Before concluding that the second Romans was a
92 George Steiner To Speak of God op. cit.
93 Romans II, 97.
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retreat from Expressionism, it is advisable to consider seriously the
possibility that it constituted a parallel reaction to essentially the same set
of circumstances as faced post-War Expressionism: disappointment in the
failure to achieve some meaningful social reconstruction, and a consequent
reinterpretation of hope.
ix. Expressionism and the second Romans: convergence
Michael Beintker describes Barth's development between the two editions of
Romans in the following terms: "Under the sign of eschatology, an
everywhere tangible de-historicization of the salvation event was carried out
in Romans II ... Herein lies the real break between the two commentaries on
Romans".94 The 'process' eschatology of the first edition, to use
McCormack's terms, was displaced by "a radically futurist 'consistent'
eschatology according to which the Kingdom of God is understood as that
which brings about 'the dissolution of all things, the cessation of all
becoming, the passing away of this world's time'."95 It is important, as
McCormack stresses, that the development between the two editions did not
consist in the introduction of eschatology, let alone in the emergence of
dialectical thinking. Rather it consisted in a change in the character of Barth's
eschatology, from one which conceived of the world of God as this world
made new, and as growing organically within this world, to an eschatology
which pushed the eschaton radically into the future, so radically in fact that
as he later admitted, it became a moment which "never has 'come' and
never will 'come'."96
In its recoil from activism after 1918, Expressionism also developed in a way
that can be described as a change in its eschatology, a displacement of the
eschaton from the present world into a distant future.97 Georg Kaiser's Gas I
94 Beintker Die Dialektik in der 'dialektischen Theologie' Karl Barths (Chr. Kaiser Verlag,
Munich, 1987), 44, quoted by McCormack, CRDT, 209.
95 McCormack ibid. 208.
96 CD II/l, 635. Barth admitted that the second Romans had been guilty of one-sidedness in
its "reduction of the eternity of God to the denominator of post-temporality". (CD 11/1,
634.)
97 Richard Roberts notes the widespread eschatological mood of the earlyWeimar years,
consistent with this development. See "Barth and the Eschatology ofWeimar: a Theology
on its Way?" in Roberts op. cit. 169-199.
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of 1918 is an early, though rather superficial, example of this response to
disillusionment by the postponement of hope. It represents a point at which
optimism has been challenged but "remains unchanged in essence".
Activism's hope is postponed but not essentially modified. Its vision "is
simply projected into a more propitious future".98 Toller's Masse-Mensch, as
noted earlier, contains rather more of a modification of the activist hope,
prompting Sokel's talk of a second Wandlung, supplementing and crowning
the first. The second Wandlung rejects the messianic conviction of the
Expressionists that they could actively usher in the new world. The play still
places its faith in the new community which "will come into being some
day, when the violent bitterness of mass man will have given way to
sympathy and love". That day, however, "has been moved into a vague and
distant future. It will not be here tomorrow. Infinite patience is necessary."99
There is a clear analogy between the postponement of hope to a distant
future in such plays and the change in Barth's eschatology between 1918 and
1920. To this extent, the development in Barth's thinking was consistent
with a much wider trend, connected with disappointments in the political
and social upheavals which followed the end of the War. It is important, in
this context, to realize that these upheavals extended beyond the boundaries
of post-revolution Russia and post-War Germany. Bruce McCormack gives
an excellent summary of events in Switzerland around the end of the War,
and illustrates how Swiss socialists such as Barth had cause to be
disappointed not only in the failure of the German 'November Revolution'
but also at events in their own land. Of particular relevance here was the
struggle that resulted in the Swiss Landesstreik of November 1918.
Following Christine Nothiger-Strahm,ioo McCormack notes the traditional
moderation of Swiss Socialism, but also its radicalization during the War as
a result of oppressive measures taken by the Swiss Government. The tension
between the state and workers came to a head in the call by the Olten Action
Committee for a nationwide mass strike from 12th November 1918. The
strike lasted until 14th November, when it was called off by the organizers
98 Sokel, WE, 194.
99 Ibid. 199.
100 Christine Nothiger-Strahm Der Deutschschzueizerische Protestantismus und der Landesstreik
von 1918: Die Auseinandersetzung der Kirche mit der sozialen Frage zn Beginn des 20.
Jahrhunderts (Peter Lang, Bern, 1981).
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despite the government's refusal to concede any of its demands. Its aim had
not been revolutionary; it was an attempt to protest against social injustice,
and to force the adoption of programmes of social renewal which would
alleviate the plight of the working classes.
McCormack notes Barth and Thurneysen's comments on the political
situation in their correspondence: they affirm the importance of the
'otherness' of the Kingdom of God, and the consequent need to keep their
hope distinct from "all democratic and other 'preliminary stages'."101 But
equally they sought some sign of the 'organic connection' between this
world and God's. As Barth wrote on 11th November:
If only we had turned to the bible sooner, so that we might now have firm
ground beneath our feet! Now one broods alternately over the newspaper
and the New Testament and sees precious little of the organic connection
between the two worlds, of which one ought now to be able to give clear
and powerful testimony.102
Positive comments in the correspondence between Barth and Thurneysen
tend to come from the latter. Thurneysen suggested in his sermon the
following Sunday that the right way to interpret the upheavals of
Switzerland and of Germany and Russia was to see in them a reflection of a
deep longing for a new world, implanted in peoples' hearts by God. This
was not to identify the cause of the workers with the cause of God, but it
was to see a real connection. There is no indication in Barth's letters, though,
that he felt able to see even this connection. As for the two men's attitudes to
the Swiss struggle in particular, Thurneysen's letters hope for "fruits of
righteousness", though without giving religious approval to the striking
workers. He wrote that the "saddest thing of all" would be if the upheavals
did not produce such fruits;11® this, of course, was precisely what happened.
101 Thurneysen to Barth, 30th October 1918. See B-Th. Br. I. 299. Quoted by McCormack,
CRDT, 188.
102 B-Th. Br. I. 300. Quoted by McCormack, ibid. 188. This quotation, incidentally, seems to
me to provide all the proof one could ask for that there was a difference of substance
between Barth's eschatology at this point and the eschatology of the second Romans. The
'organological conceptually' was clearly more than an ill-chosen rhetorical scheme. This
quotation is also, of course, evidence of the fact that socio-political events were exerting
significant pressure on this conceptuality.
t°3 See McCormack, CRDT, 189.
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What is clear in all this is that Switzerland, despite its neutrality during the
War and its relative stability afterwards, was not completely insulated from
the social and political turmoil of central Europe provoked by the War and
the manner of its end. The hopes and disappointments experienced by Swiss
socialists display striking analogies to those of their German counterparts at
precisely the same moment. Moreover Barth, a German-speaking Swiss who
had lived, studied and worked in Germany before the War, and who spent
the war years living only some fifteen miles from the border, would
inevitably have had some interest in the events in Germany. McCormack
has noted his critical comment on the Weimar republic in August 1919: that
it represented a "watered-down" version of socialism.i°4 Barth clearly
shared the common judgement of those who had cherished high hopes for
reconstruction after the War, a judgement about the failure of the German
revolution to attain something decisively better than the old regime.
It ought to be noted here that Bruce McCormack seeks to minimize the
importance of contextual factors on Barth's development, despite his
valuable discussion of this material. He writes:
the political upheavals of 1918 and 1919 and their consequences were at
most a contributing factor in leading to Barth's further development. More
decisive was his reaction to reviews of his commentary (which showed him
how easily his organological model of eschatology could be misunderstood)
and the influence ... of Franz Overbeck, Heinrich Barth and Soren
Kierkegaard.105
I cannot agree that factors such as the misreading of the first edition by
reviewers are more decisive than the political and cultural factors
mentioned above.106 To give prominence to Barth's desire to avoid
misunderstanding risks implying that both process eschatology and
consistent eschatology were essentially rhetorical devices, adopted to
104 McCormack, CRDT, 194.
105 Ibid. 203.
106 See ibid. 181 for details of these reviews. Chief among them was Brunner's. The striking
thing about all these 'misreadings' is that they took Barth to be advocating views close to
those which he had in fact advocated before 1915. This could, to some extent, have resulted
from the familiarity of these readers with Barth's earlier views, and their having read his
new work with expectations derived from his earlier work. However it could also have
been caused by the fact that Barth's text failed to break as decisively as he thought with his
earlier Herrmanmsm.
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facilitate the communication of an unchanging message. This would be a
great over-simplification. While the changes between the two editions of
Romans should not be overstated, they were real. McCormack's argument
here is in danger of trivializing them. Secondly, there are problems
surrounding Barth's reception of the influences mentioned: for example
his interpretation of Overbeck is often seen as anachronistic, to say the
least;107 and recent assessments of Kierkegaard's influence have tended to
minimize its importance.108 Even without these doubts, though, and
granting the full significance of these influences, there remains a question as
to why Barth was susceptible to precisely these influences at that particular
time.
I would suggest, then, that McCormack's attempt to minimize socio-political
factors is flawed. It gives insufficient weight to Barth's frustration at being
unable to discern a connection between the events of the times and the
Kingdom of God. Barth's theology already employed the idea of a diastasis
between the divine and the human realms; it also, though, thought in terms
of a relation between the two worlds, a turning from the old to the new
world, discernible to faith. The end of the War and its aftermath put this
relation in question: instead of the fulfilment of hopes it seemed to imply the
permanent frustration of hopes for an organic growth of the new in the
midst of the old. Hopes for renewal had been sustainable during the War,
since there was the prospect of a better world afterwards; but
disappointment in the post-War period left many without hope of
something significantly different and better. In such circumstances it is
understandable that Barth should reject his previous view of an organic
connection between the two worlds, and therefore that his theology would
place greater stress on the remaining element, the diastasis motif.
To this extent, I would argue, the shift in Barth's eschatology is analogous to
the recoil from activism in Expressionists like Toller. This claim has to be
handled carefully, however, for Barth had never been committed to
107 McCormack himself admits that Barth's interpretation of Overbeck was "certainly
tendentious", and he notes Jiingel's view that Barth's reading rested on a "grotesque
misunderstanding". See ibid. 227.
108 See Beintker op. cit. 233 f.
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anything like the activism of the first Wandlung. As I have already made
clear, his location of originary thought in God places him in opposition to
the Expressionist visualization of inner realities, and to the activist vision of
social renewal, both of which presuppose the constructive human spirit. The
diastasis between this world and the world of God is not ultimately
commensurable with the Expressionist gulf between old and new humanity.
It is important to note, though, that Barth had at one time stood very close
not to Expressionist activism but to the Religious Socialist activism of
Leonhard Ragaz. His adherence to Ragaz had never been complete nor
uncritical; yet as noted earlier, in the early months of the War Barth had felt
himself closer to Ragaz's position than Kutter's.109
Barth's subsequent development can be seen as a series of steps away from
this position. The first Romans had turned firmly against this activism,
taking a very negative view of the practical political possibilities available in
this world. Yet the distance between the first Romans and Religious Socialist
activism was limited by Barth's notion of the Kingdom of God growing
within this world, making this world new. A greater distance is discernible
in the Tambach lecture, even though it did not really break with the
eschatology of the first Romans. The emphasis in this lecture on the gulf
between the Christian and society made the rejection of activism much more
obvious than it had been before, sufficient for Busch to describe that lecture
as Barth's farewell to Religious Socialism.no Even at Tambach, then, Barth
could be said to have been on the same path as those participating in the
Expressionist recoil from activism. His critique in that lecture of the idea of
the ecclesiastical reconstruction of society has close affinities with the late
Expressionist critique of the idea of the artistic reconstruction of society.
What came after the Tambach lecture, though, Barth's turn from process
eschatology to consistent eschatology, constituted a genuine and more
radical change, an abandonment of attempts to perceive an organic
connection between this world and God's, and therefore a projection of hope
109 McCormack, CRDT, 121.
HO Busch, Karl Barth op. cit. 111.
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into a distant future.1*1
Where do things stand, then, with the comparison between post-War
Expressionism and the theological ideas involved in the turn from process to
consistent eschatology? I would suggest that Barth's development should
not be seen as a simple turn away from modernism but as a development
analogous to the developments in late Expressionism. The futurist
eschatology is not a retreat from the modernist turn from substance to
process, but a development of it. It widens the gulf between the processes of
dissolution and renewal, such that the former are exposed in an even starker
light than before. This is particularly clear in the dissolution of the centred
subject that takes place in the second Romans. Richard Roberts describes this
as
the displacement of the relatively secure, contemplative subject in the first
Romerbrief and its replacement by a striving negative space in the second;
this is what may be justifiably regarded as a deconstruction avant la lettre of
the ontology of the subject.112
111 It is perhaps necessary to comment here on McCormack's observations about possible
connections between Barth and the 'anti-historical revolution' in this period, particularly as
described by the historian Kurt Nowak. See McCormack, CRDT, 233-5, where he disputes
any such connection, at least without "some weighty qualifications". Having said this,
though, and having argued against this connection, he goes on to make the following
admission: "On a subterranean level, there was undoubtedly some connection between
Barth's theology and the figures and movements associated with the 'anti-historical
revolution'." What troubles me here is the word 'subterranean'. It seems to imply that any
connections between Barth's thought and cultural trends such as an 'anti-historical
revolution' are somehow inaccessible to any kind of critical evaluation and discussion. Why
this should be so is not made clear, however. The adjective 'subterranean' in fact crops up
several times when McCormack purports to be considering the relation between Barth's
thought and its context. (See also p. 32, mentioned below, and p. 140.) On each occasion it
seems to foreclose further discussion of the extent of any parallels, their nature, and their
significance. This approach seems to me to undermine McCormack's appearance of offering
an account of Barth's development which includes an assessment of the influence of
political, social and cultural factors (an impression fostered by his inclusion of a brief
discussion of Expressionism on the third page of his Chapter 1). McCormack therefore fails
to justify or explain his early claim (on p. 32-3) that "the best single introduction" to Barth's
theology is his anti-bourgeois sigh, the roots of which are to be found "in the years prior to
the outbreak of the FirstWorldWar, in the subterranean currents of the counter-culture
which was beginning to emerge", and which was embodied in socialism, in the youth
movements, and, "most eloquently", in Expressionism. Again the adjective 'subterranean' is
presumably the key. He does, on p. 235, offer a reason for not exploring such analogies in
any detail: attempts to specify such connections seem "invariably to overlook some one
aspect of differentiation which makes comparisons difficult." I am not convinced; but even
if this is granted, it provides no reason to avoid the task; rather, it ought to encourage a
more careful treatment of the subject, avoiding such pitfalls.
112 Roberts op. cit. 191-2.
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As Sokel pointed out, there is a strong 'antipersonalism' in the transition
from substance to process: "The idea of individual personality has meaning
in a world of substances; it is meaningless in a universe of pure function and
process. Personality, in the Goethean sense, exists in and for itself; it
exercises no function beyond that of being itself, "ns The eschatology of the
second Romans, placing the subject under an absolute critique, extends,
rather than retreats from, the modernism of the first edition.
x. Barth's later criticism of the second Romans
Barth's use of consistent eschatology turned out to be a passing phase in his
theological development, however. One perspective on the reasons for this
is given in his later critique of the second Romans, in volume II/1 of the
Church Dogmatics. Speaking of the concept of eternity, he notes that in his
own earlier stress on eternity as post-temporality, he ended up with
something very close to the Neo-Protestant emphasis on eternity as supra-
temporality. He wrote:
It is clear that I did say there things which can and have to be said at the
periphery if Rom. 13:11 f. is to be correctly understood. But it is also clear
that with all this art and eloquence I missed the distinctive feature of the
passage, the teleology which it ascribes to time as it moves towards a real
end. Above all, it is clear and astonishing that that in my exposition the one
thing which continues to hold the field as something tangible is the one¬
sided supra-temporal understanding of God which I had set out to combat.
... while I had radically disturbed the optimism of the Neo-Protestant
conception of time in itself it had really been confirmed by the extreme form
it had been given by me.114
The future into which eternity was pushed was, he admits, so radical that it
bore no relation to any future in time. Therefore: "The 'last' hour, the time of
eternity, was not an hour which followed time. Rather at every moment in
time we stood before the frontier of all time, the frontier of 'qualified
time'."115 This distortion was necessary as a correction to the Immanentism
of the previous period, but it was equally unbalanced. It was unstable, and
U3 Sokel, WE, 117.
U4 CD II/l, 635.
115 Ibid. 635.
could last for long. "It could not actually be the 'theology of crisis' for more
than a moment."116 What is interesting, though, is that Barth had, a few
pages prior to these remarks, commented on the cheapening of the notion of
eternity that took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He
wrote:
In a really distressing way ... the concept of eternity had lost in depth and
perspective, so that finally the point was reached where the assertion of it
was hardly to be distinguished from the denial of its contents. In the last
resort ... it became little more than an exclamation mark which had no
positive content, so that it could be placed not only behind the word 'God'
but behind any word at all denoting a supreme value, even in the last
analysis, as we have seen under National Socialism, behind the word
'Germany'.117
These remarks undoubtedly apply to Expressionism, which did tend to use
religious imagery, the idea of eternity in particular, to denote its supreme
values. The postponement of Expressionist hopes into a distant future did
not break with this. Immanentism and supra-temporalism are still present
even in the Expressionism of the second Wandlung: the central character of
Masse-Mensch continues to use the language of eternity.118 But what is
significant is that in so far as Barth's idea of eternity in the second Romans
was one sided, and approximated to the supra-temporality of the Neo-
Protestants, his criticisms have some application to his own earlier view.
Though Barth did not make this implication explicit, he would presumably
have accepted that the eschatology of the second Romans was also guilty of a
cheapening of the idea of eternity, guilty of a tendency to use it to denote its
supreme value, attributed to the idea of crisis. I would suggest, then, that
Barth's later critique of the second Romans supports my account above. It
should not be thought that the eschatology of the second Romans placed it in
a different category from the postponement of Expressionism's hopes. As
Barth himself later admitted, the fault of that eschatology had been that it
did not constitute a fundamental break with the supra-temporalism of post-
Enlightenment theology and culture.
116 CD 11/1,636.
117 Ibid. 632-3.
118 The Woman says: "You live today; tomorrow you will die. But I - turning and circling -
I come into being eternally. I shall become cleaner, more guiltless, I shall become Mankind."
Quoted by Sokel, WE, 200.
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What his theology lacked, in the second Romans, was sufficient attention to
the dimension of pre-temporality that had been the characteristic emphasis
of the reformers. His theology had within it the basis for its own correction
here: the latent idea of the decision of God as the ground of our being, our
knowledge, and our language about God. Barth's later criticism is accurate
in its recognition that the dialectical method of the second Romans did not
allow this idea to play the role it ought to. The earliest occurrence of this
recognition, though, as I have argued in Chapter 1 above, was the
Elgersburg lecture of October 1922, where he began to see the value of "a
simple direct word of faith and humility".119
xi. The recoil: Barth, Expressionism and community
Just as the eschatology of the second Romans was unstable, and could not
last in that form "for more than a moment", the second Wandlung was an
unstable response to the disappointments the immediate post-war situation.
Toller's postponed optimism was an attempt to fend off a despair which
broke through in these other places.120 The instability of Toller's postponed
hope, though, resulted from its abstractness. A number of works avoided
this by locating their hopes in some more concrete institution or ideal. In
Platz, Unruh envisaged an elevation, in place of the 'new man', of the
concrete relationships of marriage and family life. Likewise Brod's Das
grosse Wagnis opposed Expressionist utopianism with an elevation of the
individual's ability to love, related to a specific form of human community -
this time the national-political hopes of Zionism.121
Barth's new interest in the possibility of "a simple direct word of faith and
humility" has similarities with this trend. It represents an attempt to make
hope concrete rather than abstract, the future of God related to a future in
time. It involved a new appreciation of the relation of hope to the life of a
particular human community - the community of the Church. It involved a
119 Barth, WGWM, 212.
120 See Sokel, WE, 200-1 and above p. ?
121 The connection of hope not only to community but to a community with some sort of
historical continuity or tradition is particularly clear in Werfel's Spiegelmensch trilogy. See
Sokel, WE, 217.
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new understanding of the way that speech about eternity is rooted in the life
of a community and a tradition.^ This becomes clear in Barth's Gottingen
dogmatics lectures, of 1924. From their first page, it is emphasized that
theological discourse is bound to the speech of a particular community, as
reflection on the Word of God "proclaimed and heard in Christian
preaching".123
Despite these not inconsiderable similarities, however, there is a deep
disjunction between Barth's turn to dogmatics and the Expressionist turn
towards Sachlichkeit.124 It is a consequence of the gradual but now decisive
rise to prominence in Barth's thinking of the idea of the originary decision
and action of God. Theology may be bound to a particular community as a
reflection on its speech, but it is not simply reflection on the speech of a
122 Note here Bruce McCormack's emphasis in his 1989 thesis on the fact that Barth's
dogmatics, from 1924 onwards, was 'school dogmatics', relating itself to the Reformed
orthodoxy that flourished in the seventeenth century. On this accountMcCormack
describes Barth's Gottingen dogmatics as a sentence commentary on Heinrich Heppe's
textbook of Reformed dogmatics. (This judgement is repeated, though not developed, in his
published account - see McCormack, CRDT, 349. The material in Chapter 6 of his thesis
which dealt with this will presumably bear fruit in the book which McCormack promises as
a second volume supplementing the present one. See ibid, vii.) It was in fact Barth's
'scholasticism' that McCormack described as the main object of study in his thesis, and in
virtue of which he arrived at the title for it. See McCormack A Scholastic ofa Higher Order op.
cit., passim, and especially 1-15 and 558-663. See also Barth's statement in the introduction
to his Gottingen lectures (GD, op. cit. 4) that dogmatics requires as a background "the
presence of a Christian church that we do not have to build or support but that edifies and
supports us". See also GD, 27, where Barth says that he wants to restore the connection
between dogmatics today and dogmatic history.
123 Barth, GD, 3.
124 -phis is perhaps an appropriate point at which to note that constrictions of space prevent
any detailed consideration of the relation between Barth's turn to dogmatics and the
emergence, during the mid-1920s, of the tendency in German culture known as neue
Sachlichkeit. McCormack says that any suggestion of a connection here is unacceptable
because "Barth displayed little interest at this time in contemporary art" (CRDT, 330). This
point is surely irrelevant, though, unless one wished to argue that Barth was directly
influenced by an acquaintance with this art. To say that only direct influences are of any
interest would be to impose arbitrary restrictions on discussion of Barth's relation to his
context. McCormack further notes the judgement of historians that nene Sachlichkeit was
essentially a reactionary tendency, an accommodation to the status quo. This may well be
so; conclusions about Barth's relation to (or lack of relation to) such tendencies should not
be drawn too quickly, though. R.C. Speirs notes that the term 'neue Sachlichkeit' is
"awkward and confusing, since everyone wanted to describe his own attitude as 'sachlich',
but different individuals and groups meant quite different things by it." (Bance op. cit. 143.)
As this implies, the desire for Sachlichkeit was widespread. Sokel notes this also (see p. 220),
and points to a long-standing tradition of Sachlichkeit in German literature, in which Goethe
is the most significant figure. He compares late Expressionism's 'ethos of limitation' with
"the practical and socially conscious 'ethos of renunciation' of the old Goethe".
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human community. The object of dogmatics is the Word of God. Theology
concerns itself not with God as such - this would be a pre-Kantian confusion
of metaphysics and theology; nor is it essentially a reflection on human
religious speech or consciousness - this would be the error of Protestantism
from the 17th century onwards. It is grounded in the Deus dixit. Barth even
affirms the idea of a correlation of God and faith, so long as this is
understood in terms in God's address.125 The notion of such a correlation
does not, Barth observes, necessarily involve the reversal of the divine and
human subjects. But in practice this had been the consequence. The error of
modern theology had not been to talk in terms of a correlation between God
and faith but to reverse the places of the divine and human subjects in this
correlation. Barth, on the basis of the Deus dixit, turns the wheel back round
again, reversing this reversal.
Barth's understanding of theology, as outlined at the beginning of his first
dogmatics lectures, envisages a more ambiguous relation between the
'intellectual' and the community than the Expressionists who adopted the
"ethos of limitation"125 and attached themselves to particular movements.
Neither Johst's Nazism nor Becher's Communism, nor even Werfel's
populism, retained any serious critical reservation from the communities in
which they pursued their future careers. Barth's venture into dogmatic
theology, by contrast, retained a critical distance, an 'eschatological' or
'final' reserve.127 This takes effect via his insistence that it is the Word of
God in preaching that is the object of dogmatics. Dogma and dogmatics
have a judicial function over against preaching: they "tell us what will do
and what will not do, what we may say and what we may not say if what
we say is to be Christian preaching."125 But this is only one side of the
relation. For dogmatics is itself grounded in the Word of God, which is to
say that it is under the judgement of that Word. It has no secure vantage
point from which to carry out its own judgement. It is threatened. Its
"dignity, significance and role are derived". 129 This two fold relation of
125 See Barth, GD, 10-11.
125 The phrase was coined by Hans Johst - see Sokel, WE, 218.
127 The former term is that used by McCormack. The latter is used in the English translation




preaching to dogmatics reflects the fact that Earth's turn to dogmatic form,
while representing in a sense the rehabilitation of preaching and theology
into a community and a tradition, is far from being an uncritical submission
to the concrete authority of tradition or Church.
All this is emphasized in Barth's comments on the authority of the church in
section 9 of the Gottingen Dogmatics. His view is summarized well in the
thesis which he placed at the head of the section:
That God's Word speaks to us in scripture is first conditioned historically by
the authority of the church. The scope and form in which the witness of the
prophets and apostles comes to us, the interpretation which it is given by
individual teachers and the church's universal doctrinal church definitions,
and finally the outer and inner situation of each historical moment — all
these things are factors which necessarily determine our hearing of the
Word. Nevertheless, this authority is historical, relative and formal. It is
reserved exclusively for scripture as God's Word to secure for itself direct,
absolute, material authority. 13°
A recognition of the church's authority is essential. It is the church which
determines which writings are scripture, the precise text of those writings,
and the fundamental points of the interpretation of such scripture. Without
a recognition of the authority of the church in these things there could be no
Word of God in scripture and therefore no hearing of God's Word in
preaching. The other side of this coin, though, is that the church's authority
is not absolute. Critical distance is not extinguished. The church and its
teaching ought not to be accepted without reservation. On the contrary
church authority is historical and relative. It is itself under the criticism of
the Word which it proclaims. Its authority "is a real one ... But it is a real
one, we now conclude, in brackets, and these brackets must not be
excised." !3i There is a higher authority standing over the church's authority,
one which constitutes "a crisis of the crisis, a norm by which all norms are
measured and must let themselves be measured." 132 There is, in fact, a
dialectical relation of authority and freedom, something which Barth
believed the reformers to have affirmed. He quoted Luther's famous





a free lord of all things and subject to none, a Christian is a servant of all
things and subject to all." 133
This further development beyond the second Romans, though, brings us
back to the question of the relation between Barth's thought and
modernism. Does the further rise to prominence of the idea of divine
decision, the divine ground of being and knowledge, signal the collapse of
the heady modernism of his commentaries? I would suggest that it doesn't.
The key thing to note is his insistence on a dialectical relation between
freedom and authority, and his consequent affirmation of church authority
as a 'bracketed' authority. His turn to dogmatic method, and to a
recognition of the authority of the particular community of the church and
its teaching, does not constitute an abandonment of the modernist and
Expressionist impulses identified in his earlier work. The 'absolute crisis'
has not been revoked; God's Yes does not mean that God's No is no longer
uttered. Barth's 'dogmatics under crisis' is an attempt to relate the dual
impulses of Expressionism dialectically, and so preserve both. He offers
dogmatics as a sustainable form of speech, sustainable because it is both
rooted in and directed to the life of an existing historical community. Yet
this speech knows that it is relative and historical, always undergoing
dissolution, unable to speak the truth by its own power. Whether Barth's
subsequent, lifelong theological endeavours succeeded in maintaining this
dialectic is another matter altogether, and beyond the scope of this study.
But in its conception, Barth's advocacy of a dogmatics bound to a particular
tradition of speech and embodied in an actual community is an attempt to
fashion an authentically modern theology: genuinely modern, but also
genuinely a speaking of God.
xii. Dialectical 'solutions': Barth and Kafka.
Nowhere does twentieth century literature come closer to Barth than in the
stories and aphorisms of Kafka. The parallels are many. First of all, Kafka,
more than any other writer connected with Expressionism, took the problem
of human estrangement from truth seriously, sufficiently so that he
133 See Barth, GD, 252.
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approaches Barth's notion of the diastasis between the old and new worlds.
One of the dominant ideas of his early writing (for example Das Urteil and
Der Prozefi) was the conviction that the truth we are estranged from is an
absolute justice which condemns us. Significantly, it was in precisely the
same period that Barth's sermons were beginning to show an unusual
emphasis on divine judgement, an emphasis that was to develop into the
Krisis motif of the second Romans. Barth's admiration, expressed in the latter
work, for Dostoevsky's 'absolute critique' could perhaps have been
extended also to Kafka's stories, had he known them.
Even when Kafka begins to think in terms of 'das Unzerstorbare' as the basis
of life, the estrangement of consciousness from being is just as firmly
maintained. The condemnation is still present, only it is no longer the last, or
the only, word. The transcendent truth we are estranged from also seems to
be the ground of our existence. There is something of this in Das Schlofi, in
the fact that the Castle not only legislates for the village but, in a great
variety of ways, is the source and sustenance of its life. It is also present
perhaps in the squeaking of Josefine, which has a unique role in the life of
the mouse-people, especially in their moments of need. Her singing may
not, as her supporters claim, actually save the people or give them any
strength, but nonetheless she is listened to at these times, and she "achieves
effects that a true singer would seek in vain to achieve with us".134 Her song
touches the people as no other squeaking ever does; they find that "it is as if
the limbs of each were loosened, as if each single, anxious individual were
allowed for once to stretch out and relax to his heart's content in the great
warm bed of the people." 135 in Josefine's song, somehow, the people's
squeaking "is freed from the fetters of everyday life and can free us from
them, too, for a little while."136
Kafka and Barth are also at one in maintaining that our estrangement from
truth cannot be overcome either by religion or by our striving after
transcendence. Ritchie Robertson suggests that Kafka viewed religion as a
form of estrangement from being. Yet he did not on that account regard




religion as an illusion. After all it is not only religion that is estranged from
being: all of consciousness suffers the same condition. The important thing
is that while religious language and imagery may be useful, they are not
adequate to truth.137 The Castle, which symbolizes the transcendent realm,
is described at the start of Das Schlofi partly by contrast with the church spire
in K.'s home town. Unlike that spire, the Castle only seemed distinct from a
distance. Closer up it seemed ramshackle and in decay, and there was no
clear division between church and town, sacred and secular. Like the
decaying punishment machine in In der Strafkolonie, Robertson points out,
the transcendent is symbolized in a way which also suggests the decay of
religion and its traditional symbolism and language. All of this reflects very
closely Barth's theology in which there can no longer be any attempt to
fence off a realm of religion and religious knowledge, impervious to
criticism; in which religion is part of the old world, under judgement,
suffering dissolution, valuable only because and when it points beyond
itself, to that which is genuinely transcendent.
A closely connected thought of Barth's is his insistence that to attempt to
encounter transcendence is futile, and, worse than that, a fundamental
transgression: "When men stretch out their hands and touch the link which
binds them to God, when they touch the tree in the midst of the garden,
which ought not to be touched, they are by this presumptuous contact
separated from Him." 138 This is very similar to Kafka's view of attempts to
encounter transcendence. The most important example, of course, is K.'s
repeated attempts to meet Klamm and to enter the Castle. Simply to have
chosen to attempt such encounters is, as described in the chapter 2, to have
chosen the wrong path. K.'s attempt to meet Klamm in the courtyard of the
Herrenhof, for example, simply results in what seems to K. at the time to be
the Castle's breaking off all relations with him. 139
137 Robertson says (p. 241): "Religion is not an illusion, as Freud thought, since for Kafka
the religious impulse is essential to humanity; but it must always be under an illusion.
Hence the imagery of religion is valid as the expression of the religious impulse, but
misleading as an interpretation of this impulse."
138 Romans II, 247-8.
139 The Castle, 105. See also the following aphorism: "The crows maintain that a single crow
could destroy the heavens. There is no doubt of that, but it proves nothing against the
heavens, for heaven simply means: the impossibility of crows." (The Great Wall ofChina, 84.)
The name Kafka, though German, is also the Czech word for crow.
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Kafka and Barth sought the same thing: a mode of discourse and life which
knows the inaccessibility of truth and yet is not thereby reduced to silence
and isolation. Both realised the futility of striving after the transcendent, and
realised that any solution must involve connection to a real community of
speech and life. Yet such a solution must remain dialectical, a recognition of
the gulf between consciousness and being, the human and the divine.
Neither the feeble squeaking of Josefine nor the dogmatics of the
confessional theologian can attain unconditional truth.
To say all this, though, is not to try to enrol Kafka as a Barthian, even a
deviant one. He was a Jew, who felt himself deeply cut off from the religious
traditions of the Jewish past. Twelve days after the publication of Josefine,
Kafka's last story, Barth began his first lectures on the prolegomena to
dogmatics. This further step, premised on God's gracious assumption of our
inadequate speech, took Barth beyond the point where the comparison with
Kafka is fruitful.
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Chapter 4 The Enlightenment project as the context ofmodernity
i. Modernity and the Enlightenment.
The foregoing discussion has considered in some detail the relation between
Barth's theological development and German Expressionism. These two
histories were closely contemporary, and they can therefore reasonably be
seen as situated in and responding to the same set of circumstances. This
has, however, meant that the discussion has focussed almost exclusively on
the period in which the two histories occurred, which is to say the years
1909 to 1924 or thereabouts. Very little has been said so far either about the
larger-scale theological history which Barth understood his work to be in
dialogue with, or about the earlier cultural and intellectual history relevant
to the understanding of modernist movements. What would be beneficial at
this stage, I would suggest, is some consideration of these larger histories,
with a view to improving our understanding of the origins and nature of the
modernity to which I take both Barth and Expressionism to have been
responding.
To that end, I propose to use this and the following chapters to consider two
distinct accounts of the Enlightenment, which I take to have been a central
episode in the relevant history. The first of these accounts is to be found in
the writings of Alasdair Maclntyre, and in particular in his influential book
After Virtue4 This concentrates on moral theory and discourse, but happens
to describe the Enlightenment in terms which illuminate its contribution to
the circumstances of modernity experienced in the early part of this century.
The second account to be considered is Barth's own, in his lectures on the
background to and history of modern Protestant theology. Maclntyre's
argument will, I hope, provide a plausible context for the modernity already
described. If it can do this, then the argument of the previous chapter will be
enlarged, such that the relation of Barth's ideas to modernism will at the
same time constitute a relation between Barth's ideas and the
Enlightenment. The account of modernity contained in the foregoing
chapters would also derive some support from this outcome. The discussion
1 After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Duckworth, London, 2nd edition 1985).
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of Barth's lectures, on the other hand, will supplement this consideration of
Maclntyre, since the latter has little to say about German culture and ideas,
or about the influence of the Enlightenment on religion and theology. In
addition, though, the fact that this is Barth's account of these subjects is
important. For if it proves to be congruent with the reading of his theology
offered so far, that reading will be defended as well as expanded. Thirdly,
such an outcome would defend the commensurability of my reading with
what I take to be Barth's own point of view. It will, that is to say, defend my
claim that attention to context does not presuppose hostility to Barth's
theology but can yield better theological understanding of his work.
A benefit of considering the two narratives together, beside those listed
above, is that they may prove to be mutually illuminating. I will attempt to
make use of this in due course, particularly by drawing on Maclntyre's ideas
to clarify the structure of Barth's narrative. The value of Maclntyre's work in
this regard will, I hope, become clear when I consider Barth's lectures in
chapters 5 and 6.
ii. The background to the Enlightenment
First, though, some general comments on the Enlightenment may be useful.
It is customary to think of it as an intellectual movement characterized by
ideas of individual freedom, religious toleration, and the equality of citizens
before the law. We associate it with a flowering of culture and polite society
in eighteenth century Europe, and with an optimistic belief in social
progress. Such images may not tell the whole story, but neither are they
entirely without foundation. We should not assume, though, that eighteenth
century Europe was so dazzled by its optimism that it was unaware of the
destructive capacities of human nature. As one commentator, Nicholas Till,
has put it:
The philosophes and Aufklarer were certainly believers in progress; but while
one eye of the Enlightenment was always focussed gladly on the bright
future, the other eye was trained uneasily on the recent past. For the
Enlightenment had been born in the shadow of the disintegration of social
order which had occurred throughout Europe in the seventeenth century,
following what had seemed like an almost total collapse of political and
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religious authority. Civil war on a scale hitherto unknown had riven nations
and overthrown established political powers; religious doubt had come to
assail those not possessed and consumed by the new fanaticisms; status and
property no longer offered security and certainty.
The unrest of the mid-seventeenth century forced a fundamental
reappraisal of the principles of social order, which led people to ask
whether the traditional bonds could ever again be adequate. The brutal
spectre of anarchy so pitilessly portrayed in Hobbes's Leviathan haunts
eighteenth-century Europe.2
Against such a background, the Enlightenment appears as an attempt to
work out new accounts of human nature, society and the cosmos, in order to
defend social and moral life against the threat of chaos. There were two
sides to the Enlightenment coin, then: one of awareness of the disintegration
of the medieval social order and its legitimations, and fear of anarchy; the
other determined to transcend this loss and the disruptions of the previous
century by forging a new basis for order.3
Also relevant as background to the Enlightenment was the rise of capitalism
in early modern Europe. Till, again, offers a useful description of this,
bringing out its significance for the development of Enlightenment ideas. In
the medieval period, he notes:
Most people had been born into a predetermined social position that
defined them throughout their life, and placed them within a network of
hierarchies and institutions understood to be part of the divine, unchanging
order: a person was inseparable from his or her role in society; he or she was
a peasant, an artisan, a knight, and not an individual who happened to have
this or that occupation; and the medieval person's role carried with it a
number of pre-ordained obligations such as those of kinship or feudal duty.
2 Nicholas Till Mozart and the Enlightenment (Faber and Faber, London, 1992), 1.
3 This latter aspect is nicely illustrated by Jeffrey Stout's comments to the effect that
Enlightenment ideas represent a necessary attempt to articulate a notion of the common
good despite lack of agreement about religious confessions. Thus: "What made the creation
of liberal institutions necessary, in large part, was the manifest failure of religious groups of
various sorts to establish rational agreement on their competing detailed visions of the
good. It was partly because people recognized putting an end to religious warfare and
intolerance as morally good—as rationally preferable to continued attempts at imposing a
more nearly complete vision of the good by force—that liberal institutions have been able to
get a foothold here and there around the globe." Jeffrey Stout Ethics after Babel: the languages
ofmorals and their discontents (James Clarke & Co., Cambridge, 1988), 212. This also provides
a useful perspective on the Enlightenment's tendency to be hostile to traditional religious
doctrine and its strong commitment to religious toleration. Stout says: "Might it be that
theology got into trouble with the intellectuals largely because it was unable to provide a
vocabulary for debating and deciding matters pertaining to the common good without
resort to violence?" ibid. 222.
Binding this multiplicity of institutions and hierarchies together was the
authority and power of the Church .... The stability of medieval society was
undermined fromwithin by the dynamics of economic growth: the opening-
up of markets, the widening circulation of commodities, the accumulation
of wealth by a new class that derived its power from money rather than
status. This in turn forced into being another class without status
obligations, which sold its labour in exchange for a wage. Thus the demands
of economic activity gave rise to some of the basic ideals of the
Enlightenment itself: individual freedom, legal equality, religious
toleration.4
Once again, such factors emphasize the character of the Enlightenment as a
project, an attempt to articulate new moral, legal and religious principles
consistent with the emerging social order, and thereby to legitimate that
order and ward off the threat of chaos.
iii. Maclntyre's thesis: emotivist culture and the Enlightenment
In After Virtue, Alasdair Maclntyre has advanced just such a view of the
Enlightenment, depicting it as the project of providing a new account of and
justification of morality, in the changed and changing circumstances of
modern European society. It is a project which, in his opinion, has failed,
and that failure has resulted in the emergence of what he calls 'emotivist
culture'. He begins his account by suggesting a hypothesis which turns out
to constitute the framework for the subsequent narrative. This hypothesis is
that our moral discourse, which was formerly coherent and in good order,
so to speak, has passed through a crisis in which much of its coherence and
significance has been lost. It has become separated from the social contexts
in which it originated. Its meaning has become problematic and question¬
able; connections can no longer be made, implications have been forgotten.
Yet all of this has been largely invisible to those involved in it. Our current
situation is therefore one in which we continue to use moral language,
without realizing the extent to which it is in a state of disorder. The initial
presentation of this hypothesis as a historical process is important, for the
disorder results from the loss of previous contexts of meaning. In the
absence of these contexts, he suggests, we are left only with:
the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts
4 Till op. cit. 2-3.
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from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of
morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have -
very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and
practical, of morality.5
Defending this hypothesis requires the elaboration of a narrative, then, and
Maclntyre supplies it by first enlarging on his analysis of contemporary
moral discourse, and then working backwards to attempt to explain the
development of the disorder so described. He begins by asserting that moral
argument in modern societies is characteristically interminable, and
disagreement is typically insoluble. He illustrates this with a number of
examples of particular moral arguments, notable only for their familiarity
and ubiquity - arguments about the morality of war, about abortion, and
about the ethics of private health care and education. On the basis of these
examples he makes three specific claims. The first is that they demonstrate
the conceptual incommensurability of many of our most common
arguments. These arguments, and many others like them, are presented
again and again in all manner of settings, without ever coming close to a
clear victory of one against an other. Such victories and defeats as occur are
on the basis of superior or inferior rhetoric, rather than the ability of one
argument to count decisively against an other. The reason for this
interminability is that the competing arguments are based on quite distinct
principles. One invokes justice as its founding premise, while another is
built on survival. One appeals to the notion of rights, while another argues
from the notion of a universalizable will. One makes its case on grounds of
equality, while another highlights liberty. Maclntyre comments:
From our rival conclusions we can argue back to our rival premises, but
when we do arrive at our premises argument ceases and the invocation of
one premise against another becomes a matter of pure assertion and
counter-assertion.6
His second claim draws our attention in a rather different direction. While
moral argument typically comes to resemble "pure assertion and counter-
assertion", it has at least the appearance of a very different nature. The




They seem to appeal to criteria independent of the person making the moral
utterance. They are not reasons of the form "Do this because I will it." They
seem to argue, rather, "Do this because it is right, irrespective of my will or
yours." When combined with the first point, this seems to yield a paradox: if
moral discourse is essentially the clash of irreconcilable wills, why does it
have the appearance of rational argument? "If the surface appearance of
argument is only a masquerade, the question remains 'Why this
masquerade?' "7 But if the appearance of rationality is more than a mask, if
there is a way of deciding rationally between these arguments, why is moral
debate so interminable?
Maclntyre's third claim forms the bridge between this paradox and its
historical origins in the catastrophe mentioned in his initial scenario. His
initial point is about the diversity of these origins. The examples he gave of
moral argument can be traced to sources as diverse as Aristotle, Machiavelli,
Marx, Fichte, Locke, Kant, Aquinas, Rousseau and Adam Smith. Such a list
of names can mislead, though: Maclntyre wishes to see our arguments as
rooted in entire cultures, rather than individual works of moral thought.
This is important, as the substance of this third claim is that our moral
concepts are derived from particular historical cultures in which they were
deeply rooted. The problem for us is that they are no longer so rooted. They
once "enjoyed a role and function supplied by contexts of which they have
now been deprived".8 Furthermore, in the journey from their original home,
most of the concepts we use have undergone semantic change. The history
of the journey undertaken by the characteristic terms of our moral
vocabulary, including the history of semantic change, will constitute the full
elaboration of the narrative of transition from coherence to incoherence
initially proposed by Maclntyre.
The first stop in this journey is with emotivist theories of moral utterance.
Emotivism, in its classic forms, (Maclntyre refers mainly to C.L. Stevenson,
perhaps its most influential advocate in the 1930s and 1940s) is a thesis
about the meaning of moral language. It claims that moral statements can be




asserted a semantic equivalence between "This is good." and "I approve of
this; do so as well." Maclntyre argues that emotivism is an abject failure as a
semantic view. If any worthwhile account is to be given of the meaning of
moral language, the nature of the approval involved will have to be
described. But no adequate description of it can be given. The tendency will
always be to fall back toward the vacuously circular answer "moral
approval". A more serious point is that Maclntyre has already given
grounds for supposing that moral utterances and expressions of attitude are
not semantically equivalent. To make a moral claim, he said, is to give a
reason for action which appeals to criteria independent of the particular
utterance. This is clearly not the case with a statement like "I approve of this;
do so as well." Expression of attitudes and feelings, Maclntyre suggests, is
characteristically a feature of the pragmatic dimension of language, rather
than the semantic. It is a matter of the function or use of an utterance, rather
than its meaning.
It is at this point though that Maclntyre draws attention to what he
considers to be a genuine insight hidden, albeit unwittingly, within in
emotivist theory. For he suggests that emotivism is correct not as an account
of moral discourse as such, but as an account of the the typical use of moral
discourse in its disordered modern state. Contemporary moral discourse, he
argues, is frequently in fact no more than the expression of attitudes.
Maclntyre is inclined to maintain, not surprisingly, that moral utterance still
has semantic content which is not exhausted by its expressive use; yet in
such circumstances there is a conflict between meaning and use. They are
"at odds in such a way that meaning would tend to conceal use."9 The
danger is that a speaker lends unwarranted dignity to their own attitudes
and feelings by cloaking them in the guise of independent, universally valid
reasons for action. Moral argument of this sort comes perilously close to
manipulation, even if the speakers are as deceived as the hearers.
Maclntyre's narrative proceeds backwards, in an attempt to account for the
origin of this problematic situation. The immediate predecessor of
emotivism, as every text-book of the subject records, was the view known as
9 AV, 14.
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intuitionism and associated with the likes of H.A. Prichard and, particularly,
G.E. Moore. Stevenson had been a pupil of Moore; Maclntyre argues that
there is an important connection between intuitionism and emotivism:
"wherever something like emotivism is found to flourish it generally is the
successor theory to views analogous to Moore's or Prichard's."10 Why
should this be so? Because, Maclntyre suggests, intuitionism like that of
Moore expressed and fostered a milieu in which moral discourse was
essentially expressive of feelings and attitudes. The moral discourse with
which the emotivists were most familiar was the discourse of Moore and
others like him - and they analysed it astutely and, for the most part,
correctly. That discourse therefore forms a paradigm case of what Maclntyre
has asserted is true of the generality of modern moral debate - i.e. a de facto
emotivism, a use of moral discourse to express the feelings and attitudes of
the debaters. If Maclntyre is correct, intuitionism, and the attitudes and
judgements of those who espoused it, are particularly revealing of the basic
character of contemporary moral discourse.
What is it about intuitionism that would make this so, and why should it be
particularly a precursor of emotivism? Briefly, Moore's Principia Ethica
claimed to offer a decisive solution to the problems of ethics by attending
carefully to the particular nature of the subject. Moore believed that a
solution to the problems of ethics could be built upon a careful analysis of
the meaning of key terms. In particular, he argued that 'good' is not to be
identified with any natural property. It cannot be defined, at least where
definition is taken to mean analysis of the concept. 'Good' is unanalysable.
There is no other concept or group of concepts which can be substituted for
it without alteration of content. Moore's famous "naturalistic fallacy" is the
error of defining goodness in terms of other properties belonging to things
which are good. He sees nothing wrong with a project of identifying such
other properties - so long as we don't imagine that we have thereby said all
there is to say about goodness. We must not think we define goodness by
such an inquiry. 'Good' is the name of a non-natural, unanalysable quality.
It is not a complex quality but a simple one, incapable of being broken down
in terms of other concepts. To this extent, the term "naturalistic fallacy" may
10 AV, 18.
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be a little misleading, and was in fact acknowledged to be so by Moore
himself. The basic error he identifies in other moral philosophies is the
treatment of fundamental moral terms as analysable, complex, capable of
being broken down into other concepts or having other notions substituted
for them.
Moore was reluctant to suggest that there is a faculty of apprehension
named intuition which we employ in making moral judgements. He did,
however, give the name 'intuition' to propositions declaring the goodness of
some situation or course of action. Such intuitions are not based on
evidence, and are not amenable to proof or disproof. Maclntyre states
Moore's view succinctly:
... he ... does compare good as a property with yellow as a property in such
a way as to make verdicts that a given state of affairs is or is not good
comparable to the simplest judgements of normal visual perception.il
Maclntyre summarizes the other elements of Moore's position by pointing
out first that he was a utilitarian, in that it is the consequences of an action
that matter (the question to be asked is how much good a course of action
will produce) and secondly by noting the views of Moore as to what the
greatest goods in human life actually are: "The achievement of friendship
and the contemplation of what is beautiful in nature or in art become
certainly almost the sole and perhaps the sole justifiable ends of all human
action."i2
Maclntyre further notes that the publication of the Principia Ethica was
greeted as a liberation, as a substitution of "the fresh air and pure light of
common sense" in place of the "religious and philosophical nightmares,
delusions, hallucinations in which Jehovah, Christ, St. Paul, Plato, Kant and
Hegel had entangled us."i3 He suggests that this enthusiastic reception for
Moore's work, alongside its widespread and lasting influence, can only be
explained by its happening to catch and express the mood of the moment. In





social action, in its sense that it constituted a rejection of the nineteenth
century, it articulated widespread experiences and attitudes.
The Bloomsbury group was particularly in the forefront of this. Maclntyre
gives some weight to retrospective comments by John Maynard Keynes of
the conduct of some of Moore's adherents: "In practice, victory was with
those who could speak with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting
conviction and could best use the accents of infallibility."14 Those who felt
the Principia Ethica to be a liberation were, Maclntyre argues, a group for
whom the distinction between moral qualities and personal preferences had
largely been lost. In what they regarded as their moral discourse they
expressed their preferences, their feelings, their attitudes. Moore's
theorizing gave them the means to do this, for they genuinely took
themselves to be intuiting the presence of the non-natural property 'good'.
Intuitionism, on this account, is a theory which appears and is taken up at a
point in history where any appeal to an independent moral criterion has
become problematic. Emotivism is a theory which arises when people
continue to use evaluative discourse as if they had such a criterion, despite
the fact that "all grasp of any such criterion has been lost."16 These are
important claims; or at least they are important if they have the widespread
relevance Maclntyre seeks for them, and are therefore more than
observations about the moral discourse and theories prevalent in Cambridge
in the years following 1903. Maclntyre makes brief reference therefore to
Nietzsche and Sartre, both of whom, he suggests, express the insight that the
moral discourse of their societies exhibited a de facto emotivism. Relevant
here is Nietzsche's identification of the will-to-power as the actual source of
would-be moral judgements, reflecting a culture in which the use of moral
discourse disguises the fact that reasons can no longer be given for such
judgements. Likewise Sartre can be pressed into service, in virtue of his
critique of bourgeois morality as "an exercise in bad faith by those who
cannot tolerate the recognition of their own choices as the sole source of
moral judgement".16




It is worth pausing at this point to note how well this analysis of moral
discourse and theory accords with what has been said about modernity in
chapters 2 and 3. The emotivist culture in which modern moral discourse
takes place is one in which moral judgements are not statements about an
objective reality. Values cannot be derived from facts. Moral language does
not operate by means of reference to extra-personal moral truth but by
expressing attitudes and emotions. There is a clear parallel here with the
modernist culture in which the ability of language to connect to or represent
reality is in doubt, and the expression of inner realities becomes more
important than the representation of external realities which are in doubt. In
addition the relativism inherent in modernist aesthetics finds a resonance in
emotivism. In the culture Maclntyre describes there are no absolute moral
values; moral judgements differ from person to person according to the
beliefs, attitudes, desires and emotions of that individual. They do so
because moral language must now be used outwith the social contexts from
which its meaning derived; just as modernist artists and writers had to work
in a world in which the inherited conventions of artistic practice and social
life were in doubt, estranged from the contexts in which they had
originated.
iv. The failure of the Enlightenment project
The next stage in Maclntyre's argument is to explain the emergence of this
emotivist culture. His central claim is that it was the direct result of the
failure of the Enlightenment project of securing some rational, tradition-
independent basis for morality. How did this failure come about, though?
Why did the Enlightenment project run out of steam and provide the
emotivist self with its premises? Maclntyre begins his answer by turning to
Soren Kierkegaard. The work he discusses is Enten-Eller, which he sees as "a
book which is at once the outcome and the epitaph of the Enlightenment's
systematic attempt to discover a rational justification for morality."17
Its novelty and value was that it placed at the root of morality the notion of
17 AV, 39.
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a choice for which no further reason could be given. Maclntyre argues that
the literary form of Enten-Eller - the competing and unresolved
presentations of the ethical life and the aesthetic life in the form of the
papers of the characters 'A' and 'B' - is a critical clue to Kierkegaard's own
concern. Kierkegaard simply presents the choice, the either/or. He is not in
Maclntyre's view to be identified with either option, nor even with any
specific thesis about the ultimacy of the choice. The choice, the either/or, is
simply present.
The second feature of the Enten-Eller which Maclntyre is interested in is the
conflict between the notion of radical choice, and the notion of the ethical
life which is presented as one of the choices.
The ethical is presented as that realm in which principles have authority
over us, independently of our attitudes, preferences and feelings. ... But
now whence does the ethical derive this kind of authority?18
The point is that it does not make sense to talk of a principle as authoritative
over us if we have to choose whether to accept that principle or some
competing one. How can a principle be authoritative if it is open to us not to
choose it as a principle? Maclntyre links this to having reasons for the
choices we make. A principle is authoritative just in so far as there is a good
reason for accepting it as a principle. But where no reason can be offered
whatsoever, where we are faced with a choice for which no reasons can be
given, then no option can be authoritative for us. Maclntyre believes, then,
that there is a contradiction at the heart of Either/Or: "if the ethical has some
basis, it cannot be provided by the notion of radical choice".19 A final
element in the book is identified by Maclntyre as relevant to his case: he
points out that Kierkegaard presents not an ethical life to his readers, but the
ethical life. The content of the demands of ethics is not difficult for
Kierkegaard to specify, for he presents what he has inherited. The content of
his ethics is highly conservative. In Maclntyre's view there is as a result a
"deeply incoherent combination" of the inherited and the novel at the heart
of the book. To grasp this is to have the key not only to Kierkegaard but to
the whole history of the Enlightenment's attempts to provide a rational




Maclntyre's next step backwards is to Kant. The contrast that interests
Maclntyre is an obvious one: Kant builds his ethics not on ungrounded
choice but on reason. But behind this contrast, claims Maclntyre, lie several
similarities: he points to the conservative content of ethics in both cases -
Kant was no maverick either in moral judgement; moreover in Kant, as in
Kierkegaard, morality is sharply distinguished from questions of happiness
or from questions of God's command; the authority of ethical precepts is
given great stress in both also - for Kant, the moral law is absolutely
binding. Maclntyre's exposition is brief, based almost exclusively on the
Groundwork. His criticisms are fairly conventional also: he points to the
difficulty of reconciling the various formulations Kant has of the categorical
imperative; he questions whether Kant's test for moral maxims will actually
either allow the ones he wants to pass to do so, or exclude those which quite
clearly he would not wish to pass. At bottom, Maclntyre's point is that Kant
fails in his task. His arguments fall short of their aim, and have not in fact
stood the test of time; reason alone is not conclusively shown to be capable
of supplying the required grounding for morality. It is, frankly, hard to
disagree with this. But equally it is hard to see at this point why Maclntyre
has bothered to introduce Kant into his narrative. The reason is in fact
simply this: the failure of Kant's attempt to justify morality was recognized
well by Kierkegaard, and that failure was his starting point. Kierkegaard
conceived morality largely in Kantian terms, but, recognizing the failure of
Kant's project, proclaimed choice rather than reason to be the source of
morality. Maclntyre sees "Kierkegaardian choice as a surrogate for Kantian
reason" 20
Maclntyre's next step follows the same pattern: having offered Kant's failure
as the starting point for Kierkegaard, he now seeks the stimulus which
prompted Kant. He turns therefore to Diderot and Hume, and to their views
of desire and the passions. Again the treatment is brief, and the points
Maclntyre seeks quite simple. Diderot is discussed first, and accorded the
dubious honour of having, in Le Neveu de Rameau, shown why his own
20 AV, 47.
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attempt to found morality on desire cannot work. He shows, according to
Maclntyre, that we require some way of choosing between different desires,
since desires have a tendency to conflict with one another. But if, in this
connection, there is some criterion which is not desire and by means of
which our desires can be discriminated, then desire is no longer the source
of our moral judgements. Similarly Hume's attempts to use the passions as
the basis for a moral scheme, in the Treatise and then the second Enquiry,
demonstrate the impossibility of the task, claims Maclntyre. In the former,
Hume attempted to answer the question as to why we should obey moral
rules when they are not in our interest without recourse to an innate source
of altruism. By the time he wrote the Enquiry, he realized this is impossible,
and proposed a passion named sympathy as the solution. Maclntyre
dismisses sympathy, in the forms used by both Hume and, later, Adam
Smith, as "a philosophical fiction".21
What conclusions are to be drawn from this brief tour of modern moral
philosophy? The theories Maclntyre has examined are chiefly characterized
by their failure to find a firm grounding for moral judgements and beliefs.
He claims in fact that their greatest successes were in their criticisms of their
competitors in the project. Hume attempts to explain and justify morality in
terms of the passions because he believes that it must find its home either
there or in reason - and he has powerful arguments against the latter view.
Similarly Kant takes the course that he does having excluded by his
arguments the possibility of using the passions. Kierkegaard pursued the
path he did having rejected both of the previously explored alternatives.
Why, though, did the Enlightenment project apparently end in this failure?
Why, when it was so convinced of its own moral superiority to the previous
social order, should it have been incapable of coming up with a coherent
account of and defence of morality? Maclntyre has an impressively simple
answer for these questions. He portrays the problems of Kant, Hume, Smith,
Diderot, Kierkegaard et al as the outcome of the breakdown of the medieval
moral scheme. That scheme had three essential elements: first of all, a
conception of human nature as it is, as it happens to be; secondly a notion of
21 AV, 49.
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the telos of humanity, human nature as it ought to be; and thirdly, moral
precepts and laws, forms of moral reasoning which allow us to make the
connection between these two, the means of transition from the first to the
second. This scheme is recognisably Aristotelian in outline. It survived and
developed principally in theistic ways, in Christian culture but also in
Jewish and Islamic forms. It ran into difficulties, though, with the
development of a different conception of rationality in the late middle ages
and early modern period. The most obvious illustration of this is Calvin's
view of the fall as having corrupted the powers of human reason.22 Reason,
on this view, can not discern essences - it cannot apprehend a telos of human
life or deal with matters of potentiality and act. Maclntyre notes the crucial
role played by Pascal, who realized the congruence between this limited
view of reason and that which was operative in the developing natural
sciences. Reason was now seen as calculative, able to speak of means, but
bound to silence on the subject of ends.
The important thing to realize is that this view of reason is shared by all
major Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment theorists. It is true for Kant as
much as for Hume that reason is limited in its powers. It cannot discern a
telos towards which we will advance as we act morally - there is no place for
anything resembling this in Kant's scheme, except as a "presupposition of
pure practical reason". There is no real human essence discovered or
discoverable by reason. This is true for Pascal, Hume, Diderot, Kant,
Kierkegaard, and any other significant modern theorist one may care to
mention. Maclntyre only adds that "to understand this is to understand why
their project of finding a basis for morality had to fail".23 In Maclntyre's
view what modernity has tried to work with is two parts of the older
scheme without the third; and without that third element, the notion of the
telos, human nature as it can become, the elements that are left cannot be
reconciled.
What we are left with is "incoherent fragments of a once coherent scheme of
22 Maclntyre notes, in passing, that Hume's Calvinist inheritance may have had something
to do with his view of reason as the slave of the passions.
23 AV, 54.
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thought and action".24 The notion that no 'ought' can be derived validly
from an 'is' could never have gained acceptance where factual claims about
the essence or telos of humanity were allowed. It could therefore never have
gained currency where traditional structures of moral reason were accorded
any respect. Maclntyre points out that this principle, so often associated
with Hume, is in fact characteristic of the whole course of modern moral
theory. He also points out that when this principle became established, the
traditional view of moral judgements as factual was inevitably banished. In
Kant, the moral law yields only imperatives, not factual judgements. The
adoption of the principle of no 'ought' from an 'is' actually signifies the
futility of the Enlightenment project.
This, then, is Maclntyre's account of the failure of the Enlightenment project,
and the emotivist culture it has produced. He has talked almost exclusively
of moral theory and discourse, though. What of the wider picture? The
significant point is that the incoherence he has identified in moral discourse
is the consequence of social change, since moral language had become
detached from the social contexts from which it had derived and in which it
made sense. The processes of change were not just matters of morality:
Maclntyre himself makes reference to the rise of modern science and to the
Reformation, as noted above. And though he confines his discussion to
moral theory, for the most part, he does affirm a general historical
connection between theory and practice, commenting that:
there ought not to be two histories, one of political and moral action and one
of political and moral theorizing, because there were not two pasts, one
populated only by actions, the other only by theories. Every action is the
bearer and expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts;
every piece of theorizing and every expression of belief is a political and
moral action. 25
He insists that to analyse moral theory and moral discourse is at the same
time to analyse the societies in which they arise: "it is not clear to me ... how
any adequate philosophical analysis in this area could escape being also a





appearance of intuitionism and emotivism at that point in history at which
moral judgement had lost touch with an objective criterion, such that it
"lacked any public, shared rationale or justification"27 he is not just talking
about the history of moral theory. His claims have wider implications, some
of which relate to the position of religion in modern societies. Maclntyre
writes:
In a world of secular rationality religion could no longer provide such a
shared background and foundation for moral discourse and action; and the
failure of philosophy to provide what religion could no longer furnish was
an important cause of philosophy losing its central cultural role and
becoming a marginal, narrowly academic subject. 28
It is implicit in Maclntyre's argument that religious discourse in modern
societies is in a situation analogous to that of moral discourse. It lacks any
public shared rationale or justification; its theological articulation, having
failed to provide this, has become marginal and narrowly academic.
Moreover it is even possible that theology will be seen to mirror moral
philosophy, and in the aftermath of the failure of the Enlightenment project
will take forms analogous to intuitionism and emotivism. As such we might
expect to find theology conceiving its object in a manner reminiscent of
Moore's non-natural properties; we might, moreover, find it reflecting the
fact that access to any public, rationally defensible criterion of truth has
become deeply problematic.
v. Intuitionism and modern theology
It is interesting to note, then, that there are significant resemblances between
Moore's intuitionism and the theology of the young Earth, and in precisely
the areas that Maclntyre's narrative would lead one to expect. Intuitionism
represents the theorizing of the point at which philosophers could no longer
offer any reasons for moral judgements and principles, beyond the
attribution of moral qualities. In Maclntyre's view, of course, it is an attempt
to theorize for a world in which there are no grounds for preferring one




that choice has become sovereign. Correspondingly, in the work of
Herrmann and the young Barth, theology reached a point where the relation
between its discourse and its object became extraordinarily problematic.
Like Moore's ethics, Herrmannian theology affirmed that it was concerned
with a real object. In both cases, though, no process of reasoning can lead to
a knowledge of the presence or nature of the object. In both, the object in
question is simply apprehended in experience, in a process analogous to
perception; but in neither case was it possible to affirm the activity of an
infallible faculty of intuition able to accomplish this task.29 In both cases,
cognitive discourse cannot describe the object: 'good' is the name of a simple
and unanalysable property, for Moore; just as the word 'God' is not a
description but the name of a reality inaccessible to philosophical
epistemology and quite distinct from the world of law-governed, rational
cognition and discourse.
In addition, both Moore's ethics and Herrmannian theology explicitly
opposed naturalism, and accused much of the previous century of having
committed this particular sin. They were, moreover, essentially at one in
what they meant by this. By naturalism Moore meant the mistake of
confusing the non-natural and the natural, of failing to appreciate that moral
qualities are simple and unanalysable, and in this mistaken state attempting
to define moral qualities by means of natural properties. The naturalism
opposed by Herrmann and Barth similarly was the mistake of confusing the
non-natural and the natural, failing to appreciate the distinction between
God and the world. Certainly the two did not draw the line between natural
and non-natural in precisely the same place. In both, though, there is a stark
dualism between a realm in which reasoning is possible, and the realm of
ultimate truth and value, for which all rational cognition is inadequate.
29 It ought to be emphasized that Herrmannian theology drew on Ritschl, and particularly
on his distinction between nature and spirit. Fisher provides a useful concise description of
the characteristics of theologies influenced by Ritschl: "First, there was the denial that
philosophy, natural science, or any form of theoretical knowledge that refused to adopt this
revelatory and experiential basis, could articulate any general statement about the world or
attain reliable knowledge of God. There was, secondly, the view that philosophy was
incapable of assessing the truth claims of religious knowledge. Thirdly ... there was a naive
theory about religious experience which maintained that God is known chiefly through
introspection." (Fisher Revelatory Positivism? 131.)
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Both the theology of the young Karl Barth and the ethics of the Principia
Ethica are characterized by an emphasis on the distinctness of their
respective objects, which serves to separate those objects from the realm in
which rational discourse is possible. The significance of this is that Barth's
earliest theology can be read as part of the post-history of the Enlightenment
project, in the same manner as Moore's ethics. It is reasonable to see Barth's
theology marking the point at which access to any public, rationally
defensible criterion of truth for religious claims has become deeply
problematic. This is not the sole significance of the parallel, though. More
important still is the fact that it gives us a new perspective on Barth's
disillusionment with, and turn away from, the theology of his youth. For it
consisted in the rejection of that element in Herrmannism which tends to
conceal the real situation of modern theology: its belief that religious
experience provides access to a realm of genuine truth and value. In his
rejection of this grounding of theology in experience, I would suggest, Barth
maintained his convictions regarding the distinctness of the object of
theology, but rejected the licence for theological and religious speech that
this distinctness had allowed. He accepted that there is no access for
theology to the truth at which it aims. Religious experience had, in
Herrmannian theology, served to conceal the fact that we lack the ability to
give reasons to defend our use of religious language. Barth's rejection of this
use of experience amounts to the acceptance that our religious language is
indefensible. Emotivists regarded Moore's non-natural properties as
philosophical fictions, concealing the true function of moral discourse. After
1915 Barth began to regard the God intuitable in religious experience as a
theological fiction, (the 'No-God' of Romans),30 which served to conceal the
true situation of theology and humanity.
There is one further parallel between Moore's ethics and the young Barth. I
suggested in chapter 1 that a Herrmannian dualism of faith could actually
30 See for example Romans II, p. 50: "... sometimes the behaviour ofmen or of animals is
exalted to be an experience of God, sometimes the Being and Existence of God is 'enjoyed'
as a human or animal experience. In all this the prime factor is provided by the illusion that
it is possible for men to hold communication with God ... But, on whatever level it occurs,
if the experience of religion is more than a void, or claims to contain or to possess or to
'enjoy' God, it is a shameless and abortive anticipation of that which can proceed from the
unknown God alone. In all this busy concern with concrete things there is always a revolt
against God. For in it we assist at the birth of the 'No-God', at the making of idols."
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be understood as the retreat of theology behind barriers which would be
impervious to scientific and historical criticism. Interestingly, Maclntyre
points out that the substance of Moore's ethics can also be understood as a
rearguard action rather than an advance. He notes the considerable measure
of continuity between the Principia Ethica and the views of some of the
predecessors whom Moore took himself to be refuting. He points out for
example that Moore's scheme was consequentialist rather than
deontological, for it is the results of our actions that we have to have in mind
as we seek to discern the presence of goodness and make moral judgements.
He identifies the utilitarianism of Henry Sidgwick in particular as having
many things in common with Moore's views - save that Sidgwick regarded
his conclusions with deep pessimism, whereas Moore proclaimed
substantially the same conclusions as a great discovery and a liberation.31
Sidgwick, to a greater degree than any of his utilitarian predecessors,
recognized the difficulties of specifying happiness in a coherent and unified
way even for the individual, let alone for the greatest number. He came,
extremely reluctantly, to the conclusion that our moral beliefs cannot be
unified and their acceptance must be unargued. Maclntyre quotes
Sidgwick's judgement that "where he had looked for Cosmos, he had found
only Chaos".32 After 1915, Earth's theology embodies the insight that where
31 Maclntyre, incidentally, is not correct when he states (AV, 65) that Moore borrowed from
Sidgwick without acknowledgement. On p. 17 of his Principia Ethica, Moore claims that only
one philosopher, namely Henry Sidgwick, has anticipated him in his arguments against
naturalism, and in support of the indefinability of good. Additionally though, as W.D.
Hudson has pointed out, Moore is incorrect in crediting only Sidgwick with this
anticipation. See Modern Moral Philosophy (Macmillan, 1970), 72f. Hudson notes that a
number of prominent eighteenth century moralists made points very similar to Moore's.
Among these were Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Cudworth; but the most striking
anticipations are by Richard Price. In his A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals,
published in 1758, he wrote this: "Right and wrong when applied to actions which are
commanded or forbidden by the will of God, or that produce good or harm, do not signify
merely, that such actions are commanded or forbidden, or that they are useful or hurtful,
but a sentiment concerning them and our consequent approbation or disapprobation of the
performance of them. Were this not true, it would be palpably absurd in any case to ask,
whether it is right to obey a command or wrong to disobey it; and the propositions, obeying a
command is right, or producing happiness is right, would be most trifling, as expressing no
more than that obeying a command, is obeying a command, or producing happiness, is
producing happiness." Price Review ed. D.D. Raphael, (Oxford, 1948), 16-7. Quoted by
Hudson, p. 73. It is interesting to note that the main division among eighteenth century
British moralists was between those who can be labelled the 'moral sense' school and those
who can be called 'rational intuitionists'. Even without considering the views of such
writers, these designations make it clear that they represent other forms of the principal
options available to Enlightenment moral theorists in Maclntyre's narrative.
32 AV, 65.
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the Enlightenment had sought Cosmos, there existed only Krisis.
vi. Modernity and the ubiquity of choice.
There is one other aspect of modernity which comes to the fore in
Maclntyre's narrative. Central to the societies which have emerged from the
failed Enlightenment project is the notion of ungrounded choice or decision.
This became particularly visible with Kierkegaard, as was noted. In Enten-
Eller, ungrounded choice lies behind all action, for the choice that faces us is
not just between good and evil: more fundamental still is the decision
whether to choose in terms of good and evil, or whether to make one's
choices according to some other scheme. Yet even if Kierkegaard is judged
to be part of the project that failed, even if there is an inconsistency between
his idea of groundless decision and the notion of morality as something
authoritative and binding, the principle he exposed remains. It is his notion
of groundless choice that emerges from the ruins of Enlightenment project.
If nothing in untutored human nature - neither its passions, its reason nor
simply its choices - can satisfactorily account for and justify the authoritative
character of moral claims, the implication is that moral judgements, which
masquerade as authoritative and binding, in fact have no source outside the
individual. There are no given moral standards: each individual is the
source of their own judgements and actions. The notion of ungrounded
choice seems to describe this situation accurately, no matter that particular
actions and judgements will in fact have all manner of contingent causes
and grounds, in the passions for example. If the Enlightenment project has
failed, then morality lacks a ground of the sort that had been sought: a
rational, tradition independent, public, objective basis. For this reason
Maclntyre seems right to describe Enten-Eller as the "outcome and epitaph"
of the Enlightenment's search for a rational basis for morality. And for this
reason the notion of ungrounded choice, uncovered by Kierkegaard, is
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central to modern morality and society.33
Bearing in mind Maclntyre's emphasis on the connection between ideas and
their social embodiment, though, it is reasonable to ask whether modern
societies do indeed embody this principle of ungrounded choice. Some
affirmative observations are possible here, without our having to engage in
full-scale sociological analysis. In general terms, the rise of capitalism in
early modern Europe meant that economic activity and social relations
increasingly followed a contractual pattern, with agents free to enter into
agreements or not according to their individual will and not according to
inherited obligations. The practical effects of this ought not to be overstated:
power and wealth are in practice unequally divided in modern societies,
and the extent and value of the freedoms conferred by modernity are
disputable. Nonetheless, the fact remains that one of the chief characteristics
distinguishing modern societies from their predecessors is that social
relations are entered into or avoided according to individual will rather than
according to class or status obligations.
What of the period of particular concern in this context, though, the early
years of the twentieth century? First of all it must be noted that the
prominence of ungrounded choice is a central part of whatMaclntyre means
when he talks of emotivist culture. In order to support this description he
provides some further discussion which is useful despite its brevity and its
rather anecdotal character. He suggests that a social world characterized by
emotivism will be one in which the distinction between manipulative and
non-manipulative social relations will be well-nigh obliterated, which is to
33 It is worth noting that Maclntyre, in a paper published two years later than After Virtue,
gave a stronger account of Kierkegaard's debt to Kant. See "Moral Philosophy: What
Next?" in Revisions: changing perspectives in moral philosophy ed. Stanley Hauerwas and
Alasdair Maclntyre, (Notre Dame, 1983), 1-15. It was essential for Kant, Maclntyre points
out, that the will is free, and that it can be either a good will, willing in accordance with
universalizable maxims, or else a bad will, willing in accordance with desires and appetites.
However, Kant's claim that morality can be grounded in rationality in this way came under
severe criticism, notably from Hegel. If such criticism is granted, Kant's moral theory
collapses leaving only the undetermined will which must choose how it is to will. To
paraphrase this, if your moral theory is built on freedom and reason, and you lose hold on
reason, you are left with something approximating to ungrounded choice. Maclntyre also
argues in the same place that Thomas Reid provided a parallel to Kant in Scotland, and that
Reid's views suffered the same fate in so far as his principles of common sense failed to
stand up to protracted scrutiny.
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say that behaviour will be determined not by the demand to comply with
some authoritative norm, but by the desire to implement one's will
effectively. Maclntyre gives three examples of how modern social and
cultural life reflects this trend. First of all he suggests that Henry James'
novel The Portrait of a Lady offers a literary portrayal of just such a social
world, that of rich European aesthetes in the second half of the nineteenth
century. As such it should be seen as a piece of moral commentary to rank
with the writing of Diderot and Kierkegaard. It pictures, he argues, "rich
aesthetes whose interest is to fend off the kind of boredom that is so
characteristic of modern leisure by contriving behaviour in others that will
be responsive to their wishes, that will feed their sated appetites."34 The
world depicted is, in other words, one where individual will is unrestrained,
subject to no imposed code of behaviour. It is a world where mastery of
social relations means mastery of techniques for the successful
implementation of whatever one wills.
Maclntyre's second example is of the kind of organizational behaviour
suggested by Max Weber's description of bureaucratic rationality. On this
account, questions about the aims or ends of behaviour cannot be addressed
rationally. Reason can only be calculative, working out the means to an
already given end. As for questions of ends, Maclntyre says: "one must
simply choose - between parties, classes, nations, causes, ideals.
Entscheidung plays the part in Weber's thought that choice of principles
plays in that of Hare or Sartre."33 To underline the point Maclntyre quotes
Raymond Aron's description of Weber's view: "Values are created by
human decisions".36
The third of Maclntyre's examples is the therapeutic culture deriving
ultimately from Freudian psychoanalysis. Therapy obliterates the distinction
between manipulative and non-manipulative behaviour as effectively as
bureaucracy, he suggests, but in the sphere of personal life. In matters of
human behaviour, all that can be addressed rationally is what is covered by
34 AV, 24. Maclntyre notes his debt toWilliam Gass for his reading of this novel. He refers
toWilliam H. Gass Fiction and the Figures ofLife (Vintage Books, Boston, 1972), 181-90.
33 AV, 26.
36 Ibid. 26. See Raymond Aron 'Max Weber' in Main Currents in Sociological Thought (vol. 2)
trans. R. Howard & H. Weaver, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970), 206.
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therapeutic technique. Following Philip Rieff, Maclntyre suggests that
therapeutic culture replaces truth with psychological effectiveness. Once
again we find a dualism between a realm of technique, in which rational
discourse is possible, and a realm of aims or ends, which are beyond the
scope of reason and where individual choices must simply be made.
These three examples do not by any means amount to a comprehensive
study of social relations in European society in the relevant period. Yet they
are useful illustrations, filling out Maclntyre's description of emotivist
culture. They are pictures of a culture characterized by a dualism: on one
hand rational debate and decisions are possible on questions of means,
methods, techniques, and efficiency; on the other hand, though, are matters
of aims, ends, values, and commitments, where only ungrounded choices
can be made. An emotivist culture is a culture in which statements of values
and ends are dictated by personal choices, whatever else we might take
them for and whatever language we might clothe them in.
What, then, might be the theological significance of the fact that individual
will and groundless choice have such prominence in the societies that
experienced the Enlightenment project and its failure? It is my contention
that Barth's distinctive theology should be seen as situated in and
responding to the failure of the Enlightenment project. It was a theological
response to the Enlightenment's inability to provide a satisfactory new
account of humanity and its place in the cosmos, such as would secure and
justify the social order of the modern world. Enlightenment presuppositions
could not yield cosmos; the threat of chaos could not be warded off by such
means. A different possibility presented itself, though: that the universe is
not cosmos but creation. Barth's theology was an attempt to forge just such a
post-Enlightenment view; and it was therefore deeply engaged with the
ideas and principles of the post-Enlightenment world, and not least with the
idea of groundless choice. Barth's fundamental theological innovation, I
would argue, was to invert the principle of individual, groundless choice.
He turned the notion of an ultimate, unavoidable, groundless choice on its
head: what matters is not any choice that we might make, no matter the
seriousness with which it is taken by us. The significant choice is and can
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only be one that has been taken by God, the electing act of God in Jesus
Christ.
I have already referred in chapter 1 to the importance of this idea of divine
decision in Barth's developing theology: it was present even in his earliest
theology; it rose gradually to prominence in his thinking, providing a basis
for his turn to dogmatic method in the early 1920s; it was important for the
development of his doctrine of the analogia fidei; and its ultimate flowering
was in the treatment of the doctrine of election contained in volume II/2 of
the Church Dogmatics, justly described by von Balthasar as "the most
magnificent, unified and well-grounded section of the whole" and "the
heartbeat of his whole theology".37 Barth's notion of divine decision, I
would argue, not only constitutes an inversion of the neo-Kantian idea of
the Ursprung, and an inversion of the Expressionist and modernist idea of
the constructive mind, but an inversion of the basic principle of social and
cultural relations in the post-Enlightenment world. It is important to be clear
what is implied by the term 'inversion' though. For one thing it does not
mean rejection. Barth's theology is emphatically not a simple rejection of
modernity. It would be premature to accuse Barth of seeking to go back
behind the Enlightenment and effect a repristination of some pre-modern
scheme of thought. His inversion is, rather, an affirmation of modernity and
of the unavailability of the grounds which the Enlightenment had hoped to
supply. Yet it is an affirmation raised to a higher order. Its presupposition is
divine Ursprung, constructive mind, decision. To presuppose divine decision
is not to do away with the post-Enlightenment sense of contingency, but to
affirm it as the truth of a world standing under divine judgement. On the
other hand, though, inversion of the principle of ungrounded choice does
not mean simply its extension to include an additional realm. To presuppose
divine decision is to deny that our own decisions are all that matters. It is to
premise a different ground of our existence, including its social and cultural
aspects. To presuppose divine decision is not to deny any reality or meaning
to human choices; but it does alter their significance, by placing them in the
light of divine grace.
37 Von Balthasar The Theology ofKarl Barth 174.
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To understand Barth's theological innovation as an inversion - of neo-
Kantianism, of modernist ideas, of ungrounded choice - is therefore to
understand its dialectical character. His response to the principles embodied
in modern intellectual, cultural and social life was neither to take them as
determinative, obligatory for all enquiry including theology; nor was it to
reject them out of hand on the basis of some supposed access to divine truth
uncorrupted by the intellectual, cultural and social context. It was to affirm
them in the light of divine negation, and to deny them in the light of divine
affirmation. In the light of God's No, ungrounded choice is affirmed to be
the truth of the reality encountered among the ruins of Enlightenment pride,
which was after all only one form of pride. But in the light of God's Yes the
significance of human decision is relativized by the ultimate significance of
divine grace. Barth attempted, then, to articulate a genuinely modern
theology: modern both in its engagement with the principle of ungrounded
choice, and in its confirmation of the modern apprehension of our alienation
from and inability to represent ultimate truth. Yet it sought to be theology in
a way which had escaped most of Barth's immediate predecessors,
including his younger self. It recognized the impossibility of theology on
Enlightenment presuppositions, and aimed instead at being theological in a
much stricter sense, presupposing only God's decision and act in Jesus
Christ.
In conclusion, what emerges from Maclntyre's narrative is an account of
emotivist culture with remarkable similarities to the modernity described in
the previous chapter. Once again familiar contexts of meaning have been
lost; once again the ability of our discourse to connect to reality is in doubt;
once again expression takes precedence over discourse which aims at truth;
and once again the human subject emerges as the sole source of truth and
value. And as a result my earlier conclusions about the relation between
Barth's theology and its context take on an added dimension.
Yet the account of the Enlightenment provided by Maclntyre is far from
complete. It is, for one thing, limited by its nearly exclusive concern with
moral discourse and theory. It lacks any significant discussion of the
influence of the Enlightenment on religion and theology. Moreover its
172
discussion of the culture and ideas of the German speaking world, the most
immediate background to Barth's thought, is effectively limited to Kant's
Groundwork. Maclntyre acknowledges all these deficiencies,38 and he offers
partial remedies to some of them in his more recent books.39 The most
obvious remedy from my point of view, however, is to consider Barth's own
lectures on the history of modern theology. To examine Barth's analysis of
the Enlightenment, after all, will not only supplement the foregoing
discussion, but will provide us with a unique perspective on the relation
between his theological viewpoint and the context in question.
There is one further reason for studying Barth's lectures, though. It is simply
that they have been quite unfairly neglected by commentators on and
interpreters of Barth's theology, who have rarely taken them seriously as a
source of illumination for his other writings. Yet Barth lectured three times
on the history of modern Protestant theology between 1926 and 1933. Apart
from his dogmatics lectures, there is no other subject matter which received
this degree of attention. For all these reasons, it is to Barth's history lectures
that I now want to turn.
38 See AV, 278 and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Duckworth, London, 1988), 11.
39 See particularly Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry
(Duckworth, London, 1990).
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Chapter 5 Barth on the Eighteenth Century
i. Barth's lectures on modern Protestant theology
Barth's lectures on the recent history of Protestant theology developed in a
rather unusual fashion. The first series, delivered in Miinster in the summer
semester of 1926, began with a short introductory section and a brief
chronicle of nineteenth century events,1 and then comprised seventeen
sections on individual theologians, ranging from Schleiermacher to
Blumhardt.2 When Barth lectured on this subject for a second time in 1929-
30, he appears to have almost completely rewritten this material.3 More
significant, perhaps, is the fact that he extended it not, on the whole, by
adding extra detail to his treatment of nineteenth century theology but by
adding substantial chapters on Lessing, Kant, Herder, Novalis and Hegel.4
The third set of lectures, delivered in Bonn in the winter semester of 1932-33
and the summer semester of 1933, displays a similar pattern. This time the
material on theology was not revised or added to at all, and of the existing
chapters of background material, only that on Lessing was rewritten. Barth's
energies were directed instead into the production of a substantial body of
new material analysing the culture, religion and theology of the eighteenth
1 See introduction above p. 1.
2 Two of these sections, on Schleiermacher and Feuerbach, were published in Zwischen den
Zeiten and also included in the collection Theologie und Kirche. I am advised bv Dr. Hinrich
Sloevesandr that m view ot the substantial differences between these lectures and the later
versions, publication of the complete 1926 text is planned for inclusion in the Karl Barth
Gesamtausgabe.
3 I am grateful to Dr. Hinrich Stoevesandt on this point. He suggests that there is a partial
taking over of some sections from the earlier text (in particular on Tholuck, Beck and
Kohlbrugge) but that the majority were written completely new. This confirms what can be
observed in those sections that have been published. The section on Feuerbach, in
particular, is not only different in the two versions; the later version is also considerably
shorter.




What is remarkable about this process is that Barth sought on two occasions
to gain greater understanding of modern theology not by discussing it in
greater detail but by placing it in the context of intellectual and cultural life,
and specifically of the Enlightenment. Moreover the final text produced by
this process does constitute a coherent and unified account, despite the fact
5 See Die Protestantische Theologie im 19. jahrhundert. The material written new in 1932-33
comprises chapters 2-6 of the published text, pp. 16 to 236. These are entitled, in the English
translation: 'Man in the Eighteenth Century'; "The Problem of Theology in the Eighteenth
Century'; 'Protestant Theology in the Eighteenth Century'; 'Rousseau'; and 'Lessing',
respectively. Of these only chapter 6, on Lessing, dealt with a subject that had been covered
in 1929-30. Barth appears to have mostly discarded that earlier material, though, and
written the chapter on Lessing afresh in 1932-3. It should also be noted that chapter 7, on
Kant, shows considerable revision and enlargement compared to the 1929 text. This
presumably occurred during the preparation of the third series of lectures in 1932-3.
It is important to make this process of development clear. More recent commentators have
often been remarkably careless in their assumptions about the date of production of this
material. Van A. Harvey is an extreme example. In his essay 'AWord in Defense of
Schleiermacher's Theological Method' he describes the section on Schleiermacher in
Protestant Theology as "Barth's essay of 1952 on Schleiermacher" and, comparing it with
Barth's 1922 lectures on Schleiermacher, talks of the thirty year gap between the two
treatments. Harvey, in other words, mistakes the date of publication (and not even first
publication) for the date of composition. See The Journal ofReligion XLII (1962), 151f. It is
understandable that he was unable to date the material to 1929. but he shnulH at least have
been able to date it to 1932/3, which was given as the date of the lectures' delivery in the
preface to the German edition, and had been mentioned in reviews of the selection
published as From Rousseau to Ritschl in 1959. See for example Roger L. Shinn's review in
The Union Seminary Quarterly Review 15 (1960), 170-2. More recent writers have made similar
errors. See for example John L. Thiel, who suggests that a dialogical relationship between
Barth and Schleiermacher began only with Barth's essay in Protestant Theology, which he
dates to 1947, and that the attitude Barth displays there constitutes a departure from "the
one-sided, thoroughly polemical, and even ahistorical approach that characterised his
preoccupation with Schleiermacher during the 1920s." See 'Barth's Early Interpretation of
Schleiermacher' in Barth and Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse? ed. J.O. Duke and B.F.
Streetman, (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1988), 11.
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that its earliest sections were written last. 6 The material added in 1932-33
genuinely does serve as background to the whole series of lectures. It begins
with the section which appeared in the published version as chapter 2,
under the title 'Man in the Eighteenth Century'. In it, Barth offers a wide-
ranging analysis of the cultural and social life of eighteenth century Europe,
from its characteristic political forms to its social life and manners, from its
architecture to its music. Only when this is complete does he (in chapter 3)
consider the religious life of the eighteenth century; and only when that is
complete does he turn (in chapter 4) to the century's theology. These three
sections of the lectures, taken together, provide the key to Barth's
subsequent analysis of the theology of the nineteenth century, and by
implication to much of the theology of his own time too. The remainder of
this chapter is therefore devoted to a study of these sections.
ii. The key to the Enlightenment: absolutism
Barth begins by emphasizing that the popular pictures of the
Enlightenment's adherents and ideals are inadequate. According to such
images, Enlightenment man was "the champion against prejudices and
passions, against vice and hypocrisy, ignorance and superstition,
intolerance, partiality and fanaticism; he would honour wisdom and virtue,
reason and nature..."7 The standard slogans associated with this picture,
"optimism, moralism, intellectualism and so on",8 do not tell the whole
story, though. They catch the likeness of the Enlightenment only partially,
6 This is something which Barth was at great pains to emphasize. When, at a later date,
translations of selections from the lectures into English and French were proposed, he
refused to provide a foreword for them, on the grounds that the work formed a unity and
should not be split up. The publication of selections went ahead without his blessing. He
wrote to SCM Press in 1959 as follows: "I have looked at the book again recently and am
more than ever convinced that the work is a fragment - but, as a fragment, nevertheless a
unity, in which the two chief parts (Background and History) form unities. The reasons
which have moved you to present this united fragment in still more fragments, you will
have to explain to the English reader yourself: I cannot, because I just do not understand it."
See Barth, PT, 7. The talk of fragments is a reference to the fact that he had hoped originally
to add a chapter on Goethe to the background, and had intended to extend the history
section closer to his own day, as far as Troeltsch. See Barth, PT, 11. Note that Alasdair
Maclntyre was one of the joint editors of the series in which that earlier translation was
published. A foreword in the name of the joint editors was included. See From Rousseau to
Ritschl (SCM Press, London, 1959).
7 Barth, PT, 33.
8 Ibid. 34.
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missing some of its features entirely. Earth, following H.A. Korff,9 highlights
some of the Enlightenment's other faces, such as the scepticism and
resignation depicted in Goethe's Mephistopheles, or the quasi-mysticism of
Mozart's Die Zauberflote, or the founding of Freemasonry "in the form of a
mystery religion". 10 If rationalism were truly the centre of the
Enlightenment, Barth points out, it could not have so soon produced such
irrationalism.
What does this mean, though? Must we say that the period's various
tendencies and faces are simply divergent, or even in conflict with one
another? Is there no sense in which the various faces of the Enlightenment
and its time constitute a coherent movement? Barth believes there is. The
standard slogans may not capture the coherence of the Enlightenment, but
that does not mean that it had no centre. Barth very quickly identifies a
unifying principle, which is to serve as the key to his analysis of the period:
absolutism. His use of this term is fascinating, for on the one hand he has
borrowed it from historians of the period; yet he has, in the borrowing,
altered its significance radically. It is of the utmost importance to appreciate
the nature of Barth's innovation in his use of the term; and it is therefore
necessary first to have some appreciation of its normal significance.
Absolutism had, even in 1932, long been used by historians as a description
of a form of political order characteristic of early modern Europe.11 A
particularly influential account of it was formulated by Wilhelm Roscher in
1847, who distinguished three successively stronger forms of monarchial
government: 'confessional absolutism', lasting from the Reformation to the
end of the Thirty Years War; 'courtly absolutism', which Louis XIV typified,
lasting for a century or so from around 1650; and 'enlightened absolutism',
9 H.A. Korff Geist der Goethezeit: einer ideellen Entzvicklung der klassisch-romantischen
Literaturgeschichte vol. 1, (J.J. Weber, Leipzig, 1923).
!0 Barth, FT, 35.
11 It originated during the first half of the nineteenth century. See Herbert H. Rowen, 'Louis
XIV and Absolutism' in John C. Rule (ed.) Louis XIV and the Craft ofKingship (Columbus,
Ohio, 1969), 312; cited in H.M. Scott (ed.) Enlightened Absolutism (Macmillan, London, 1990),
4. Barth himself mentions the description of the eighteenth century as "The Age of
Absolutism" in a work byWalter Goetz which had recently been published at the time of
his lectures. See Walter Goetz et al. Das Zeitalter des Absolutismus, vol. 6 of the Propylden-
Weltgeschichte, Berlin, 1931. See Barth, PT, 36.
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dominant during the second half of the eighteenth century, and exemplified
by rulers like Frederick the Great in Prussia and Joseph II in the Habsburg
lands. 12 Something like this was still the common view of German historians
in 1932.13 in essence, the term 'absolutism' signifies a focussing of power in
the state, and in particular in the monarch, unfettered by parliamentary
institutions. It implies a centralizing of government, involving a growth of
central governmental institutions.!4 Thus far, absolutism is essentially a
matter of political structures. Ideas, and in particular Enlightenment ideas,
only become relevant where we are dealing with the last of the three forms
identified by Roscher: enlightened absolutism. Much debate has surrounded
this notion in recent decades, and doubts have been raised about the reality
and nature of the supposed connection between Enlightenment ideas and
actual policies.15
None of this bodes well for Barth's account. If absolutism is essentially a
matter of political structures it is not obvious why it should be the key to a
more general analysis of eighteenth century life. Moreover if Enlightenment
ideas have little to do with absolutism, and maybe even with so called
enlightened absolutism, it seems unlikely that absolutism can help us
understand the Enlightenment. Barth allows none of this to worry him,
though. For when he proposes absolutism as the key to the century, he is not
talking primarily about political forms. They provide him only with a point
12 See Scott Enlightened Absolutism, 6. This was the first occasion on which the term
'enlightened absolutism' was used. It indicates the explicit influence of Enlightenment ideas
on social and political policy.
13 Ibid. 6-7, and 344 note 21, where Scott notes the affirmation of similar views in 1932 by
Fritz Hartung.
44 See for example Jeremy Black: "Absolutism" in The Blackwell Companion to the
Enlightenment ed. J.W. Yolton, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1991), 11, where he defines absolutist
states as "powerful entities with monopolization of power by the government and the
growth of central institutions, such as the court, the standing army and the bureaucracy".
He adds that the objectives of absolutist states include the "extraction from subjects of the
wherewithal needed to support the mainstays of the absolutist regime - that is the standing
army and bureaucracy; and the coercion of internal and external opponents of the ruler's
policies". It is worth noting also that 'absolutism' and 'despotism' have sometimes been
treated as interchangeable terms. K. Maxwell notes however that Fritz Hartung drew a
distinction between the two: the absolutist ruler "voluntarily submits to laws and
acknowledges the rights of subjects"; whereas despotism is simply "unchecked tyranny".
See 'Pombal: The Paradox of Enlightenment and Despotism' in Scott, Enlightened
Absolutism, 116. The distinction is genuine, and the stipulation of terms sensible, though
historiography of the period has not always observed it.
13 See Scott, ibid. 1-15 for a summary of this debate.
178
of departure: "political structure" he affirms, "is at all times and was
therefore also at that time no more than an expression of the order of life, the
ideal of life in human powers." 18 For Earth the political structures are
important but secondary. They point to something deeper which is their
source, and, as he makes clear in due course, the source of many other
things also. What interests him is the fundamental idea lying beneath the
political structure. Absolutism therefore requires to be redefined, so as to
grasp this deeper level, this fundamental idea. Barth readily provides the
necessary definition: " 'Absolutism' in general can obviously mean a system
of life based upon the belief in the omnipotence of human powers."17 Given
this belief in human powers, a new image of humanity developed:
Man, who discovers his own power and ability, the potential dormant in his
humanity, that is, his human being as such, and looks upon it as the final,
the real and the absolute, ... self-justifying, with its own authority and
power, which he can therefore set in motion in all directions and without
restraint—this man is absolute man.18
Defined in this way, absolutism is able to play the role Barth has earmarked
for it, as the key concept in a wide-ranging survey of eighteenth century
society and culture, or, as he puts it, as the key to an entire "system of life".
In Barth's hands it becomes a common thread uniting apparently diverse
moments within the cultural and intellectual life of the period. It is the
connecting factor between the various faces of the century - the less
obviously enlightened ones as well as those in the main Enlightenment
tradition.
Political structures provide a good example of the way in which the
application of the term is widened by its redefinition. For when Barth
discusses the politics of the period he detects the presence of absolutism
beyond the normal boundaries. It is not limited to the monarchial
governments typified by Louis XIV, Frederick the Great, and Joseph II, the
"absolute princes" as Barth calls them. The basic redefinition calls for a
subsidiary redefinition: "Politically, absolutism means the determination of
law by that class in the state which in contrast to the others possesses the




effective power." 19 This allows Barth to see the French revolution of 1789 as
an act of absolutism, just as much as any act of Louis XIV. He is enabled
(and inclined) to see it not as the failure of the absolutist principle, nor as a
reversal of the previous character of the century, but as its development into
a new form - perhaps even its fulfilment. For the French revolutionary
government, just as for the absolute princes, the basis for law is the
possession of effective power. All that has changed is the identity of the
possessors of power.
What, though, of the origins of the new attitudes and convictions Barth calls
absolutism? Where did they come from? Barth points to the discoveries of
Copernicus and Galileo, to the expanding colonial power of Europe, to the
development of scientific and technological achievement. He suggests,
though, that the most important factors were political: specifically he
identifies the significant decline in power of the Holy Roman Empire,
connected particularly with the events of the Thirty Years War.20 Though
the empire remained in existence throughout the eighteenth century, its
power was greatly reduced. It no longer served as a limit over against the
territories of which it was comprised, and in due course the Habsburgs
became little more than another instance of political absolutism in their
hereditary lands. Barth accords great significance to these changes: "Perhaps
eighteenth-century man is in this respect best described negatively: he is the
man who no longer has an emperor."2i The empire's significance, in Barth's
view, lay in the fact that it had been the concrete form of the understanding
that rulers held and exercised power "in common submission with the
people before a power which is superior to them both".22 Political
absolutism came about, Barth says, when those left with actual power after
the effective collapse of the empire used that power to identify the laws and
structures of their domain with their own will. It is this identification
19 Barth, PT, 42. The phrase 'effective power' is interesting, bearing inmind Maclntyre's
discussion of effectiveness as the characteristic value of emotivist cultures, and his analysis
of bureaucratic authority as nothing but power.
20 For a concise description of the position of the empire after the end of the Thirty Years
War, see Europe Unfolding 1648-1688 John Stoye, (Fontana, London, 1969), 15-19. For a
general view of the political structures of Germany in the eighteenth century, see Bruford,
op. cit. 1-11.
21 Barth, PT, 41.
22 Ibid. 42.
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between law and individual will which constitutes the initial (princely) form
of political absolutism; Barth insists that this identification has priority over
the structures and policies that follow from it. By this identification the
absolute ruler is made to be like God. The right and freedom which are
established and guaranteed by the state are in fact now established and
guaranteed by the ruler. This, Barth, takes it, is the significance of Louis
XIV's "L'etat c'est moi!".23
The analysis described thus far constitutes the core of Barth's thinking about
the eighteenth century. What assessment can be made of it? First, a point in
its favour. By understanding political absolutism in this way, Barth avoids a
criticism which has sometimes been made of the description of eighteenth
century government as absolutist. The argument is that the designation is
misleading, since it implies the absolute power of the rulers in question.24 In
fact, it is pointed out, the powers of rulers were far from absolute. Historical
study of particular rulers and their domains reveals, not surprisingly, a
myriad of ways in which their powers were limited.25 The conclusion has
tended to be drawn that 'absolutism' is of little value as a descriptive term
for the political systems of the period.
Now it might be thought that this point could be fatal to an analysis like
Barth's, which makes absolutism its most essential category. This is not so.
Barth's redefinition of the term 'absolutism' actually makes it less vulnerable
to this criticism. As redefined, it does not, perhaps, imply that the power of
an absolute ruler to implement his or her will was unlimited. Rather it
indicates a shift in power, associated with changes in the traditional (and by
assumption divinely sanctioned) structures of society. Power shifted away
from other estates and was centralized in the monarchy. The ruler was
absolute in the sense that his or her will was the final court of appeal, so to
speak. Barth does not, and does not need to, assert that such rulers could
implement any policy or law they wished without opposition or the need of
23 Barth, PT, 43.
24 See for example Jeremy Black in Yolton, op. cit. 11.
25 Black ibid, says this: "The power of the ruler was limited in three significant respects:
first, resistance to the demands of the government; second, the often tenuous control of the
ruler over the bureaucracy; and third, constraining attitudes towards the proper scope of
monarchical authority."
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compromise. The point is rather that what is law is understood as the
expression of the ruler's will, rather than as the expression of some higher
necessity. The loss of the imperial ideal, then, meant the loss of any higher
authority in terms of which law was to be justified; it therefore meant the
assimilation of legal authority to defacto power .26
Barth's talk of the loss of the imperial ideal is helpful, then. It ought to be
noted, though, that it also creates a difficulty. The problem is that the
analysis is well suited to the German states, which went through the
political changes Barth has described, but has little application to other parts
of Europe. The Enlightenment, however, and for that matter political
absolutism, were not restricted to Germany nor to lands that were part of
the Holy Roman Empire.27 Barth's identification of the decline of the
empire's power as a chief cause of absolutism is problematic, then. In fact
the history of the empire was only one element in the emergence of political
absolutism. Barth's account is impoverished by its inattention to other
factors, such as the socio-economic developments in early modern Europe.
He has for example nothing significant to say about the rise of capitalism
and the corresponding weakening of the feudal ordering of medieval
26 It has to be admitted that Barth's phrase "the omnipotence [Allmacht] of human powers"
is misleading on this point. The substance of his analysis is not affected, though.
27 Take for example the Scottish Enlightenment, which has increasingly come to be
recognized as a genuine and significant branch of the wider European Enlightenment. Note
for example Maclntyre's comments in After Virtue, 37: "The French themselves often
avowedly looked to English models, but England in turn was overshadowed by the
achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment. The greatest figures of all were certainly
German: Kant and Mozart. But for intellectual variety as well as intellectual range not even
the Germans can outmatch David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, John Millar, Lord
Karnes and Lord Monboddo." On the Scottish Enlightenment see also the comments of
Richard B. Sher in Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh Univ.
Press, Edinburgh, 1985). He suggests (p. 11) that there is no difficulty in seeing the Scottish
Enlightenment as part of the wider movement "so long as one does not follow Peter Gay in
mistaking the skeptical, anticlerical, reformist Enlightenment of certain French philosophes
and a few men of letters elsewhere for the Enlightenment as a whole". Gay's views are in
The Enlightenment: An Interpretation 2 vols., (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1967-70). A
wider perspective can be found in R. Porter and M. Teich (eds.) The Enlightenment in
National Context (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981).
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society.28 His account would be more broadly based had he placed less
weight on the empire, and said more about the demise of feudalism, the loss
of faith in a divinely ordained social order in which each had their place,
and from which their rights and obligations derived.
This is a significant failing in Barth's account; nonetheless, it does not
detract from the usefulness of the points he did in fact make, particularly in
the German context. It would do his account an injustice not to note that his
redefinition of absolutism has not reduced the concept's relevance to
political life; rather it adds to its explanatory power. A good example is that
it helps him to explain some of the most characteristic policies of absolutist
states such as the development of centralized bureaucracies and the
maintenance of standing armies.29 His suggestion is that idea of an absolute
ruler of a geographically limited territory made no sense: "The existence of
other territories openly contradicts the idea of an absolute prince, but this
state of affairs could be improved by inheritance, by marriage, by
acquisition and - the ultimate ratio - by wars of conquest."30 Territorial rule
constitutes at very least a disconfirmation of the idea of the absolute prince;
the result is warfare as "a latent principle" of the time. This requires a
standing army, which in turn leads to the requirement of a unitary state
28 Barth discusses these issues very briefly, at p. 43. What he says there is not without
value. He notes, for example the rise of the bourgeois middle classes since the late Middle
Ages. He also has a rather odd quotation from Goetz op. cit. which suggests that this rise
was the result of a deliberate policy on the part of the princes. Barth's relative lack of
interest in such matters is surprising in the light of his socialism, perhaps. What makes
Barth's omission even more surprising, maybe, is the fact that the breakdown of feudalism
is treated so prominently in the operas of his beloved Mozart, and in particular in Le Nozze
di Figaro and Don Giovanni. See Nicholas Till Mozart and the Enlightenment passim, and
especially chapters XII to XV.
29 An indication of this latter development is given by Charles Ingrao in 'The Smaller
German States' in Scott Enlightened Absolutism, 225-6: "Virtually every state, no matter how
small, maintained at least some troops, if only for ceremonial functions. In a great many
instances the military's size corresponded to a principality's needs and resources. Yet more
than a few princes were unable to restrain their passion for soldiers. Perhaps there is no
better example than PrinceWilliam of Schaumburg-Lippe, who condemned military
aggression in his memoirs, yet maintained a 1,200-man army in a country of only 20,000
people." Ingrao also makes the point (p. 226) that Frederick "had, after all, been proclaimed
'Great' by contemporary Europeans not for the triumphs of his intellect but for the victories
of his army." For fuller description and discussion of the development of standing armies
see M.S. Anderson War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789 (Fontana, London,
1988).
30 Barth, PT, 43. It is worth noting that what Barth says here makes it clear that his
understanding of the absolutist prince, while not requiring absolute actual power, requires
at least the idea of unlimited power.
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which can sustain the commerce to provide the taxation which will pay for
this. This need for revenue necessitates the development of a bureaucracy.
In this way, Barth offers some explanation of what were widespread
developments. In addition, his account provides an explanation for the
otherwise puzzling fact that absolutist rulers, even those who pursued
extensive policies of social reform and improvement, frequently engaged in
aggressive external policies, apparently unmodified by Enlightenment
ideals.31 It is to Barth's credit that he is able to offer a plausible suggestion
about these developments.
Another merit in Barth's understanding of absolutism is that it enables him
to offer an account of the unity present in the diverse forms of absolute
monarchy. He notes the two main types, the "prince by divine right"
typified by Louis XIV, and the "enlightened absolutist", of which Frederick
the Great is probably the paradigm case 32 The former expresses itself not
only in warfare but in pomp and splendour - Versailles of course is the
architectural embodiment of this; it became the model for and inspiration of
many other imposing palaces, not least Vienna's Schonbrunn. Enlightened
absolutism, on the other hand, is a product of the same principle as this -
"through power to power" - but it manifests it "rationally rather than
aesthetically".33 Where the former kind of ruler had "zest for life", the latter
has "earnest zeal".34 The essential feature is social reform, involving for
example scientific and technical advance, economic development, and
improvements in education.
The more striking step in Barth's analysis, though, is when he discerns a
unity not only between these two forms of absolute ruler, but between these
and the "revolutionary from below" who came to the fore in France in 1789.
Barth envisages this revolutionary as the alter ego of the former, "following
in his footsteps as inevitably as the darkness follows the light". The citizen,
31 See Scott Enlightened Absolutism, 25: "Rulers and statesmen who pursued progressive and
humanitarian ends at home do not appear, at first sight, to have followed these same
principles abroad. ... Any revival of the concept of enlightened absolutism must resolve this
difficulty."
32 In this division, of course, Barth is following the lines established by Roscher.
33 Barth, PT, 45.
34 Ibid. 46.
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who feels himself to have been deprived of his rights, could redress the
situation by acquiring power "in order that he might now determine
without let of appeal what is right and just".35 The absolutist principle
identifying legal authority with actual power stays the same; it is just that
power now lies in different hands. The people assumed statehood "by
means of a simple inversion of Louis XIV's dictum".36 It is interesting to
note here that in Barth's view, absolute humanity not only identifies its will
with law: "what is right and just" is now also to be determined in this way.
iii. Absolutism and After Virtue
Before going on to look at how Barth uses absolutism as the key to other
areas of eighteenth century life, it is worth pausing to consider how his
account might connect to Maclntyre's narrative. Caution is necessary here,
since only a small portion of Barth's discussion is presently in view.
Already, though, it is possible to identify an extremely important point of
contact between the two analyses. Barth presents the Enlightenment as the
product of a set of attitudes and beliefs which derive from the loss of the
imperial ideal. This ideal had amounted in effect to the understanding that
the social order, and the rights and obligations of those within it, are both
limited and grounded by something beyond that social order. What has
been lost is a "higher authority".37 Without such an authority, there is
nothing beyond the social order to limit the identification of law, right and
justice with the will of the possessor or possessors of effective power.
The important thing to note here is that Maclntyre's narrative, despite its
rather different concerns and its distinct subject matter, takes the very same
view. It too sees the Enlightenment as the consequence of a loss of previous
attitudes and beliefs. It too identifies this as the loss of any grounding for
rights and obligations outside the existing social order. Gone is any notion
of "human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its- telos"; all that is available




is "human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be".38 The only court of appeal is the
existing order of things, such as the desires and interests of its members. The
common ground that has emerged here between Barth and Maclntyre is of
considerable importance. Barth's analysis of absolutism is the key to his
understanding of the Enlightenment and its consequences. Likewise
Maclntyre's claims regarding the loss of the medieval moral scheme are the
centrepiece of his narrative. What has not been established thus far is how
Barth develops his account, and in particular whether it parallels
Maclntyre's claim about the inevitable failure of the Enlightenment project,
given the loss of essential elements of the older scheme.
One interesting possibility is worth mentioning here, though. Maclntyre at
one point takes the narrative of After Virtue back as far as the Reformation.
He notes that early Protestant theologies, and also Jansenist Catholic
theology, operated with a new concept of reason. The capacity to
comprehend the true end of humanity was understood to have been
destroyed by the fall; reason has no power therefore to apprehend ultimate
ends, nor to correct our passions. For such theologies, the notion of the
human telos remained, but it is only grace that enables us to respond to and
obey the precepts of divine moral law. Maclntyre sees Pascal as a
particularly important figure here, since it was he who first understood the
connection between these theologies and the new, non-Aristotelian science,
in which reason was no longer expected to "comprehend essences or
transitions from potentiality to act", but was essentially "calculative".39 An
important conclusion drawn by Pascal on the basis of this concept of reason
38 See After Virtue, 53-4. The comparison is particularly clear in one or two places where
Maclntyre speaks explicitly of the loss of any foundation for morality outside the existing
social order. A good example of this is his discussion of English society in the early
eighteenth century in chapter XII of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Speaking of rights of
property, he says: "there cannot be from the standpoint of this form of social and political
order any well-founded appeal... to a standard of right external to that social and political
order, to a standard expressed in principles whose truth would be independent of the
attitudes and judgments of the participants in the order." Also: "it would be concluded by
an adequately reflective adherent of such an established order that there can be no good
reason for appealing to some standard external to the order." (pp. 216-7)
39 AV, 54. Pascal was heavily influenced by Jansenism, spending the latter part of his life in
the Jansenist retreat at Port-Royal. It is interesting that two of the early achievements of his
life were the disproof of an important proposition of Aristotelian science - that nature
abhors a vacuum (by a method which led to the invention of the barometer), and the
invention of a calculating machine!
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was that human beliefs are ultimately based only on nature, custom and
habit. In this, as in his view that reason cannot direct the passions, he is of
course an anticipator of (and influence on) Hume; in this way he connects
Maclntyre's narrative both to the beginnings of modern science and to pre-
Enlightenment theological thought.
There are in fact some very strong parallels here with the account Barth has
given of the eighteenth century. The critical thing to notice about
Maclntyre's discussion is that there are two elements involved in the loss of
the notion of "human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised-its-fdos"40. Firstly
there is the Aristotelian concept of reason as a faculty which can
comprehend essences and transitions from potentiality to act - it is the loss
of this which Maclntyre concentrates on; but secondly there is the concept of
divine grace as able to direct us towards the telos of human life in the
absence of such a faculty of reason. Only when this is also lost does
Maclntyre's narrative take off. He pays little attention to this second loss,
though. He does note in passing that Hume had been brought up in a
Calvinist environment, and that this has some relevance to his later
development. But the loss of the concept of divine grace - also necessary
before that philosophical development could occur - is not discussed either
in the particular case of Hume or more widely.
What is interesting is that Maclntyre's account is capable of development in
directions which he himself does not pursue. He tends to equate the loss of
teleological forms of moral reasoning with the loss of Aristotelian structures
of enquiry, tying his historical narrative to his own espousal of a revived
form of Aristotelianism. But it would equally be possible to give more
attention than he does to the other way of sustaining teleological forms, by
means of a quite radical notion of divine grace. If this were done, it would
be possible to relate his narrative, without any significant modification, to a
revived form of Protestant (or even Jansenist) theology. To develop the
narrative of After Virtue in this way would mean not seeing the loss of end-
comprehending reason as the critical loss. Rather, what would matter would
be the loss of any standard distinct from actual human willing in the light of
40 AV, 53.
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which moral reasoning could operate - whether that standard be provided
by Aristotelian reason or divine grace. To use Maclntyre's vocabulary, the
critical factor would be the loss of anything other than "human-nature-as-it-
happens-to-be";41 to use Barth's vocabulary it would be the loss of any
"higher authority", the loss of "the very notion of a concrete
responsibility".42 What is left is a situation where moral discourse and
reasoning can only be rooted in existent human reality: for Maclntyre,
Hume's emphasis on custom, habit and the passions is the realization of
this; while for Barth, it is the possessor of de facto power, whether prince or
populace, who determines "what is right and just". To this, Barth has a
question: "Does not right cease to be right whenever it is seized? Is not right
possible only in a relationship which presupposes peace and excludes the
thought of revolution because its basis is a commandment?"43 Barth's point
here is the same one made by Maclntyre when he identified an incoherence
in the notion ofmorality as something authoritative, yet which we can either
choose or reject.
iv. The will for form
Barth moves on from the political realm, with the conviction that it has
shown us the century "most clearly as a whole".44 His attention turns to the
influence of absolutism in social and cultural life. He divides his treatment
between two aspects, which he calls the inner and outer forms of life. By the
outer form he means the constant element in the cultural aims and
achievements of the era. By the inner form he means the recurrent and
characteristic attitudes of individuals toward themselves, the world, and
God. The outer form of life of the eighteenth century, the constant among
the diverse cultural achievements of the age, is identified by Barth as "a
striving to reduce everything to an absolute form".43 In the natural world, in
dress and manners, in the built environment, in music, in language, in the
44 AV, 53.
42 Barth, FT, 48.
43 Ibid. 52. Note that the reference to revolution covers both the princely and the popular
absolutist. Barth sees the former as the revolutionary from above, the latter as the




social world, in the understanding of the individual, in individual
development - in all these areas the repeated pattern is the desire to impose
form on a mass of raw material. The inhabitant of the period "believes
himself to be the master" of this unformed matter, confronting it as one
"who has all the knowledge: knowledge of the form, the intrinsically right,
fitting, worthy, beautiful form".46 This pattern of the imposition of form on
raw matter is worked out by Barth in each of the areas mentioned above.
In its relationship with nature, eighteenth century culture had an aesthetic
as well as a scientific aspect. But the character of its aesthetics was to impose
form in accordance with human sensibility, and so idealize nature - the
order and harmony (which come down largely to geometry, in Barth's view)
of the gardens of the period is well known.47 In the architecture of the
period a similar will for form is evident. Barth is struck by the tendency to
use materials in a way which does not manifest the character of the material,
but which imposes a logical form on space. He notes in particular the
fondness for the use of plaster, "so obedient to the forming hand!"48 The
town planning of the period also expressed the same character, the
imposition of form not according to the natural features of the land, but as
an expression of a form "held significant and valuable enough to justify its
projection into the materials, regardless of everything in them contrary to its
own nature".49 The age in fact put its own spirit into the built environment
as no other age had done, comments Barth. But this was inevitable, since the
age's "inmost heart was precisely this idea of man as one taking hold of
everything about him and subjecting it to his will".50 Barth applies these
categories also to the characteristic fashions in dress and manners. The
ornamented and grand fashions of the age conveyed the message that: "man
carries in his soul an image of himself which in comparison with his actual
figure is still much more noble, much more graceful and much more
46 Barth, FT, 55.
47 Barth also mentions the representation of nature in the decorative arts, commenting on
the "tamed, groomed and trained animals, shepherds and shepherdesses whose nice
prettiness and grace really left them no alternative but to turn eventually into those little





perfect".51 Great dignity and charm were certainly achieved, but this
imposition of form on appearance and presentation was paid for by
"burdens and discomforts"!
Barth turns next to the question of the century's attitude towards history.
The notable feature is that this was the period in which the critical study of
history began. The eighteenth century historian regarded the past from a
point of view of conscious superiority. History was allowed no independent
power to speak to the historian. It was inevitably classified either as light or
dark. Again, then, the task is to impose form on the raw material offered.
There is no question of the material challenging the one who forms it.
Education took on a new significance in the eighteenth century - there was a
new estimation of what education could achieve: Barth quotes Franke's view
that education could bring the young person to "true godliness and
Christian wisdom".52 The century's confidence in its understanding of the
child and its ability to educate and shape it is, in Barth's view, one of the
most notable examples of the will for form. State schooling and compulsory
education were developments which arose from this new thinking, and they
inevitably led to the increasing independence of education from the Church.
The forming of associations, and the relationship between these and older
social institutions, is next to be discussed. The distinction here is really
between obligatory institutions, one's membership of which is more a
matter of necessity than choice,53 and associations which one chooses freely
to enter into. The former came increasingly to be seen as only the visible
sign of community, rather than its true expression. Instead it came to be
believed that "association could be created, and indeed that association in its
true and really living sense had to be created."54 The older, obligatory
institutions are to some extent usurped by this new understanding of and
51 Barth, PT, 57.
52 Ibid. 60.
53 Barth mentions as examples "the natural communion of marriage and family life, the
professional association of the guild and the corporation, and the associations, partly
geographical, partly political, of the village, the township and the state. Embracing all the
others, and not so much formed as instituted, the community of the Church, and that of the
empire too". Ibid. 62.
54 Ibid. 62-3.
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desire for community. Again for Barth this development is an expression of
the impulse to impose form on malleable raw material. Not even social
institutions are immune from the desire and need to give to all that presents
itself a form and shape in accordance with human understanding and
choice. This elevation of free association is of course related to the political
developments of the age, for now the state is reinvented as a free association
of individuals.55 As for examples of this new impulse towards association,
the order of Freemasons is perhaps the most obvious one, but Barth
mentions others such as the Rosicrucians, societies for the furtherance of
knowledge, student associations and, not least, the Moravian brethren. 56
In language, literature and poetry, Barth notes the development of a desire
to give literary and poetic form to the vernacular, rather than the classical
languages of antiquity. Again this is seen as an expression of the will for
form, operative on a mass of raw material which had begun to become a
source of shame in and because of its unmoulded state. But it is in the music
of the period that Barth finds the most intimate communication of the
absolutism of the age. He points out that music was understood more as a
craft than as an art, and one which consisted primarily in the technical
mastery of musical instruments. Composition was essentially a means to
this end of proficiently played music. Successful musical composition was
not the expression of the self, but the expression of laws:
Not sensibility, not experience, not mystique and not Protestantism, but art
as a skill, as proficiency in the manipulation of the most exacting rules - not
without 'invention', certainly, as it was then called, but invention
55 Barth, PT, 50. Barth states that the French National Assembly in its Statement of Human
and Civil Rights "is explicit in taking the state to be an association
56 This is a convenient point to note that the views expressed in these lectures were at many
points a development of ideas Barth had already used at an earlier date in theological
lectures and publications. This is important, given that my discussion of Barth's theology
concentrates on the period up to around 1924, while these lectures date from 1929 to 1933.
Here, the point I want to note is that in a lecture first delivered in Liibeck on 30th
November 1923, Barth noted that the visible church has the form of a free society of
individuals; however he denied that this is the character of the true Church. The true
Church is grounded in the event of revelation, not in the possession of a common religious
interest. Moreover Barth argued in that lecture that the character of the Church changed
significantly in the eighteenth century, with the Enlightenment. In the seventeenth century
the Church had, he suggests, still understood that it is founded in divine judgement. The
lecture is 'Die Kirche und die Offenbarung', subsequently published in the Gesamtausgabe
volume Vortrage und kleinere Arbeiten 1922-1925 (Theologischer Verlag Zurich, 1990), 307-
349. Bruce McCormack discussed this lecture in A Scholastic ofa Higher Order 267-71.
continually inventing a new necessity, inventing not so much in the
expression of what the composer himself found personally stimulating, but
rather of general laws - this was needed to write a fugue.57
The mastery sought by the eighteenth century musician involved belief in
their sovereignty over the musical instrument and over the range of possible
sounds it could produce. They therefore had a particular fondness for
polyphonic instruments and music - paradigmatically, of course, the music
of the keyboard instruments. It was a matter of ordering the "rough
amorphous mass of possible sounds", of "evolving harmony from the
confused mass of possible combinations of sounds"58 all in accordance with
laws of form, which are in a sense known to each individual human being;
but skillful and inventive application of these laws was the mark, not of
genius, but of the master of the art.
All that went into the music of the period was directed towards flawless
playing. Beauty was not something which inhered in the music itself, but
rather followed from the work of the craftsman performed skillfully. It was
a beauty which "consisted in the freedom founded upon subjection to the
law".59 Earlier music had not achieved the same mastery in subjecting the
raw material to laws; later music, from Beethoven on, did not have the same
love for the world of sound in itself, and so was not capable of "looking
upon it in the same unequivocal way as a game".60 But the "music of
absolutism" simply plays, and in so doing achieves a peculiar and
unmatched beauty. It is interesting that Barth not only seeks to apply the
notion of the will for form to the subject of music; he actually suggests that
here absolutism, the origin of that will, is at its utmost extreme. For he
suggests that this music "sought to emulate the wisdom even of the Creator
in its results and in the abandonment and superiority which cause us to
forget all the craftsmanship behind it". Support for this comes from a
comment of Goethe about the music of J.S. Bach: "As if the eternal harmony
were discoursing with itself, as might perhaps have happened in the bosom
of the Lord, just before the Creation; so I was moved inwardly and felt that I





no longer needed ears, nor eyes the least of all, nor any other senses."61 This,
which Barth suggests is the most profound comment on Bach it would be
possible to make, relates to Proverbs 8:27-31, where it is said that the
Wisdom of God is beside God in the act of creation, like a master craftsman,
"playing always before him".62 So, while it was the political life of the
century that most clearly showed its character as a whole, it is the music of
the period that is the purest and most extreme expression of absolutism.63
This, then, is Barth's attempt to describe the outer form of life of the century.
The will for form, seen as the outgrowth of absolutism, is the constant
element through all these diverse areas of culture and life. The attempt is
certainly impressive; his identifications of the presence of the will for form
are generally plausible and powerful. To have the same pattern discerned
and displayed for the reader in so many areas of culture has the effect of
reinforcing each individual instance. Closely linked to this material is
Barth's discussion of what he calls the inner form of life of the period. It is
central to Barth's discussion of the inner form that it corresponds accurately
with the outer. The characteristic understanding of self, world, and God,
reflects the absolute will for form evident in cultural and social life.
Fundamental to Barth's analysis of the inner form is the idea of human
freedom over against and mastery of the non-human. The self-awareness of
the period involves a conviction of the superiority of the human to the non-
human, and the freedom of the human in this relationship. The world
therefore is understood as the scene prepared and set ready for human
action. Belief in God is conditioned by this. God is understood to be the
absolute perfection of those qualities of goodness and wisdom which are
present in and so important to the human self-awareness of the period. The
belief in this God is sustained by wonderment at the suitability of the world
as material to be formed and mastered by humanity. Linked to this is the
conviction that the world, like humanity, is the creation of God; therefore a
correct understanding of the world will tell us about the will of God, about
61 Barth, FT, 72.
62 Ibid. 72.
63 cf. Maclntyre After Virtue, 37, speaking explicitly of the eighteenth century: "It was a
musical culture and there was perhaps a closer relationship between this fact and the
central philosophical problems of the culture than has usually been recognized."
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what goodness and virtue consist in. Reason is the "elemental voice"
speaking to humanity, both subjectively and objectively, from within and
from without. Therefore we must "allow Nature (and this is within our
power) to tell us what is good".64 Barth suggests that this inner attitude to
life is permeated by absolutism to the extent which it assumes that humanity
can ask these questions and answer them itself. The self-understanding of
the age does not doubt for a moment that it is capable of all this. Barth sees
this as a revival, in a new form, of the humanism of the Renaissance, and
prior to that the philosophy of Stoicism. 65 The essence of this humanism is
that "the perfect life consisted in the complete autarchy of rational man in a
rational world on the basis of the existence and dominion of a Deity
guaranteeing this association and thus too man's complete autarchy". 66 This
humanism has the power to answer all questions - even, and in particular, it
must and can attempt a theodicy and, more fundamentally, an
anthropodicy. Leibnitz therefore is the purest of the humanists of the period.
This theme, obviously, is more directly relevant than the discussion of the
outer form of life to Barth's basic concern - the background to theological
history. One might wonder, in fact, why a study of the history of theology
should concern itself with architecture, manners and music at all. It would,
however, be a mistake to think of the discussion of the outer form as of
secondary importance, preparatory material leading towards the genuinely
relevant matter. In seeking to open up the eighteenth century to view, Barth
has sought a principle which will apply to all aspects of the life of the
century, and in absolutism he believes he has found it. Absolutism is
valuable to Barth because it applies to political, social, cultural and
intellectual life, across the board. If it did not apply to architecture, manners
and music, it would not be the fundamental principle of the period, and
there would be no reason to suppose it would be particularly relevant to
religion and theology. The comprehensiveness of Barth's account is
therefore essential to it; and an appreciation of that comprehensiveness is
essential to any account of Barth's narrative.




In considering the outer and inner forms of life, Barth has described two
related ways in which absolutism is expressed: firstly, in the will for form;
secondly, in the conviction that man is "linked with, and ultimately of the
same substance as" God. 67 This enables us to see more completely what it is
that Barth means by absolutism. The idea that this period of history was
characterized by belief in the omnipotence of human powers was given
content in political history by the idea that political and legal authority was
something that originated not outwith the human, but in the effective will of
the possessor of power. Now, this same notion of belief in the omnipotence
of human powers is applied by means of the idea that all that humanity
encounters in its social and cultural existence has to and can be created and
formed by means of that same effective will. The will for form is, it should
not be forgotten, the will for absolute form - that is to say, the will to impose
a form determined absolutely by humanity. The effective human will can
and must determine the shape of that which it encounters, whether it be
political structures and codes of law, the world of possible sounds, or the
built environment. The effective will gives forms which reflect and display
the fact that they have been imposed by an absolute will: the layout of towns
and cities, the sound of a prelude and fugue, the apparel of a fashionable,
well to do citizen - all these could have served as examples of human
contrivance every bit as well as as the watch which Archdeacon Paley asked
his readers to imagine they had found upon the ground, at the beginning of
his argument for the existence of God.68 All these expressed and exclaimed
that they were the creation of beings which have knowledge of the "right,
fitting, worthy, beautiful form"69 and, of course, the skill and craftsmanship
to realise that form. The idea of "man as one taking hold of everything about
him and subjecting it to his will"70 is the one which unites the analysis of
political life with the analysis of the inner and outer forms of life of the
century.
67 Barth, PT, 74. It is necessary to raise a question mark about this, since Barth later (p. 131)
says that the century, to be consistent, would have adopted pantheism or panentheism,
though it in fact resisted this preferring a deistic understanding of God.
68 William Paley Natural Theology 1802. Quoted in J. Hick (ed.) The Existence ofGod
(Macmillan, London, 1964), 99 f.
69 Barth, PT, 55.
70 Ibid. 57.
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v. The treatment of Christianity in the eighteenth century
Having completed this general discussion, Barth does not turn straight away
to the theology of the eighteenth century. Rather he offers a lengthy
discussion of what he calls the problem of theology.71 He means this in the
sense of the subject matter of theology. The chapter is, broadly speaking,
about the religious life of the period. Barth considers how religion fared in
the light of the eighteenth century's distinctive attitudes and concerns. He
asks how the consciousness of the period treated the Bible, the Church, and
the faith of the Church. The core of his answer is, perhaps not surprisingly,
derived from the preceding chapter: the prevailing attitudes, he argues,
were the product of absolutism. Therefore the "attitude towards Christianity
at first proves to be just one further instance of his attitude to life in
general".72 That is his first point. His second point, though, is that there is
nonetheless a difference here, as compared to the other aspects of life
examined already. The difference is that here absolutism meets a subject
matter which offers it some resistance. The absolutist approach to
Christianity "succeeds only partially". We see the absolutist "hesitate and
stumble at various points".73
This second point is of the utmost importance for Barth's whole argument.
The absolutist approach to Christianity is an attempt humanize it, to bring it
under control, to impose on it a form determined by human powers. The
humanization of the subject-matter had to mean "the incorporation of God
into the sphere of sovereign human self-awareness, the transformation of
the reality that came and was to be perceived from outside into a reality that
was to be perceived and understood inwardly."74 But the subject-matter of
theology seems somehow to make a claim to have an authority over against
humanity, an authority "set over against men, an authority that is different
from men".73 Such an authority, of course, could not be recognized on the
basis of absolutism, with its faith in the omnipotence of human powers.
Barth suggests that the whole absolutist scheme is challenged by this






difficulty. If absolutism cannot be realized here, it will fail, despite its
successes elsewhere. If it cannot succeed here, the omnipotence of the
human asserted elsewhere will be seen to be a sham.
Barth describes the treatment of Christianity in terms of four related
developments. He characterizes these as: "the attempt ... to humanize the
problem of theology by its incorporation into (1) the state; (2) morality and
the bourgeoisie; (3) science and philosophy; (4) inwardness and the
individual."76 With regard to the first of these, the incorporation of
Christianity into the state, Barth argues that the eighteenth century was the
high point of the history of Caesaro-papism. The state, understanding its
own will to have the power of absolute law, treats the Christianity practised
within its territory as subject to its sovereignty. The critical development
was not, Barth argues, the theory of the supreme episcopacy of the ruler, or
the Calvinistic view of the collaboration of secular authority in church
affairs. Rather he points to territorialism and collegialism, both of which
denied the Church any independence from the state. Barth notes that the
absolute state can declare its religious principle to be the salvation of each in
their own fashion. The relativity of confessions was a truth declared by
political rulers "long before the theologians succeeded in struggling towards
this or a similar wisdom."77 Alternatively it can adopt one confession and
make it effectively obligatory on all citizens. Such actions were not, either,
imposed against the will of the churches. The net effect, though, was that the
Church and the matters it was concerned with were understood as being
under human authority.
Secondly, Barth discusses the incorporation of Christianity into morality and
the bourgeoisie. The eighteenth century was very much aware of the wars of
religion that had occurred in the aftermath of the Reformation, culminating
in the Thirty Years' War, and of the devastation caused. There was a
determination that such events should never be permitted to recur. To that
end, there developed "the theory of the barrenness, indeed the danger of
theological theory".78 There was a common perception that the error of the




past, the error that had to be avoided, was to have understood Christianity
as an intellectual matter, a set of doctrines:
the Christian citizen of the eighteenth century ... thinks that he can see the
mistake which crept in during all those dark times: the way in which people
understood the Christian creed then was wrong, perverse and evil. ... The
supreme verities of faith had been robbed of their real content and had been
changed into barren theological maxims whose contradictions inevitably
aroused the direst passions.79
The correct understanding of Christianity, in the eyes of the century, was as
"not teaching, but life". Or, at least, in so far as Christianity is a teaching, is
must be understood only as teaching for life. The real meaning of
Christianity is the transformation of life: "It demands of us a changed, a
transformed life, and that alone can be the 'true' faith with which we are to
respond if we are really to be called Christians."80 What this amounts to in
practice is the adaptation of Christianity to bourgeois life.
This notion of the transformation of life is, Barth argues, at the root of both
of the notable developments in the religious life of the century - pietism and
rationalism.81 Pietism, designated the inner line of this bourgeois
development, applies the notion of the transformation of life as a
hermeneutical rule - in biblical interpretation it emphasizes notions such as
rebirth, conversion, faith active in love, repentance etc. Rationalism, on the
other hand, the outer line of this development, sees the transformation of life
not as a hermeneutic rule but as the text that has to be read. It is the real
message, and Bible, dogma and Church must find their place in relation to
it. For rationalism, true worship of God consists in or, at very least, is made
manifest in the transformation and improvement of life, in "struggles
against unreason and depravity, in steady practice of the Christian duties
79 Barth, PT, 92.
80 Ibid. 93.
81 Thus Barth makes good a promise made a little earlier - he stated at pp. 84-5 that he
follows Baur and Ritschl rather than Troeltsch and others, in that he sees Pietism and
Enlightenment rationalism as related developments, both connected with the main trends
of the life of the period.
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and virtues".82 The intention, note, was not to avoid or reject orthodox
belief. Yet the emphasis is all on the improvement of life, and so a subtle
undermining of the creed takes place. Pietists and rationalists are united in
this emphasis on life. They differ principally in that the former favour inner
works while the latter favour outer improvement. Earth presents them both
as opposing not only a quietistic doctrine of justification, but also the
genuine interpretation of the reformers. He suggests that they depend more
on Stoicism than on scripture. Again, absolutism and the will for form are
present. Form now means morality "in the most comprehensive sense of the
concept".88 The critical thing about this is that when it is understood as
morality, Christianity is subject to human power. Barth here makes a
comment which reveals something of the significance of this development
for him: moralism, he says, has outlasted the period. Even in his own day,
"Christianity means moralistic, bourgeois Christianity, or it does not mean
Christianity at all. It can have a pietistic or a rationalistic colouring, but
whatever happens it must be a praxis pietatis. "84 This is one point, then, at
which Barth's implicit desire to understand the present in and through an
82 Barth, PT, 94-5. As an example of such piety, Barth mentions a volume of 'Village
Sermons' published in 1792 by a pastor, one Traugott Gtinther Roller, and dedicated to the
Archduke ofWeimar. An example of their character is that the Easter sermon was on
'Reasonable Rules for the Christian Burial of Corpses' - motto: 'Ne'er speed the body




understanding of the past becomes explicit.85
Thirdly, Barth discusses the attempt to incorporate Christianity into science
and philosophy. He reiterates that the criticism of Bible, Church and dogma
was not central to the treatment of the the problem of theology; the retreat of
religion into a circumscribed 'natural' religion in the face of historico-critical
attack was not the most basic feature of the period. Such developments need
to be seen in context. This is provided by the two aspects of the treatment of
the problem of theology already discussed: the state and bourgeois morality.
The two most basic categories which determined attitudes to religion were
those of citizen and moralist. Criticism of and philosophizing of Christianity
were consequent upon these categories. Why, though, were such
consequences as criticism and doubt so prevalent? Barth has already stated
that moralism does not lead inevitably to the criticism of Bible and dogma.
He suggests, then, that the reason lies in the failure of the moralistic
85 This theme of moralism is something else which reflects Barth's thinking in a much
earlier period. It can be traced right back to his disillusionment with the activism of
Leonhard Ragaz in 1915. In a letter to Martin Rade of 19th June 1915, Barth criticises the
priority given to the question 'What should we do?'. (See B-R. Br. I. 134. Quoted by
McCormack, CRDT, 124.) In a letter to Thurneysen of 6th August that year, he repeats this
criticism, suggesting that this question, with its "plunge into ethics", in fact "avoids the real
subject-matter". (See B-Th. Br. I. 69-70.) I would suggest that we have here the root of
Barth's criticism ofmoralism, the attempt to make Christianity subject to human will by
elevating life over doctrine. Another illustration of this can be found in his address 'The
Righteousness of God' delivered in January 1916. There Barth speaks in terms which
prefigure his description of absolutism's treatment of Christianity, its attempt to place it
under the control of human will:
"We are inwardly resentful that the righteousness we pant after is God's and can come to
us only from God. We should like to take the mighty thing into our own hands and under
our own management, as we have done with so many other things. It seems quite
desirable that the righteousness without which we cannot exist should be controlled by
our own will, whatever kind of will that may really be. We arrogate to ourselves,
unquestioningly, the right to take up the tumultuous question, What shall we do? as if
that were in any case the first and most pressing problem." (WGWM, 15-16.)
Note how the attempt to place religion under the control of human will is linked to
moralism, and this in an address dating from some sixteen years before the lectures under
consideration here. Also interesting is the fact that Barth and Thurneysen began to study
Pietism seriously during the second half of the War. They found its centre to be this same
question, 'What shall we do?', and therefore began to see Religious Socialism as a new form
of this Pietism. Thurneysen makes this connection in a letter to Barth of 12 December 1917.
(See B-Th. Br. I. 249.) Note that Barth's relation to Pietism has been fully explored in
Eberhard Busch Karl Barth und die Pietisten: Die Pietismuskritik des jungen Karl Barth und ihre
Erzoiderung (Chr. Kaiser Verlag, Munich, 1978). Busch makes clear that Barth's father Fritz
was strongly influenced by Pietism, and valued particularly its emphasis on life rather than
doctrine.
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interpretation of Christianity to succeed in its self-appointed task: that of
transforming life, and presenting the humanity of the period as sanctified.86
Even in the optimism of the period, few, says Barth, thought that what had
been achieved or could be achieved was a realization of Christianity. There
was a resignation here, which led Pietism towards mysticism, and
rationalism towards utilitarianism. This recognition of the difficulty of
setting oneself up as sanctified, this recognition of limitation, so painful for
absolutism, issued also in the thought that Christianity had been perhaps
misunderstood, and that there was a truer Christianity still waiting to be
discovered. It would be a more original, more genuine Christianity - but it
would have to be dug out from below the layers of dogma and tradition
which had caused the problem.
Barth makes some trenchant criticisms of these developments. He likens the
relationship between the moralistic principle and Christianity to the relation
between an axiom and a tenet grounded on it.8? One is held absolutely, the
other relatively. Christianity is held at a distance, able to be presented and
affirmed in a variety of ways. It is affirmed but only "with a secret
sovereignty which already seemed to make it questionable whether what
was being affirmed was still Christianity. Perhaps Christianity cannot be
affirmed in this way."88 The way forward, for moralism, involved an
attempt to "knock all the corners off" this old Christianity which is simply
86 Barth, PT, 101. "Probably because it does not completely succeed in reaching the reality
for which it longs so much, it must in turn manage to confirm that it is at least the truth.
Thereupon there arises the new, critical, philosophical theory of Christianity.
Psychologically speaking, abstract theories of Christianity, whether they are positive or
critical, traditional or neological, are always a compensation for an actual (albeit at times
very hidden) deficiency in Christian practice. Unless we see this connexion, we shall look in
vain for the real pathos of the eighteenth century's criticism of Bible and dogma, its
philosophizing of Christianity."
8? It is interesting to note that Barth's lecture "The First Commandment as Axiom in
Theology" dates from 1933 - shortly after this lecture would have been given. It was first
delivered on 10th March 1933, and first published in Zwischen den Zeiten vol. 11 (1933), 297-
314. ET in The Way of Theology in Karl Earth; Essays and Comments ed. H.M. Rumscheidt,
(Pickwick, Pennsylvania, 1986). For discussion of this lecture see H.M. Rumscheidt "The
First Commandment as Axiom For Theology: A Model for the Unity of Dogmatics and
Ethics' in Theology Beyond Christendom ed. J. Thompson, (Pickwick, Pennsylvania, 1986).
Hitler's regime had come to power on 30th January, at which point, Barth later commented,
he was occupied with Rousseau, i.e. two chapters further on. There cannot have been more
than three or four months between this material here being delivered and the delivery of
that lecture. It is not impossible, then, that there is a connection in Barth's thinking. See also
Busch, Karl Barth, 224.
88 Barth, PT, 105.
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"too crude" as it stands.89 Elements in the Bible or dogma which offended
were explained away, or perhaps accorded a different status - as mysteries.
They could then be retained in the liturgy and the hymn book without
entering into preaching or instruction.90 Again, here, Barth makes a
reference to the relevance of this trend beyond the eighteenth century: the
culmination of this concern to make Christianity fit for society, he suggests,
is the work of Albrecht Ritschl.9i Christianity turned itself into a philosophy,
the chief characteristics of which were: an identification between God's
action and the principle of providence, of which revelation, reconciliation
etc. are modes of appearance; an understanding of Christ as an enlightened
and enlightening teacher; a view of the Church as a religious society; an
understanding of salvation as a realizable path from imperfection to
perfection; a rejection of the notion of hell and a spiritualized doctrine of the
immortality of the human soul. And as before Barth finds that Stoicism is
the standard by which all is actually being measured.
Fourthly, Barth deals with the incorporation of Christianity into inwardness
and individualism. By individualization, Barth means "making inward, the
making inward of what is external, objective to man, by which it is robbed
of its objectivity, so to speak eaten up and digested, made into something
within man. ... Individualization means appropriation of the object to be the
purpose of his domination."92 Equally, this can be characterized as
externalization - the projection of the human outward until the object is
identified with it. This characterization of the period is in fact for Barth the
"pure form of the general tendency of the time".93 Moreover while this pure
form found expression in the moralism and Caesaro-papism of the
eighteenth century, it also, in Pietism, has the form of individualism. Here,
though, the resistance of Christianity to this absolutist treatment comes into
play powerfully. Absolutist individualism cannot tolerate the externality
and objectivity of the central element of the creed - the incarnation. The
89 Barth, FT, 107.
90 Ibid. 109. Note Maclntyre After Virtue, 37: "the relationship of our beliefs to sentences that
we only or primarily sing, let alone to the music which accompanies those centuries, is not
at all the same as the relationship of our beliefs to the sentences that we primarily say and
say in an assertive mode."




temporal distance cannot be tolerated. The reality of the incarnation must be
made present reality: "The real birth of Christ is in our hearts; his real and
saving death is that which we see accomplished in ourselves, that which we
have to accomplish ourselves".94 Barth distinguishes this from the
Reformers' doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which he says does not abolish the
temporal distance, since the Spirit is still an objective presence.
Interiorization, on the other hand, loses interest in history. An example of
this tendency is Zinzendorf's calling Christ the supreme elder of his
community of brethren. Barth even suggests that this interiorization, this
abolition of temporal distance, is prefigured in the late orthodox doctrine of
the verbal inspiration of scripture.
This was not, though, the only aspect of Christianity which resisted
absolutist appropriation. Barth suggests that Pietist individualism was
unable to tolerate the particularity of the human individual. It could only
envisage the Church as a community of brethren, formed by free
association. The otherness of particular individuals had to be neutralized by
reinventing them as brethren. A third element unacceptable to
individualism was the notion of an authority external to and over against
the individual. A fourth was the notion of divine command. The Protestant
view of this, he says, is of a particular command, not a general one, such that
there is no room left for interpretation; the only room left is for the choice
between obedience and disobedience. By making the command a general
rule, however, the individualist interiorizes the law.95 A fifth and final
element resisting assimilation was the concept of sacrament or mystery. It
was essential that this should become a comprehensible mystery. It therefore
was internalized: "individualism meant that man discovered the mystery
within himself: he himself becomes the invisible sign of invisible grace".96
In an important passage for later sections of the lectures, Barth then
considers the sense in which, in the light of all this, and in spite of all his
previous qualifications, 'reason' can yet be called the normative
94 Barth, PT, 115.
96 Note the emphasis on the particularity of the divine command in Barth's own ethics. See
especially CD II/2, Chapter VIII.
96 Barth, PT, 121.
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characteristic of the century. He suggests that while limits to human
understanding and willing were seen and acknowledged (and to this extent
limits to the power of reason were acknowledged) at the same time what lies
beyond those limits is within human capacity to shape and command. There
is a second, wider sense of the term 'reason' here, and within this wider
notion, mystery has its place. Humanity discovers that it "is capable not
only of understanding and willing, but also of feeling, experiencing and
undergoing".97 There is an "expanded inner room" in which mystery in
general, and the Christian mystery in particular, can be accommodated.
Barth then concludes his discussion of individualism by emphasizing the
importance of Pietism (as the classic embodiment of the century's
individualism) as a forerunner of the later individualism of the age of
Goethe and Romanticism.
All that remains to be said about the treatment of Christianity in this century
is to note again that the attempt to humanize Christianity was only a partial
success. Its influence extends to subsequent ages but there have at least been
developments beyond the approach attempted then. Barth tries to pinpoint
some of the reasons for this. First he suggests, without specifying very
clearly what he means, that a greater self-confidence than was actually
present would have been required if absolutism were to be effective on
Christianity. Secondly he points to conflict between different expressions of
the absolutist will: between the state church and individualism; between the
state church and moralism; between moralism and individualism; between
moralism and intellectualism. Thirdly he notes that the Bible continued to be
widely read during the century. This in itself he considers sufficient to count
against the humanization of Christianity. Fourthly he argues that certain
elements of dogma survived in the eighteenth century, and by their
presence offered resistance to the whole attempt at humanization. He
identifies the characteristic doctrine of God of the period as such an item: its
deistic quality preserved the distinction between God and humanity. He
points also to the Pietistic doctrine of justification: the stress on the blood
and wounds of Christ as the place of salvation retained a hint of a scheme
different from the pervasive 'Pelagianism'. Fifthly he identifies a shadow of
97 Barth, PT, 121.
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a genuine eschatology: in so far as immortality was a tenet of even the most
rationalized religion, there was the preservation of something beyond,
something outwith human power, something in which they could only
believe. Even though this belief was largely an expression of absolutist
optimism, it still retained a link with a different view.
vi. Theology in the eighteenth century
After all this Barth turns to the work of the theologians.98 The striking aspect
of his discussion is that the most important thing has, in a sense, already
been said: the developments in the life of the Church during the eighteenth
century, the treatment of Christianity, the characteristic understanding of
Christian faith during this century - all these were shaped decisively by the
absolutism evident in the whole culture and life of the period. In other
words, the theologians did not have a determinative relationship to the life
of the Church and the treatment and understanding of Christian faith. They
were not leading and shaping; they were following where others led:
the theology of the eighteenth century moved in the general direction of its
time, though rather behind that time, so that while in an absolute sense its
movement was very vigorous, theology was always in a relative sense
rather obsolete and old-fashioned.99
There were, in this century, many theologians worthy of respect. But
theology always seemed to be having to come to terms with developments
outside it; moreover it always seemed to be slow to respond - Barth lists
how at each stage of development theology was one step behind the
changes it was appropriating.too Irrespective, then, of the ability and
scholarship of the theologians of the period, their theology did not guide the
Church. They were not "guardians and prophets" for the Church. Barth
incidentally casts his eye forward again at this point, suggesting that this
was also the case in the nineteenth century. Such a situation forces him to
the acknowledgement that "on a purely historical level we have hit on one
of the hardest and most grievous problems in the history of recent




theology". 101 At no previous time in the history of the Protestant Church,
not even in its worst moments, has theology handed over the Church to the
cultural forces of the time. But from the end of orthodoxy onwards "the
wagons begin to skid"!102
Barth's emphasis on the importance of this development must be taken with
the utmost seriousness. I would suggest that it is in fact the key to the
pattern which organizes and gives significance to the whole narrative. Barth
believes that in the eighteenth century, the relationship between Christian
theology and the Christian Church changed. It is this change which concerns
him, for it determines the subsequent history of theology in important ways.
Moreover it is in order to identify and describe this change adequately that
Barth's treatment of the eighteenth century takes the surprising form that it
does, discussing the political and cultural life of the period so fully.
With the hindsight provided by this crucial point in the narrative, it is now
possible to describe more clearly the pattern organizing the material covered
so far. The critical factor for understanding the theology of the nineteenth
century, Barth believes, is the relationship between theology and the
Church. Theology no longer guides the Church - it has surrendered the
momentum to other forces in society and culture. This surrender can
actually be traced, however, to the eighteenth century. Essential, therefore, is
an examination of the eighteenth century which must do two things: (i) it
must identify the significant trend or trends in the life of the period,
showing that it or they genuinely are determinative of the various aspects of
life, and explaining, as far as possible, why such a trend or trends
developed; (ii) it must show that this trend (or trends) was also
determinative of the treatment and understanding of the Church and its
faith. When these two tasks have been completed, and only then, can the
claim be made that the life of the Church has been shaped and led by
something external to it. It will then be possible to claim that the relationship
between the Church and theology has changed in the way indicated. These
101 Barth, PT, 137.
102 Ibid. 138.
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two tasks are precisely what Barth has undertaken to this point.103 With this
pattern in view, it becomes clear that the sheer breadth of Barth's discussion
is not really the result of a general methodological principle. It serves a very
specific function: to demonstrate how the relation between theology and the
Church has changed, and what it is that now leads and guides the Church.
What, though, of the eighteenth century's theologians? Barth's comments on
individual writers mainly serve to illustrate aspects of the analysis already
provided. They are not any less important for that, though. To begin with,
Barth finds in many of them a great emphasis on life and practice. Samuel
Wernfels, Professor in Basle, was typical of this - Barth says he accepted the
validity of dogma "in its principal concern". This principal concern he
identified as "that part of the Bible and dogma, of course, which related to
practice and could be translated into practice".104 Another theme Barth seeks
to illustrate here is his insistence that the rationalist critique of orthodoxy
was motivated by moralism rather than intellectualism. He quotes, by way
of support, the opinion of Karl Aner (whom he otherwise is very critical of)
in discussion of the so-called neologists: "One cannot understand neology if
one characterizes it in a predominantly intellectualistic way. Its criticism of
dogma is not born of reason, but of ethical and personal needs."105
An important point that Barth wants to make about the neologists is that
they were not, in his view, the first genuine innovators in the century. This
had been the view of Troeltsch and others. This is no small matter for Barth -
it betrays differences in the fundamental analysis of the developments of the
period. Open criticism of dogma and the Bible certainly was not greatly
evident in the earlier part of the century; but Barth finds important changes
in many theologians who remained fairly orthodox on the surface. A
particularly significant example of this is J.A. Turrettini. Barth notes that
there was in him "hardly any perceptible break from dogma"; however his
103 It is worth noting with regard to Barth's objection to the publication of a selection of
chapters, that the selection which Barth objected to in 1959 included Chapter 2, 'Man in the
Eighteenth Century', but not Chapters 3 and 4. See From Rousseau to Ritschl. Bearing inmind
the close relationship of each of these three chapters to the others in the scheme outlined,
Barth's lack of enthusiasm for that selection is not hard to understand.
104 Barth, FT, 145.
105 Ibid. 165. Barth's criticism of Aner is that like Troeltsch and others he ascribes too much
importance to the neologists.
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affirmations are made with a "completely different theological attitude".106
What this amounts to is that "dogma, and in dogma Christianity, is really an
academic opinion".107 Similarly, Barth notes that in the work of J.F.
Osterwald, "the dogma stands and is held to be valid essentially in its old
extent and wording, yet it is presented in a context and with a stress that
tend to make its meaning questionable and therefore its validity
dubious".108 Again, there is the Wolffian 'orthodoxy' of such theologians as
J. Carpov and S.J. Baumgarten, which claimed to proceed on the basis of
revelation but which identified a balancing sphere for reason alongside it.
Barth believed that despite the professed basis in revelation, such theology
was "quite divorced from the event that bears this designation".109 The
novelty in this theology is not that it abandons orthodox dogma. Rather it is
a matter of epistemology - dogma is affirmed but on a different basis and
crucially, therefore, in a different way. To affirm dogma in this way is quite
different from the situation under orthodoxy; its significance and function
have changed.110 Theology, obedient to the absolutism that has taken the
lead in the treatment of theology's subject-matter, accepts its lesser role.
As far as Barth is concerned, then, the most significant development in the
theology of the century is neither neology nor Wolffianism but the much
earlier work of Johannes Franz Buddeus. Buddeus is the first theologian
Barth discusses (other than V.E. Loscher who is mentioned as the last
notable representative of Lutheran orthodoxy). He is open to pietism,
emphasizing the praxis pietatis constantly. The significant thing, for Barth, is
that for him "the Christian truth as a whole and in its individual details is
necessary to faith not as a revealed truth, but as one which leads to our
salvation".111 The reality of salvation in the human being becomes the
criterion for assessing the value of revealed truth. Human reason is capable
108 Barth, PT, 150.
107 Ibid. 150. It is worth noting, perhaps, that in his first series of dogmatics lectures, in
1924, Barth emphasized strongly that dogma and dogmatics "are not human opinion". See
Barth, GD, 17.
108 Barth, FT, 147.
109 Ibid. 161.
110 It is tempting to make the comparison with Maclntyre's description of the modern
predicament as one in which moral discourse remains unchanged on the surface, while in
reality it has become deeply problematic.
111 Barth, PT, 142.
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of distinguishing between true and false revelation. Barth finds in this a
fundamental and revolutionary shift in theological epistemology. It does not
bear its full fruit in Buddeus himself, who had a rather conservative
disposition; he had, however, opened up a road which "ascribed to reason
the significance of a material criterion for revelation".112 Many positions that
Buddeus himself did not attack had later to be given up "because they could
no longer be held after what Buddeus and his colleagues had conceded and
surrendered".113 Barth takes care to stress that this was no genuine
innovation on Buddeus' part either - it was of course only his appropriation
of the new approach to the subject-matter of theology. The issue which
Barth is most concerned with in all the theologians of the century is
identified here: the relationship between reason and revelation. The loss (or
rejection) of the belief that the human telos is given by a particular act of
divine grace enters theology in the transformation of the understanding of
revelation, such that human reason acts as a criterion by which revelation
can be measured, assessed, judged and, ultimately, rejected.114
vii. Barth and Maclntyre: relations between the two narratives
Given this clearer picture of the structure and detail of Barth's narrative,
what can now be said about its relation to Maclntyre's history of moral
theory? I suggested earlier that while the two are concerned with different
subject-matter, they have a great deal in common, arising from a common
identification of the loss of teleological forms of moral and theological
reason as a critical turning point in history. Reflection on Maclntyre's
analysis suggested the possibility of a narrative which paralleled his, but
which presupposed something like a restored faith in divine grace, rather
than a restored form of Aristotelian reason.113 What would such a narrative
look like? I would suggest that it would concentrate on the effects of the loss
of the notion of grace which had been understood to direct us towards the
112 Barth, FT, 163.
113 Ibid. 164.
114 Note that Barth made use of this analysis later in the Church Dogmatics. See CD 1/2,288-
90. His comments in both places have been queried by StephenWilliams. See his essay
'Barth, Buddeus and the Eighteenth Century' in Modern Theology 2 (1986), 309-318.
113 Jeffrey Stout has made a similar point about the possibilities Maclntyre's narrative
might allow. See 'Virtue among the Ruins: An Essay on Maclntyre' in Neue Zeitschrift fur
Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 26 (1984), 266.
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telos of human life. This means it would focus on theological subject matter
rather than on moral theory; it would discuss the loss of a 'higher authority'
in human affairs, and the increased significance of human will in place of
divine will. It would record the subsequent history of theological discourse
and reasoning; since it would be seeking to describe the decreased relevance
of divine will, it might consider changes in theological epistemology, to see
whether that epistemology comes to reflect the de facto inaccessibility of
divine will. It might in particular consider whether there were changes in
the understanding of revelation, which had been so significant for the
theological epistemology of the post-Reformation period.
In all these respects Barth's analysis so far does indeed constitute such an
alternative narrative. The structure of the two analyses is very similar. For
Maclntyre, Enlightenment moral theory has an impossible task, for it tries to
proceed without an element essential to its success, namely an account of
the telos of human life. For Barth, Enlightenment theology likewise has an
impossible task. It too tries to proceed without something essential to its
success, namely knowledge of the divine purpose for humanity, given in
revelation. The result, on Maclntyre's account, is a situation in which moral
discourse has the appearance of an appeal to objective criteria, but in fact
only expresses the individual will. On Barth's account, the result is a
theology which has the appearance of a discourse which serves and guides
the Church, but in fact only has the force of individual opinion. Each of
these discourses begs a similar question: why should the expression of an
individual will be a guide for conduct? And why should discourse with the
status of individual opinion be a guide for the Church?
As for epistemology, Barth highlights changes in the theological
understanding of revelation right at the start of the eighteenth century. The
relation between revelation and reason is substantially altered, such that any
claim regarding revelation must be tested by reason. It is noteworthy that
Maclntyre's most detailed study of eighteenth century thought - his
treatment of Scottish philosophy and culture - picks out this very same issue
as central to the development the Enlightenment in that context.
Commenting on the philosophical and theological currents of the time, he
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notes:
that we discover in the first part of the eighteenth century a sequence of
heresy trials in which, although sometimes the orthodoxy of the accused in
respect of some central Christian doctrine, such as that of the Trinity or of
the intercessory work of Christ, is in question, the central issues are the
relationship of rational enquiry in general, and more particularly of the
enquiries of the moral philosopher to the Christian revelation within
theological study. 116
The background to these trials was a period of rivalry between distinct
interpretations of Calvinist orthodoxy, which differed as to whether
philosophical argument could be used in the service of theological truth.
John Simson, Professor of Divinity at Glasgow, was tried in 1717 and 1727,
and on the second occasion barred from teaching because of his views. His
fundamental offence, Maclntyre notes, was his "avowed guiding maxim in
theology that reason is its principle and foundation".117 Yet within a short
space of time views like Simson's could be aired without censure. Maclntyre
mentions a sermon preached to the Synod of Dumfries in 1729 encouraging
its hearers "to examine in the light of reason every claim to revelation, old or
new." us Moreover other teachers - such as Archibald Campbell, Francis
Hutcheson and William Leechman - who held similar views to Simson's and
were tried between 1735 and 1744 did not have their teaching condemned.
The period was one of transition. As Maclntyre notes: "it is difficult to resist
the inference that it was not so much that Hutcheson was more orthodox
than Simson as that the dominant conception of orthodoxy had somewhat
changed."H9
In short the observations made by Barth about the changes in theological
epistemology in Germany in the early eighteenth century are paralleled
remarkably closely by Maclntyre's observations about Scotland in the very
same period. In both cases the critical change is in the understanding of
revelation, and in particular the development of the notion that revelation
must be tested and judged by reason. In both cases this occurs despite the
maintenance of the appearance of orthodoxy.





In conclusion, what does the material surveyed in this chapter enable us to
say about Barth's relationship to and attitude towards the Enlightenment?
What matters most, perhaps, is that Barth analyses the Enlightenment in
terms very similar to Maclntyre's. To that extent, the material considered
tends to support the conclusions I drew at the end of the previous chapter.
In the process it adds extra breadth and detail to the narrative. Does it entitle
us, though, to say that Barth sees the Enlightenment as the source of the
circumstances facing theology in his own time? I suggest that it would be
wise to defer answering this question until the end of the next chapter, when
the remainder of Barth's discussion of the background to modern theology
has been considered.
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Chapter 6 Barth on the transition to the Nineteenth Century.
i. Rousseau: first voice of the age of Goethe.
The remainder of the section on 'Background' consists of six chapters on
individual writers. The extended treatment they receive contrasts sharply
with the limited space devoted to each of the eighteenth century's
theologians, and, indeed, to most of the nineteenth century theologians
discussed later. Once again Barth's interest is in intellectual life quite
generally: along with Kant and Hegel, he considers Rousseau, Lessing,
Herder and Novalis, and, as already noted, had intended to conclude with a
chapter on Goethe. 1
Jean-Jacques Rousseau is first to be discussed, and is a pivotal figure in
Barth's narrative, marking the emergence of a new spirit and, indeed, a new
period. This new period - the age of Goethe - was notable for a reaction
against the Enlightenment and its absolutism. However the new spirit, Barth
argues, is not actually new at all: when properly understood it can be seen to
be a development of the spirit of absolutism into a new form. Rousseau was
the first, almost premature, voice of this age. Barth says of him that "he
contradicted and rose above eighteenth-century man in no other way than
that it was in Rousseau himself that eighteenth-century man achieved
fulfilment".2 His optimistic view of human nature and his educational
theory, for example, seem to be expressions of the most exalted eighteenth
century humanism. His writings embody pronounced individualism and
rationalism. Yet with Rousseau all this has somehow changed in character,
and entered the thought world that was to dominate the nineteenth century.
As support for this contention Barth cites an article written by Rousseau for
his Dictionnaire de musique, published in 1764, which deals with the nature of
1 Commentators on Barth's lectures have tended to pay most attention to the sections on
Kant and Hegel. The interconnection of the various chapters as episodes in a unified
argument has not always been appreciated. See for example Colin Gunton 'Towards a
Theology after Christendom' in Thompson Theology beyond Christendom, 285-301. Gunton
sees these lectures as evidence that Barth "was consciously adopting a programme" which
attempted to transcend the Enlightenment, (p. 289.) But while he discusses Barth's
treatment of Kant and Hegel, he doesn't mention his treatment of Rousseau, Lessing,
Herder or Novalis.
2 Barth, PT, 174.
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genius in music: "It conveys ideas in the form of feeling, feeling by means of
accent. And in giving expression to passions it awakens them in the depths
of the heart." Further, to the one who is incapable of apprehending this
quality of genius, Rousseau declares: "if you feel no ecstasy or delight, if you
find merely beautiful that which should move you to the depths of your
being, how dare you ask the meaning of genius?"3 This notion of genius is,
Barth notes, not from the world of Bach, Haydn or even Mozart. It is
"unmistakably Beethoven, Schubert and Mendelssohn, line for line."4
What is Rousseau's true and lasting significance? It is not, says Barth, to be
found in his contribution to the theological debates of his time, principally
in the Confession of Faith of a Vicar of Savoy, from his novel Emile. While it is
tempting for the theologian's gaze to linger here, it has to be recognized that
Rousseau's life was not primarily a struggle against theological orthodoxy in
the cause of rationalism. Nor was its primary achievement the political and
educational theories he constructed in Du contrat social and Emile
respectively. Nor was it located in the morality of his novel la nouvelle
Heloise. Such constructions, Barth argues, were still an expression of the
spirit of the older age, though admittedly they were put forward with a
resignation that was new - for they could only be second-best solutions for
Rousseau. Barth then considers and rejects the idea that the centre lies in
Rousseau's "lyricism of immediate feeling for himself and the world about
him",5 in the light of which his positive constructions can only have this
second-best status. While this would obviously seem to point forward to
idealism and romanticism, Barth does not see it as the critical first word of
the new age. Rather, he looks to Rousseau's biography, his "pathological
method of existing as such".5 Here is found the fundamental discontinuity
with the spirit of the eighteenth century: the various twists and turns of
Rousseau's life were the result of his opposition to the bourgeois moral life
of the period. Even his delusions of persecution in the later part of his life
3 Barth, PT, 177. Barth did give references when quoting Rousseau, but unfortunately he did
not specify which editions of the texts he was using. The same is true of each of the authors
considered in this chapter.
4 Ibid. 178. Barth notes that such ideas can also be found in Schleiermacher's Reden, which




are accorded this significance. In fact they express the break with the
eighteenth century more fully than any other part of Rousseau's life; these
delusions may have been a madness but, says Barth, "we cannot help
admitting that in its own way it was at least a pertinent madness".7
What is significant in Rousseau's life is its broken quality; and in this it
represents the breaking down of the absolutist will for form. It is not that
Rousseau rejects the absolutism - rather he cannot accept its expression in
the will to impose form. A society ruled by this will is a hell rather than a
paradise. It is not a sphere where life can be lived in accordance with true
human nature. In a revealing passage, Barth suggests that Rousseau could
not compromise with this world:
His only possible course was radically to deny the spiritual and intellectual,
the moral and social forms which, unshaken by the Lisbon earthquake, held
sway in Europe from 1750 to 1760. From the world in which Voltaire was a
great man Rousseau, shaken to the depths of his being, could only
withdraw, depart into the wilderness, into madness, put on fanciful
Armenian clothing, marry Therese Le Vasseur, copy scores and go plant-
gathering. Anyone who was a friend of this world could be no friend of his,
even if his name was David Hume, and were he ever so well-disposed, or
what passes for well-disposed, towards him. Let all his contemporaries
reject him—indeed they must reject him, it cannot be otherwise. The time
would come when he would be understood—in his last years Rousseau
continually consoled himselfwith this, his prophecy.8
Rousseau's resignation to this world, on the basis of which his great
constructive works were written, is based on a more fundamental non-
resignation. He retains the notion of man in a state of nature, and in fact
speaks of man in society only on this basis. This, says Barth, is what gives
Rousseau's work its peculiar impetus.9 With this impetus the absolutism of
the eighteenth century is broken - but not destroyed. It is broken but it is
also fulfilled, such that it enters the new age in a new form, an
anthropological form. The eighteenth century, Barth comments, had not
extended the scope of its absolutism to include humanity itself. The
distinguishing feature of the age of Goethe, though, is that it takes this step:
"man's command was now regarded as much wider, as including man's
7 Barth, FT, 219.
8 Ibid. 218.
9 Ibid. 220.
command over himself". 10 The spirit of the old age is reborn in the new "like
the phoenix from the ashes"! The new age has an optimism and a
Pelagianism which are also developments of the typical eighteenth century
view - but they are "incomparably more powerful" than those of the older
age.11 Such optimism is not a product of simple naivete, Barth argues, but
derives its power from its new basis - human existence as such. Barth says of
Rousseau that:
A whole world revealed itself to him when he gazed into himself. He did
not do this in the manner of the individualism of his time, which looked
within in order to go out again at once into the outside world, desiring to
apprehend, form and conquer. Rousseau intended to linger there because
he had recognized that in it he possessed his own unique world full of
unique forms of truth and beauty.12
Human existence as such becomes the important criterion of truth and
value, and the "dependable norm for all the distinctions and choices that are
necessary in life".13 The absolutism of the new age therefore involves belief
not just in the infinite capacity of human powers, but also in the infinite
value of human existence. Humanity in the state of nature is really just the
human itself, as opposed to the human in its social relations or in its works.
Rousseau discovered a new world which is not so much located in himself -
it just is himself.
The thing he discovered can be described as that most important element of
the age of Goethe - feeling. Barth quotes Rousseau's Reveries to good effect:
"The feeling of existing stripped of all other emotions is in itself a precious
feeling of peace and security, which would alone be quite enough to make
one's existence sweet and dear."14 The standard view, Barth notes, would be
to say that Rousseau and the age which he prefigured discovered feeling as
something which was beyond knowledge and action, in that it was their
source, and was therefore understood to be the fundamental capacity of the




14 Ibid. 227. Note that in the English translation the beginning and end of the quotation
from which this comes are not marked. They are, however, correctly indicated in the
German edition.
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human mind. Barth is concerned, though, to emphasize that feeling is not to
be understood solipsistically: he talks of there being a dialectical
relationship with the object. In feeling one is in contact with an existence
different from one's own; one is neither dominated by the object nor master
of it. In feeling one respects and does not interfere with the object as such,
but one equally respects oneself, experienced in that same feeling. Barth
draws attention, significantly, to the quality of freedom implied by this
understanding of feeling:
With feeling—and it is this which makes for the intoxicating grandeur of the
human capacity which has been discovered here, and for the mature
wisdom of him who is aware of it—it is always a question of the superior
freedom inherent in being able to make contact with objects and yet being
able to part from them again, to be separate from them and yet able to make
contact with them again and again.15
This "superior freedom" is significant, for it sounds almost like divine
freedom. The thought clearly crossed Barth's mind too: he recalls again a
remark of Rousseau's which he had quoted a couple of pages earlier: in
feeling one is "impassible comme Dieu meme". In this state one is "for the first
time invested with a true power in the world of things".16 This remark
illustrates Barth's conviction that the new age consists not only in the
breaking of the absolutism of the century, but of its rehabilitation in a more
powerful form: the century which believed in the omnipotence of human
powers is now offered the means to possess a new power in the world. This
quasi-divine freedom possessed in feeling includes the freedom to be aware
of the identity between self and object, and the freedom to be aware of their
non-identity. This freedom can, Barth suggests, be described as that of
human "spirit-nature". He draws attention once again to the way in which
Rousseau anticipated Goethe, for Rousseau's "nature" is the spirit-nature of
the age of Goethe.17
This is a point of great significance, for Barth, in that it impinges on the
theological problematic at the critical point - the relation of reason and
15 Barth, PT, 230.
16 Ibid. 230.
17 See ibid. 231. Barth also notes that there "is already something of the great peace
imparted by this Goethean concept in Rousseau's confusion". Barth later laid great
emphasis on the importance of peace for Schleiermacher.
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revelation. Rousseau leaves behind the notion of original sin and the notion
of revelation, understood as "an event which was something apart from the
inherent development of humanity";18 it is not so much that he joins in the
criticism to which these had been subject, as that he leaves them behind
altogether. He can do so because with the discovery of feeling, everything
becomes a relative movement within human reality. Sin and grace, reason
and revelation - such oppositions are resolved in the dialectic of spirit-
nature. The conflict between reason and revelation is solved, Barth notes, in
that "man was encouraged to look upon himself alternately now as reason
and now as revelation". 19 What has taken place in Rousseau's discovery of
human spirit-nature is in fact a tremendous widening in the concept of
reason. Within this widened understanding of reason the theological
problem can be accommodated and treated; from this time is it possible to
have a consistent theological rationalism, in which "the Christian Spirit is
identical with the truly humane spirit, as it is inalienably and tangibly
present to us in that depth of the ratio in that inmost anthropological
province".20
What are the important points in this discussion of Rousseau for the
direction of Barth's narrative? First of all, I think it is interesting that Barth
sees a widening of the concept of reason in this relativization and
reformulation of the oppositions of sin and grace, reason and revelation
within human spirit-nature. It is perhaps worth recalling Maclntyre's
argument in After Virtue. The Enlightenment project is, he argues, the
consequence of a narrowing of the conception of reason that had prevailed
in the middle ages. The futility of that project arises from the impossibility of
giving a satisfactory account of morality on the basis of the modern,
impoverished, calculative understanding of reason. It is significant, then,
that Barth lays such emphasis on the fact that Rousseau's notion of nature
involves a widening of the concept of reason, one which embraces and
incorporates the distinctions between sin and grace, and reason and
revelation. In his earlier analysis, Barth had stressed how the absolutism of
the eighteenth century sought to deny original sin. In this, its so-called




Pelagianism, and in its insistence that revelation must be brought before the
tribunal of human reason, it denied itself any access to the notion of true
uncorrupted human nature, in distinction from present human reality. It
denied itself, in other words, the very things that would allow a teleological
element in its anthropology or its moral discourse. Now, Barth describes
Rousseau's anthropology as two-dimensional, in distinction from the typical
eighteenth century view "whose way of thinking was one-dimensional".21
He seems to mean by this that the widening of the concept of reason
consisted in the restoration, in some form, of the teleological capacity of
human reason. The second dimension, missing in the eighteenth century's
thought, is the dimension which reaches out to something beyond human
desires and will.
Yet Barth has to qualify the view that Rousseau reintroduces a second
teleological dimension in his anthropology; this dimension is always relative
and bounded. It is not really the distinction between good and evil, and the
comparison with the doctrines of original sin and the fall is inappropriate:
even in the state of corruption "the corruption of this state is only relative
corruption". 22 The second dimension is only present in a relative way
because, fundamentally, the true human nature it apprehends is
apprehended as a human possibility. Neither Rousseau nor the whole age
that followed him were able to "get beyond the distinction between man in
his heart of hearts and his actual inner life, between human possibility and
actuality".23 The new and broadened concept of reason is broader only to
this extent: that within it human possibility can be known as well as human
actuality. With this concept of reason in place the age of Goethe may
proceed.
ii. Lessing
Barth presents Gotthold Ephraim Lessing as a figure who, like Rousseau,
belonged to the eighteenth century but at the same time rose above it. The
two, moreover, had in common the discovery of the "second dimension",




the discovery of "human existence as such". For Lessing, as for Rousseau,
"the ultimate reality is this free, stirring communion of the ego with the
object, in which, however, the ego ever retains and regains the mastery".24
Lessing's main achievement was in drama and dramatic theory -
significantly, he viewed drama as that in which, to use Barth's words "what
is actually presented is the inner life of these characters, the sight of which
must evoke in the spectator feelings of sympathy and of compassion". 25 His
dramas were felt to contain something new; Barth suggests this new factor
was to be found in their real object - human life as such.
Barth uses this study of Lessing to pick up and expand on themes which he
had identified while discussing Rousseau. In Lessing, it is particularly the
treatment of the theme of revelation that is of interest. Barth notes that the
Reimarus fragments published by Lessing mounted an unprecedented
assault on Christian revelation, attacking its very possibility. They
contained a sharp contrast between the human possibility of natural religion
and any allegedly revealed historical religion; they attempted a reduction of
the latter to the former, in a similar manner to the theology of the
Rousseau's Vicar of Savoy. Lessing's concern is not simply to effect this
reduction, though. He is conscious not only of this critique of revelation, but
also of the poverty of what is offered in its place. Revelation, as far as
Lessing is concerned, is not yet finished with. He had a "positive interest in
revelation", even though "the nature of that interest was relative". 26 He did
not believe that a critique of revelation such as that of Reimarus could
succeed. His interest in that critique, Barth suggests, was rather that it
provided a kind of litmus test for the Church and theology. Lessing was
concerned with their response to this test, and was willing to advise them as
to the character of their response. The Reimarus fragments contained a
historian's attack on revelation as a historical reality and possibility.
Lessing's concern was that the theology of the time attempted to reply to
this attack with a historical defence. This he regarded as a serious mistake:
"When will they cease to want to hang nothing less than the whole of




eternity on a spider's thread!"27 It was pointless, he argued, to reply to
historical attacks on revelation with historical 'proofs'. No historical matter
can be demonstrated, however strong the evidence. And if "no historical
truth can be demonstrated, then neither can it in turn be used to
demonstrate anything"28
Barth goes on to suggest, though, that this criticism of the historical defence
of revelation is only in fact a secondary matter for Lessing. More important
is Lessing's positive recommendation as to the defence which ought to be
mounted - for it is the notions of feeling, experience and the heart that
provide the way to a true defence. Barth notes Lessing's famous dictum:
"Accidental historical truths can never become proofs for necessary truths of
reason. "29 It is not the historical character that disqualifies here - rather the
accidental character; historical truths can indeed play their part in the proof
of "necessary truths of reason" - by way of the heart:
it is as something which reaches and touches us directly, as something
which immediately enlightens and enters into us, that historical truth
becomes revelation and proves that it has the force of the necessary truth of
reason.30
Lessing talks of the necessity of inner truth, in terms of which written
tradition must be explicable.
What, though, is meant by revealed religion in this context? It cannot, Barth
argues, be any encounter with God as that was understood by Protestantism
prior to the eighteenth century. It cannot be any notion of revelation as
historical truth which descends from above, a particular truth stepping in
from outside in distinction from all other historical truth; a truth which is
indeed, uniquely qualified. For that is the character which the Protestant
doctrine of Scripture concretely ascribes to revelation.31
It cannot be such because Lessing's polemics in the dispute about the
27 Quoted Barth, PT, 250.
28 Quoted ibid. 251.




Reimarus fragments are against precisely such a possibility. For Lessing,
revelation is not an encounter with a God who breaks into history but a
matter of realities immanent within history - inner truth, the history of
religions, the production of virtue. He speaks
in unison with Roman Catholicism and the whole of Protestant modernism
... in favour of history itself as distinct from and as against the Lord of
history, who is indelibly denoted precisely by the Protestant doctrine of the
Scriptures.32
In short, Lessing's view is that "History is revelation".33 This revelation can be
seen as the continuing education of humanity, giving more quickly what
reason is in principle capable of discovering on its own.
In so far as there is a second, teleological dimension in Lessing's thought,
then, it is once again bounded within the horizons of human possibility; this
is shown even by the fact that in the fable of the rings the proof of true
religion will be a moral virtue which can be specified in advance. Yet this
teleology, for all its limits, is genuine; and it is this which distinguishes
Lessing from more typical neologians. His significance for Barth is that he
spoke "the old word 'revelation' with a new solemnity as a description of
this course"34
The discussion of Lessing, then, repeats and reinforces points made in the
section on Rousseau. The fundamental issue Barth highlights in these
chapters is that the new line of thought which emerges with these men, a
line of thought apparently opposed to the thought and culture of the earlier
eighteenth century, and explicitly critical of it, is in fact a development of
that earlier thought, and perhaps even its fulfilment. Again the key here is
absolutism, once more being used to unite apparently opposed tendencies.
The significance of this is, of course, that the prior analysis of absolutism
becomes relevant not only to the Eighteenth century, but to nineteenth
century ideas and life also. The 'expanded inner room' of reason appears, on





grounded in human actuality. Yet the most radical distinction it can
recognize is in this regard is the distinction between what is actual and what
is humanly possible. Instead of restoring a 'higher authority', it therefore
amounts to a further adulation of human nature, a further intensification of
absolutism. Barth summed this up well during the discussion of Rousseau:
The tension which is peculiar to Rousseau's teaching, in virtue of his
distinction between two dimensions, consists only however of the
difference, native to man himself, between the possibility and its particular
realization at any time, between man as he is in his heart of hearts and his
actual inner life, between what is truly human and man as he is in practice.
It was this distinction which Rousseau discovered, and with it the great
problem of critical idealism as it was later seen and developed by Kant ...
But since his teaching recognizes this distinction only in man himself, since
man's capacity for doing good is not affected by it, the end effect of his
teaching ... is none the less like an augmented and heightened triumph of
man, or triumph of man's capacities, which to this extent makes it a solemn
repetition and confirmation of the great eighteenth-century thesis.35
iii. Kant
Immanuel Kant does not, Barth recognizes, stand in quite the same line of
development as these others. He did not contribute to the broadening of the
eighteenth century's understanding of reason; he sought instead to criticize
reason. His criticism is not a form of scepticism, though, but an attempt to
understand human understanding, and thereby to make it all the more
secure. To that extent, however, he also contributed to the fundamental
tendency of the period, to the transformation of absolutism into a new and
more powerful form.
Much of Barth's discussion of Kant is devoted to a description of Kant's
philosophy of religion, and its basis in his critical philosophy. The point of
this material is to show that there is in Kant's philosophy no room for any
religious reality which has its foundation elsewhere than in reason.
Specifically, Barth suggests that the primary aim of Kant's philosophy of
religion is to establish that religious and theological knowledge is a matter
in which reason is involved, and therefore that it is based on human
practice, indeed on the moral act understood as the action of the good will.
Kant's secondary intention is to assess and describe religion in so far as it
35 Barth, PT, 223.
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has this character. The philosophy of religion, for Kant, treats of the religion
of reason alone, which is the "inner, smaller circle" within revealed religion
- Barth suggests that Kant sees the relationship as that of the kernel to the
shell.36
The religion of reason consists essentially in morality, appearing "in its
majesty". Morality itself contains this movement toward religion, since
belief in the idea of God is presupposed by the act in accordance with a
good will. The position of religion which claims the authority of a revelation
is decisively conditioned by this: Barth notes that on this basis any God
proclaimed or revealed must be measured "against an ideal conception of
God... in order to recognize the former as God. He must therefore have
already perceived God directly and in himself before any act of revelation
has taken place."37 But revelation cannot be a matter of empirical knowledge
- there cannot be any criteria which could correctly distinguish it from other
empirical knowledge. In treating of the religion of reason, Kant cannot
accommodate any claim to revelation - it must be a religion of reason alone.
The best that can be said of claims to revelation in religion is that due to
human weakness, positive religion is generally necessary as the 'vehicle' for
true religion. It is possible that rational and revealed religion may coincide,
and Kant thinks that this coincidence occurs in the case of Christianity.
There is, though, a second strand in Kant's philosophy of religion, which
connects to the foregoing precisely at this critical point, the boundary of the
religion of reason alone. The second strand is evident in Kant's discussion of
the idea of a principle of evil: Kant accepts the existence of radical evil, evil
which is present within the realm of human reason and which cannot be
purged by human effort. Its source is in the freedom of the will to choose
whether or not to will in accordance with duty: "in the same
incomprehensible freedom of reason in which the good, lawful will can be
made actual, its great opposite, a will for evil, can be made manifest too".38
Kant talks of weakness of will, self-interest, and even malevolence as





acceptance of such a notion is out of step not only with the eighteenth
century but, apparently, with the principles of his thought as already
discussed. Barth notes that the notion of radical evil seems to disturb the
completed and contained quality of rational religion as already described. It
leads Kant to consider notions such as justification and atonement, which, as
Barth says, derive from a different centre than that of Kant's rational
religion. Yet for all this Kant does not come near to the reformers' doctrine
of justification. Barth notes how Kant, when considering the problem of the
distance between human incapacity and moral duty, insists in keeping his
distance from the question of the part God might play in bridging this gap.
A revelation of, for example, divine forgiveness, is in principle impossible.
The admission of the possibility of an absolute divine decree would be the
death of reason, as Kant understands it. Grace can only be a parergon of
rational religion; in so far as Kant discusses grace, he either tends to equate
it with human nature, or to stress the need to do as much as one can towards
self-improvement, on the understanding that grace will, in some unspecified
manner, provide what is lacking. Barth describes this as "the twofold
possibility of the Roman Catholic doctrine of salvation". 39
Barth makes much of the fact that Kant's philosophy of religion has this dual
character: shaped, as the religion of reason alone, by the central elements of
his critique of reason; and yet at the same time aware of something beyond
these limits, even if that something is only hinted at. Even at the beginning
of his discussion of Kant, Barth had identified this as the most important
point, suggesting that Kant, uniquely in his time, recognized the possibility
of a different theology, even if he rejected it. With this recognition he "points
beyond the relative distinction between the old and the new time which
concerns us here. And he points beyond what is common to them both."40
Given this characterization of Kant's philosophy of religion, Barth suggests
that there are three possible ways for theology to respond to it. He outlines
these, giving examples of how these different possibilities were taken up in
the theology of the nineteenth century. The first possibility is to accept the
main lines of Kant's philosophy and programme, and to adopt these as the
39 Barth, PT, 303.
40 Ibid. 267.
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premises for a theology. This is the route of rationalistic theology such as is
represented by Wegscheider, and taken up again by Ritschl and his
followers. Secondly, it was possible to accept the Kantian scheme, but with
the significant reservation that his conception of reason requires to be
broadened by the recognition of feeling alongside the theoretical and
practical capacities of reason. This was the line taken by Schleiermacher and
others - the main line of nineteenth century theology in fact. Thirdly it was
possible to reject Kant's conception of the philosophy of religion more
radically - a line which would have involved a more fundamental break
with the theology of the Enlightenment than either of the earlier
possibilities. Yet this possibility was not really taken up seriously by the
theology of the nineteenth century, Barth suggests. It would have involved
theology daring to take its stance upon its own basis, revelation specifically,
rather than upon reason; this would have been for theology to enter into "a
dialogue with philosophy, and not, wrapping itself up in the mantle of
philosophy, a quasi-philosophical monologue".41
The final step Barth takes in assessing Kant's philosophy of religion is to
consider what basis there is in Kant's own writings for a theology taking up
this third possibility. He suggests that there are occasions when Kant takes
half a step over the boundary of purely rational religion: he designates what
can exist there as biblical theology, and denies that his philosophy of
religion disputes the validity of any claim to revelation. What he does
dispute is, in Barth's words:
the idea that the reality and possibility of revelation, its availability as data
for human reason and its perception by human reason, are things which can
be accounted for by philosophical means, the idea that over and beyond the
philosophy of religion there is a philosophy of revelation and of faith, and
that by it theologymight be represented, or make its position secure.42
Theology is to be understood in its distinction and separation from
philosophy and from purely rational religion. Barth quotes Kant to the effect
that theology must not "in what concerns the fulfilment of the divine
commandments in our will... by any means count upon nature, upon man's
41 Barth, PT, 307.
42 Ibid. 309-10.
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own moral capacity (virtue), that is".43 Further, Kant sees the proper task of
the 'biblical theologian' as to be "the scribe of the Church faith, which rests
upon statutes; laws, that is to say, which stem from the arbitrary choice of
another authority".44 What Kant does, in other words, is to make
suggestions about the character of a religion which, while, potentially
consistent in its content with the religion of reason alone, exists entirely
beyond the boundary of that religion. It must seek no rational defence of its
faith that God has spoke in the Bible; it must seek no basis in or support
from reason or philosophy. It depends on grace, on revelation which can
only amount, from Kant's point of view, to 'arbitrary choice'. Barth finds
this possibility summed up by Kant's comment that "The biblical theologian
proves that God exists by means of the fact that he has spoken in the
Bible."45
Kant could not have made these comments, Barth notes, without an element
of irony, perhaps even in partial mockery of the position of the 'biblical
theologian'. Yet they have great significance for the theologian. Nonetheless
it is difficult not to feel that Barth's interest in this third possibility is rather
odd. Certainly there would appear to be connections between it and his own
understanding of theology. But for Barth to devote a significant portion of
his discussion to this possibility, and particularly to a search for
anticipations of it in Kant's own writings, risks undermining the account he
has already given of Kantian philosophy of religion. Barth's procedure
requires an explanation, which he makes the reader wait some time for, and
to which Iwill return in due course.
iv. Herder
With Barth's essay on Herder we return to the line of development which
beganwith Rousseau and Lessing. Barth identifies Herder as the figure who,
though aware of Kant's critical philosophy, attempts to pass round about it
and reinstate feeling and experience as capacities within human reason
alongside its theoretical and practical capacities - indeed to relativize these
43 Quoted Barth, PT, 310.
44 Quoted ibid. 310.
45 Quoted ibid. 311 and, italicized, at 312.
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latter capacities and install feeling as the fundamental form of reason. Such a
movement, of course, had to ignore the fact that Kant had no place for any
faculty of feeling, stating bluntly that it "cannot possibly form the basis for
any knowledge at all".46
Barth calls Herder a "despiser of the syllogism".47 The most significant idea
in his thought, Barth suggests, is quite simply humanity; and to be human is
to be so much more than a mind of pure reason: "Just as our way of
knowing is only human, and must be so if it is to be right, so our will can
only be human too; something which arises from and is full of human
feeling. It is humanity which is the noble standard by which we know and
act."48 This interest in humanity is expressed in a concern with history.
Herder not only has an interest in particular historical periods, he takes the
eighteenth century to task for its lack of a historical sense, and attempts to
write a philosophy of history - a very unusual notion at the time. History
matters to Herder because it is the expression of the human spirit in
particular circumstances. History, moreover, is tradition: we are historical
beings and, therefore, in the exercise of our will and understanding we are
not autonomous but related to a history. In this, as in much of his thought,
"Herder shouted what Lessing had whispered".49
Though not primarily a theologian, Herder was quite willing to speak of
theological subject matter. In his thought, God is to be found in living
experience. But living experience is both self-experience and the experience
of the self as historical, in a tradition. Herder then can equate the voice of
God with "the tradition... which shapes the future".50 Religion is spoken of
by Herder as the highest form of humanity. To understand this, though, one
has to remember the full significance of the notion of humanity for Herder -
for him to say this is not to limit religion but to exalt it. In distinction from
Kant, Herder finds it easy to speak of revelation: humanity, not least in its
religious aspect, is historical, and historical tradition is the very means by
which God speaks to us. "Standing within history", Barth comments, "also
46 Barth, PT, 315.
47 Ibid. 324.




means on principle standing in the stream of revelation."54 As for the
relationship between revelation and reason, Herder likens the former to a
mother and the latter to her daughter: "The mother cannot be against the
daughter, and the daughter, if she is the right sort, should have no wish to
be against the mother."52 Rightly understood, there can be no conflict
between reason and revelation. Barth's view of all this is clear, despite his
desire to describe and not to judge: Herder turns theology into, in his own
words "the most beautiful, significant and true philosophy".55 As such, says
Barth, any claim theology might make for itself can only be "one very
debatable assertion among others. On such a footing theology will not be
able on principle to reject and deplore criticism from a philosophy which
has itself become critical."54
v. Novalis
Barth moves on to Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), chosen as a
representative of Romanticism. This is necessary, he believes, since the
"decisive main stream of nineteenth-century theology cannot ... be
explained in terms of Herder alone".55 There was an explicit Romanticism in
the early work of Schleiermacher, which is reflected in the theology of the
century even as far as Herrmann and Troeltsch. Barth suggests, in fact, that
in studying Romanticism "we may be concerned here with the very heart of
nineteenth-century theology".56 Romanticism, he suggests, is the deeper
source of the theology which followed Herder methodologically. Where
Herder offered a correlation, Romanticism offered a synthesis. Novalis'
Romanticism was particularly pure, a consequence perhaps of the fact that
he died so young. His Romanticism was the expression of yearning, and
"Romanticism is pure as yearning, and only as yearning."57
51 Barth, PT, 330.
52 Quoted ibid. 332.
53 Quoted ibid. 338.
54 Ibid. 338. Cf. Charles Taylor Hegel pp. 3-29 for a related account of this period, but which
attributes greater significance to Herder.
55 Barth, PT, 343.
56 Ibid. 348.
57 Ibid. 347. Novalis died of consumption in 1801, at the age of 29. It is worth recalling that
in his lecture at Schulpforta in July 1922 Barth depicted his theology as a sigh. It may not be
unfair to suggest that he would, by 1929, have regarded that as a lingering element of
Romanticism.
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Barth focuses on the concept of 'poesy', used by Novalis as the basis of a
synthesis between the problematic antitheses which hovered on the border
between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: Barth lists these as
philosophy and art, nature and history, love and religion, and, ultimately,
Mary and Christ. The first three of these antitheses are properly seen as
"antithetic unities", Barth says, for they have "an exact and therefore neutral
and therefore superior centre".58 Moreover, the centre of these three
antitheses coincide - the antitheses should be seen as diameters of a circle,
necessarily sharing the same centre.59 The last antithesis, betweenMary and
Christ, is one which Barth is not prepared initially to assimilate to the others.
Instead he raises the question of whether it can be understood as an
antithetic unity, or whether it must rather be seen "as a disjunctive
antithesis, as an either—or".60
The centre of all antithetic unities is poesy - this is related to the original
meaning of 7roir|ats - creative work. Barth quotes Novalis' claim that "The
poetic philosopher is en etat de createur absolu."6'1 The poetic is not to be
identified only as art, though. In dealing with poesy we are dealing with
creative work in the broadest sense. The concept of poesy is the concept of
the self, or of life. Barth notes that Novalis sometimes spoke in a Fichtean
manner of the ego confronting the non-ego but such that neither can be
posited without the other. At other times, though, Barth observes, Novalis
defined this centre better and more peculiarly as the life which consists
precisely in its defiance of the attempt to comprehend it, because it has its
being beyond the ego and non-ego, being and non-being, composed of
synthesis, thesis and antithesis and yet nothing of all three.62
In this neutral centre, the division between art and thought, poet and
philosopher, is overcome. Consideration of either poetry or philosophy
58 Barth, PT, 349.
59 Note that later, in his chapter on Schleiermacher, Barth likens the latter's thought to an
ellipse with two centres, but questions whether the two can resist the tendency to collapse
into one.
60 Ibid. 349.




involves the movement from one to the other. Likewise, nature is not
properly understood without an appreciation of its "necessary counter-
pole", history.63 In nature and history we have to do with seeking and
finding the familiar in the strange, the ego in the non-ego. In neither is there
an outward movement without also a referring back to the neutral centre. In
love and religion, it is even harder, Barth says, to distinguish either from the
other or from the unifying, creative centre. In love, the non-ego is
understood as Thou rather than as It.
As for the antithesis between Mary and Christ, Barth engages in an extended
discussion of the possibility that Novalis' religious teaching contains an
element which calls into question the entire romantic scheme. He considers
Novalis' remark that "God is sometimes 1 x °°, sometimes 1/°°, sometimes
0."64 The last part of this, the '0' is what interests Barth - the rest is easily
enough seen as the dialectic of Romanticism. Barth considers the idea that
this '0' represents death, the boundary beyond which the Romantic
synthesis could not extend. The question of whether Novalis takes Christ
seriously is, for Barth, the question of whether he takes the boundary
seriously, including the idea that there can be something beyond this
boundary. The antithesis between Christ and Mary is the antithesis between
on the one hand this possibility, and on the other hand the possibility that
for Novalis there can be no serious recognition of this boundary, and
therefore that there can be no advance beyond his doctrine of the Lord's
Supper, in which communion with Christ is interpreted as communion with
the non-ego in general. In this case death would not be a boundary but
would be within the scope of the Romantic synthesis, and religion could
only be for Novalis the religion of Mary rather than Christ. 65 For pure
Romanticism, religious subject matter must be and must remain a matter of
symbol. Whether or not Novalis' transcended his Romanticism at this point
Barth does not in the end feel compelled to decide.
63 Barth, PT, 355.
64 Quoted ibid. 363.
65 See ibid. 381. Barth's choice ofMary to occupy one pole of this antithesis an example of
his tendency to equate the thought of the nineteenth century with Roman Catholic thought.
Here he suggests that Catholic Mariology is, like the religion of the Romantics, a religion of
immanence: "In what concerns Mariology the Roman Catholic Church doctrine too... is still
confined within the frame of the ancient and ever new religion of immanence, which one
hundred years ago was called Romanticism."
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vi. Hegel
The road which began with Rousseau ends, in a quite decisive way, with
Hegel. Barth believes that Hegel represented, in an incomparable way, the
whole period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries together,
understanding the latter as the fulfilment of the former. The odd thing, in
Barth's view, is not that Hegel saw his system as the final culmination of the
history of philosophy; rather: "The astonishing thing is that nineteenth-
century man did not acknowledge that his concern in the realm of thought,
his basic intellectual concern, had truly achieved ultimate recognition in
Hegel's philosophy."66 Barth undertakes two tasks, therefore: first, to
describe Hegel's thought, understood as the solution to the problems which
had until that point only met with partial answers; second, to consider the
reasons for the rejection of Hegel's solution.
"Hegel's philosophy is the philosophy of self-confidence67 This sentence is
the beginning and the theme of Barth's exposition. He spells out some of its
meaning straight away: this confidence is the self-confidence
(Selbstvertrauen) of "thinking man", rooted in the act of thinking. In the act of
thinking the thinker and the object of thought are completely present in one
another, and therefore are identical. This identity is called Geist, and is one
with God. Self-confidence, then, is also confidence in Geist, and confidence
in God. It is confidence in the self, but not on the basis of individual
enlightenment - it is confidence in human reason as such.
On the basis of this brief outline, Barth explains how Hegel is the fulfilment
of the whole movement of thought that began with Rousseau.68 There is first
of all a strong affinity between Hegel and Novalis: in affirming the identity
and equivalence of the ego and the non-ego, Hegel affirms the basic concern
of Romanticism. He moves beyond Romanticism, though, because he found
it "to be lacking in a firm and universally valid basis. It seemed to him that
66 Barth, PT, 384.
67 Ibid. 391.
68 Rousseau himself is not actuallymentioned in this chapter, though. This is a consequence
of the fact that this material dates from 1929, when the lectures began with Lessing. The
argument is not substantially affected, though.
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the truth and force of this synthesis was imperilled by the mere appeal to
poetry, to creative experience, to the individual genius."69 Secondly Hegel
takes up in a similar way the concerns of Herder, in his inclusion of
historical thought within his conception of reason. The broadening of the
concept of reason noted first in Rousseau receives its definitive expression.
Barth suggests in fact that the chief difference between Herder and Hegel is
the latter's critique of Romanticism, which has already been noted. Thirdly,
Hegel preserves the transcendentalism of Kant, but on a different basis.
Hegel has no use whatsoever for a theory of knowledge; but the task Kant
undertook in his critique of reason is an essential one - the correct self-
understanding and self-establishment of reason. The Kantian distinctions
within reason fall away, though, in the synthesis between ego and non-ego
which Hegel takes from Romanticism.
Barth's view of the matter is that Hegel sought to secure the
Enlightenment's confidence in the power of rational thought, a confidence
which had been open to enlightened attack. What enables Hegel to secure it
is his definitive broadening of the conception of human reason, such as to
include all those things which seemed capable of calling that confidence into
question. As such Hegel was able to fulfil the aims of both the
Enlightenment and those who moved beyond it, the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries together:
the watchword 'Have the courage to use your own understanding' could
only ring true when the idea of one's 'own understanding' was so deepened
that the conflict with the object, the ignoring of history, and shutting one's
eyes to the reality of destiny was superfluous, because all these things, the
object, history and destiny, were included in it. God must not any longer be
an offence or foolishness to one's 'own understanding'.70
While understanding is one's own, it is also "the one and only reason", the
true human reason and, necessarily, the true reason of God. The idea of God
standing opposed to human reason is disposed of, because it is relativized.
Hegel made "the offence and foolishness of this opposition relative... by
seeing that it could finally be resolved in the peace of reason, which is at
69 Barth, PT, 392.
70 Ibid. 395.
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once and as such the peace that is higher than all reason".7! It is the
inclusiveness of Hegelian reason, then, that gives the philosophy of self-
confidence its basis and its power. Hegel is "the mighty and impressive
voice of an entire era, the era of modern man".77 Yet at the same time he
takes care of the subject matter of theology better than all theologians, and
not just in the modern period, "with the possible exception of Thomas
Aquinas"!73
Barth begins a new section of exposition by drawing attention to further
characteristics of Hegelian reason - firstly it is absolute, and secondly it is to
be understood as event; these two points are closely related. Absolute
reason and Geist are free of all limitation or one-sidedness, and as such have
absolute dignity, strength and value, qualities which cannot be limited or
qualified by any contrast. Reason, though, only merits absolute confidence
in so far as it is understood to be identical with the act of thinking. Barth
states this forcefully:
reason, truth, concept, idea, mind, God himself, are understood as an event,
and, moreover, only as an event. They cease to be what they are as soon as
the event, in which they are what they are, is thought of as interrupted, as
soon as a state is thought of in its place. Essentially reason and all its
synonyms are life, movement, process. God is God only in his divine action,
revelation, creation, reconciliation, redemption; as an absolute act, as actus
purus.74
This has important implications for understanding the character of Hegel's
system: just as reason cannot be understood as static, so Hegel's system is no
static construction. As regards actually reading Hegel, we are, Barth
suggests, "only to look, and look again and again, and anyone who thinks
he sees stable points and lines, quantities and relationships, is not in fact
seeing what Hegel is seeking to show us".73 Hegel's system is constituted
and held together by a rhythm - the "rhythm of life itself, running through
the fullness of history". It is, in fact, "the famous dialectical method of thesis,






antithesis and synthesis". 76 The character of reason as event means that the
centre of Hegel's system must be this method. No part of the system can be
its organizing principle. Only the method can play this role, which is to say
that "the centre moves with the thinker himself; it is always at the point
where the self-movement of the mind in the consciousness of the thinking
subject is taking place". 77
The method of dialectic is Hegel's great achievement, but it is not the details
of the method that matter so much as the fact that he has invented a truly
universal method. With this, Barth's exposition has reached its destination:
it is the universality of Hegel's method that enables him to fulfil the
aspirations of his era so completely; and therefore it is the universality of his
method that makes him an exemplar of the spirit of modernity. Hegel's
method consisted in:
the invention of a rule for thinking whereby one can arrive at the thought
and its rule itself just as much as at the things in themselves as the object of
thought,... at the most primitive paths of the human psyche just as much as
at the decisions of the Lord himself.78
Hegel's philosophy is enabled to be the philosophy of self-confidence
because it has this method at its heart. Human thinking surely merits
confidence, Barth says, if its principle is identical with this.
The thrust of Barth's exposition, then, is that Hegel provided an answer to
problems which had, until that point, only met with partial solutions.
Providing a philosophy of self-confidence was not only Hegel's aim - it had
been the aim of the whole movement of thought from Rousseau onwards. A
method which so broadened human reason as to include within it all
possible sources of a challenge; a rule for thinking which could ground itself
as well as the object of thought; in short a concept of reason which could
once and for all make good the Enlightenment's belief in the "omnipotence
of human powers" - this was not only Hegel's goal, but the goal towards
which the whole line of thought had been directed. What distinguished
Hegel, Barth suggests, was simply that he reached it.




To make such a claim, though, brings us to the second task Barth set himself
- accounting for the subsequent and almost total rejection of Hegel. Why did
failure follow so soon? Barth considers this question twice in the course of
his discussion. The first occasion is prior to his exposition of Hegel's
thought. Barth is adamant first of all that the age's turning away from Hegel
can by no means be explained by weaknesses of his system in its details.
Such weaknesses certainly exist, but do not at all justify the rejection of the
whole, in the absence of any comparable or superior offer of universal
method. Rather than the details, it must have been the nature of the project
itself that came to be questioned. It must have been the case that
the attempt to make a key to every lock must have come under suspicion, a
deep resignation must have been born not only as far as the How of the
Hegelian method was concerned, but also as regards its That, as regards the
possibility of such a universal method at all.79
The rejection of Hegel must have resulted from a failure of confidence in the
entire direction of the age's thought, and perhaps even a failure of the
Enlightenment's confidence in human powers. Certainly from this moment
on Barth observes that there was a loss of the sense of a unified culture.
Knowledge diversified into its distinct disciplines. There was a great deal of
talk of method but no method proved satisfactory. Relative to the line Barth
has traced so far, "the intellectual development which has taken place since
Hegel can only be regarded as a decline and a retrogression".80
The rejection of Hegel was therefore "the first sign that the new time was
growing old, the first harbinger, perhaps we might say, of the catastrophe of
1914".81 In rejecting Hegel, the nineteenth century rejected its own will and
desire. In expressing that will so fully, Hegel had put on display its
limitations, the hidden flaw in the age: "The rejection of Hegel might have
been the fig-leaf with which man at this time sought to hide what he himself
was aware of as his pudendum from his own sight, from the sight of others
and from the sight of God."87 The flaw Barth is thinking of is that in





working out its own particular concern, the age of Hegel neglected and
denied concerns which it had a dim awareness of but which would have
hindered the full expression of its particular spirit.
What does Barth mean by this talk of other concerns? He means the
theological possibilities which he has sought an awareness of in each of the
previous chapters. First was Kant: having described his philosophy of
religion, Barth then asks how far Kant's own writings testify to an aware¬
ness of a completely different theological possibility, one with its point of
departure in revelation. Such a procedure is puzzling. Having taken some
care to describe Kant's philosophy of religion fairly, and to put it in the
context of the critique of reason, why should Barth devote the final pages of
his treatment to the thought that Kant might have been aware of a different
possibility altogether? The same pattern of argument was used in the
treatment of Herder. Barth suggested that Herder, like Kant, sometimes
talked in ways which indicate a recognition of "the independence in faith
which belief derives from its object, and only from its object".83 But
immediately he acknowledges that Herder never seems to have come to a
genuine awareness of such a theological possibility. Why raise this issue,
one might wonder, since it seems to relax the focus on the distinctive and
important contribution of Herder to the period? The same question has to be
asked of the chapter on Novalis. There, Barth introduced an antithesis
involving Mary and Christ, to ask whether Novalis recognized a theological
possibility with a basis outwith the Romantic synthesis. Yet the attention
given to this last antithesis seems to weaken Barth's exposition, which had
focussed on the antithetic unities in Novalis' thought.
The reason for this puzzling procedure only becomes apparent now that
Hegel has been reached. Barth suggests that the entire age engaged in "the
neglect, the overlooking, the covering up and denying of other concerns"84
which limited and challenged its absolutism. Such possibilities were beyond
the boundaries of the age's thought, excluded by the drive towards a self-
confidence grounded in a universal method. Yet they seem at times to have
been noticed, albeit without being taken seriously. Their neglect amounted
83 Barth, PT, 338.
84 Ibid. 389
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to a "crime against the truth", and such crimes "must sooner or later be paid
for". The price will inevitably be extracted from the "leaders and heroes, by
those in whom the age itself was great".85 Despite Hegel's philosophy of
self-confidence; despite the care he took of theology, the price to be paid was
his rejection.86
This, then, is Barth's initial argument about the rejection of Hegel. It has to
be said it is problematic. Barth is suggesting that Hegel's rejection results
from the entire age's failure to take into account certain theological
possibilities. Hegel stood out from the age for the care he took of theology,
better than the theologians in fact; yet if Barth's argument is correct it
implies that he still did not take enough care of theology. I would suggest
that Barth has an arguable case so far as the age in general and Romanticism
in particular are concerned. But to include Hegel in this is questionable,
when it is more usual to see his rejection as a consequence of his having
been too theological. One could argue, in fact, that Hegel made the same
criticism of Romanticism as Barth has made - that it neglected the question
of truth. And if Hegel, as Barth admits, took much better care of this than
the age in general, it seems paradoxical to suggest that he was rejected by
the age for conforming to its failings.
However the argument described above was, as already mentioned, placed
early in the chapter. One could be charitable to Barth and allow that it
85 Barth, FT, 389.
86 It is worth recalling the difficulty which Marburg neo-Kantianism had in dealing with
religion. Barth's perspective can perhaps be traced back to his days as a pupil of Herrmann,
who rejected the neo-Kantian attempt to subsume religion under the categories of logic,
ethics or aesthetics. It is worth recalling here also that Barth followed the same procedure in
his discussion of the eighteenth century's attitude to religion. Specifically, he spent some
time identifying points at which absolutism was unable to subdue theological questions
entirely. (See ibid. 124-135.) The point of doing so was not perhaps entirely obvious at the
time. In fact, however, it prepared for the subsequent material in two ways: first, it
introduced the theme of the later chapters, that the attempt to treat theology and religion on
the basis of absolutism was unable to succeed entirely; and second, precisely this failure in
the eighteenth century created the need for a new and more powerful form of self-
confidence. Regarding the resistance presented to absolutism by Christianity, Barth said:
"Did not the man of the eighteenth century, the man who believed in the omnipotence of
human capability, for whom there could be no subject matter of this kind in the last resort,
find himself confronted here in nuce with the problem of the nature of his subject matter?
Was not the attack which he had carried out so victoriously on all fronts against his subject-
matter a failure if it was a failure here?" (ibid. 83-4.)
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constitutes a criticism more of the line of thought already discussed than of
Hegel himself; it sums up the position with regard to Hegel only in so far as
he completes that line of thought. It does not, perhaps, do justice to him in
so far as he transcended that line.
Barth returned to the question of the rejection of Hegel at the end of the
chapter. His comments there are interesting, for he appears to offer a more
balanced account. Barth began by putting the entire Enlightenment project
in context:
The Middle Ages had possessed a uniform culture, which even the
Reformation had not destroyed. What did destroy it was the relentless
progress of the intellectualmovement of the Renaissance, of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.87
The Enlightenment contributed to an ever-widening gulf between Church
and culture, a gulf which constituted a genuine threat to both. The quest for
a basis for human self-confidence was a quest for a secure basis for culture,
in its distinction from Christianity. But there could be no such assured
human self-confidence or secure culture so long as religion was behind it "in
the role of an insulted enemy". Schleiermacher's theology of peace, says
Barth, anticipating himself, constituted an attempt at a truce between the
two. This, though, could "not restore what had been lost since the Middle
Ages, the unity of the human and the Divine".88 (!) Only Hegel's speculative
idealism was capable of bridging the gulf, and, Barth says, it did in fact do
so. Hegel was able to be both a 'modern man' and a Christian.
Yet to do this he had to present demands to both sides, demands which
required no compromise or concession but rather a truer self-understanding
and a mutual recognition. Neither side could accept these demands:
Modern man, without knowing of a better unity than that proposed by
Hegel, yet split himself once again, as oil and water separate, into the
Christian and the man. The grip whereby Hegel sought to unite him in
himself turned out to be premature, too strong, or too weak, even, to
prevent the centripetal forces of both sides from once again shattering the
unity. That was probably the deepest, and perhaps the tragic meaning of the




Why does Barth say that Hegel's grip was "too strong, or too weak"? Why
the apparent uncertainty?What Barth actually seems to mean is that Hegel's
grip was too strong to be acceptable to either theology or 'modern cultural
awareness'. His synthesis was too theological. Yet at the same time his grip
was, from the point of view of a theology like Barth's, still not strong
enough; and Barth therefore ponders whether, if Hegel's grip had been
stronger still, he might just have been believed.
There is an ambivalence in Barth's account here. He seems to hold out two
possibilities regarding Hegel's rejection: either he was too theological or he
was insufficiently theological. In fact, I am suggesting, the latter is not a
plausible interpretation of the history in question. It is essentially a critique
of the entire age's patterns of thought, conducted from Barth's theological
point of view. There are points where Barth seems to admit that this is the
case. He understands that the age sought a synthesis, a means of
overcoming the alienation of object from subject, nature from spirit,
inclination from reason; and he acknowledges that Hegel achieved such a
synthesis, but also that it demanded too much of the age. Modern cultural
awareness, Barth says,
neither sought to understand itself in its own depth, nor did it want to be
reconciled in this depth with Christian awareness in such a way as Hegel
thought it should be. Why not? Because the demand was too great, its
conditions too theological? That is in fact how it was felt and how it is
usually represented.90
This seems to me to amount to an admission, albeit rather grudging, that
89 Barth, PT, 411.
90 Ibid. 414-5. A less idiosyncratic account of the demise of Hegel's thought after 1840 can
be found in Taylor Hegel, 538-545. Taylor emphasizes the significance of the rise of
technology and of industrial society in the mid-nineteenth century, with its instrumental
modes of reason. Such developments sat relatively easily with Enlightenment thought, but
less comfortably with the line of thought from Rousseau to Hegel, which Taylor calls
expressivism. Hegel in particular "attempted to integrate the expressivist current in more
than subordinate ways", something which proved to be out of step with the civilization of
the second half of the nineteenth century, which "tended to entrench the Enlightenment
conception of man, in its progressive transformation of nature, in its collective structures
and in its most prestigious intellectual achievement, science." (p. 542.) Barth was perhaps
disinclined to highlight this type of explanation because of his overriding concern to
emphasize the continuity between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
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Hegel was not rejected in favour of a more orthodox theism.
At bottom, though, Barth's interest was not in giving an accurate and
detailed account of the reasons for Hegel's rejection. His primary interest
was in his critique of the entire period. He therefore concluded his
discussion with a section which pondered further the possibility that
Hegel's thought may have had "too little theology in it, for it to seem
worthy of belief". 91 He attempted to justify this thought, and his earlier
reflections on the rejection of Hegel, by identifying what he saw as Hegel's
inadequacies. First, he questioned Hegel's view of truth at the centre of what
it is to be human, asking: "Does not man always exist at the invisible
intersection of his thinking and willing?" He suggests that Hegel's emphasis
on truth was a valuable corrective against imbalance, but was itself
insufficiently aware of the practical character of truth: the theory of truth, he
says, can surely only be "the theory of human practice".92 Because Hegel
does not acknowledge this, he speaks of matters which a theory of human
practice would remain silent on - he seeks to think and speak "beyond the
mystery of evil and salvation". 93 This seems to be a plea for a recognition of
the kind of limits which Barth had emphasized in his discussion of Kant.
Secondly, Barth comments on Hegel's view of the self-movement of truth,
which "is identical with the self-movement of the thinking of the human
subject". 94 Because of this, Barth suggests, there is no real basis in Hegel for
a relationship between God and humanity; there can be no real confron¬
tation between them, and no real revelation. Thirdly and most importantly,
though, Barth suggests that Hegel's dialectical method, when identified with
God, involves an abolition of divine sovereignty. God "is God only in so far
as he is the mind of the Church". On such a basis there can be no knowledge
of "the actual dialectic of grace". 95 All three of Barth's criticisms amount in
fact to this: there can be no true revelation, for revelation cannot be a free act
of God; within Hegel's thought, God's revelation must take place in the
manner in which it does in fact take place. Hegel is insufficiently theological






precisely in his "failure to recognize that God is free—one might perhaps
say in all succinctness: in the failure to recognize double predestination".96
There is a striking contrast here: at the end of this line of thought Barth
detects the obliteration of divine freedom. By contrast, as noted earlier, this
line had begun with the discovery of feeling, in which the capacity of human
reason is expanded, and humanity acquires a "superior freedom" in which it
is "impassible comme Dieu meme".97 Absolute humanity appropriates the
superior freedom which had once been, and might still yet be, supposed to
belong to God alone.
It would be remiss of me not to note that this exposition and critique of
Hegel is highly contestable. One problem is a tendency to assimilate Hegel's
notion of Geist to the human spirit, and therefore to see Hegel's talk of God
collapsing into talk of humanity.98 It would be more usual to see the danger
in Hegel's system as lying in the opposite direction, the dissolution of the
human into the divine. Barth's treatment on this point in fact reflects the
tendency of certain of the Young Hegelians more than Hegel himself. 99 A
related problem is the claim that Hegel obliterates divine freedom. Barth
pays little attention to Hegel's insistence on the radical freedom of absolute
Geist which, unlike the individual human spirit, does not come to self-
expression and awareness in the acknowledgement of something which is
given to it. Nothing is given for absolute Geist. As Charles Taylor puts it:
"Freedom for man means the free realization of a vocation which is largely
given. But Geist should be free in a radical sense. What it realizes and
recognizes as having been realized is not given, but determined by itself."100
Certainly, Geist is bound by rational necessity, but it is not necessarily fair to
say that it is therefore not free. For Hegel the following of rational necessity
is, similar to the case of the Kantian moral subject, the paradigm of
96 Barth, PT, 420.
97 Ibid. 230.
98 See for example ibid. 419: "Hegel's living God—he saw God's aliveness well, and saw it
better than many theologians—is actually the living man."
99 See Taylor Hegel, 71 f. and 546-7.
100 Ibid. 92. For a good discussion of Barth's criticism, and of Barth and Hegel on divine
freedom, see Gary D. Badcock 'Divine Freedom in Hegel' in The Irish Theological Quarterly 61
(1995), 265-271.
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freedom. 101 Admittedly, Hegel's view differs from the mainstream of
traditional theism. Many would read Hegel as saying that Geist cannot exist
without the world, and Barth therefore has some justification for saying that
creation is necessary for Hegel's God.102 But even then it is at very least a
moot point whether Barth is entitled to say that revelation "can now no
longer be a free act of God".103 It can just as well be replied that rational
necessity is the ground of freedom rather than a limit upon it.
These problems in Barth's treatment of Hegel are instructive, however. In
his criticisms, as indeed in his exegesis of Hegel in terms of the self-
confidence of the thinking human subject, Barth's over-riding aim was to
present Hegel as the culmination of absolutism, understood as the
grounding of culture in human decision and will. In doing so he
undervalues the extent to which Hegel's Geist constitutes a dialectical
supercession of such absolutism and of the oppositions which it implies.
Barth's treatment of Hegel therefore distorts its subject; but it also disguises
the substantial similarities between Hegel's thought and Barth's own
dialectical inversion of absolutism.
vii. The failure and triumph of absolutism
What is not in dispute, though, is that in Barth's account of the entire line
from Rousseau to Hegel, his aim has been to affirm and expand the claim
that the fundamental principle of modern thought and culture is absolutism.
He recognized no genuine opposition between those intellectual and
cultural movements which understood themselves as a rejection of the
Enlightenment and that which they sought to reject. The broadening of the
concept of reason that took place in the idealist and romantic strands of
nineteenth century thought constituted a fulfilment rather than a rejection of
Enlightenment faith in human powers. Barth's aim was to reveal absolutism
as the principle not only of eighteenth century thought and life, but of the
whole of the Enlightenment project, a project which, on this account as on
Maclntyre's, does not cease with the ending of the eighteenth century, nor
101 See Taylor, Hegel, 93-4 for a useful summary of Hegel's position on this.
102 See ibid. 100-102. For a slightly different view, though, see Badcock, op cit.
103 Barth, PT, 420.
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even with the end of the nineteenth.
The demise of Hegel signalled, for Barth, the failure of the Enlightenment,
understood as the attempt to ground culture on the basis of human will and
decision. Like Maclntyre, then, Barth believed both that the intellectual
project of Enlightenment had failed, and that it had been bound to fail. But
this does not mean, in either Barth's view or Maclntyre's, that the principles
and forces which the Enlightenment had sought to justify have ceased to be
relevant. On the contrary, the modern world is a product of these very
principles and forces. In Maclntyre's terms, we live in an emotivist culture.
In Barth's terms, while the intellectual project of grounding absolutism may
have failed, the modern world still knows of no other standard than human
will and decision. The failure of the intellectual project of Enlightenment is
accompanied by absolutism's defacto triumph.
But Barth's view of this absolutism is by no means neutral. His description
of the path from the demise of the Holy Roman Empire to the rejection of
the philosophy of Hegel is at the same time a sustained critique of
absolutism. As the principle of a culture emancipated from the Church,
absolutism can accommodate the Church only on terms which Barth clearly
regards as unacceptable. On the whole he refrained, in these historical
lectures, from prescribing any detailed theological response. It is nonethe¬
less clear that Barth's point of view was the same whether he was writing
history or theology. One could not act as if absolutism did not exist, as if the
emancipation of culture from the Church had never happened. Nor, though,
could one simply accept that human will and decision are the only
standards available. Barth's lectures confirm that his theology can and ought
to be understood as a response to the Enlightenment. It is a response which
recognizes absolutism, the grounding of social, moral and cultural life in
human decision and will, as the legacy of the Enlightenment. It neither
accepts this absolutism nor imagines that it can simply oppose it. Instead, it
seeks to overcome it by effecting its inversion, or rather by seeking to
conform to the only decision which matters, the divine decision which has
already overcome it.
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Postscript Dogmatics among the Ruins
There is one issue arising from the foregoing discussion which ought to be
addressed before concluding. A principal aim of that discussion has been to
highlight the similarities between Barth and Alasdair Maclntyre with regard
to their attitudes to the Enlightenment. The question is whether it is credible
to compare their narratives as I have done, given that they were written
from very different points of view. This question is particularly pressing
since a presupposition of Maclntyre's narrative in After Virtue is that any
attempt to give a historical and sociological account of morals will
presuppose a particular evaluative standpoint, and that standpoint will be
in dialogue with the views one is seeking to give an account of. Similarly in
the introductory section to his lectures on modern theology, Barth affirms
that to write a history of theology requires a prior engagement with the
subject matter. No neutral standpoint is available. And when we look at the
standpoints from which Barth and Maclntyre have written, it is immediately
clear that they are not the same. In After Virtue and the works which have
followed and supplemented it, Maclntyre espouses the recovery of "a
conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition".! And while he
seeks to describe this 'tradition-constituted-enquiry' in ways that are neutral
between competing traditions, this does not detract from the fact that a good
deal of the conceptual superstructure is provided by Aristotle. He seeks to
revive 'the tradition of the virtues', and he takes Aristotle to be the most
important guide to their nature. Barth's understanding of dogmatics,
however, is not obviously Aristotelian, and there seems to be little to
connect his theology, or theological ethics, to any Aristotelian view of the
virtues.
What is necessary then is some comparison of these two viewpoints, one in
the tradition of the virtues, one in dialectical dogmatics. To do this properly
would require a detailed account of each, something which is beyond the
scope of the present discussion. I want nonetheless to make a few points in
defence of my prior argument, by highlighting what seem to me to be
significant analogies between the two viewpoints. The first thing to be said
1 Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 7.
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is that the two are related in their perception that the basis for their
discourse must be the revival, albeit in a criticized and amended form, of a
discourse that had largely been swept away by the Enlightenment. They
share, in other words, the sense that there is a break in history, "a before and
an after" as Maclntyre puts it.2 This divides them from those who see a
unified history of enquiry, whether that unified history is of reason as
"impersonal, universal and disinterested" or as "the unwitting
representative of particular interests".3 Maclntyre's description of the
alternative to such a unified history applies to Barth's viewpoint as well as
to his own: it is
the possibility that reason can only move towards being genuinely
universal and impersonal in so far as it is neither neutral nor disinterested,
that membership in a particular type of moral community, one from which
fundamental dissent has to be excluded, is a condition for genuinely
rational enquiry and more especially for moral and theological enquiry.4
Involved in this also is the conviction that discourse has to be socially
embodied. Maclntyre knows that what is needed is not just the construction
of a new (or old) kind of moral theory. In a by now famous passage from the
end of After Virtue he says: "What matters at this stage is the construction of
local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and
moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already
upon us."5 For Barth also it is not just a new (or old) kind of theology which
is needed. Theology must be rooted in the Church, and be addressed to the
Church. What is needed therefore is the recovery by the Church of its
awareness of its true identity, founded in that judgement in which grace is
also present. Barth's concept of ecclesiastical dogmatics corresponds
remarkably well in these respects to the concept of socially embodied
rational enquiry which Maclntyre elucidates.
Another similarity is in the type of realism which each seems to involve.
Maclntyre describes tradition-constituted-enquiry by highlighting the
difference between those forms of enquiry rooted in Plato and Aristotle and





the main stream of post-Enlightenment thought:
It is a central feature of all crafts, of furniture making and fishing and
farming, as much as of philosophy, that they require the minds of those
who engage in the craft to come to terms with and make themselves
adequate to the existence and proprieties of some set of objects conceived to
exist independently of those minds. The embodied mind, in and through its
activity, has to become receptive to forms (eide) of what is other than itself
and in being constituted by those formal objects becomes, in the appropriate
way, them.6
Such was the realism of Augustine and Aquinas, and of theologians who
participated in the revival of Thomism. This type of realism, though, was at
variance with Enlightenment thought. Moreover it conceived the relation of
theology and philosophy very differently from the Enlightenment:
For where that philosophy subjected theology to the same rational
standards which it imposed elsewhere, rejecting, modifying, and truncating
theism until it became a doctrine acceptable within the framework imposed
by the encyclopaedist's unitary and ahistorical conception of rationality-
'God' is ... the name of the ultimate object of rational enquiry-so making of
the object only what the mind conceived in post-Kantian terms allowed it to
be, the philosophy of craft-tradition presented the mind as inadequate until
it has conformed itself to the object which theology presented for its
attention.7
For Barth, something similar holds. The mind is inadequate, not fit for the
object which theology presents for its attention; and that object is indeed
genuinely other than the mind, and independent of it. However we cannot
ourselves achieve a conformity of our minds to that object. This doesn't
mean, though, that such conformity is an unattainable ideal; it is attainable
only on the basis of the gracious decision of God. Our words may also be
God's Word. Dogmatics can and ought be attempted, then, and may yet
serve its object faithfully:
Theological thought and speechmust venture to let itself be led by its object
and to live in the strength of the truth of its object. In this disclosed
weakness our words must be witnesses. Thought and speech about God
must be ventured. But the final outcome must be left to God's own Word.
This must come to expression in the theses of dogmatics, too.8




In conformity to God's Word, then, and in the service of it, rational enquiry,
in the form of dogmatic theology, is possible and in fact necessary.9
Perhaps the most interesting point of comparison between the two
viewpoints, though, is something which I referred to at the start of this
postscript, but which has been illuminated by these points made since. It is
essentially this: both Barth and Maclntyre reject the notion of a neutral
standpoint, and of a neutral rationality which can assess any claim made
from any standpoint. Their discourse presupposes the existence of a
particular tradition of enquiry in which they participate, and of a particular
community in which their discourse is embodied. And for both,
significantly, achieving this understanding of their situation constituted the
solution to a problem, a problem which has been called the paradox of point
of view. Maclntyre gave some indication of this in the preface to After Virtue.
He noted there that his earlier writing on moral philosophy, dating from the
mid 1960s, had offered a critique of modern morality and moral theory
which was in most respects the same as the critique contained in After
Virtue A® What that earlier work lacked, though, was the ability to recognize
the fact that its own judgements were "informed by a distinct evaluative
standpoint". 11 In his own early writing, he notes, he
seemed to be asserting that the nature of moral community and moral
judgment in distinctively modern societies was such that it was no longer
possible to appeal to moral criteria in a way that had been possible in other
times and places — and that this was a moral calamity! But to what could I
be appealing, ifmy own analysis was correct?12
On what grounds, after all, could Maclntyre possibly pass moral
judgements about the fact that, as he presented it, morality in the modern
world consists of the incoherent remnants of older schemes of thought and
9 See Barth, GD, 12f. where Barth insists that dogmatics is concerned to discover something
rather than to invent or establish something. Recall also Barth's comments in his 1913
lecture 'Der Glaube an den personlichen Gott', p. 23: "The scientific character of dogmatics
cannot consist in the freedom from contradiction of the most harmonious system possible,
but in the most exact interpretation possible of religious reality by its propositions, and in
the greatest possible purity and completeness of thought. In this respect Calvin's Institutio is
more scientific than most of what has been written in dogmatics since."





judgement? His analysis, as he later came to realize, undermined itself.
Jeffrey Stout has highlighted the paradox nicely:
The narrative lacks a point of view from which the fragmentation might be
judged and found wanting. Author and reader alike are left suspended in
mid-air — disillusioned, perhaps, but unable to judge or to act. Maclntyre
seems to have been looking down on his age from above, while also telling
us that this cannot be doned3
As Stout points out Maclntyre's later work, beginning with After Virtue, is in
fact an attempt to recast his earlier narrative so as to find a way round the
paradox of point of view. What Stout also deserves credit for pointing out,
though, is that the difficulty faced by Maclntyre was not unique to him, but
simply one instance of a much wider problem. The paradox of point of view,
he notes, has plagued many varieties of modern writing, to the extent that
Maclntyre's earlier work can be seen as "a typically modernist
authorship".14 Stout explains this as follows:
Literary critics since Henry James have spoken of the problem of point of
view in fiction ... Maclntyre's difficulty shows that historical writing
encounters its own versions of this problem, though without the full range
of options writers of fiction have at their disposal for resolving itd5
Maclntyre's difficulty, then, amounted to a recurrence of a problem that has
been widely reflected in modern art and literature, as for example in the
developments in painting noted earlier, in which there is no longer a fixed
stable point from which the subject can be viewed, but multiple and shifting
perspectives.
More important in the present context is the fact that Maclntyre's difficulty
is a recurrence of the problem which Barth had faced in his earlier work, the
paradox implied in his attempt to speak of a universal Krisis of judgement.
As I argued earlier, Barth's turn to dogmatic method in the early twenties
constituted the adoption of a point of view, and therefore a way round the
paradox of point of view embodied in the dialectical form of theological
speech, which constantly undermines itself. Barth found himself




increasingly unwilling or unable to perform the "appalling performance" of
balancing on a vanishing point. The solution came from the idea of God's
gracious decision to allow our words to be the vehicle of his Word; on such
a basis, on the Word of God so understood, dogmatic theology becomes
possible and necessary, and one can reconnect oneself to the dogmatic
theological tradition of one's community, at a point at which it still had
something of that understanding of its own nature.
Both Barth and Maclntyre arrive at their mature positions by finding a way
round the modern paradox of point of view, self-consciously connecting
their discourse to a tradition of enquiry which predates Enlightenment
presuppositions. Maclntyre, as Stout points out, offers us a renewal of the
tradition of the virtues among the ruins of the Enlightenment project and the
morality it sought to defend. By contrast, Barth offers not virtue but
dogmatics among the ruins.
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Appendix A
Kantian vs. neo-Kantian elements in Barth, with particular reference to
the second Romerbrief.
In his substantial study, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology,
Bruce McCormack argues that Barth's theology acquired a new starting
point around 1915, a starting point which can properly be described as
"critically realistic". In McCormack's view it is this critical realism which
distinguishes Barth's new theology from his previous views, which had
depended on an idealistic grounding.! Inattention to this shift has
sometimes been responsible, McCormack suggests, for the failure to
appreciate the sharpness of Barth's break with Herrmannian theology.2
What, though, does McCormack mean by the phrase 'critical realism'? It
indicates, first of all, that Barth did not leave idealism behind altogether. He,
"would continue to acknowledge the general validity of the idealistic point
of view where knowledge of the 'given' was concerned. The 'given' ... is the
product of the knowing activity of the human subject."3 This is the
significance of the term 'critical'. The term 'realism', though, is the more
important one. It is intended by McCormack to signify that the reality of
God is to be conceived in such a way that it is "real, whole, and complete in
itself apart from the knowing activity of the human subject".4 As
McCormack presents it, there is a bifurcation here: idealism for the empirical
realm, realism for God.
McCormack makes this analysis more specific by considering the
philosophical influences relevant to Barth's critical realism. His fundamental
claim is a slightly surprising one: Barth's position, he says, has less to do
with neo-Kantianism than with Kant himself.5 In McCormack's view Barth
rejected the stronger idealism of Cohen, turning back to Kant because of the
1 CRDT, 67.
2 He criticises Hans Frei in particular for this failure. See ibid. 67.
3 Ibid. 67.
4 Ibid. 67.
5 See for example ibid. 130, where he says that Barth: "everywhere presupposed ... the
validity of Kant's epistemology (where it touched upon knowledge of empirical reality)".
This, of course, heavily qualifies McCormack's earlier affirmation of Barth's idealism.
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element of realism in the latter's philosophy. McCormack presumably
regards this as true of Barth's thinking from 1915 onwards, but he suggests
that it was around 1920 that this turn to Kant was strongest. At that time, he
argues, Barth moved "away from the thoroughgoing constructivist
epistemology of the neo-Kantians" towards a view in which "human beings
have intuitions of objectively real empirical data". 6 McCormack has
repeated this claim in a recent article, reviewing Graham Ward's book Barth,
Derrida and the Language of Theology.7 He says there that Barth "had revised
his philosophical commitments in the direction of a more classical form of
Kantianism by 1920".8 Reinforcing the point a page later, he says that Barth
"abandoned Cohenian constructivism around 1920 in favour of a more
traditional form of Kantianism which allowed greater room for realism".9
The real importance of all this for McCormack, of course, does not lie in its
relevance to Barth's view of empirical realities; what matters is its relevance
to his understanding of God. McCormack wants to establish that Barth's
theology begins from the reality of God, a reality which "precedes all human
knowing".io And in order to establish this, he regards it as vital to show that
Barth turned from neo-Kantianism to Kant. Without Kant's notion of
intuition, McCormack says, "a critically realistic theology in the form Barth
was now developing would have been impossible."11
What evidence does McCormack produce for his claim that there is a
significant relation between Barth's theological realism and Kant's notion of
intuition? Surprisingly, there is only one piece, which is to be found in his
consideration of Barth's second commentary on Romans. It comes in the
course of a discussion of that volume's theology of revelation.12 Barth,
McCormack says, wanted to speak of revelation in such a way as to retain a
distinction between revelation and its medium; his favourite way of doing
6 CRDT, 226.
7 See 'GrahamWard's Barth, Derrida and the Language ofTheology' in The Scottish Journal of





12 See ibid. 226, where McCormack says: "the theology of revelation set forth in Romans II
was more Kantian than it was neo-Kantian".
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this was to use the Kantian terminology of intuition. He quotes Barth as
saying that revelation "does not become intuitable next to other intuitable
objects; it becomes intuitable as the Unintuitable".13
The critical question here is how we are to interpret Barth's talk of the
unintuitable, and its becoming intuitable. One possible reading would be to
say that by the unintuitable, Barth means the object as it is in itself, rather
than as it appears to us. This would seem to make reasonable sense. After all
the union of intuition and concepts does not yield knowledge of things as
they are in themselves. Kant says of the concept of a noumenon that we "do
not possess an intuition, indeed, not even the concept of a possible intuition,
by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given
us".14 There are, certainly, some reasons for reading Barth this way. For one
thing there is, on the face of it, an analogy between the hidden, inaccessible
thing-in-itself, and the God who remains hidden, indeed who veils himself,
even in the event of revelation. The Kantian distinction between the
noumenal and the phenomenal appears to be a useful model for a doctrine
of revelation which emphasises the distinction between revelation and its
medium.
It is interesting to note, then, that this does appear to be McCormack's
reading of Barth. This states this most clearly, once again, in his review of
Ward. He says:
The coherent integration of his [Barth's] theological epistemology with this
Kantian epistemology is easily grasped where once it is realized that, for
Barth, God is the one noumenal reality which— precisely because He is the
omnipotent divine Subject who created all things and is therefore Lord even
over the subject-object split — is capable of grasping us through the
phenomena from the other side.15
It is hardly surprising that McCormack should read Barth this way, though.
If he did not, he would have no basis for connecting Kant's notion of
13 Quoted by McCormack CRDT, 249, from Barth Romans II, 67. See also McCormack ibid.
225. McCormack has chosen to retain the capitalisation of the noun in translation. I have not
followed this except in direct quotations.
14 See Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPure Reason trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn, revised and ed. V.
Politis, (J.M. Dent, London, 1993), 213.
15 'GrahamWard's Barth ...' op. cit. 105-6.
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intuition with Barth's theological realism. Kant's 'realism' lies, after all, in
the fact that he distinguished sharply between intuition and concepts,
regarding the former as the apprehension of some reality that exists
independently of our perception of it, albeit that we have and can have no
knowledge of it as it is in itself. McCormack's position therefore actually
requires that Barth's talk of the "unintuitable" be correlated with the
Kantian thing-in-itself.
If this reading is sustainable, then, McCormack seems to have a case.
Unfortunately, for him, it is not. The apparent analogy between the hidden
God and the inaccessible thing-in-itself is specious. To envisage God as a
Ding an sich lying behind some particular phenomenon is to envisage God as
an object among other objects, known in the manner in which other objects
are known, and unknown in the manner in which other objects are
unknown. It is important, if not entirely surprising, to note that Barth
explicitly rejected the idea that God can be envisaged as some kind of thing-
in-itself, and for precisely this reason. One statement of this is in his
Tambach lecture of 1919. The relevant passage reads as follows:
Dead are all things which claim to be more than material, which claim a
kind of reality in themselves. ... Dead are all 'things in themselves' (Dinge
an sich), all the heres and theres, all the onces and nows, all the thises and
thats which are not united to each other. Dead are all mere facts. Dead is all
metaphysics. Dead were God himself if he moved his world only from the
outside, if he were a 'thing in himself' and not the One in all, the Creator of
all things visible and invisible, the beginning and the ending. 16
It is notable that in this passage Barth seems to be rejecting a Kantian view
of empirical reality, as well as the view of God in question. With regard to
the latter, it demonstrates clearly that it would be quite inadmissible at the
time of this lecture to compare Barth's view of the reality of God with the
realism inherent in the positing of Dinge an sich.
The only doubt which might remain would be whether he still took this
view two years later, when he wrote the second Romans, and after the date
which McCormack identifies as the time of a definite turn towards Kant. It is
extremely significant, then, that in the second edition of Romans, the very
16 WGWM, 291.
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work to which McCormack appeals to justify his claims, Barth repeated his
denial of the propriety of this comparison between God and things-in-
themselves. He says:
The final subjection to the wrath of God is faith in His righteousness: and
then God is known as the Unknown God. As such, He is precisely no 'thing-
in-itself', no metaphysical substance in the midst of other substances, no
second, other Stranger, side by side with those whose existence is
independent of Him. On the contrary, He is the eternal, pure Origin of all
things. 17
Not only does Barth here reject the comparison between God's reality and
things-in-themselves, he opposes it with the neo-Kantian term Ursprung.
Again the reason is that to think of God by analogy with things-in-
themselves is to place him in the world as an object among other objects.
Barth's rejection of any such view is reaffirmed a few pages later, once again
in terms which suggest a heavy dependence on neo-Kantianism:
If God, as the final Cause, could ... be placed within the succession of other
things in this world, and if conclusions could be drawn about Him from the
other things of the world, what are we then to make of the fact that the
whole concrete world is ambiguous and under Krisis? There is no object
apart from our thinking of it; nor has an object any clear characteristics save
when we are able to recognize them by some quick-moving previous
knowledge. ... If, therefore, God were ... an object among other objects, if
He were Himself subject to the Krisis, He would then obviously not be God,
and the true God would have to be sought in the Origin of the KrisisA8
There is certainly no basis here for the conclusion that Barth turned away
from neo-Kantian constructivism towards a Kantian notion of intuition.
McCormack's reading seems untenable, then. It does not even seem to be
consistent with the one passage he quotes, the statement that revelation
"does not become intuitable next to other intuitable objects; it becomes
intuitable as the Unintuitable''.i9 if God were a noumenon behind some
phenomenon, why would our intuition in this case be any different than in
the case of other intuitable objects? Barth's denial that this is so would leave
us no wiser. What could that denial mean, after all? There would be a real




problem with the phrase "it becomes intuitable as the Unintuitable". It is
hard to see what it could mean other than that revelation should become
intuitable as it is in itself.20 But this would not only be a paradox, it would
amount to the destruction of Kant's distinction between the noumenal and
the phenomenal. Revelation, in this case, would be given to us not merely in
the manner of other phenomena: it would be given to us absolutely. Kant
called the concept of the noumenon a limitative concept;2i if the thing-in-
itself becomes intuitable as such, all limitation on our knowledge of it is
gone. This would hardly be a return towards a 'classical' Kantianism. The
trouble with this possibility, though, is not just that it would do violence to
Kant's conceptuality: the real difficulty is that it would destroy the
metaphor which made this reading attractive in the first place. To say that
the thing as it is in itself becomes intuitable is to say the opposite, surely, of
what Barth wanted to say. It would destroy precisely what Barth wanted to
preserve, the hiddenness of God in revelation.
If McCormack's reading of Barth is untenable, though, what other way is
there of interpreting the idea that the unintuitable must become intuitable?
Assuming that Kant's philosophy is the proper context for reading such
remarks (and this is an assumption) I would suggest the following: that by
the unintuitable Barth had in mind those concepts which Kant believed
transcend all actual and possible experience, in particular the concepts of
God, freedom, and immortality. This reading does not, it should be noted,
remove the paradoxical aspect of Barth's statements. Barth's views are not
'classical' Kantianism on this reading either. For it was quite inconceivable
to Kant that such concepts (or 'transcendental ideas') should become objects
of experience; but this is because of the nature of these particular concepts.22
This reading is still, though, much less problematic than the alternative, for
it avoids the position which Barth explicitly rejected in the two passages
20 The only alternative interpretation I can imagine would be to say that Barth simply
means that the unintuitable, i.e. the noumenon, is what is intuited; though it is not thereby
known as it is in itself, only as it appears to us. However the second half of the sentence
would then conflictwith the first, for this is just what happens in the case of other intuitable
objects.
21 Kant op. cit. 213-4.
22 See Kant ibid. 252. Such ideas, he says "are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all
experience, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented that would be perfectly
adequate to a transcendental idea."
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quoted above. It may not be consistent with Kant; but it does at least appear
to be consistent with Barth.
The problem for McCormack, though, is that this reading does not support
the conclusions he seeks to draw. Specifically, it does nothing to connect
Barth's theological realism to Kant's notion of intuition. McCormack's desire
to relate Barth to Kant seems to be motivated by a conviction that
theological realism does not combine easily with neo-Kantian concepts. This
may be so. McCormack is surely mistaken, though, to think that Kantian
intuition is of any assistance here; the combination he offers is if anything
even more problematic. Moreover the relevant texts simply do not support
his interpretation. Neo-Kantian concepts are deeply embedded in the
theology and conceptuality of the second Romans; the talk of the
'unintuitable' occurs much less frequently, and, despite McCormack's
claims to the contrary, is of rather less significance.
To argue this is not, though, necessarily to present Barth as an orthodox neo-
Kantian. It must be allowed that Barth made his own use of neo-Kantian
concepts. This is something McCormack is well aware of, as the following
passage testifies:
Werner Ruschke has rightly observed that those critics who have
complained about Barth's failure to use 'clean' (i.e. consistently defined)
philosophical categories have themselves failed to realize that his use of
them was governed by a theological subject-matter which required constant
adaptation and alteration of their original meaning. This in itself is forceful
testimony to the fact that Romans II was meant to be theology, not
philosophy disguising itself as theology.23
It is, however, not only to neo-Kantianism that such comments apply. There
is no reason to suppose that things were different when Barth used Kantian
concepts and terminology. On no reading does Barth's talk of the
unintuitable becoming intuitable sound like orthodox Kantianism, as
already noted. It is not clear that he did accept a Kantian notion of intuition,
let alone that he used it to explicate or defend his theological realism.
I would conclude that Barth's talk of the unintuitable becoming intuitable
23 CRDT, 225, n. 57.
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does not in any way establish that in the second Romans he accepted the
validity of Kant's epistemology in general;24 or that he turned away from
neo-Kantianism; or that there was a "most crucial difference" here between
Karl and his brother Heinrich;25 or that his theological realism is grounded
in Kant; and certainly not that Barth was moving towards a 'classical' or
'traditional' Kantianism. McCormack's attempt to establish Barth's
Kantianism, and thereby to distance him from neo-Kantianism, is
misconceived.
24 See CRDT, 245, where McCormack claims that in the second Romans Barth "took for
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